2010-2011
The
Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia
House
of Representatives
Explanatory
Memorandum
(Circulated by the
authority of the Minister for Climate Change
and Energy Efficiency, the Honourable Greg Combet AM MP)
Glossary.............................................................................................................. 5
Policy context.................................................................................................... 9
Outline of the Clean Energy Bill 2011........................................................ 27
Part 1 Design of the carbon
pricing mechanism................. 43
Chapter 1 Liable
entities and covered emissions........................... 45
Chapter 2 Pollution
caps................................................................... 105
Chapter 3 Emissions
units................................................................ 115
Chapter 4 Assessing
and meeting liabilities.................................. 137
Part 2 Industry assistance...................................................... 157
Chapter 5 Jobs
and Competitiveness Program............................. 159
Chapter 6 Energy
security................................................................. 181
Part 3 Administration................................................................ 223
Chapter 7 Compliance
and enforcement....................................... 225
Chapter 8 The
Regulator’s decisions and review of decisions.. 257
Chapter 9 Public
information............................................................ 263
Chapter 10 Independent
reviews....................................................... 271
Chapter 11 Administrative
and miscellaneous provisions............ 279
Index............................................................................................................... 291
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ACCC
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Australian
Competition and Consumer Commission
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ACCU
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Australian carbon
credit unit
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ANREU Act
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Australian National
Registry of Emissions Units Act 2011
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ASIC
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Australian
Securities and Investments Commission
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Austrac
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Australian
Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre
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Authority
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Climate Change
Authority
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Authority bill
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Climate Change
Authority Bill 2011
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bill or main bill
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Clean Energy Bill
2011
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carbon pricing
mechanism or mechanism
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The carbon pricing
mechanism set up by the Clean Energy Bill 2011
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CEI plan
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Clean Energy Investment
Plan
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CFI
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Carbon Farming
Initiative
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CFI Act
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Carbon Credits (Carbon Farming
Initiative) Act 2011
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Charges bills
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The Clean Energy (Unit Shortfall
Charge—General) Bill 2011; Clean Energy (Unit Issue Charges – Fixed Charge)
Bill 2011, Clean Energy (Unit Issue Charges – Auctions) Bill 2011, Clean
Energy (Charges—Excise) Bill 2011, Clean Energy (Charges—Customs) Bill 2011
Clean Energy (International Unit Surrender Charge) Bill 2011.
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Clean Energy
Legislative Package
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The Clean Energy
Bill 2011 and related legislation
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CO2
CO2-e
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Carbon dioxide
Carbon dioxide
equivalence
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Consequential
Amendments bill
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The Clean Energy
(Consequential Amendments) Bill 2011
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CPRS
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Carbon Pollution
Reduction Scheme
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Database
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Liable Entities
Public Information Database
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DCCEE or Department
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Department of
Climate Change and Energy Efficiency
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EN
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Emissions number
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Eligible emissions
unit
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A carbon unit, an
eligible international emissions unit or an eligible ACCU
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Eligible
international emissions unit
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Defined in section
4 of the ANREU Act as a certified emission reduction (other than a temporary
certified emission reduction or a long-term certified emission reduction); or
an emission reduction unit; or a removal unit; or a prescribed unit issued in
accordance with the Kyoto rules; or a non-Kyoto international emissions unit.
It is immaterial whether a unit covered by paragraph 4(d) was issued in or outside
Australia.
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Fixed charge period
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The financial years
2012-13, 2013-14 and 2014-15, being ‘fixed charge years’
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Fund
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The Energy Security
Fund in Part 8 of the bill
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Garnaut
Review
Garnaut
Review Update 2011
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R Garnaut (2008) The Garnaut Climate Change Review: Final Report,
Commonwealth of Australia, Cambridge University Press, Melbourne
R Garnaut (2011) The Garnaut Review 2011: Australia in the Global
Response to Climate Change, Commonwealth of Australia, Cambridge
University Press, Melbourne
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Green Paper
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Carbon
Pollution Reduction Scheme Green Paper, July 2008
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GW
GWh
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Gigawatt
Gigawatt hour
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IPCC
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Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change
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JV
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Joint venture
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Kyoto rules
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This term is
defined in section 5. In brief, it includes the Kyoto Protocol, decisions of
the Meeting of the Kyoto Parties, certain standards adopted by such a Meeting
and prescribed instruments
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Kyoto units
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An assigned amount
unit, a certified emission reduction, an emission reduction unit, a removal
unit or a prescribed unit issued in accordance with the Kyoto rules
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LI Act
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Legislative
Instruments Act 2003
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LETI
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Low Emissions Transition Incentive
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LTC
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Liability transfer certificate
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MW
MWh
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Megawatt
Megawatt hour
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MPCCC
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Multi-Party Climate
Change Committee
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NGER Act
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National
Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Act 2007
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Non-Kyoto
international emissions units
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A prescribed unit
issued in accordance with an international agreement (other than the Kyoto
Protocol) or a prescribed unit issued outside Australia under a law of a
foreign country
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Opt-in Scheme
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The Opt-in Scheme
set out in Part 3, Division 7 of the bill
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OTN
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Obligation transfer
number
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Ozone Act
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Ozone
Protection and Synthetic Greenhouse Gas Management Act 1989
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PC Act
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Productivity
Commission Act 1998
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PEN
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Provisional
emissions number
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Program
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The Jobs and
Competitiveness Program in Part 7 of the bill
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Registry
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Australian National
Registry of Emissions Units
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Regulator
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Clean Energy
Regulator
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Regulator bill
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Clean Energy
Regulator Bill 2011
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White Paper
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Carbon
Pollution Reduction Scheme: Australia’s Low Pollution Future, White
Paper, December 2008
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On 10 July 2011, the Government released Securing a clean energy future: The Australian
Government’s climate change plan,
which explains the policy basis for the introduction of the carbon pricing mechanism
(the mechanism) and related measures.
The need for
action
The evidence that the world is getting warmer is
unequivocal. In Australia and around the globe, 2001 to 2010 was the warmest decade
on record. In Australia, each decade since the 1940s has been warmer than the
last.
If we do not reduce carbon pollution, the world risks
serious effects from climate change. Global average temperatures could
increase by up to 6.4 degrees Celsius above 1990 temperatures by 2100. Sea
levels are estimated to rise by between 0.5 and 1 metre by 2100 from 2000
levels and the acidity of the world’s oceans to increase significantly. Cyclones,
storms, floods and other extreme weather events are likely to increase in
severity or frequency and rainfall patterns around the world to change, making
some places drier and other places wetter.
Australia is a hot and dry continent. This means that
among the world’s developed countries, Australia faces acute risks. Studies
indicate that warming of more than 2 degrees Celsius will overwhelm the
capacity of many of our natural ecosystems to adapt. With that level of
warming, for instance, the survival of the Great Barrier Reef will be in
jeopardy as higher ocean temperatures and acidity levels cause major changes to
coral reefs.
Climate change will not just damage the natural
environment. Left unchecked, it also poses risks to Australia’s economic
prosperity. Climate change will impose economic costs on our society. These
costs can be reduced and managed if the world takes action to reduce carbon
pollution. But the longer action is delayed, the more it will cost and the
worse the impacts will be.
How high temperatures might rise in coming decades
will depend on how much carbon pollution increases.
Governments around the world have agreed to limit
carbon pollution so that average global temperature rise can be held below 2
degrees Celsius above pre‑industrial levels. If the
global 2 degree goal is achieved, Australia will still face some impacts. However,
our communities and environment will be better able to cope. It is in our
national interest to do our fair share.
The task of reducing carbon pollution is achievable. Economies
can be retooled so that growth and rising prosperity are decoupled from growth
in carbon pollution. This will require changes to the way we live and the way
we do business, especially to the ways we produce and use energy.
Studies in Australia and around the world have
demonstrated that, with known technologies, pollution can be reduced while
maintaining economic growth. Indeed, the retooling of our economy will deliver
new technologies, new jobs and new opportunities.
Australia’s carbon pollution levels are very high
given our population size and our economy is heavily dependent on
emissions-intensive energy sources. To maintain our international
competitiveness in the future as more countries take action on climate change,
we need to reduce our carbon pollution and concentrate on cleaner pathways to
economic growth.
Australia’s carbon pollution represents 1.5 per cent
of global emissions of greenhouse gases. That makes us one of the top 20
polluting countries in the world. Our annual carbon pollution is roughly the
same as that of countries like Spain, France, Italy, South Korea and the United
Kingdom. All of those countries have populations two to three times larger
than Australia. In fact, Australia produces more carbon pollution per head of
population than any developed country in the world, more even than the world’s
biggest economy, the United States.
Reflecting the availability of cheap and abundant
coal, electricity generation is Australia’s largest source of carbon pollution.
Electricity generation is responsible for just over a third of Australia’s
total carbon pollution. Direct fuel combustion—reflecting the use of gas and
other fuels in industry and homes—accounts for another 15 per cent. Transport
and agriculture each contribute around another 15 per cent.
The remaining sources are ‘fugitive’ emissions—mainly
the methane and carbon dioxide which escapes into the atmosphere when coal is
mined and gas is extracted—along with pollution from industrial processes and
decomposition of waste in landfills and elsewhere. Trees absorb carbon
dioxide, so when land is cleared there is an increase in carbon pollution and
when vegetation grows there is a decrease. The net impact of these
sources—deforestation, reforestation and afforestation—contributes 3 per cent
of Australia’s total carbon pollution.
Australia’s emissions are projected to continue to
grow by almost 2 per cent a year without action to put a price on carbon. Even
taking into account existing climate change policies such as the Renewable
Energy Target and the CFI, our emissions are expected to be around 22 per cent
higher than 2000 levels in 2020.
The Government has committed to reduce carbon
pollution by 5 per cent from 2000 levels by 2020 irrespective of what other
countries do, and by up to 15 or 25 per cent depending on the scale of global
action. These targets will require cutting pollution in 2020 by at least 23
per cent from the level it would otherwise be expected to be.
The Government has also committed to a new 2050 target
to reduce emissions by 80 per cent compared with 2000 levels, in line with
targets announced by the United Kingdom and Germany.
Australia’s targets represent a fair contribution from
Australia, and provide guidance and confidence to investors working to achieve
our clean energy future.
The carbon
pricing mechanism
A broad-based carbon price is the most environmentally
effective and cheapest way to reduce pollution.
A carbon price puts a price tag on carbon pollution. Under
the mechanism, around 500 of the country’s biggest polluters will be required
to pay for each tonne of pollution they release into the atmosphere. This will
have two effects.
It creates a powerful incentive for all businesses to
cut their pollution by investing in clean technology or finding more efficient
ways of operating. A price on carbon will also create economic incentives to
reduce pollution in the cheapest possible ways, rather than relying on more
costly approaches such as government regulation and direct subsidies.
These incentives will flow through the economy. The
carbon price will make lower-polluting technologies, especially clean energy
technologies, more competitive and will boost investment in these technologies.
In this way, introducing a price on carbon will trigger the transformation of
the economy towards a clean energy future.
Our economy has successfully handled comparable
structural changes over its history. In fact, transformative changes—new
products and technologies, and the integration of our economy into the global
economy set in train by the reforms of the 1980s and 1990s—have underpinned
rising prosperity and sustainable growth in Australia.
Table I: Key elements of the carbon pricing mechanism
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Price
Fixed price period
Emissions trading scheme
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A two stage approach:
The mechanism will commence on 1 July 2012, with a price that will be
fixed for the first three years. The price will start at $23 per tonne and
will rise at 2.5 per cent per annum in real terms.
On 1 July 2015, the carbon price will transition to a fully flexible
price under an emissions trading scheme, with the price determined by the
market.
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Coverage
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Broad coverage from commencement, encompassing the stationary energy
sector, industrial processes, non‑legacy waste, and fugitive
emissions (other than from decommissioned coal mines).
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Treatment of fuel and transport
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Transport fuels comprising liquid petroleum fuels, liquid petroleum
gas, liquefied natural gas and compressed natural gas will be excluded from
the mechanism. However, an equivalent carbon price will be applied to some
business transport emissions and non-transport uses of these fuels through
changes in fuel tax credits or fuel excise.
Users of specified fuels can choose to opt into the mechanism instead
of paying the equivalent carbon price through the fuel tax system.
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International linking
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International linking to credible international carbon markets and
emissions trading schemes will be allowed from the commencement of the
flexible price period. At least half of a liable entity’s compliance
obligation must be met through the use of domestic units or credits.
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Price ceiling and floor
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A price ceiling and floor will apply for the first three years of the
flexible price period. The price ceiling will be set at $20 above the
expected international price and will rise by 5 per cent in real terms each
year. The price floor will be $15, rising annually by 4 per cent in real
terms.
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Carbon Farming Initiative
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Kyoto-compliant credits created under the CFI can be used for
compliance under the mechanism subject to a 5 per cent limit in the fixed
charge period.
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Governance
Climate Change Authority
Clean Energy Regulator
Productivity Commission
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Establishment of the Authority to advice on pollution caps, progress
towards meeting targets, and undertake reviews of the mechanism.
Establishment of the Regulator to administer the mechanism.
The Productivity Commission will undertake reviews on industry
assistance, fuel tax arrangements and carbon pollution reduction activities
internationally.
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The carbon pricing
mechanism’s governance structure

Household
assistance
The carbon price will be accompanied by a household
assistance package.
Over 50 per cent of carbon price revenue will be spent on households.
A carbon price will add modestly to the cost of living.
The average household will see cost increases of around $9.90 per week, while
the average assistance provided will be around $10.10 per week. The prices of
most household purchases will barely be affected by the carbon price—for almost
everything other than electricity and gas, the estimated price impact is likely
to be less than 0.5 per cent in most cases. Taking electricity and gas into
account, the overall impact on the Consumer Price Index (CPI) is expected to be
around 0.7 per cent in 2012–13. Households will not face a carbon price on
transport fuels.
The household assistance package is targeted at those
who need help the most, particularly pensioners and low-and middle-income
households. Around two in three households will receive assistance that
offsets their expected average price impact. About nine out of ten households
will receive some assistance.
Because the carbon price raises revenue, it provides
an opportunity to cut other taxes. The Government will cut income taxes by
raising the tax-free threshold so that, initially, up to 1 million people will
no longer need to file a tax return. From 2015, a second phase of tax reform
will mean that up to an additional 100,000 people will not have to file a tax
return. Reducing taxes by increasing the tax-free threshold is an important
change in Australia’s tax mix: it involves reducing taxes on desirable things
(work and income), boosting incentives to work, and replacing them with a
charge on something undesirable (carbon pollution).
The tax‑free threshold will be more than
trebled to $18,200 in 2012–13. From 2015, the tax‑free threshold will be further
raised to $19,400. People with incomes below the new tax‑free thresholds will get to keep
all of their wages in their regular pay packets.
In addition to tax cuts, pensions, allowances and
benefits will increase.
Other features of the household assistance package
include:
• special
payments for people who have high energy use due to medical needs
• shared
assistance between aged care residents and providers
• the
development of an opt‑in
program where household assistance payments can be directed towards accredited
energy efficiency measures through non‑government organisations.
Household assistance will be permanent and will keep
up with increases in the cost of living.
Pensions and other benefits are automatically indexed
to keep pace with the cost of living, while the tax changes will be set at a
level to cover the expected impact of the expected carbon price to 2019-20.
Jobs and
Competitiveness Package
To support Australian businesses to make the
transition to a clean energy future, the Government has designed a number of
assistance measures for the business community, from large industrial producers
to small businesses. The Government will allocate around 40 per cent of
revenue from the mechanism to help businesses and support jobs.
Assistance measures will target emissions‑intensive,
trade‑exposed
industries, other areas of manufacturing, food processing, foundries and small
business.
The Jobs and Competitiveness Program will ensure that
businesses that produce a lot of pollution and compete in international markets
remain competitive, while still retaining strong incentives to reduce carbon
pollution. Almost all emissions-intensive and trade-exposed activities are in
the manufacturing sector. The Program will provide support to activities that
generate over 80 per cent of emissions within the manufacturing sector.
The food processing, metal forging and foundry
industries will also be assisted to support jobs in these parts of manufacturing.
More general assistance for small businesses and manufacturing industries will
target improvements in energy efficiency.
All of these measures have been carefully designed to
avoid interfering with the purpose of the carbon price: creating incentives to
reduce carbon pollution.
In addition to these measures, the Government has
decided to provide a Coal Sector Jobs Package and a Steel Transformation Plan.
Clean energy
The transformation of Australia’s energy sector
towards clean energy sources will unfold over the coming decades. The carbon
price will play a major role, creating powerful commercial incentives to avoid
traditional high‑pollution solutions and to adopt low‑pollution
alternatives. However, given the scale of the transformation and the
imperative to change, additional measures to support innovation and investment
in clean energy are required.
The Government will provide significant levels of
financial support for innovation in clean energy technologies.
A new $10 billion commercially oriented Clean Energy
Finance Corporation will invest in renewable energy, low pollution and energy
efficiency technologies.
A new Australian Renewable Energy Agency (ARENA) will
administer $3.2 billion in Government support for research and development, demonstration
and commercialisation of renewable energy.
The Renewable Energy Target, combined with other
elements of the Government’s plan, including the carbon price, will drive $20
billion of investment in large-scale renewable energy by 2020 in today’s
dollars.
Energy
markets
The Government will implement measures to underpin a
successful energy market transition and maintain secure energy supplies. These
measures will supplement the carbon price and clean energy policies.
An Energy Security Fund will be established to ensure
there is a smooth transition which preserves energy security. The Energy
Security Fund comprises two elements.
The first element is an allocation of free carbon
units and cash payments to strongly affected coal-fired electricity generators.
These allocations will be conditional on electricity generators strongly
affected by a carbon price publishing Clean Energy Investment Plans, which show
how they will reduce their pollution, and by meeting power system reliability
standards.
Second, the Government will seek to negotiate the
closure of around 2,000 megawatts (MW) of highly polluting generation capacity
by 2020. Closing down some of our highest polluting coal‑fired generation
capacity makes room for investment in lower pollution plants—and kickstarts the
transformation of our energy industry in a managed way.
In addition to the Energy Security Fund, as a
transitional measure the Government will offer loans to coal-fired generators
for the purchase of future vintage carbon units at auction for the first three
years that auctions are held. The Government may also offer loans to
coal-fired generators for the purpose of refinancing existing debt.
The Government has also announced the establishment of
an Energy Security Council which will provide advice to the Government in the
event that systemic risks to energy security emerge from the financial
impairment of power stations arising from any source, including form the
introduction of carbon pricing.
Energy
efficiency
Using energy more efficiently can lower carbon
pollution and save money—which is why energy efficiency is the third element in
the Government’s clean energy future plan.
The Government is helping households and businesses
improve their energy efficiency and will expand these efforts. The carbon
price will create a strong incentive to use energy more efficiently. A large proportion
of industry and household assistance is also directly targeted at facilitating
further energy efficiency improvements.
The Low Carbon Communities Program will be
significantly expanded to promote energy efficiency at a local level and among
low‑income
households and to ensure the services of charities who are heavy users of
maritime and aviation fuel are not adversely affected by the introduction of a
carbon price.
The Government will expedite the development of a
national energy savings initiative, as recommended by the Prime Minister’s Task
Group on Energy Efficiency. The energy savings initiative will be a ‘white
certificate’ scheme, creating and trading credits that reward energy efficiency
activities.
Land sector
initiatives
The farming, forestry and land sectors have just as
important a role to play in reducing carbon pollution as governments,
households and the wider business community.
A carbon price will not apply to agricultural
emissions. This means there will be no requirement for farmers to pay for
emissions from livestock or fertiliser use.
Australia faces significant opportunities to reduce
carbon pollution and increase the amount of carbon stored on the land. Those
who pursue these opportunities will be rewarded through the CFI, which allows
farmers and land managers to receive credits for carbon storage and pollution
reduction activities. Kyoto-compliant credits can be sold to liable entities
under the mechanism, and all credits can be sold in the domestic voluntary
market or exported to foreign purchasers.
The Government will also provide substantial funding
for a range of new land-based measures, including an ongoing fund for
landholders to undertake projects that establish, restore, protect and manage
biodiverse carbon stores. The Biodiversity Fund will improve the resilience of
Australia’s unique species to the impacts of climate change, enhance the
environmental outcomes of carbon farming projects, and help landholders protect
biodiversity and carbon values on their land.
An ongoing Carbon Farming Futures program will help
farmers and landholders benefit from carbon farming by supporting research and
development, measurement approaches and action on the ground to reduce
emissions or store carbon.
The Government is also providing ongoing support for
Indigenous communities to participate in carbon farming, and support for
natural resource management bodies to plan for climate change.
Major steps
to date
International
commitments
United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
On 30 December 1992 Australia ratified the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.
The Convention is aimed at stabilising greenhouse gas concentrations in the
atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference
with the climate system. It includes an obligation on Australia to ‘adopt
national policies and take corresponding measures on the mitigation of climate
change, by limiting anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases and protecting
and enhancing its greenhouse gas sinks and reservoirs’ (Article 4.2(a)). It
provides an overall framework for intergovernmental efforts on climate change.
Ratification
of the Kyoto Protocol
On 3 December 2007 Australia formally ratified the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change
and the ratification entered into force on 11 March 2008. Under the Kyoto
Protocol, Australia is committed to restraining its national emissions to an
average of 108 per cent of 1990 levels over the first commitment period (2008
to 2012).
Cancun
Agreements
The 2010 Cancun Agreements
anchor under the Climate Change Convention the mitigation pledges made by
developed and developing countries in the Copenhagen Accord. The agreements
recognise the need to hold any increase in global temperature to below 2
degrees Celsius. Over 85 countries, including both developed and developing
economies, have already made pledges to limit their emissions. Together, these
countries represent more than 90 per cent of the global economy and are
responsible for more than 80 per cent of global emissions.
The Garnaut
Review and Update
On 30 September 2008, the Government published The Garnaut Climate Change Review: Final Report.
This was an independent study conducted by Professor Ross Garnaut AO
commissioned by the Australian, state and territory governments. In November
2010, the Australian Government commissioned Professor Garnaut to provide an
update to the 2008 Review.
Professor Garnaut released a series of papers in early
2011 addressing developments across a range of subjects including climate
change science and impacts, emissions trends, carbon pricing, technology, land
and the electricity sector.
Professor Garnaut presented his final report, called The Garnaut Review 2011: Australia in the Global
Response to Climate Change,
to the Government on 31 May 2011. The Report concluded that a broad-based
market approach will best preserve Australian prosperity as we make the
transition to a low carbon future.
Previous
policy development and legislative processes
In the late 1990s the Australian Greenhouse Office
released a series of discussion papers on the design of an Australian emissions
trading scheme.
In 2006, a task force set up by the States and
Territories released a paper on setting out a proposed design of an Australian
emissions trading scheme.
In 2007, the Howard Government's Prime Ministerial
Task Group on Emissions Trading
— a group of leading business representatives and senior officials —
recommended that the Government adopt an emissions trading scheme. Later that
year, the States and Territories released their final report on emissions
trading scheme design.
On 16 July 2008 the Government released its Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme Green Paper.
This Paper reflected the Government’s preferred positions on issues concerning the
CPRS.
On 15 December 2008, the Government released a White
Paper called Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme:
Australia’s Low Pollution Future.
The decisions in the White Paper formed the basis the CPRS legislative
packages.
In 2009 and 2010, the Government introduced three
packages of legislation to implement the CPRS. These were not passed by the
Parliament.
Treasury
modelling
On 10 July 2011, the Government released Strong growth, low pollution: Modelling a carbon
price,
which models various scenarios concerning the proposals set out in Securing a clean energy future: The Australian
Government’s climate change plan. This built on Australia’s Low Pollution Future: The Economics of Climate
Change Mitigation,
which was released on 30 October 2008.
The reports present the results of the Treasury’s
economic modelling of the potential economic impacts of reducing emissions over
the medium-and long-term. They span global, national and sectoral scales, and
look at distributional impacts, such as the implications of carbon pricing for
the goods and services that households consume.
The Treasury’s modelling demonstrates that early
global action is less expensive than later action; that a market-based approach
allows robust economic growth into the future even as emissions fall; and that
many of Australia’s industries will maintain or improve their competitiveness
under an international agreement to combat climate change.
Architecture
for a carbon pricing mechanism
In September 2010 the Government announced the
establishment of the Multi-Party Climate Change Committee (MPCCC) to consult,
negotiate, and report to the Cabinet, through the Minister for Climate Change
and Energy Efficiency, on agreed options for the implementation of a carbon
price in Australia; and to provide advice on, and participate in, building
community consensus for action on climate change.
On 24 February 2011, the Prime Minister announced the
climate change framework outlining the broad architecture for a mechanism,
which had been considered by the MPCCC. The proposed mechanism focused on the
high level architecture, start date, potential mechanisms to allow flexibility
to move to emissions trading, sectoral coverage and international linking
arrangements.
DCCEE conducted a public consultation process on the
proposed mechanism in April and May 2011.
Securing a
clean energy future
On 10 July 2011, the Government published Securing a clean energy future: The Australian Government’s
climate change plan. This set out the details of the mechanism and
related proposals for fostering renewable energy generation, energy efficiency
and action on the land. It also set out measures to assist Australian
households and businesses to adapt to the mechanism and to support energy
markets.
Exposure
draft legislation
On 28 July 2011, the Government released the following
draft bills to implement the mechanism and related initiatives for public
comment:
• Clean
Energy Bill 2011;
• Clean
Energy (Consequential Amendments) Bill 2011;
• Clean
Energy Regulator Bill 2011;
• Climate
Change Authority Bill 2011;
• Clean
Energy (Unit Shortfall Charge—General) Bill 2011;
• Clean
Energy (Unit Issue Charge—General) Bill 2011;
• Clean
Energy (Charges—Excise) Bill 2011;
• Clean
Energy (International Unit Surrender Charge) Bill 2011;
• Ozone
Protection and Synthetic Greenhouse Gas (Manufacture Levy) Amendment Bill 2011;
• Ozone
Protection and Synthetic Greenhouse Gas (Import Levy) Amendment Bill 2011;
• Fuel
Tax Legislation Amendment (Clean Energy) Bill 2011;
• Excise
Tariff Legislation Amendment (Clean Energy) Bill 2011; and
• Customs
Tariff Amendment (Clean Energy) Bill 2011.
The
exposure process
During the period from 28 July 2011 to 22 August 2011,
DCCEE:
• met
with government representatives from the States and Territories;
• convened
a forum for peak industry, environmental, community and other non-government
organisations;
• convened
three legal experts workshops (in Sydney, Melbourne and Brisbane);
• convened
four technical working group meetings on the treatment of natural gas, the
point of liability and landfill (in Canberra and Perth);
• conducted
meetings and teleconferences with business representative groups, businesses
and other stakeholders; and
• received
over 300 submissions on the draft legislation.
The 2011
Clean Energy Legislative Package
A description of the bills introducing the mechanism
is set out below.
Table II: The Clean Energy Bill 2011 and related bills
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Main bill
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The Clean Energy
Bill 2011 creates the mechanism. It sets out the structure of the
mechanism and process for its introduction. These include:
• entities
and emissions that are covered by the mechanism;
• entities’
obligations to surrender eligible emissions units;
• limits
on the number of eligible emissions units that will be issued;
• the
nature of carbon units;
• the
allocation of carbon units, including by auction and the issue of free units;
• mechanisms
to contain costs, including the fixed charge period and price floors and
ceilings;
• linking
to other emissions trading schemes;
• assistance
for emissions-intensive, trade-exposed activities and coal-fired electricity
generators;
• monitoring,
investigation, enforcement and penalties;
• administrative
review of decisions; and
• reviews
of aspects of the mechanism over time.
|
|
Statutory bodies
|
The Clean Energy
Regulator Bill 2011 sets up the Regulator, which is a statutory
authority that will administer the mechanism and enforce the law.
The responsibilities of the Regulator include:
• providing
education on the mechanism, particularly about the administrative
arrangements of the mechanism;
• assessing
emissions data to determine each entity’s liability;
• operating
the Australian National Registry of Emissions Units (the Registry);
• monitoring,
facilitating and enforcing compliance with the mechanism;
• allocating
units including freely allocated units, fixed charge units and auctioned
units;
• applying
legislative rules to determine if a particular entity is eligible for
assistance in the form of units to be allocated administratively, and the
number of other units to be allocated;
• administering
the National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting System (NGERS), the Renewable
Energy Target (RET) and the Carbon Farming Initiative (CFI); and
• accrediting
auditors for the CFI and NGERS.
|
|
|
The Climate Change
Authority Bill 2011 sets up the Authority, which will be an
independent body that provides the Government with expert advice on key
aspects of the mechanism and the Government’s climate change mitigation
initiatives.
The Government will remain responsible for carbon
pricing policy decisions.
This Bill also sets up the Land Sector Carbon and
Biodiversity Board which will advise on key initiatives in the land sector.
|
|
Consequential amendments
|
The Clean Energy
(Consequential Amendments) Bill 2011 makes consequential
amendments to ensure:
• NGERS
supports the mechanism;
• the
Registry covers the mechanism and the CFI;
• the
Regulator covers the mechanism, CFI, the Renewable Energy Target and NGERS;
• the
Regulator and Authority are set up as statutory agencies and regulated by
public accountability and financial management rules;
• that
emissions units and their trading are covered by laws on financial services;
• that
activities related to emissions trading are covered by laws on money
laundering and fraud;
• synthetic
greenhouse gases are subject to an equivalent carbon price applied through
existing regulation of those substances;
• the
Regulator can work with other regulatory bodies, including the Australian
Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC), the Australian Competition and
Consumer Commission (ACCC) and the Australian Transaction Reporting and
Analysis Centre (Austrac);
• the
taxation treatment of emissions units for the purposes of GST and income tax
is clear; and
• the
Conservation Tillage Refundable Tax Offset is established.
|
|
Procedural bills
|
Those elements of the mechanism which oblige a
person to pay money are implemented through separate bills that comply with
the requirements of section 55 of the Constitution.
These bills are the Clean Energy (Unit Shortfall Charge—General) Bill
2011, Clean Energy (Unit Issue
Charge – Fixed Charge) Bill 2011, Clean Energy (Unit Issue Charge – Auctions) Bill 2011, Clean Energy
(Charges—Excise) Bill 2011, Clean Energy (Charges—Customs) Bill 2011, Clean Energy (International Unit Surrender Charge)
Bill 2011, Ozone Protection and Synthetic Greenhouse Gas
(Manufacture Levy) Amendment Bill 2011 and Ozone Protection and Synthetic Greenhouse Gas
(Import Levy) Amendment Bill 2011.
|
|
Related bills
|
Other elements of the Government’s Climate Change
Plan are being implemented through other legislation. These are:
• the
Clean Energy (Excise Tariff Legislation
Amendment) Bill 2011 and the
Clean Energy (Customs Tariff Amendment) Bill 2011, which imposes
an effective carbon price on aviation and non-transport gaseous fuels through
excise and customs tariffs;
• the
Clean Energy (Fuel Tax Legislation
Amendment) Bill 2011, which reduces the business fuel tax credit
entitlement of non-exempted industries for their use of liquid and gaseous
transport fuels, in order to provide an effective carbon price on business
through the fuel tax system; and
• the
Clean Energy (Household Assistance
Amendments) Bill 2011, Clean
Energy (Tax Laws Amendments) Bill 2011 and the Clean Energy (Income Tax Rates Amendments) Bill
2011, which will implement the household assistance measures
announced by the Government on 10 July 2011. These bills amend relevant
legislation to provide payment increases for pensioners, allowees and family
payment recipients and provide income tax cuts and establish new supplements
for low- and middle-income households.
|
Structure of
the Clean Energy Bill 2011
The bill creates the mechanism. The mechanism is also
implemented through other bills, and reference should also be made to those
bills where appropriate. This Explanatory Memorandum indicates where those
other bills are relevant.
Table III: Structure of the Clean Energy Bill 2011
|
Part
|
Title
|
Description
|
|
Part 1
|
Preliminary
|
Part 1 sets out the objects of the bill,
arrangements for commencement, definitions and explains specific concepts of
relevance to the mechanism.
|
|
Part 2
|
Carbon pollution cap
|
Part 2 provides that a carbon pollution cap can be
set by the Government through regulations.
|
|
Part 3
|
Liable entities
|
Part 3 sets out the circumstances in which a person
is liable under the mechanism, deals with mechanisms for transferring
liability and establishes the Opt-in Scheme for specified fuels.
|
|
Part 4
|
Carbon Units
|
Part 4 provides for carbon units and the way in
which these are issued by the Regulator and dealt with under the Registry.
|
|
Part 5
|
Emissions Number
|
Part 5 sets out how a person’s emissions number is
determined.
|
|
Part 6
|
Surrender of eligible emissions units
|
Part 6 sets out the way in which a person may make a
payment or surrender units to meet their obligations under the mechanism.
|
|
Part 7
|
Jobs and Competitiveness Program
|
Part 7 provides for assistance to
emissions-intensive trade-exposed industries to adjust to the mechanism.
|
|
Part 8
|
Coal-fired electricity generation
|
Part 8 provides for assistance to coal-fired
electricity generators to support energy markets.
|
|
Part 9
|
Publication of information
|
Part 9 sets out the Regulator’s obligations to
publish specific information about the mechanism.
|
|
Part 10
|
Fraudulent conduct
|
Part 10 sets out the circumstances in which a person
may be ordered to relinquish units if they are convicted of a criminal
offence involving fraudulent conduct.
|
|
Part 11
|
Relinquishment of carbon units
|
Part 11 sets out the way in which a person
relinquishes units where he or she must do so.
|
|
Part 12
|
Notification of significant holdings of carbon units
|
Part 12 sets out the obligations of corporate groups
and others to notify the Regulator of a significant holding of units.
|
|
Part 13
|
Information gathering powers
|
Part 13 sets out the Regulator’s information
gathering powers when investigating possible contraventions.
|
|
Part 14
|
Record-keeping requirements
|
Part 14 sets out liable entities’ reporting requirements
under the mechanism and the consequences of not complying with them.
|
|
Part 15
|
Monitoring powers
|
Part 15 sets out the Regulator’s powers to engage in
monitoring activities, including entering premises under warrant, when
investigating possible contraventions
|
|
Part 16
|
Liability of executive officers of bodies corporate
|
Part 16 provides that executive officers of bodies
corporate may be liable for contraventions in certain circumstances.
|
|
Part 17
|
Civil penalty orders
|
Part 17 sets out the way in which civil penalties,
including pecuniary penalties, are imposed for contraventions.
|
|
Part 18
|
Infringement notices
|
Part 18 sets out the way in which infringement
notices may be issued.
|
|
Part 19
|
Offences relating to unit shortfall charge and
administrative penalties
|
Part 19 sets out the way in which sanctions for
contraventions of criminal offences are imposed.
|
|
Part 20
|
Enforceable undertakings
|
Part 20 provides that the Regulator may accept
enforceable undertakings from persons who may have engaged in a
contravention, and the way in which these undertakings may be enforced.
|
|
Part 21
|
Review of decisions
|
Part 21 provides for reviews of administrative
decisions made by the Regulator and the Government.
|
|
Part 22
|
Reviews by Climate Change Authority
|
Part 22 sets out the obligations of the Authority to
undertake periodic reviews about the mechanism and aspects of it and also
specific reviews requested by the Minister or both Houses of Parliament.
|
|
Part 23
|
Miscellaneous
|
Part 23 provides for a range of matters which
facilitate the operation of the mechanism.
|
The objects
of the carbon pricing mechanism
The objects of the mechanism are:
• to
give effect to Australia’s international obligations on addressing climate
change under the Climate Change Convention and the Kyoto Protocol;
• to
support the development of an effective global response to climate change,
consistent with Australia’s national interest in ensuring that average global
temperatures increase by not more than 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial
levels;
• to
take action directed towards meeting Australia’s long-term target of reducing
net greenhouse gas emissions to 80 per cent below 2000 levels by 2050 and take
that action in a flexible and cost-effective way; and
• to
put a price on greenhouse gas emissions in a way that encourages investment in
clean energy, supports jobs and competitiveness in the economy and supports
Australia’s economic growth while reducing pollution.
The objects of the bill are set out in Part 1. The
constitutional basis of the mechanism is addressed in Chapter 11.
The mechanism
The mechanism starts on 1 July 2012. From that date,
businesses covered by it will pay for each tonne of carbon pollution they put
into the atmosphere each year.
The commencement arrangements of the bill are set out
in Part 1 (see Chapter 11).
There will be two stages. For the first three years,
the carbon price for each tonne of pollution will be fixed, and will operate
like a carbon tax. Then, from 1 July 2015, the mechanism will shift to a ‘cap
and trade’ emissions trading scheme. In this second ‘flexible charge’ stage,
the carbon price will be set by the market.
The fixed
charge period
An initial stage with fixed carbon charges will
provide stability and predictability. This will give businesses time to get
used to the new system, to understand their obligations and to start planning
ways to reduce their pollution. Businesses will reduce their pollution when it
is cheaper to do so than to pay the fixed charge. Thus the market will create
incentives to cut carbon pollution.
The fixed charge will start at $23 per tonne on 1 July
2012. In each of the next two years, it will rise by around 2.5 per cent in
real terms, assuming inflation of 2.5 per cent a year, which is the mid-point
of the Reserve Bank of Australia’s target range for inflation. The carbon
charge will be $24.15 per tonne in 2013-14 and $25.40 per tonne in 2014-15.
This issue is discussed in Chapters 1, 2, 3 and 4 of
this Explanatory Memorandum. The operation of the fixed charge period is
covered in Parts 3, 4, 5 and 6.
Moving to a
flexible price
The mechanism will move automatically to a flexible,
market-driven approach on 1 July 2015. From this date, the carbon charge will
no longer be fixed, but will be set by the market.
During the flexible price period, an overall limit (or
cap) will be placed on Australia’s annual greenhouse gas emissions from all
sources of pollution covered by the carbon price. There will be no limits on
individual sectors, firms or facilities.
The Government will set the cap by issuing a fixed
number of carbon units each year. Each unit will represent one tonne of
pollution. This will be one of the main ways Australia meets its pollution
targets. Some of the carbon units issued each year will be sold by the
Government at auction. Others will be allocated to businesses without charge
to support jobs and competitiveness, and help strongly affected industries make
the transition to a clean energy future.
Businesses will be free to buy and sell the carbon units
they have acquired from the Government. This will create a market for carbon
units that is designed to ensure the reductions in pollution under the carbon
price are achieved at the lowest cost to the economy: firms will buy units if
they cannot reduce their pollution for less than the cost of the units.
This issue is discussed in Chapters 1, 2, 3 and 4 of
this Explanatory Memorandum. The operation of the flexible price period is
covered in Parts 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6.
Pollution
caps
In the flexible price period, the Government will set
annual caps on pollution. Before the start of this flexible price period, the
Government will be required to set out the caps for the first five years from 1
July 2015. Once the flexible price system is under way, the caps will be
extended each year. This is designed to ensure that businesses always have
five years of certainty about the pollution caps they face.
Table IV: Timeline for setting pollution caps
|
Deadline
|
Pollution cap announced for
financial year(s) beginning:
|
|
31 May 2014
|
2015, 2016, 2017, 2018 and 2019
|
|
30 June 2016
|
2020
|
|
30 June 2017
|
2021
|
|
|
Pollution caps will continue to be set annually
|
Pollution cap timelines are discussed in Chapter 2 of
this Explanatory Memorandum. Pollution caps are covered in Part 2.
Climate
Change Authority
The bill provides for reviews by an independent
statutory body, the Authority, which will provide independent advice to the
Government on the performance of the carbon price and other initiatives. It is
set up by the Authority bill.
One of the Authority’s roles will be to make
recommendations to the Government on pollution caps and on any national
emissions trajectory or carbon budget. The Government will make the final
decisions. The Authority will report regularly on progress. The Authority
will conduct regular, public reviews and its reports will be made public. The
Government will respond to its recommendations within a limited timeframe.
The Authority will complete its first review – which
will provide recommendations on the mechanism’s first five years of pollution
caps – February 2014.
This issue is discussed in Chapter 10 of this
Explanatory Memorandum. The Authority’s responsibilities are set out in Part
22 and the Authority bill.
Price
ceilings and floors
For the first three years of the flexible price
period, safety valves will be built into the system, in form of price ceilings
and floors, to avoid price spikes or plunges. This will reduce the risk for
businesses as they gain experience in having a market set the carbon price.
A price ceiling will be set $20 higher than the
expected international carbon price at the start of the flexible price period
(1 July 2015). A price floor will mean that the carbon price cannot fall any
lower than $15 a tonne in 2015-16. The floor is designed to reduce the risk of
sharp downward movements in the price, which could undermine long-term
investment in clean technologies. Both the price ceiling and the price floor
will increase gradually each year.
The price ceilings and floors will apply for the first
three years of the flexible price period. A review by the Authority of the
role of the price ceiling and price floor will occur in 2017.
This issue is discussed in Chapter 2 of this
Explanatory Memorandum. Price ceilings and floors are addressed in Part 4,
Division 2 and in Part 23.
Coverage of
the carbon price
Carbon pollution from the following sources will be
covered by the mechanism: stationary energy, non-legacy waste, industrial
processes and fugitive emissions (other than from decommissioned coal mines).
Some business transport emissions will face an
equivalent carbon price through changes to fuel tax credits or fuel excise. Emissions
from non-transport uses of liquid petroleum transport fuels (for example,
diesel and petrol) and gaseous transport fuels (LPG, LNG and CNG) will also be
subject to an equivalent carbon price in this way. This issue is discussed in
greater detail in the section below on transport.
The bill also allows for the establishment of an Opt-in
Scheme to enable large users of specified fuels to voluntarily opt into the
mechanism instead of paying the equivalent carbon price under the fuel tax or
excise systems.
Treasury modelling shows that a broad-based carbon
price will encourage pollution reductions across all sectors of the economy. If
sectors are excluded, it means that Australia misses out on their full contribution
to the pollution reduction task.
Around 60 per cent of Australia’s emissions will be
directly covered by the mechanism and around two-thirds will be covered by a
carbon price applied through various means.
This issue is discussed in Chapter 3 of this
Explanatory Memorandum. Coverage is addressed in Part 3.
Carbon
Farming Initiative
Farming and other land-based activities will not be
covered by the mechanism. However, the CFI will give farmers and other land
managers an opportunity to generate income from taking action to reduce their
pollution.
The CFI is covered by the CFI Act and the Carbon
Credits (Consequential Amendments) Act 2011.
Gases
The mechanism will cover four of the six greenhouse
gases counted under the Kyoto Protocol – carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide
and perfluorocarbon emissions from the aluminium sector. The remaining
greenhouse gases counted under the Kyoto Protocol (hydrofluorocarbons and
sulphur hexafluoride) as well as other perfluorocarbon emissions will face an
equivalent carbon price through existing synthetic greenhouse gas legislation.
Amendments to apply an equivalent carbon price to synthetic
greenhouse gases are set out in the Consequential Amendments bill.
Large
polluters
It is important to ensure that the mechanism is
practical and minimises costs to business. For this reason, only facilities
that release over a certain amount of carbon pollution a year, or are users or natural
gas suppliers, will pay the carbon price under the mechanism. Facilities that
have direct greenhouse gas emissions of 25,000 tonnes of CO2-e a
year or more (excluding emissions from transport fuels and some synthetic
greenhouse gases) will be covered. There will be a lower threshold for certain
landfill facilities. Facilities that consume large volumes of natural gas will
also be covered. Natural gas suppliers will be liable for carbon pollution
from the use of natural gas they supply to small-to medium-sized customers.
Liable entities will be required to either make a
payment for emissions or surrender an equivalent number of units. If a liable
entity does not surrender any units or an insufficient number to meet their
liability, then it will become liable for a shortfall charge. Those who choose
to pay, or who are liable for, a shortfall charge will pay a premium above the
value of the unit.
This issue is discussed in Chapters 3 and 4 of this
Explanatory Memorandum. The operation of the fixed charge period is covered in
Parts 3 and 6.
Transport
Households and light commercial vehicles will not face
a carbon price on the fuel they use for transport. In addition, the
agriculture, forestry and fishing industries will not face a carbon price on
their off-road fuel use.
An effective carbon price will apply to fuels used in
domestic aviation, marine and rail transport. Similarly, a carbon price will
apply when liquid petroleum and gaseous transport fuels are used for
non-transport purposes, such as running diesel generators on a mine site.
In general, where an effective carbon price applies to
transport fuels, it will be applied through changes in fuel tax credits or
changes in excise. The changes will be calculated to have the same price
effect as coverage by the mechanism and will be adjusted periodically to ensure
the effective carbon price on transport fuels is in step with the carbon price
applying to the rest of the economy.
The Government intends to apply an effective carbon
price to heavy on-road transport from 1 July 2014.
While no transport fuels will be covered directly
under the mechanism on a mandatory basis, large users of specified transport
fuels may, in certain circumstances, choose to opt into coverage by the
mechanism via the Opt-in Scheme. These opt-in arrangements will be available
from 1 July 2013. By opting-in, fuel users will have their fuel emissions
directly covered by the mechanism and will not face the equivalent carbon price
through the fuel tax system.
Table V: Treatment of transport fuels
|
A carbon price will be applied to:
|
A carbon price will not apply to:
|
|
Domestic aviation
|
Fuel used by households for transport
|
|
Domestic shipping
|
Light on-road commercial vehicles
|
|
Rail transport
|
Ethanol, biodiesel and renewable diesel
|
|
Off-road transport use of liquid and gaseous fuels
(except in agriculture, forestry, fisheries)
|
Gaseous fuels used for on-road transport
|
|
Off-road fuel use by the agriculture, forestry and
fishing industries
|
|
Non-transport use of liquid and gaseous fuels
|
Transport fuels when used as lubricants and solvents
or in other ways that do not result in emissions
|
The treatment of transport fuels is addressed through
the:
• Clean
Energy (Fuel Tax Legislation Amendment) Bill 2011;
• Clean
Energy (Excise Tariff Legislation Amendment) Bill 2011; and
• Clean
Energy (Customs Tariff Amendment) Bill 2011.
Jobs and
Competitiveness Program
The Government recognises the importance of
manufacturing and heavy industries that compete on international markets and
use large amounts of energy or generate significant levels of carbon pollution.
The goods these industries produce will remain important in a clean energy
economy.
In most industries, a carbon price will represent a
very small proportion of total revenue. However, some industries, particularly
heavy manufacturing industries, are pollution intensive.
Without appropriate assistance arrangements, applying
constraints on carbon pollution in Australia before other countries could risk
‘carbon leakage’ — activities could be relocated from Australia to countries
where those activities may not be subject to comparable carbon constraints. Carbon
leakage is not in Australia’s interests — either from an environmental or an
economic point of view. The Jobs and Competitiveness Program (the Program) is
designed to reduce this risk.
The Government has designed the Program to provide
assistance to our emissions-intensive, trade-exposed industry while still
maintaining a strong price signal for industries to reduce the pollution
intensity of their products. Making products like steel, aluminium, glass,
clinker and chemicals in cleaner and more efficient ways is good for the
environment, supports Australian jobs and will ensure our industry remains
competitive.
This issue is discussed in Chapter 5 of this
Explanatory Memorandum. The Program is set out in Part 7.
Energy
Security Fund and coal-fired electricity generation
An Energy Security Fund will be established to smooth
the transition and maintain energy security. This Fund will incorporate two
main initiatives. First, there will be transitional assistance to highly
emissions-intensive coal-fired power stations in Australia. This assistance
will come with conditions to ensure security of supply and transparent
information on the action taken by these generators to move to a cleaner energy
future. Second, there will be scope for payments for the closure of around 2,000
megawatts (MW) of very highly emissions-intensive coal fired generation
capacity by 2020. This will start the process of replacing existing, highly
polluting electricity assets with cleaner generation.
This issue is discussed in Chapter 6 of this
Explanatory Memorandum. The Fund and assistance for coal-fired electricity
generation is covered in Part 8.
International
linking
Australia’s carbon price will be linked to carbon
markets around the world from the start of the flexible price period. This
will allow reductions in carbon pollution to be pursued globally at the lowest
cost. Carbon pollution is not confined to national borders. It affects the
whole planet. International linking of carbon markets will allow businesses
that release carbon in one country to be matched up with businesses in other
countries that are able to reduce their carbon pollution at lower costs. International
linking encourages action to reduce carbon pollution around the world, and
plays an important role in helping developing countries adopt clean
technologies.
International linking will start when the carbon price
moves to its flexible price period from 1 July 2015. Australian businesses
will be able to buy international units from credible international carbon
markets or emissions trading schemes in other countries. They will be allowed
to use these units to meet some of their local obligations. When an Australian
business buys an international unit, it means that a tonne of pollution cannot
be released overseas. In addition, farmers will be able to sell credits
generated from the CFI to international markets.
Safeguards will be in place to ensure international
units are credible and do not undermine the environmental integrity of
Australia’s pollution reduction efforts. Until 2020, businesses will have to
meet at least half of their annual obligations each year by buying carbon units
or Australian Carbon Credit Units (ACCUs). It will be more efficient and less
costly to reduce Australia’s carbon pollution by a mixture of domestic
reductions and international unit purchases compared with relying on domestic
action alone. International linking allows Australian businesses to pursue
credible, cheaper carbon pollution reduction opportunities wherever they are
available.
If reducing carbon pollution in Australia is more
expensive than reducing carbon pollution in another country, Australian firms
will be able to purchase an international unit. With international linking,
the carbon price in Australia will be set by international supply and demand
for units.
This issue is discussed in Chapter 3 of this
Explanatory Memorandum. International linking issues will be addressed in Part
4 of the bill and in the Consequential Amendments bill.
Governance
Sound governance will ensure that the mechanism is
efficient and effective. The roles of making, administering and reviewing the
rules have been carefully allocated to ensure that appropriate accountabilities
are in place.
The Government and the Parliament will be responsible
for major policy decisions that require the balancing of environmental, economic
and social factors.
Clean
Energy Regulator
The Regulator will administer key elements of the
mechanism, as well as the CFI and the Registry. It will have robust powers to
ensure the integrity of the mechanism and the Registry.
The Regulator is set up through the Regulator bill. This
issue is discussed in Chapter 7 of this Explanatory Memorandum and the
Explanatory Memorandum for the Regulator bill. The Regulator’s
responsibilities and powers to administer and enforce the mechanism are set out
throughout the bill, and general powers set out in Part 23.
Climate
Change Authority
The Authority will review pollution caps, the future
trajectory of Australia’s pollution levels and the performance of the carbon
price and will track Australia’s progress towards meeting its targets for
reducing carbon pollution.
The Authority is set up through the Authority bill. Its
role is discussed in Chapters 2 and 10 of this Explanatory Memorandum and the
Explanatory Memorandum for the Authority bill. The Authority’s
responsibilities and powers to conduct reviews are set out in Part 22.
Productivity
Commission
The Productivity Commission will review industry
assistance under Parts 7 and 8. It will also review the impact of the
carbon price on industry and continue reporting on actions by other countries
to reduce carbon pollution.
This issue is discussed in Chapters 5 and 6 of this
Explanatory Memorandum. The Commission’s responsibilities and powers to
conduct reviews are set out in Parts 7 and 8.
Links
to other Regulators
The mechanism will be administered by the Regulator;
however other national economic Regulators and law enforcement agencies will also
have a role. Under the Package, the Regulator will be given powers to share
information and cooperate with these agencies.
The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission
(ACCC) administers and enforces economy-wide competition, fair trading and
consumer protection laws, which will apply to business activity under the
mechanism. The ACCC has received additional funding of $12.8 million over four
years for additional resources to deal with false and misleading claims about
the carbon price.
The Australian Securities and Investments Commission
(ASIC) administers and enforces Australia’s financial services laws, which will
cover emissions units, as these will be defined as financial products. It will
also have responsibility for the regulation of related trading markets.
The Regulator will also have powers to work with the
Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (Austrac), the Australian
Federal Police and the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions concerning
activities that may contravene the requirements of the mechanism and be linked
with fraud and criminal activity, such as money laundering.
The bill’s
operation and background
Simplified
outlines
The bill includes a simplified outline of the
mechanism and each Part of the bill includes a simplified outline of that
Part’s contents.
Date
of effect and application
Once passed:
• clauses
1 and 2 will commence on the date the bill receives the Royal Assent;
• the
substantive provisions of the bill (clauses 3 to 303 and 304 to 311) will
commence on a date to be proclaimed; and
• clauses
303A, 303B and 312 will commence on the day after the bill receives the Royal
Assent.
The first year for which entities will be liable under
the mechanism will commence on 1 July 2012. This is achieved by use of the
phrase ‘eligible financial year’ which is defined to mean the financial year
beginning on 1 July 2012 or a later financial year.
Prompt commencement will allow liable entities and the
Regulator to prepare for the mechanism and for the Regulator to prepare for its
functions as the responsible agency for the CFI and the Registry. The
timeframe will also provide time for:
• education
and assistance for entities which are likely to be liable and their
representatives; and
• receipt
and assessment of applications, for example, for certificates of eligibility
for coal-fired generation assistance, Registry accounts, obligation transfer
numbers, emissions-intensive trade-exposed assistance and for reforestation.
Proposal
announced
The measures are based on the announcement on 10 July
2011 and the publication of Securing a clean
energy future: The Australian Government’s climate change plan.
Transitional
provisions and consequential amendments
The transitional provisions and consequential
amendments are included in the Consequential Amendments bill. There is a
separate Explanatory Memorandum for that bill.
Financial
impact
The financial impact associated with the legislative
proposals in the Clean Energy Legislative Package, is reflected in Fiscal Tables 1 to 4 below.
Further detail on the financial implications of these
measures is provided in Securing a clean
energy future: The Australian Government’s climate change plan and
related documents.
The Government will use all of the revenue it receives
from the sale of emissions units to help households and businesses adjust and
move Australia to the low pollution economy of the future.
Fiscal Table 1: Plan for a clean energy future
|
|
Fiscal
Impact ($m)
|
Fwd
Est’s.
|
|
|
2011-12
|
2012-13
|
2013-14
|
2014-15
|
|
Revenue from the sale of units
|
0
|
7,740
|
8,690
|
9,190
|
25,620
|
|
Revenue from the application of
carbon price via other measures
|
0
|
290
|
320
|
320
|
930
|
|
Fuel tax credit reductions
|
0
|
570
|
70
|
70
|
710
|
|
Household assistance measures
|
-1,534
|
-4,230
|
-4,809
|
-4,830
|
-15,403
|
|
Assistance for low- to middle-income households
|
-1,470
|
-4,125
|
-4,672
|
-4,700
|
-14,967
|
|
Increases in transfer
payments
|
-1,470
|
-775
|
-2,302
|
-2,380
|
-6,927
|
|
Tax reform
|
0
|
-3,350
|
-2,370
|
-2,320
|
-8,040
|
|
Low Carbon Communities - redesign and extension
|
-5
|
-39
|
-83
|
-90
|
-217
|
|
Other household energy efficiency measures
|
-7
|
-13
|
-15
|
-13
|
-48
|
|
Household assistance implementation
|
-51
|
-54
|
-39
|
-28
|
-172
|
|
Support for jobs
|
-26
|
-3,017
|
-3,475
|
-3,773
|
-10,291
|
|
Jobs and Competitiveness Program
|
0
|
-2,851
|
-3,059
|
-3,312
|
-9,222
|
|
Clean Technology Program
|
-19
|
-142
|
-245
|
-312
|
-717
|
|
Increased small business instant asset write-off
|
0
|
0
|
-100
|
-100
|
-200
|
|
Regional structural adjustment
|
0
|
-10
|
-50
|
-30
|
-90
|
|
Other business energy efficiency measures
|
-7
|
-15
|
-21
|
-19
|
-62
|
|
Clean Energy Finance Corporation
|
-2
|
-21
|
-467
|
-455
|
-944
|
|
Energy security and transformation
|
-1,009
|
-1
|
-1,003
|
-1,042
|
-3,054
|
|
Land and biodiversity measures
|
-69
|
-131
|
-506
|
-489
|
-1,194
|
|
Carbon Farming Initiative
|
0
|
-47
|
-65
|
-81
|
-193
|
|
Biodiversity Fund
|
-37
|
-35
|
-250
|
-251
|
-572
|
|
Carbon Farming Futures Program
|
-31
|
-30
|
-113
|
-102
|
-276
|
|
Carbon Farming Initiative Non-Kyoto Carbon Fund
|
0
|
-1
|
-50
|
-47
|
-97
|
|
Regional Natural Resource Management Planning
|
0
|
-13
|
-23
|
-4
|
-40
|
|
Other land and biodiversity measures
|
-1
|
-5
|
-5
|
-4
|
-16
|
|
Governance
|
-78
|
-90
|
-106
|
-107
|
-382
|
|
Clean Energy Regulator
|
-68
|
-68
|
-61
|
-59
|
-256
|
|
Coverage of synthetic greenhouse gases
|
-1
|
-2
|
-26
|
-31
|
-60
|
|
Climate Change Authority
|
0
|
-6
|
-9
|
-9
|
-25
|
|
Productivity Commission Reviews
|
-4
|
-4
|
-5
|
-5
|
-18
|
|
Other governance
|
-5
|
-9
|
-5
|
-4
|
-23
|
|
Total impact
|
-2,717
|
1,110
|
-1,285
|
-1,116
|
-4,008
|
Fiscal Table 2: Plan for a clean energy future
|
|
Underlying
Cash Balance Impact ($m)
|
Fwd
Est’s.
|
|
|
2011-12
|
2012-13
|
2013-14
|
2014-15
|
|
Total receipts (net of free units)
|
0
|
4,270
|
6,680
|
7,211
|
18,161
|
|
Total payments
|
-2,683
|
-4,779
|
-7,078
|
-7,303
|
-21,843
|
|
Total impact
|
-2,683
|
-509
|
-398
|
-92
|
-3,682
|
Fiscal Table 3: Plan for a clean energy future
including Government measures
|
|
Fiscal
Impact ($m)
|
Fwd
Est’s.
|
|
|
2011-12
|
2012-13
|
2013-14
|
2014-15
|
|
MPCCC agreed measures
|
-2,717
|
1,110
|
-1,285
|
-1,116
|
-4,008
|
|
Additional Government measures
|
-223
|
-48
|
-322
|
178
|
-416
|
|
Coal Sector Jobs Package
|
-222
|
0
|
-231
|
-243
|
-696
|
|
Coal Mining Abatement Technology Support Package
|
0
|
-11
|
-16
|
-15
|
-41
|
|
Steel Transformation Plan
|
-1
|
-38
|
-75
|
-75
|
-189
|
|
Additional fuel tax credit reductions for heavy
on-road transport from 2014-2015
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
510
|
510
|
|
Total impact
|
-2,940
|
1,061
|
-1,607
|
-938
|
-4,424
|
Fiscal Table 4: Plan for a clean energy future
including Government measures
|
|
Underlying
Cash Balance Impact ($m)
|
Fwd
Est’s.
|
|
|
2011-12
|
2012-13
|
2013-14
|
2014-15
|
|
MPCCC agreed measures
|
-2,683
|
-509
|
-398
|
-92
|
-3,682
|
|
Additional Government measures
|
-223
|
-48
|
-304
|
124
|
-452
|
|
Total impact
|
-2,907
|
-558
|
-701
|
32
|
-4,134
|
Regulation
impact statement
The Regulation Impact Statement, entitled Australia’s plan for a clean energy future,
is available at http://ris.finance.gov.au.
The RIS was prepared by the Department and has been assessed as adequate by the
Office of Best Practice Regulation.
Outline of
chapter
1.1
Chapter 1 explains:
• which
greenhouse gas emissions give rise to liability;
• which
entities are responsible for those emissions;
• how
obligations may be transferred voluntarily from one entity to another, to allow
liability to be met more efficiently; and
• the
arrangements allowing entities using specified fuels to choose to opt into
coverage by the mechanism.
This chapter covers Part 3.
Context
1.2
The mechanism covers emissions from stationary
energy, industrial processes, fugitive emissions (except from decommissioned
coal mines) and non-legacy waste. Amendments to other legislation covering
fuel tax and synthetic greenhouse gases apply an equivalent carbon price to
some business transport emissions, non-transport use of transport fuels, and
synthetic greenhouse gases.
1.3
Around 60 per cent of Australia’s emissions will be
directly covered by the mechanism, and around two-thirds are covered by a
combination of the mechanism and equivalent carbon pricing arrangements. Together,
these approaches cover all six greenhouse gases counted under the Kyoto
Protocol.
1.4
This broad coverage will ensure that the economy as
a whole starts moving towards a clean energy future and that the cheapest ways
of reducing pollution will be implemented, thereby lowering the overall cost to
the Australian economy.
1.5
Treasury modelling shows that a broad-based carbon
price will encourage pollution reductions across all sectors of the economy. If
sectors are excluded, Australia misses out on their full contribution to the
pollution reduction task.
1.6
Agricultural emissions are not covered by the mechanism.
However, the CFI will give farmers and other land managers an opportunity to
generate income from taking action to store carbon in the landscape and to reduce
their pollution.
1.7
To minimise costs to business and reduce
administrative complexity, only firms that directly release large amounts of
greenhouse gas emissions or are natural gas suppliers (and are responsible for
potential greenhouse gas emissions embodied in the natural gas) will pay the
carbon price. It is expected that around 500 large polluters will be liable
entities under the mechanism.
Summary of
new law
Liability of direct
emitters
1.8
Part 3, Division 2 deals with the liability of
direct emitters under the mechanism. Liable entities include those who operate
a facility which emits more than a specified amount of greenhouse gases, and
those who are liable for emissions from a facility because they are members of
a JV or hold an LTC. It also deals with the way in which landfill operators
are covered by the mechanism.
Liability for
emissions embodied in natural gas
1.9
Part 3, Division 3 deals with the liability under
the mechanism for emissions embodied in natural gas.
1.10
Part 3, Division 4 deals with the way in which an
OTN is issued and used. An OTN is used to transfer liability for emissions arising
from the use of natural gas from the supplier to the user of that gas. An OTN is
used to keep track of liability so that it is not imposed twice on the same
emissions. For example, it ensures that emissions from the use of natural gas
that count towards a facility’s emissions do not count towards a gas supplier’s
liability. OTNs also ensure that liability is not imposed on natural gas that
is used in a way that does not result in emissions.
Direct
emitters - Liability for participants in unincorporated joint ventures
1.11
Part 3, Division 5 deals with unincorporated JVs
which operate facilities covered by the direct emitters provisions. These may
be ‘mandatory designated JVs’ and ‘declared designated JVs’:
• A
‘mandatory designated JV’ is designated when a facility is operated by a JV,
but no one party has operational control of that facility. The liability for
emissions from the facility is shared between participants in proportion to
their interest in the JV. Applying liability directly to JV participants will
facilitate the pass-through of the carbon price under contracts for sale of the
output of the facility held by the JV participants.
• A
‘declared designated JV’ is declared when a facility is operated exclusively
for a JV by an operator and the JV participants voluntarily assume the
liability for emissions, with the current operator’s consent. This will provide
JV participants more flexibility to manage emissions obligations from a
facility by allowing them to directly assume those obligations if they wish to
do so.
Direct
emitters - Transfers of liability by liability transfer certificates
1.12
Part 3, Division 6 covers LTCs. LTCs are used to
transfer liability for a facility from the facility operator to another member
of the corporate group or to a person who has financial control of a facility.
Opt in
arrangements for entities covered by the fuel tax system
1.13
Part 3, Division 7 allows the Minister to make
regulations establishing the Opt-in Scheme. This will allow entities who use
significant quantities of liquid petroleum fuels to opt into the mechanism to
manage their carbon emissions liability for specified fuels instead of paying
the equivalent carbon price through the fuel tax system. The Opt-in Scheme
will start from 1 July 2013.
Detailed explanation
of new law
Liability for
emissions under the mechanism
1.14
Under the mechanism a person may be liable as:
• a
‘direct emitter’ for greenhouse gas emissions directly emitted by a facility;
or
• a
‘natural gas supplier’ for greenhouse gas emissions embodied in natural gas
supplied to another person; or
• a
person that opts-in under the Opt-in Scheme for greenhouse gas emissions
embodied in specified fuels. [Part 3, clause 19], [Part 1, clause 5, definition of
‘covered emission’], [Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘facility’], [Part 1,
clause 5, definition of ‘greenhouse gas’], [Part 1, clause 5, definition of
‘natural gas’]
Such a person is a ‘liable entity’. [Part
1, clause 5, definition of ‘liable entity’]
Direct
emitters
1.15
A person is liable for greenhouse gases emitted
from the operation of a facility if:
•
the person has operational control of that facility
(with specific arrangements for JVs or LTC holders (see below)); and
•
the facility produced covered emissions (see below);
and
•
the amount of those covered
emissions exceeds a threshold or the facility is a ‘large gas consuming
facility’ (see below). [Part 3, clause 20(1)-(3)], [Part 3, clause 21(1)-(3)],
[Part 3, clause 22(1)-(3)], [Part 3, clause 23(1)-(3)], [Part 3, clause
24(1)-(3)], [Part 3, clause 25(1)-(3)], [Part 3, clause 55A]
The types of liability for direct emitters are set out
in Diagram 1.1.
Diagram 1.1 Liability of direct emitters under the carbon pricing
mechanism

Operational
control
1.16
Generally, a person with liability for emissions
from a facility is the person with ‘operational control’ of that facility. Operational
control has the same meaning as in section 11 of the NGER Act. [Part 1,
clause 5, definition of ‘operational control’] Operational
control is generally held by the person that:
• has
the greatest ability to introduce and implement operational, environmental and
health and safety policies for a facility; and
• is
declared to have operational control by the Regulator.
1.17
The Consequential Amendments bill broadens the range
of entities that can have operational control for the purposes of the NGER Act from ‘a controlling corporation or
another member of the corporation’s group’ to ‘a person’ (see Schedule 1, Part 2, items 340-348 of
the Consequential Amendments bill). [Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘group’]
1.18
The person with operational control will generally
have the greatest ability to bring about emissions reductions. This person
will also generally hold the contracts for sale of the output of the facility,
and will be in the best position to pass through the carbon price to customers
of the facility. If liability was placed on another party then carbon price
clauses in existing contracts may not be triggered.
1.19
Exceptions to this approach are provided through
LTCs and designated JVs (see below). These exceptions aim to address
situations where a person other than the operator can more efficiently manage
carbon liabilities.
Direct
(facility) emissions covered by the mechanism
Covered
emissions
1.20
‘Covered emissions’ are those greenhouse gas
emissions that count towards facility thresholds and give rise to liability
under the mechanism. Broadly, these are ‘scope 1 emissions’, where:
•
the greenhouse gas is released into the atmosphere
as a direct result of the operation of the facility;
•
the greenhouse gas is released in Australia; and
•
a method or criteria for measurement has been
provided to measure those emissions under the NGER Act (currently the National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting
(Measurement) Determination 2008);
•
the greenhouse gas is not one of the excluded types
of emissions (see below). [Part 3, clause 30(1) and (2)], [Part 1, clause 5,
definition of ‘covered emissions’], [Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘scope 1
emission’]
Scope
1 emissions
1.21
‘Scope 1 emissions’ are defined by reference to
section 10 of the NGER Act and regulation 2.23 of the NGER Regulations, and for
which methods or criteria for measurement are provided under the NGER (Measurement) Determination 2008. Scope
1 emissions are those that are the direct result of an activity or series of
activities (including ancillary activities) that constitute the facility (for
example the emissions produced when coal is burned at a power station).
Greenhouse
gases
1.22
‘Greenhouse gas’ has the same meaning as in section
7 of the NGER Act. [Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘greenhouse gas’]
Greenhouse gases include:
• carbon
dioxide;
• methane;
• nitrous
oxide;
• sulphur
hexafluoride;
• hydrofluorocarbons
specified in the regulations; or
• perfluorocarbons
specified in the regulations.
1.23
However, as explained below, most synthetic
greenhouse gas emissions are excluded from the meaning of ‘covered emissions’
and are covered by alternative arrangements under the Ozone Protection and Synthetic Greenhouse Gas
Management Act 1989.
1.24
The Consequential Amendments bill amends the NGER
Act to provide for additional gases to be included through regulations (see
Schedule 1, Part 2, item 323 of the Consequential Amendments Bill). This
allows additional greenhouse gases which are internationally recognised to be
brought into the mechanism in the future.
Direct
(facility) emissions not covered by the mechanism
1.25
Some scope 1 emissions from facilities are not
covered emissions for the purposes of the mechanism and give rise to no
liability under it. [Part 3, clause 30(2)-(12)]
Fuels
subject to excise or customs
1.26
Where liquid petroleum fuel, LPG, LNG or CNG are
combusted and are subject to excise or customs duty, the resulting emissions will
not count as covered emissions. [Part 3, clause 30(2)], [Part 1, clause 5,
definition of ‘compressed natural gas’], [Part 1, clause 5, definition of
‘liquified petroleum gas’], [Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘liquified natural
gas’]
1.27
This ensures that emissions from transport fuels
that are excluded from a carbon price, for example, emissions from private passenger
vehicles, are not subject to a carbon price. It also ensures that fuels
subject to an equivalent carbon price under fuel tax legislation are not also
subject to a carbon price under the mechanism.
1.28
An equivalent carbon price will be applied to some
uses of excisable liquid petroleum fuels, LPG, LNG and CNG under the Clean
Energy (Excise Tariff Legislation Amendment) Bill 2011, Clean Energy (Customs
Tariff Amendment) Bill 2011 and Clean Energy (Fuel Tax Legislation Amendment)
Bill 2011. [Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘liquid petroleum
fuel’]
1.29
Where liquid petroleum fuel, LPG, LNG or CNG are
combusted and are not subject to
excise or customs duty, the resulting emissions will count as covered emissions. [Part
3, clause 30(2)], [Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘compressed natural gas’], [Part
1, clause 5, definition of ‘liquified petroleum gas’], [Part 1, clause 5,
definition of ‘liquified natural gas’] For
example, certain fuels are combusted at petroleum refineries and are exempt
from excise – the emissions from the combustion of these fuels are covered
emissions.
Combustion
of biomass, biofuels and biogas
1.30
Emissions from the combustion of biomass, biofuels
and biogas are not covered emissions. Carbon dioxide produced from these
sources is part of the natural carbon cycle and does not count towards
Australia’s emissions obligations. Other greenhouse gases from the combustion
of these sources are a minor source of emissions and are excluded for administrative
simplicity. [Part 3, clause 30(3)]
Agriculture
1.31
Emissions from agricultural sources are excluded
from the mechanism. [Part 3, clause 30(4)]
Agricultural emissions correspond to many of the emissions sources covered by
the CFI Act, which broadly correspond to the agricultural emissions that
countries are required to report under international accounting rules.
1.32
The exclusion of soil-related emissions is limited
to emissions that arise from, or that are produced in, soil. Emissions that
result from carbon capture and storage, or emissions attributable to the
operation of a landfill facility are not exempted. [Part
3, clause 30(5)]
Other
emissions from land
1.33
Emissions, other than emissions attributable to the
operation of a landfill facility, from changes in the levels of carbon
sequestered in living biomass, dead organic matter or soil and that are
attributable to land use, changes in land use (including land clearing) or
forestry activities, are not covered emissions. [Part 3, clause 30(6) and (7)]
Fugitive
emissions from decommissioned underground mines
1.34
Fugitive emissions from decommissioned underground
mines are not covered emissions. A ‘decommissioned underground mine’ will be
defined in the NGER Regulations, and this definition will be used to determine
whether an underground coal mine has been decommissioned or not. [Part
1, clause 5, definition of ‘decommissioned underground mine’], [Part 1, clause
5, definition of ‘fugitive emissions’], [Part 3, clause 30(8)]
Legacy
emissions from landfill facilities
1.35
Emissions attributable to waste
deposited in a landfill facility prior to 1 July 2012 are not included in a
landfill facility’s liability. [Part 3, clause 30(9)], [Part 1, clause 5,
definition of ‘landfill facility’], [Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘legacy
emissions’]
1.36
These legacy emissions are excluded from liability
because, in many cases, there is little or no opportunity for landfill
operators to recover the cost of meeting a liability for waste that was
deposited in the past. However, as discussed below legacy emissions do count
for the purpose of determining whether a landfill facility exceeds emission
thresholds.
1.37
Details on developing a legacy emissions profile to
allow liable landfill facilities to determine the ongoing annual emissions from
legacy waste will be set out in regulations. [Part 3, clause 32]
Closed
landfill facilities
1.38
Landfill facilities which no longer accept waste
and closed prior to 1 July 2012 are excluded from the mechanism. [Part
3, clause 30(10)]
1.39
The operator of a landfill facility that closed
after 30 June 2011 will be a liable entity if the facility meets one of
the thresholds outlined below. If there is a change in operational control
after the facility is closed, obligations transfer to the new entity with operational
control. In many cases, this will be the land owner. The liable entity will
be determined through the operational control definition.
Synthetic
greenhouse gases
1.40
Emissions of synthetic greenhouse gases
(hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons and sulphur hexafluouride) are excluded
from the mechanism, except for emissions of perfluorocarbons emitted as a
result of aluminium production. [Part 3, clause 30(11) and (9)] Synthetic
greenhouse gases emissions that are excluded from the mechanism will face an
equivalent carbon price using existing import and manufacture controls under
the Ozone Act (which is covered
by the Consequential Amendments bill).
Scope
2 and 3 emissions
1.41
Indirect scope 2 emissions, such as those concerning
electricity use, and scope 3 emissions are not included in the definition of a
facility’s emissions. This ensures that there is no double counting of
emissions. . Scope 2 emissions are defined in section 10 of the NGER Act and
regulation 2.23 of the NGER Regulations. Scope 3 emissions are not defined in
the NGER legislation; they are greenhouse gas emissions that are generated in
the wider economy as a consequence of a facility’s activities but that are
physically produced by another facility and that are not scope 2 emissions (for
example, a gas-fired electricity generator will not be liable for fugitive
emissions associated with the production and transport of the natural gas that
it uses). [Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘covered emissions’], [Part
1, clause 5, definition of ‘scope 1 emission’]
Facilities
covered by the mechanism
1.42
The mechanism covers three types of facilities:
• landfill
facilities;
• large
gas consuming facilities; and
• facilities
that are neither landfill or large gas consuming facilities.
Different rules apply to liability for emissions from
each of these types of facilities.
Facilities
that emit greenhouse gases with a CO2-e of 25,000 tonnes or more
1.43
A person is a liable entity if a
facility it operates emitted covered greenhouse gases with a CO2-e
of 25,000 tonnes or more during an eligible financial year. [Part
3, clause 20(4)], [Part 3, clause 21(4)], [Part 3, clause 22(4)] This threshold broadly aligns
with the facility threshold in section 13 of the NGER Act.
Example 1.1 Application of 25,000 tonnes of CO2-e
threshold
During a financial year HosCo Ltd operates a facility
that emits 20,000 tonnes of CO2-e from the combustion of coal, and
15,000 tonnes of CO2-e from cement clinker production (an industrial
process).
The total covered emissions from the facility total
35,000 tonnes of CO2-e. HosCo Ltd is a liable entity.
Large
gas consuming facilities
1.44
A person is a liable entity if it
operates a facility that is a ‘large gas consuming facility’, which is a
facility that has, in a financial year after 1 July 2010, combusted natural gas
with a CO2-e of 25,000 tonnes or more. A facility ceasesto be a
large gas consuming facility when it satisfies the conditions specified in the
regulations. [Part 3, clause 20(1)], [Part 3, clause 21(1)], [Part
3, clause 22(1)], [Part 3, clause 55A], [Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘large
gas consuming facility’]
1.45
The arrangements for large gas consuming facilities
are designed to ensure that facilities do not move in and out of coverage from
year to year. They provide certainty as to when an OTN quotation should be
used and will ensure that gas suppliers will know that they are not liable for
emissions from particular facilities in advance of a financial year.
1.46
The threshold for large gas consuming facilities is
based on emissions in an earlier financial year. Once a facility reached this
threshold it is considered to be a large gas consuming facility for all future
years until such time that it satisfies the conditions specified in the
regulations. The regulations will provide that facilities that have
consistently reduced their natural gas combustion emissions to below 25,000
tonnes CO2 equivalence will cease to be a large gas consuming
facility.
Example 1.2 Liability for
facility with natural gas emissions
Brick Factory is operated
by NG Limited, which receives supplies of natural gas for use at the facility
from GasCo. In 2012-13, covered emissions from the operation of the facility
comprise:
•
10,000 tonnes of CO2-e from use of
natural gas; and
•
20,000 tonnes of CO2-e from other
sources.
Natural gas
emissions from Brick Factory have never been over 25,000 tonnes of CO2-e
in previous financial years. Therefore Brick Factory is not a large gas
consuming facility and NG does not have to quote an OTN.
Brick Factory has
total covered emissions of 30,000 tonnes of CO2-e. Because the
facility is over the direct emitters threshold, NG is liable for emissions from
the operation of the facility in 2012-13.
Since NG did not
quote an OTN for natural gas used at Brick Factory, it has a total liability of
20,000 tonnes of CO2-e for Brick Factory.
Landfill
facilities that exceed an emissions threshold
1.47
A landfill facility may be a liable entity if it
meets one of two thresholds:
• the
landfill facility emits covered plus
legacy waste emissions with a CO2-e of 25,000 tonnes or more; or
• the
landfill facility emits covered plus
legacy waste emissions with a CO2-e of 10,000 tonnes or more in
an eligible financial year, and is located within a prescribed distance of
another landfill facility which:
–
is a ‘designated large landfill facility’; and
–
accepts a similar classification of waste. [Part
3, clause 23(4) and (10)], [Part 3, clause 24(4) and (10)], [Part 3, clause
25(4) and (8)]
1.48
A ‘designated large landfill facility’ is a
landfill facility that triggered the 25,000 tonnes of CO2-e
threshold in the previous eligible financial year’. The Regulator may publish
a list of designated large landfill facilities and their locations to assist
landfill operators to determine whether the 10,000 tonnes of CO2-e
threshold applies to them for an eligible financial year. [Part 1, clause 5,
definition of ‘designated large landfill facility’], [Part 9, clause 206]
1.49
The additional, lower threshold is intended to
prevent diversion of waste from designated large landfill facilities to smaller
facilities nearby.
Example 1.3 Application of 10,000 tonnes of CO2-e
threshold for landfill facilities
LandfillCo, a landfill facility, emits 14,000 tonnes
of CO2-e in an eligible financial year.
LandfillCo is within the prescribed distance of
another open landfill facility, operated by TipCorp, which accepts the same
classification of waste and in the previous eligible financial year emitted
25,000 tonnes or more of CO2-e.
LandfillCo is covered by the mechanism and is a liable
entity.
Emissions
that count towards determining whether thresholds are met
1.50
All covered emissions count when determining
whether a facility meets the relevant threshold. To avoid doubt, for those
facilities that are not landfill facilities, their emissions from solid waste
disposal count for the purposes of determining whether that facility meets the
threshold.
1.51
For landfill facilities, all covered emissions plus
legacy waste emissions from the facility count for the purposes of determining
whether that facility meets the threshold for inclusion in the mechanism. This
includes covered emissions from combustion of energy sources at the facility.
Facilities
that exceed a pro-rata emissions threshold
1.52
A pro-rata threshold is applied where the liable entity
for a facility changes during an eligible financial year. If a facility’s
emissions reach or exceed the relevant pro-rata threshold, then the operator of
that facility will be a liable entity. This also applies when an entity holds an
LTC for a facility for only part of the year, or when there is a designated JV concerning
the facility for only part of a year. [Part 3, clause 20(1)], [Part 3, clause 21(1)],
[Part 3, clause 22(1)], [Part 3, clause 23(1)], [Part 3, clause 24(1)], [Part 3,
clause 25(1)]
1.53
The pro-rata threshold ensures that facilities that
would reach a threshold during an entire financial year continue to be covered
under the mechanism for the full compliance year even when the operator changes.
This maintains consistent coverage under the mechanism and prevents entities
from avoiding thresholds, deliberately or otherwise, by changes in operational
control or the issue of an LTC.
1.54
Pro-rata thresholds are calculated using a
specified formula. [Part 3, clause 20(5)], [Part 3, clause 21(5)], [Part
3, clause 22(5)], [Part 3, clause 23(5)], [Part 3, clause 24(5)], [Part 3,
clause 25(5)] The calculation is:
|
25,000 × number of
control days or certificate days (whichever is relevant)
|
=
|
pro-rata threshold
|
|
365
|
|
|
1.55
‘Control days’ are the days in the financial year,
where this is less than the full year, that a facility was under the
operational control of one or more members of a controlling corporation’s group.
[Part
3, clause 20(1)], [Part 3, clause 21(1)], [Part 3, clause 23(1)], [Part 3,
clause 24(1)], [Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘group’]
1.56
‘Certificate days’ are the days in the financial
year, where this is less than the full year, that a person was the holder of an
LTC for a facility. [Part 3, clause 22(1)], [Part 3, clause 25(1)]
Example 1.4 Pro rata threshold
A.M.Y Limited had operational control of a facility
for 100 days of the year. A.M.Y’s pro-rata threshold for that facility is
worked out as follows:
|
25,000 × 100 control
days ÷ 365
|
=
|
6,849 tonnes of CO2-e
|
If the emissions from that facility are 6,849 tonnes
of CO2-e or more during the 100
control days then those emissions will count towards A.M.Y’s liability.
Provisional
emissions numbers
1.57
If an entity is liable for a facility, then the
number of tonnes of covered emissions in CO2-e emitted from the
facility will be a PEN for that facility. PENs are used to work out an
entity’s total liability under the mechanism, and therefore the number of
eligible emissions units the entity must surrender (see Chapter 4). [Part
3, clause 20(1)], [Part 3, clause 21(1)], [Part 3, clause 22(1)], [Part 3,
clause 23(1)], [Part 3, clause 24(1)], [Part 3, clause 25(1)], [Part 1, clause
5, definition of ‘provisional emissions number’]
1.58
However, to ensure that emissions from natural gas
combustion are not counted twice - once by the liable entity for the facility
and once by the natural gas supplier to the facility - covered emissions that
are from the combustion of natural gas will not count towards the facility PEN
when a natural gas supplier is responsible for emissions embodied in the
natural gas. A liable entity for a facility will know whether they are
responsible for the natural gas combustion emissions from the facility as
follows:
• the
liable entity for the facility will be responsible for the emissions if an OTN
has been quoted for the gas supplied to the facilty;
• the
supplier of gas to the facility will be responsible for the embodied emissions
if an OTN has not been quoted
for the gas supplied to the facilty.
In the case of a large gas consuming facility OTN
quotation is mandatory and therefore liability will always rest with the liable
entity for the facility.
Further information about OTNs is provided below.
Re-allocation
of liability for direct emitters under the mechanism
1.59
In certain circumstances liability for a covered
facility will be shared between two or more entities. In other circumstances a
liable entity may transfer its liability to one or more other persons. The
situations covered by the bill are:
• where
the JV participants in a JV collectively operate a facility, liability will be
allocated amongst those participants.
• a
direct emitter may share or transfer liability to the participants in a JV.
• a
direct emitter may transfer liability to another member of its corporate group
or the financial controller of the facility outside of the corporate group by
means of a LTC.
These arrangements are shown in Diagram 1.2.
Diagram 1.2 Re-allocation
of liability by direct emitters

Designated
joint ventures
1.60
Where a JV has a covered facility, specific rules
apply to the way in which liability for that facility’s emissions will be
treated under the mechanism. These rules ensure that liability for a facility
is allocated where the JV participants collectively operate a facility and assist
with the efficient management of liability under the mechanism. Where there is
a distinct operator the treatment of JVs differs, depending on whether the JV
is a:
• mandatory
designated JV; or
• declared
designated JV. [Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘designated joint
venture’], [Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘joint venture’]
Mandatory
designated joint ventures
1.61
A mandatory JV exists where:
•
a JV has a facility; and
•
the JV participants have an agreement concerning
the facility; and
•
two or more persons have the ability to introduce
the operational, health and safety and environmental policies at the facility
(that is, satisfy the requirements of section 11(1)(a) of the NGER Act); and
•
no one person has greater authority to introduce the
operational, health and safety and environmental policies (and no declaration
has been made by the Regulator under sections 55 or 55A the NGER Act that a
person has operational control of the facility),
(see Example 1.5). [Part
3, clause 65], [Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘mandatory designated joint
venture’]
1.62
Where there is no one party with operational
control of a facility operated by a JV, JV participants are likely to hold
separate contracts for the sale of outputs of the facility and may not have
arrangements in place that allow for the pass-through of the carbon price in
those contracts.
1.63
Imposing mandatory liability on each of the JV
participants will maximise the chance that change of law or price pass-through
clauses in contracts will be triggered, so as to allow for pass-through of the
price to customers.
Example 1.5 Mandatory designated joint venture

Companies A, B and C are members of an unincorporated
JV that operates an emitting facility. They receive shares in the output of
the facility of 20 per cent, 50 per cent and 30 per cent respectively. They
collectively operate the facility, and no one party has the most authority to
implement operational, health and safety and environmental policies.
Accordingly, liability for the emissions from the
facility will be allocated to cach company in proportion to its interest.
1.64
The requirements that:
•
a JV has a facility; and
•
that JV participants have an agreement in place for
the facility,
are intended to ensure that the JV is sufficiently
related to the facility, and that the JV participants should have liability for
the facility, even if the JV participants do not formally own the facility. [Part
3, clause 65(1)(a)]
1.65
The JV participants must notify the Regulator that
they are participants in a JV, and of the facility to which the JV relates, by
31 July 2012 (where a facility already exists on 1 July 2012), or within
30 days of the JV coming into existence (for a JV that comes into existence
after 1 July 2012). [Part 3, clause 66(1), (2) and (3)]
1.66
Where a JV ceases after 1 July 2012to be a
mandatory designated JV and it would be reasonable to expect that, were the JV
a company (rather than a JV), the company would be a liable entity, then the
JV participants must jointly notify the Regulator within 30 days if a JV ceases
to fulfil the requirements for a mandatory designated JV. A JV will cease to
be a mandatory designated JV is any of the requirements of clause 65 are no
longer satisfied. [Part 3, clause 66(4)]
1.67
The participants must also apply for a ‘participating
percentage determination’, which is used to allocate liability for the
emissions from the facility between the JV participants. [Part
3, clause 66(5)]
1.68
If a person fails to notify the Regulator of the
JV, or of the cessation of a JV that has previously been declared a mandatory
designated JV, then they are liable to pay a civil penalty. [Part
3, clause 66(6)]
Declared
designated joint ventures
1.69
A declared designated JV is where:
•
the JV has a facility; and
•
the JV participants are parties to an agreement concerning
the facility; and
•
a facility is operated exclusively for the JV by a
person who may be a JV participant; and
•
none of the participants is an individual; and
•
the JV is not a mandatory designated JV.
(see Example 1.6).
For the purposes of the mechanism, this is the ‘joint venture declaration test’.
[Part 3, clause 67], [Part 1, clause 5, definition of
‘declared designated joint venture’]
1.70
This transfer of liability
recognises the potential complexity of JV arrangements and facilitates efficient
management of emissions liabilities by the participants.
1.71
As the operator of the facility may change over
time, and that accordingly provisions that refer to the operator should refer it
is the current operator (the ‘relevant operator’) that is involved in processes
such as consenting to the start date of a JV declaration. [Part
3, clause 67A]
1.72
The JV participants can apply to the Regulator for
a declaration that the JV is a declared designated JV if they have the written
consent of the relevant operator and have provided any other documents required
by the regulations or information requested by the Regulator. [Part
3, clause 68], [Part 3, clause 69]
1.73
Before making a declaration, the
Regulator can require the participants to provide more information about the
application, and must not make a declaration unless satisfied that the
JV meets the required criteria, namely:
• the
JV passes the JV declaration test;
• the
applicants have, and are likely to continue to have, the capacity, the access
to information and the financial resources necessary for them to comply with
the mechanism; and
• such
other requirements as are specified in regulations. [Part
3, clause 70]
1.74
If a JV participant has previously been subject to
obligations under the Clean Energy Act (once enacted) or associated
legislation, the Regulator must also be satisfied that the participant has a
satisfactory record of complying with those obligations. This provision is
intended to provide additional assurance that the participants in the JV will
meet their obligations under the mechanism by excluding participants that,
irrespective of their capacity to meet obligations, might have a history of not
meeting those obligations.
1.75
The declaration of the designated JV may come into
effect from an earlier date than the declaration is made, as long as that date
is within the same financial year. The declaration may also come into effect
in the future, at a date up to the end of the following financial year. In
each case the applicants and the relevant operator must consent to the start
date. This provides additional flexibility around the application to
facilitate forward planning and certainty for participants, and to reduce time
pressure on processing applications. [Part 3, clause 71]
1.76
The declaration continues indefinitely, although
the Regulator must revoke the declaration if:
• requested
by the JV participants, with the consent of the current operator of the
facility;
• the
Regulator is satisfied that the JV no longer meets the JV declaration test for
that facility; or
• there
is a continuing failure by one of the JV participants to pay a unit shortfall.
If a JV participant has an outstanding shortfall charge for more than 3 months
the Regulator must notify all of the JV participants that their declaration
will be revoked by the next 1 July unless the shortfall charge is paid, If the
payment is not made by 1 July the Regulator must revoke the declaration by
written notice to the JV participants. [Part 3, clause 72]
1.77
In the last case, The liability for the emissions
from the facility from 1 July
will return to the operator of the facility, but the liabilities for emissions
up to that time will remain separately with the JV participants (that is, the
operator and the other JV participants will not have liability for the default
on emissions, which will remain with the defaulting participant).
1.78
This provision is intended to ensure
that a JV participant cannot fail to meet its obligations indefinitely. The
declared designated JV is allowed to continue until 1 July to allow an
opportunity for the JV participants to seek to bring the defaulter back into
compliance, and to provide certainty for the operator and JV participants about
emissions liabilities for the remainder of the financial year. [Part
3, clause 67], [Part 3, clause 71], [Part 3, clause 72]
1.79
The participants in a declared designated JV will
also be required to jointly notify the Regulator within 30 days if the JV
ceases to pass the designated JV declaration test in relation the facility. A
JV will cease to pass the test if any of the requirements in clause 67 are no
longer satisfied. [Part 3, clause 71A]
Example 1.6 Designated
declared JV arrangements

Companies A, B and C are JV participants.
A facility is operated for the JV, but the party with
operational control (and therefore liability) is an independent contractor that
operates the facility (this transfer would also apply if the operator was owned
by the JV participants or if one of the JV participants was the operator).
The JV members apply to the Regulator for a
declaration and, if granted, each is liable for the facility’s emissions in
proportion to its interest in the facility.
Participating
percentage declaration
1.80
Designated JV participants must make an application
to the Regulator for a participating percentage declaration. This sets out the
shares of liability for emissions from the facility for each JV participant. The
application must be made in an approved form and the Regulator may request
further information concerning the application. [Part 3, clause 73], [Part 3, clause 74], [Part
3, clause 75]
1.81
The Regulator must make a determination of the
‘participating percentage’ of emissions for each participant in the JV, with
the percentages adding up to 100 per cent of the facility’s emissions. [Part 3,
clause 76]
1.82
The participating percentage determination must be
made according to a hierarchy of criteria, namely:
•
the share of goods each participant receives from
the facility; then
•
if the first criterion does not apply, the share of
access to services that each participant has; then
•
if the second criterion does not apply, any
criteria set out in regulations. [Part 3, clause 78]
1.83
The participants in a designated JV may also apply
for a replacement participating percentage determination to replace an existing
one. This is intended to allow for changes in the interests of the
participants over time, for instance if it is known that the amount of the
output of the facility taken by each participant will change as the JV
progresses. The percentages must always add up to 100 per cent so that all
covered emissions from a facility are accounted for. [Part
3, clause 79]
1.84
The determination can also be specified as a
formula, for instance based on participant shares of a variable product mix
from the facility. This flexibility recognises that JVs may be complex and
evolve over time. A static allocation of percentages might not reflect
changing interests, and require frequent changes to the determination. [Part 3,
clause 76]
1.85
The Regulator may also make a determination on its
own initiative, but before making any such determination must provide a copy to
the JV participants and have regard to submissions made within a specified
period, which is not to be less than 28 days. [Part 3, clause 77]
1.86
At each step the Regulator can accept an
alternative percentage if it is satisfied that this reflects equally well or
better the economic benefits received by JV participants. The determination
may also be varied by the Regulator issuing a replacement determination. [Part 3,
clause 78], [Part 3, clause 79]
1.87
This approach is intended to provide flexibility to
recognise the wide range of JV arrangements, while ensuring that the sharing of
emissions liability between JV participants accurately reflects the economic benefits
participants receive from the facility and minimising risks of avoidance
activities concerning the distribution of liability for emissions from the
facility.
1.88
The participating percentage determination will
come into force on a date specified in the determination. For a new designated
JV this date must be the same as the date of the declaration of the JV (that
is, the participating percentage must apply from the start date of the
designated JV).
1.89
For a designated JV which is already in existence
but is receiving a replacement participating percentage determination, the
determination may come into force at an earlier date than the determination, as
long as it is in the same financial year, or a later date as long as it is
before the end of the next financial year. In either case the JV participants
and the operator of the facility must consent to the date. This is intended to
allow flexibility for JV participants to apply for a determination in advance,
or to backdate the determination to reflect the timing of a change in
circumstances of the designated JV. [Part 3, clause 78A]
Liability
transfer certificates
1.90
The operator of a facility that is a direct emitter
may transfer its liability to a range of other specified entities by means of
an LTC. LTCs take two forms: corporate group transfers and financial control
transfers. [Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘liability transfer
certificate’]
Corporate
group transfer test
1.91
A registered company can apply to the Regulator for
an LTC to transfer to itself liability for a facility, where the facility is
under the operational control of another company within the same corporate
group. [Part 3, clause 80], [Part 3, clause 81], [Part 1, clause 5, definition
of ‘corporate group transfer test’]
1.92
Where an LTC is issued, the operator
is taken to have guaranteed the payment of any unit shortfall charge or
associated late payment penalty which is payable by the holder of the LTC for
the relevant financial year. [Part 6, clause 138] This
ensures that there is always a liable entity for a covered facility and
prevents the transfer being used to avoid emission liabilities.
Example
1.7 Corporate group liability transfer

A corporate group LTC is issued for Subsidiary Y concerning
Facility 2.
Subsidiary Y takes on the emissions liability for
Facility 2 under the mechanism. As a liable entity subsidiary Y also has requirements to provide
reports, under the NGER Act, to the Regulator for the purposes of determining
emissions obligations (see Schedule 1, Part 2, Item 367 of the Consequential
Amendments bill).
Corporation A will not have emissions obligations or
liability for Facility 2 but, as the controlling corporation of the corporate
group, will continue to have reporting obligations under the NGER Act.
Subsidiary X will, however, have consented to the
application for the transfer and in doing so will have guaranteed the payment
of shortfall charges incurred by Subsidiary Y.
Facility 2 will continue to form part of Corporation
A’s group for the purposes of meeting the NGER Act group thresholds, and
Corporation A will retain general reporting obligations under the NGER Act.
Financial
control transfer test
1.93
Liability may be transferred from the operator of a
facility to another person who has ‘financial control’ (see below) over the
facility. [Part 3, clause 84], [Part 1, clause 5, definition of
‘financial control’], [Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘financial control
transfer test’] As the person with financial
control of a facility may also have an influence over its emissions, it is
appropriate to let that person accept liability with the agreement of the
operator.
1.94
Transfers are not allowed to certain persons:
•
the person cannot be an individual person; this
avoids complications that may arise when an individual person is liable, such
as the person’s death or incapacity.
•
the person cannot be a foreign person; this
prevents liability from being transferred to a person overseas to avoid
compliance under the mechanism, recognising that it would be more difficult
enforce obligations against a foreign person. [Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘foreign
person’]
•
the person cannot be within the same controlling
corporation’s group as the operator; this is because an application for a
transfer in this instance is intended to be made under the corporate group transfer
test,
(see Example 1.8).
[Part 3, clause 84]
1.95
In many circumstances the operator of a facility
has financial control of that facility. However, in some circumstances, for
example contract mining and pipeline operations, the person with financial
control of a facility contracts out the operation of a facility to another
person.
1.96
‘Financial control’ covers a person
that has a significant ability to control a facility through financial means
only and, therefore, can give effect to decisions concerning emissions
reductions. It is not intended to include an agent or person acting on behalf
of an entity that has financial or operational control of a facility that does
not have any direct influence on emissions reductions. [Part 3,
clause 92]
1.97
‘Financial control’ recognises that more than one
person may have financial control over a facility. For example, several
persons may be participants in a JV or partnership that collectively have
financial control of a facility. In these circumstances, the person with the
equal or greatest share in the economic benefits from a facility will have
financial control for the purposes of the mechanism. [Part 3,
clause 92]
Criteria
for the issue of a liability transfer certificate
1.98
An entity must meet the same criteria for the issue
of an LTC by the Regulator for a corporate group transfer (see above). [Part
3, clause 87] These criteria are included to ensure
that an entity has the capacity, access to financial resources and information
to comply with its obligations under the mechanism, as well as the NGER Act.
1.99
The financial criterion ensures that a person does
not transfer liability to a person that cannot meet mechanism obligations in
order to avoid or delay compliance. This test is not, however, intended to
involve an exhaustive explanation by the applicant of its financial situation.
[Part
3, clause 87]
Reporting
obligations and liability transfer certificates
1.100
The LTC holder will take on any obligation to
report under the NGER Act for a facility under a financial control LTC. This
includes reporting obligations concerning not only greenhouse gas emissions, but
also energy production and energy consumption where currently required under
the NGER Act. This is given effect by the Consequential Amendments bill (see
Schedule 1, Part 2, items 175-181 of the Consequential Amendments bill).
1.101
The LTC holder will not take on any obligation to
report under the NGER Act for a facility which is the subject of a corporate
group LTC because general reporting obligations under the NGER Act do not
follow the transfer, but remain with the controlling corporation of the
corporate group.
Example 1.8 Transfer of
liabilities from the operator to the financial controller of a facility

Subsidiary F, which is part of Controlling Corporation
B’s group, has financial control over Facility 1. Subsidiary F (with consent
from Corporation A and Corporation B) applies for an LTC.
An LTC is issued and Subsidiary F takes on all
obligations and liability for Facility 1 under the mechanism and under the NGER
Act — this includes reporting concerning emissions, energy production
and energy consumption.
Corporation A will not have obligations or liability
for Facility 1 under the mechanism or under the NGER Act.
Application
process for a liability transfer certificate
1.102
An application for an LTC must be made in writing
in a form approved by the Regulator and include specific information:
• An
application for a corporate group LTC must be accompanied by a written statement
from the operator of the facility that it has operational control of the
facility, is a member of the same corporate group as the transferee and
consents to the transfer. [Part 3, clause 81(c)], [Part 1, clause 5, definition
of ‘member’]
• An
application for a financial control LTC must include the written consent of the
controlling corporation of the corporate group (if the operator is a member of
a corporate group), or the facility operator. In either case, the application
must include any information and documents specified in the regulations. This
is intended to include information and documents that support an entity’s
application and demonstrate that the entity meets the criteria for the issue of
an LTC. [Part 3, clause 85(3)]
1.103
To assist the Regulator’s decision making, the Regulator
may request further information about an application within a period specified
in a notice given by the Regulator. The Regulator must ensure that the
information requested is relevant to its consideration of the application and
must exercise this power reasonably. [Part 23, clause 297] If
the applicant does not provide the information in the time required, then the Regulator
may refuse to consider the application or refuse to take any action, or any
further action, concerning the application. [Part 3, clause 82], [Part 3, clause 86]
1.104
The Regulator must take all reasonable steps to
ensure that a decision is made on an application for an LTC within 90 days of
receiving an application or within 90 days of being given further information.
The Regulator must inform an applicant in writing if it decides to refuse to
issue an LTC. [Part 3, clause 83], [Part 3, clause 87]
Duration
of a liability transfer certificate
1.105
The start date may be at an earlier date within the
same financial year as the day on which the LTC is issued, or a later date up
to the end of the next financial year if the applicant and the relevant parties
consent to that start day. This ensures that all persons that may be liable under
the mechanism know who is liable for a given period. It
also provides flexibility for advance applications to increase certainty for
applicants and assist with forward planning to meet obligations under the
mechanism. This flexibility may also even out the spread of applications over
the year and consequently spread the workload for the Regulator in assessing
applications [Part 3, clause 88]
1.106
Once made, an LTC remains in force indefinitely
unless it is surrendered or cancelled. [Part 3, clause 88(4)]
Voluntary
surrender of liability transfer certificate
1.107
If an entity wants to surrender an LTC it must
obtain written consent from the Regulator. The Regulator must not consent to
the surrender unless:
•
where applicable, the controlling corporation(s) or
facility operator that agreed to the making of the application for the LTC
agrees to the surrender; and
•
the LTC has been in force for at least four years;
or
•
the LTC has been in force for less than four years,
but the Regulator is satisfied that there are special circumstances that warrant
the giving of its consent to the surrender. [Part 3, clause 89]
1.108
If the Regulator refuses its consent, then it must
give written notice to the person. [Part 3, clause 89(5)]
1.109
Special circumstances are unlikely to include a
change of operator or contract, as these changes are normal business practice
and are foreseeable by a person at the time of their application for an LTC. The
four year requirement ensures that the liable entity remains consistent and
prevents multiple transfers of liability aimed at avoiding liability. [Part
3, clause 89]
Cancellation
of liability transfer certificate
1.110
The Regulator must, by written notice, cancel an
LTC in the following circumstances:
•
if a company ceases to pass a corporate group or
financial control liability transfer tests;
•
in the case of corporate group LTC, the company is
no longer a member of the controlling corporation’s group;
•
in the case of a financial control LTC, the holder
of the LTC ceases to be a member of the corporate group of the controlling corporation
that consented to the application;
•
if a company has not paid a unit shortfall charge
more than 30 days after it became due for payment;
•
if the company has become an
externally-administered body corporate (within the meaning of the Corporations Act 2001); or
•
if regulations specify one or more other grounds
for cancellation and at least one of those grounds is applicable to entity. [Part
3, clause 90]
1.111
The cancellation or surrender of an LTC will result
in future obligations and liability returning to the person that would have had
obligations and liability in the absence of the LTC. The Regulator will be
required to provide written notice of the cancellation to the person with
operational control of the facility of the cancellation of an LTC to ensure
that the operator is aware that it has reassumed liability for the emissions
from the facility. [Part 3, clause 89], [Part 3, clause 90]
1.112
Each LTC relates to a single facility. This allows
a person to apply for the transfer of liability for particular facilities at
different times, as the person’s circumstances change. [Part 3,
clause 80], [Part 3, clause 81]
1.113
An LTC transfers significant obligations concerning
a facility. For this reason an LTC can only be issued by the Regulator and is
not transferable. [Part 3, clause 91]
Definitions
relevant to direct emitters
‘Persons’
that may be liable entities
1.114
The mechanism applies to liable
entities, which are responsible for their emissions of greenhouse gases. The
way in which these entities are liable is set out in Part 3. [Part 3,
clause 19]
1.115
A liable entity may be any type of legal person,
including an individual, a trust (a trustee or trust estate), a body corporate,
corporation sole, a body politic (that is, the Australian, state and territory governments)
and a local governing body. [Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘person’], [Part 1,
clause 5, definition of ‘local governing body’], [Part 1, clause 5, definition
of ‘trust’], [Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘trustee’], [Part 1, clause 5,
definition of ‘trust estate’]
1.116
The Australian Government and the state, territory
and local governments are bound by the bill. In line with normal practice, the
Crown is not subject to prosecution for a criminal offence or a pecuniary penalty,
with the exception of penalties for late payment of shortfall charge and for
failure to meet relinquishment requirements. This protection does not apply to
an authority of the Crown, such as a body conducting a business activity. [Part 1,
clause 8]
1.117
Government bodies may be liable under the mechanism
if they fall within the criteria set out in Part 3.
Meaning
of ‘facility’
1.118
‘Facility’ is defined in section 9 of the NGER Act. Broadly,
a facility is an activity, or a series of activities, where:
•
greenhouse gas emissions are produced; or
•
energy is produced; or
•
energy is consumed.
1.119
The activity or activities must form a single
undertaking or enterprise and meet requirements in the regulations, or they
must be declared to be a facility by the Regulator.
1.120
A ‘landfill facility’ is defined as a facility for
the disposal of solid waste as landfill, and includes a facility that is closed
for the acceptance of waste. [Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘landfill facility’]
1.121
The landfill provisions are not intended to cover
facilities for which disposal of solid waste is a secondary purpose, for
example a mine that disposes of mine-generated waste on‑site. It should be
noted that direct emissions from waste still count towards emissions thresholds
and emissions liabilities for facilities that are not landfills.
Measurement
of covered emissions
1.122
Under the mechanism, greenhouse gases emitted from
the operation of a facility will be measured using methods to be determined
under subsection 10(3) of the NGER Act, or methods which meet criteria under
that subsection, where the use of those methods satisfies any conditions
specified under that subsection. [Part 3, clause 31]
1.123
The Consequential Amendments bill provides for
subsection 10(3) of the NGER Act to allow the Minister to determine the methods
and criteria for methods by which amounts of emissions are to be measured. A
single determination will apply for the mechanism and the NGER Act (see
Schedule 1, Part 2, items 337-339 of the Consequential Amendments bill). These
methods are currently published in the National
Greenhouse and Energy Reporting (Measurement) Determination 2008.
Liability for emissions from natural gas
Overview
1.124
Natural gas is used by large facilities, small and
medium-sized businesses, and households. Given the significant amount of
natural gas used beyond large facilities, a two-tiered approach applies to
provide efficient and complete coverage of greenhouse gas emissions embodied in
natural gas:
• large
users of natural gas are responsible for their own emissions; and
• natural
gas suppliers are responsible for the remaining emissions from natural gas used
by other end-use customers.
Applying liability to a relatively small number of
suppliers is an effective way of applying a carbon price to the natural gas
emissions of many small to medium end-users.
1.125
To ensure that there is no double counting of
emissions OTNs are used to let suppliers and end-users know who is responsible
for the emissions that will result from a particular supply of gas. In some
circumstances, there is also flexibility for medium sized gas users to quote an
OTN and assume liability for their natural gas emissions, instead of their
supplier.
Responsibility
for emissions from natural gas combustion
1.126
Under the mechanism liability for natural gas
applies to the following entities:
• to
a natural gas supplier when it
supplies gas to another person who does not quote an OTN and when it may
reasonably be expected that the gas is wholly or partly for use by that other
person [Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘distribution pipeline’]
• to
a person who is a liable entity for a large
gas consuming facility (see above); in this case a natural gas
supplier is not liable for the emissions when that person quotes an OTN to the
supplier;
• other
OTN holders who are permitted to
quote an OTN for natural gas supplied to them. Typically the OTN holder will purchase
gas for a facility under its operational control (which is not a large gas
consuming facility) and will want to assume liability from the supplier.
These types of liable entities are set out in Diagrams 1.4 and 1.5.
1.127
For natural gas suppliers gas liability applies to
potential emissions embodied in natural gas and not actual emissions. This is
because liability generally arises before the gas is combusted and emissions
are released. In practice, there is little difference between the actual
emissions arising from the combustion of natural gas among different customers:
the use of potential emissions does not lead to material inaccuracies compared
with actual emissions.
Diagram 1.3 Liability for gas supplied

Diagram 1.4 Liability for
natural gas

Liability for
natural gas suppliers
1.128
Natural gas suppliers are liable where:
• the
natural gas has been withdrawn from a natural gas supply pipeline to supply to a
customer; and
• it
may reasonably be expected that the customer will consume all or part of the
gas; and
• the
customer does not quote an OTN to the supplier for that natural gas;[Part 3, clause 33], [Part 1, clause 5,
definition of ‘supply’], [Part 1, clause 6], [Part 1, clause 5, definition of
‘natural gas supplier’]
1.129
Any supplies that occur within the
natural gas supply pipeline system (which would include both transmission and
distribution pipelines), such as wholesale gas supplies between gas producers
and gas retailers, do not involve consumption of the gas and, therefore, do not
create a liability for the natural gas supplier (in this case, the producer).
1.130
Gas supplies that may result in liability for the gas
supplier (assuming no OTN is quoted) include, but are not limited to, supplies
to:
• a
residential customer;
• a
business customer, such as an office building or a small to medium business
that uses gas for heating;
• the
operator of a gas pipeline, where gas is supplied to the pipeline operator for
use in compressors that are attached to the pipeline.
1.131
A supply occurs when the natural gas passes a point
ascertained in accordance with the regulations. If the regulations do not
specify such a point, a supply occurs at the point when the gas is delivered to
the customer. [Part 1, clause 6]
Preliminary and provisional emissions numbers
1.132
Each supply of natural gas for which a natural gas
supplier is liable gives rise to a preliminary EN. A preliminary EN is equal
to the amount of greenhouse gas emissions in tonnes of CO2-e
embodied in the amount of natural gas supplied, and which is withdrawn from a
gas supply pipeline for the purpose of the supply to the customer.
1.133
The PEN of the natural gas supplier is the sum of
the supplier’s preliminary ENs for the financial year. [Part
3, clause 33]
1.134
The regulations may specify that the natural gas
supplier can ‘net out’ certain amounts of natural gas from their PEN. [Part
3, clause 33(3)] This allows for ‘fine tuning’ of
a supplier’s liability, which addresses specific circumstances where the
general rules result in liability being applied in situations when it should
not.
Example 1.9 Natural gas
supplier
In a financial year, a GasCorp supplies a total amount
of natural gas to its customers with potential emissions embodied in the
natural gas of 150,000 tonnes of CO2-e. Of this amount of natural
gas:
• natural
gas with embodied emissions of 70,000 tonnes of CO2-e is withdrawn by customers
who quote an OTN to the supplier. The supplier is not liable for this amount
of emissions – liability rests with the OTN holders.
• natural
gas with embodied emissions of 80,000 tonnes of CO2-e is withdrawn by small
residential customers who are not required or permitted to quote an OTN. GasCorp
is liable for this amount of emissions.
Liability
for large gas consuming facilities
1.135
Large gas consuming facilities are responsible for
their own emissions (see above). A large gas consuming facility is a facility
that, in any previous financial year starting from 2010-11, had emissions from
natural gas of at least 25,000 tonnes of CO2-e, or the amount specified in the
regulations. This regulation making power allows for the definition of a large
gas consuming facility to change to reflect, among other things, future
industry arrangements.
1.136
To ensure natural gas suppliers have no liability
for these emissions the recipient of natural gas that is for use in the
operation of a large gas consuming facility must quote an OTN for the supply of
natural gas for use at that facility. [Part 3, clause 55A], [Part 3, clause 55B]
The recipient of the natural gas does not need to be the operator of the large
gas consuming facility to be subject to this requirement. Failure to quote an
OTN will result in a civil penalty. [Part 3, clause 55B(3)]
1.137
To give a natural gas supplier time
to make any necessary supply arrangements, a customer must notify the supplier
of its intention to quote an OTN. The notice must be in writing and given to
the supplier at least 28 days before the first OTN quotation, or within a shorter
time agreed by the supplier and the customer. [Part 3, clause 55B(2)] A
natural gas supplier must accept an OTN quotation made in this way. [Part
3, clause 59(4)], [Part 3, clause 60(4)]
Example 1.10 Large gas consuming facilities
Maximus Gas operates the Maximus Facility, a large
facility. Another company, AntheCo, is the recipient of supplies of natural
gas from GasCorp for combustion at the Maximus Facility.
In the 2010-2011 financial year, the Maximus Facility
had emissions from natural gas combustion of 70,000 tonnes of CO2-e.
From the 2011-12 financial year onwards (that is, from
1 July 2011), the Maximus Facility is a large gas consuming facility, because
its emissions from natural gas combustion in the previous financial year were
greater than 25,000 tonnes of CO2-e.
As the recipient of natural gas for use at a large gas
consuming facility, AntheCo is required to quote its OTN to GasCorp. 28 days
before the start of the mechanism, AntheCo notifies GasCorp in writing of its
intention to quote its OTN. AntheCo quotes its OTN to GasCorp on 1 July 2012
to take on liability for the natural gas supplied.
For a few months during the 2014-2015 financial year,
the Maximus Facility temporarily closes, and the natural gas emissions from its
operation are only 20,000 tonnes of CO2-e during that financial year.
In 2015-16, the Maximus Facility’s natural gas emissions return to 70,000
tonnes of CO2-e. The Maximus Facility remains a large gas consuming
facility, despite dropping below the threshold in 2014-15, because it passed
the threshold test in a previous financial year. The OTN quotation by AntheCo
remains in place in 2014-15 and future financial years.
Preliminary and provisional emissions numbers
1.138
In some situations natural gas consumed at a
facility is purchased by an entity other than the facility operator. In such
cases, double counting of liability is avoided by ensuring that where an OTN is
quoted for the gas, whether by the facility operator or another person, liability
always rests with the liable entity for the facility. [Part
3, clause 35(2)], [Part 3, clause 20(1)], [Part 3, clause 21(1)], [Part 3,
clause 22(1)], [Part 3, clause 23(1)], [Part 3, clause 24(1)], [Part 3, clause
25(1)], [Part 3, clause 20(8)-(9)], [Part 3, clause 21(7)-(8)], [Part 3, clause
22(6)-(7)], [Part 3, clause 23(8)-(9)], [Part 3, clause 24(7)-(8)], [Part 3,
clause 25(6)-(7)]
1.139
In the above circumstances, if some of the natural
gas is not ultimately combusted at the facility, the OTN holder will be liable for
that portion of natural gas not combusted at the facility. For example, this
would apply where a facility owner purchases gas for use at a facility that is
operated by another person, but also uses some of the gas at its own smaller
facility nearby.
Example 1.11 Large gas consuming
facility, where all natural gas received is combusted at the facility
Steel Mill is a large gas consuming facility operated
by JCL Limited. Another company, Danmetals Limited, receives supplies of
natural gas from a natural gas supplier for combustion at Steel Mill.
In 2012-13, covered emissions from Steel Mill comprise
90,000 tonnes of CO2-e from use of natural gas.
In a given financial year, Danmetals receives three
supplies of natural gas. The amount of natural gas in each supply has embodied
emissions of 30,000 tonnes of CO2-e. All of these amounts of natural
gas are combusted at Steel Mill.
Danmetals must quote its OTN to its natural gas
supplier, and the supplier must accept the quotation. Usually, under clause
35(1), a preliminary EN arises for OTN holders who quote their OTNs. However, since
Danmetals is not the operator of the facility it is not a liable entity.
JCL Limited is liable for Steel Mill’s emissions,
because the facility has total covered emissions of 90,000 tonnes of CO2-e.
Example
1.12 Liability where some of the gas is not used at the facility
In 2013-14, ElsieRylee Inc. operates Steel Mill and AmYear
Ltd receives supplies of natural gas from a natural gas supplier for combustion
at Steel Mill.
In 2013-14, AmYear receives supplies of natural gas
with total embodied emissions of 90,000 tonnes of CO2-e. Most of this gas is
combusted at Steel Mill, resulting in emissions of 80,000 tonnes of CO2-e. The
rest of the gas, embodying emissions of 10,000 tonnes of CO2-e, is used by AmYear
at Ferro Forge which is under its operational control. AmYear combusts half of
this gas at Ferro Forge, resulting in emissions of 5,000 tonnes of CO2-e.
The other half of the gas, embodying emissions of 5,000 tonnes of CO2-e,
is used at Ferro Forge as a feedstock. There are no other emissions from the
facility. See diagram below which represents these arrangements.
AmYear must quote its OTN to its natural gas supplier,
as the recipient of natural gas to be used at a large gas consuming facility.
It is liable for emissions of 5,000 tonnes of CO2-e from Ferro
Forge. No liability arises for natural gas used as a feedstock.
ElisieRylee is liable for
emissions of 80,000 tonnes of CO2-e at Steel Mill.
Liability for
OTN holders who voluntarily take on liability
1.140
In certain situations, entities can
quote an OTN and take on liability for natural gas emissions where the natural
gas is not for use in a large gas consuming facility. In these circumstances
OTN quotation is voluntary. [Part 3, clause 56], [Part 3, clause 57], [Part 3,
clause 58], [Part 3, clause 59], [Part 3, clause 60]
1.141
There are two types of voluntary OTN quotation:
• the
first is where a supplier must accept the OTN quotation. This is the case
where natural gas will be used in a way that does not result in emissions
(including as a feedstock) or where the gas is converted into LPG, LNG or CNG
that will subsequently fall within the fuel tax system.
• the
second is where a supplier may
accept an OTN quotation but they are not required to do so. This applies where
a person is permitted to quote an OTN for a large gas consuming facility and
has other facilities under their operational control that are not large gas
consuming facilities. This also applies where a person expects that a facility
under their operational control will become a large gas consuming facility in
the future.
Voluntary OTN
quotations
Eligibility
to quote an OTN where quotation is voluntary
1.142
Entities eligible to voluntarily quote an OTN to a
natural gas supplier and assume liability for embodied emissions from natural
gas are:
• large
users of natural gas; [Part 3, clause 56(1)(e)(ii)]
• persons
approved by the Regulator; [Part 3, clause 56(1)(e)(i)]
• users
of natural gas as a feedstock; [Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘feedstock’]
• users
of natural gas in manufacturing CNG, LNG or LPG. [Part 3, clause 56(1)], [Part 3, clause
57], [Part 3, clause 58]
Large
user of natural gas
1.143
A person is a large user of natural gas if they are
required to quote their OTN because they are the recipient of natural gas for
use at a large gas consuming facility. [Part 3, clause 55B]
1.144
If a person is a large user of natural gas, they
may quote an OTN to their natural gas supplier to assume liability for natural
gas supplied for use at other facilities which are under their operational
control which do not meet the ‘large gas consuming facility’ threshold. [Part
3, clause 56]
1.145
This approach allows large users of natural gas to
manage all their liability for natural gas, as long as one facility for which
they receive natural gas was a large gas consuming facility. This will
simplify billing arrangements where a large fuel user purchases natural gas
from one supplier for use at more than one facility.
Example 1.13 Large user
of natural gas
SDK has operational
control over a large manufacturing plant and is supplied natural gas for use at
the plant which it withdraws from a natural gas supply pipeline. In 2010-11
emissions from the plant comprise 40,000 tonnes of CO2-e from use of
natural gas.
In 2012-13, SDK is
required to quote an OTN to take on liability for emissions from this supply of
natural gas because the plant is a large gas consuming facility.
SDK also has operational
control over another smaller plant which is a facility in its own right. In
2011 emissions from this second plant comprise 15,000 tonnes of CO2-e
from use of natural gas.
In 2012-13, SDK is
permitted to quote an OTN to its natural gas supplier for the natural gas
supplied to it at the smaller plant. It is permitted to do this because it is
required to quote its OTN as the recipient of natural gas for use at a large
gas consuming facility.
The company makes an OTN
quotation in its natural gas supply contract, and the OTN quotation is accepted
by the natural gas supplier. SDK must manage mechanism obligations for all
natural gas supplied under this contract.
Approved
person
1.146
An ‘approved person’ can also quote an OTN for
natural gas supplied to them by a natural gas supplier. [Part
3, clause 56(3)] Entities can apply to the
Regulator to become an approved person in accordance with the specified
procedures and requirements. [Part 3, clause 56(4), (5) and (6)]
The Regulator will only approve an application if satisfied that the person
operates a facility and it is likely that this facility will have emissions
from natural gas of at least 25,000 tonnes of CO2-e, or an amount
specified in the regulations. [Part 3, clause 56(8)]
1.147
This allows entities that do not yet qualify as a
‘large user’ to quote an OTN if a facility that they operate is likely to
exceed the large gas consuming facility threshold. This might occur, for
example, where an entity expects to permanently increase production at an
existing facility or where they are setting up a new facility.
Example 1.14 Start-up
company that expects to be a large user of natural gas
NatGas is in the process of commissioning a
manufacturing plant. It expects to emit 50,000 tonnes of CO2-e
of greenhouse gases from the combustion of natural gas withdrawn from a
distribution pipeline in its first year of operation. NatGas applies to the
Regulator for an OTN and submits all information and documents specified in the
regulations.
The Regulator assesses the application and decides
that it is likely that NatGas’s emissions from natural gas combustion will
exceed the threshold value specified in the regulations. The Regulator, by
written notice, declares that the company is an approved person. NatGas is permitted to quote an OTN for
the natural gas it purchases for its new electricity plant.
User
of natural gas as a feedstock
1.148
If a person uses natural gas as a feedstock, they
may quote an OTN to their natural gas supplier to assume liability for embodied
emissions in natural gas supplied to them. [Part 3, clause 57]
‘Feedstock’ is defined as ‘a substance that is converted by a chemical process
into another substance that is not a greenhouse gas’. [Part
1, clause 5, definition of ‘feedstock’]
1.149
The person may ‘net out’ from their gross liability
any amounts of natural gas which are used as a feedstock and which therefore do
not result in greenhouse gas emissions. No liability arises for uses of
natural gas which ultimately do not result in the release of greenhouse gas
into the atmosphere.
User
of natural gas in manufacturing CNG, LNG or LPG
1.150
An equivalent carbon price applies to CNG, LNG and
LPG at the point that these fuels attract excise and customs duty through fuel
taxation legislation.
1.151
Some entities manufacture these fuels from natural
gas supplied by a natural gas supplier. Without special provision, liability
under the mechanism might arise for these fuels twice: once through the
mechanism when the fuel is supplied by a natural gas supplier, and again when
an ‘equivalent carbon price’ is applied at the time that excise or customs duty
is paid on the CNG, LNG or LPG.
1.152
Therefore, if a person receives natural gas from a
supplier, and carries on a business manufacturing CNG, LNG or LPG, the person
may quote an OTN to the natural gas supplier for the natural gas supplied. [Part
3, clause 58]
1.153
As with users of natural gas as a feedstock, the
person can ‘net out’ from their gross liability for the emissions embodied in any
amounts of natural gas which are used to manufacture these fuels. This will
avoid applying a carbon price twice to these fuels.
Mandatory
acceptance of OTN quotation for natural gas used as a feedstock or in
manufacturing CNG, LNG or LPG
1.154
To ensure that a carbon price is not
applied to non-emissive uses of natural gas, and that a carbon price is not
applied twice to fuels which enter the excise system, natural gas suppliers are
required to accept an OTN quotation for a supply of natural gas which is used
as a feedstock or in manufacturing CNG, LNG or LPG. [Part
3, clause 59(4)], [Part 3, clause 60(4)]
1.155
Where a person makes an OTN quotation that a
supplier must accept the OTN holder must provide the supplier with a written
declaration that sets out that quotation is being made under a relevant section
of the Bill. [Part 3, clause 59(3)], [Part 3, clause 60(3)] It
is an offence to make a false or misleading declaration. The maximum penalty
is a period of imprisonment for up to 12 months. [Part 3, clause 62]
Preliminary
and provisional emissions numbers
1.156
Each supply of natural gas for which an OTN is
quoted gives rise to a preliminary EN for the OTN holder. The exception to
this rule is where natural gas is supplied for use in a large gas consuming facility
(see above). A preliminary EN is equal to the number of tonnes of potential
greenhouse gas emissions embodied in the amount of natural gas supplied, in CO2-e.
1.157
The PEN of the OTN holder is the sum of the OTN
holder’s preliminary ENs for the financial year. [Part 3, clause 35(3)]
If an OTN holder has a PEN, they are a liable entity under the mechanism.
Netted-out
numbers
1.158
Particular amounts of natural gas can be ‘netted
out’ from an OTN holder’s PEN. The OTN holder’s PEN is reduced by the
netted-out numbers (but not below zero). [Part 3, clause 35(4)-(9)] The
purpose of netted out numbers is to reduce the PEN (but not below zero) to take
account of:
• the
need to avoid double counting, that is to account for where a PEN has arisen
for that gas under another provision of the Bill; and
• uses
of natural gas which do not result in greenhouse gas emissions; and
• amounts
of natural gas that will be manufactured into a substance which will have a
carbon price applied through alternative arrangements (i.e CNG, LNG or LPG). [Part
3, clause 35(4)-(8)]
1.159
In particular, if an OTN holder quotes an OTN for an
amount of natural gas, a netted-out number arises for the OTN holder where:
• the
OTN holder used an amount of that natural gas as a feedstock or in a way that
did not result in greenhouse gas emissions; [Part 3, clause 35(5)]
• an
amount of that natural gas counts towards the OTN holder’s ‘direct emitter’
liability under Division 1 of Part 3; [Part 3, clause 35(6)]
Note that this netted out number
does not apply to amounts of natural gas combusted at a large gas consuming
facility as these amounts do not give rise to a PEN under clause 35(3) in the
first place.
• the
OTN holder manufactures CNG, LNG or LPG from an amount of that natural gas, and
the OTN holder holds a licence under the Excise
Act 1901 to manufacture that fuel, and that fuel is entered for home
consumption and attracts excise duty; and [Part 3, clause 35(7)]
• the
OTN holder supplies an amount of that natural gas to another person who quotes
their OTN concerning the supply. [Part 3, clause 35(8)]
• the
regulations provide for additional netted out numbers. These will be included
where necessary provided they are consistent with the purposes of clause 35. [Part
3, clause 35(9)]
1.160
Once netted-out numbers are taken into account, a
person may have a PEN that is greater than zero. This will represent the
potential greenhouse gas emission embodied in amounts of natural gas that are
combusted at facilities that are not covered facilities.
Example 1.15 Feedstock
user of natural gas
JBurn Limited (JBurn) receives an amount of natural
gas from AK Gas. JBurn uses a portion of the natural gas as a feedstock in a
fertiliser manufacturing process that completely sequesters the natural gas
into the fertiliser. JBurn also uses a portion of the natural gas for heating
purposes.
JBurn quotes its OTN to AK Gas concerning the supply.
AK Gas is required to accept this OTN quotation, as it is made by a feedstock
user of natural gas.
The emissions embodied in the portion of gas which is
used as a feedstock is a netted-out number. JBurn will not be liable for these
potential emissions. However, JBurn will be liable for greenhouse gas
emissions released from the portion of fuel combusted for heating purposes. It
will have a PEN which is equal to the potential emissions embodied in the
natural gas supplied by AK Gas minus the netted-out number representing the use
of gas as a feedstock.
Example 1.16 OTN
quotation for natural gas used to produce CNG
The WA Facility is operated by JW Pty Limited (JW). In
2012-13, JW receives a number of supplies of natural gas from its supplier with
total embodied emissions of 30,000 tonnes of CO2-e.
In 2012-13, covered emissions
from the operation of the WA Facility comprise:
•
15,000 tonnes of CO2-e from use of
natural gas; and
•
5,000 tonnes of CO2-e from other
sources.
In 2012-13, natural
gas with embodied emissions of 15,000 tonnes of CO2‑e is converted
into CNG at the WA Facility and on-sold to another company.
JW quotes its OTN
to its natural gas supplier because it creates CNG from natural gas. The
supplier is required to accept the OTN quotation.
JW (as the OTN
holder) receives a preliminary EN under clause 35(1) for each supply of natural
gas in 2012-13. JW is a liable entity under clause 35(3).
JW adds the
preliminary ENs to give a PEN of 30,000 tonnes of CO2-e, however it
nets-out from this amount 15,000 tonnes of CO2-e for natural gas
converted to CNG under clause 35(7). Therefore under clause 35, JW is a liable
entity but has a PEN of 15,000. This amount represents the gas which is
combusted at the facility.
JW is not liable
for the other emissions of 5,000 tonnes of of CO2-e from the
facility as the WA Facility does not exceed the 25,000 tonne threshold.
Using
OTNs
Issuing
an OTN
1.161
An OTN may be issued in one of two ways; as a
result of an application, or on the Regulator’s own initiative. [Part
3, clause 37]
1.162
The Regulator may issue an OTN to a person if
satisfied that the person is likely to be permitted or required to quote an OTN
and the Regulator has carried out an identification procedure that enables the
Regulator to verify the identity of the person. [Part 3, clause 40], [Part 3, clause 41]
Once issued, an OTN is not transferable. [Part 3, clause 44]
1.163
The power for the Regulator to issue OTNs without
an application will simplify the process for entities that the Regulator can
readily identify as needing an OTN. For example, the Regulator can identify
many entities that are large users of natural gas from emissions data reported
under the NGER Act.
1.164
Where the Regulator is not able to
readily identify a person that needs an OTN, the person can apply for an OTN. [Part
3, clause 39]
1.165
If the Regulator refuses to issue an OTN, it must
give written notice of the refusal to the person. [Part
3, clause 42(4)]
Cancelling
or surrendering an OTN
1.166
OTN holders no longer permitted or
required to quote an OTN may continue to hold their OTNs except where the
Regulator decides to cancel an OTN. [Part 3, clause 43]
1.167
The Regulator may, by written notice, cancel an
OTN:
• that
is held by a person not permitted or required to quote it and who is unlikely
to be permitted or required to quote it in the future; and [Part
3, clause 43(2)(a)]
• if
a person has contravened a provision of the bill or an associated provision. It
is anticipated that the Regulator may take this step where there is an
unacceptably high risk of further breaches of the bill or associated provisions
concerning the use of that OTN. [Part 3, clause 43(2)(b)], [Part 1, clause
5, definition of ‘associated provisions’]
1.168
The Regulator must cancel an OTN if the person to
whom it was issued has ceased to exist. [Part 3, clause 43(3)]
1.169
Where a person is no longer required or permitted
to quote an OTN and is not likely to be required or permitted to quote an OTN
in the future they may surrender their OTN with the written consent of the
Regulator. [Part 3, clause 42]
Example
1.17 Cancellation of an OTN and grace period for OTN quotation
From 1 July 2012, NatGas makes weekly supplies of
natural gas under an OTN quotation to Davidson Ltd. Davidson Ltd has
previously quoted its OTN and advised NatGas in writing that it intends to use
the natural gas as a feedstock. Davidson Ltd is liable for emissions from its
use of the gas.
The Regulator discovers that Davidson Ltd is not
permitted to quote an OTN, as the company is combusting all of the natural gas
rather than using it as a feedstock.
The Regulator cancels Davidson Ltd’s OTN on 1 August
2012. The Regulator removes Davidson Ltd’s entry on the OTN Register and lists
the OTN and the time of cancellation on its website. The Regulator sends an
email to all natural gas suppliers that are listed on the OTN Register,
notifying the suppliers of the cancellation and the time of its effect.
Davidson Ltd and NatGas agree that the grace period
before liability reverts to NatGas will be 21 days, rather than the default
period of 28 days.
During these 21 days, NatGas supplies gas to Davidson
Ltd with embodied emissions of 1000 tonnes of CO2-e. Davidson Ltd remains
liable for emissions resulting from its use of this gas. After this time,
NatGas is liable for emissions embodied in the natural gas it supplies to
Davidson Ltd.
1.170
If an OTN quotation is in effect, and the OTN is
cancelled or surrendered, a 28-day grace period applies, during which further
supplies of gas made to the OTN holder will be treated as if the OTN were still
in effect. As such, during the grace period, liability for emissions embodied
in the gas will accrue to the OTN holder, not the supplier. The grace period
may be reduced by agreement of the supplier and the OTN holder.
The
OTN Register
1.171
The Regulator must keep an
electronic register called the OTN Register. The OTN Register will enable
suppliers to confirm that an OTN is valid, and that it belongs to the person
that quotes it. This register will be available for public inspection on the
Regulator’s website. It will contain an entry for every current OTN. When an
OTN is cancelled or surrendered the Regulator must remove the entry from the
register. [Part 3, clause 45]
1.172
An entry in the OTN Register will include an OTN,
the identity of the person that was issued with that OTN, that person’s last
known address, and their ABN if they have one. [Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘ABN’], [Part
3, clause 45]
1.173
The OTN Register will also include a list of
natural gas suppliers.
1.174
The listing of natural gas suppliers
on the OTN Register will serve two main purposes. It will assist users of
natural gas to find a supplier who may be willing to accept their OTN quotation.
It will also provide the Regulator with list of supplier who wish to be
notified of any changes to the OTN Register, such as when an OTN is cancelled,
surrendered, when the name of an OTN holder changes, or when a new entry is
made in the register. This will lower compliance costs
for suppliers as they will be sent up-to-date information on changes to the OTN
Register.
1.175
The Regulator must, if requested by
a natural gas supplier, include an entry for that supplier in the register. An
entry for a natural gas supplier will include the name of the supplier, their
last known address, their telephone number, their website address, their ABN
and any conditions the supplier places on the acceptance of OTN quotations
which the supplier is not required to accept. [Part 3, clause 45]
1.176
An OTN holder (or a natural gas supplier with an
entry in the Register) who changes their name or address as set out in the
register must within 28 days notify the Regulator of the change. A person who
fails to meet this requirement may incur a civil penalty. [Part
3, clause 47]The regulator may make an
alteration to the OTN Register when an OTN holder changes their name [Part
3, clause 47]
Quotation
of an OTN by a natural gas customer
1.177
A person quotes an OTN concerning a supply or a
class of supplies of natural gas by making a statement in writing concerning the
supply or class of supplies. The statement may be included in a contract,
order or similar document and may be in electronic form. [Part
3, clause 48]
1.178
A quotation must set out:
• the
words ‘quotation of OTN’ followed by the OTN;
• the
person’s name;
• if
the person has an ABN, the person’s ABN; and
• any
other information that is specified in the regulations. [Part
3, clause 48(1)]
1.179
Where the acceptance of an OTN is mandatory, it is
mandatory for a supplier to accept an OTN for natural gas that is for use:
• in
the operation of a large gas consuming facility; or
• as
a feedstock or in other ways that do not result in emissions; or
• to
manufacture CNG, LNG or LPG.
In this situation, the OTN holder must provide notice
on the first occasion on which they quote their OTN.
1.180
This is intended to allow natural gas suppliers
time to make any necessary supply arrangements, including reading the customers
meter. This notice must be in writing and must be given to the supplier at
least 28 days before the first OTN quotation, or a shorter time if agreed by
the supplier and the recipient. [Part 3, clause 55B(2)], [Part 3, clause 57(2)],
[Part 3, clause 58(2)]
1.181
In other circumstances OTN acceptance is voluntary
and there is no requirement for the OTN holder to give written notice.
1.182
A person must not purport to quote a number as if
it was that person’s OTN if it is not that person’s OTN. This is a ‘bogus OTN’.
[Part
3, clause 64(1)]
1.183
If a person purports to quote a bogus OTN, and that
number is not shown in the OTN Register as the person’s OTN, the natural gas supplier
must not supply natural gas to that person. [Part 3, clause 64(3)]
1.184
Natural gas suppliers will therefore need to check
the OTN register at the time an OTN quotation is made and ensure that the person
quoting the OTN is the person listed on the OTN register against that OTN.
1.185
A person is liable to pay a civil penalty if a
court finds that the person has quoted a bogus OTN or aided a person who quotes
a bogus OTN. [Part 3, clause 64], [Part 21, clause 252]
1.186
If an OTN holder purports to quote a number as an
OTN (that is, quotes an incorrect OTN) and the purported quotation is due to an
honest mistake, then the Regulator may determine that the Act has, and is taken
to have had, effect as if the OTN holder had quoted the correct OTN concerning
the supply. A determination by the Regulator must be in writing and must be
given to the OTN holder and the natural gas supplier. [Part
3, clause 53]
Process
of acceptance
1.187
For an OTN quotation to take effect it must be
accepted. Acceptance of an OTN quotation involves the supplier giving a
written notice to the OTN holder that the OTN quotation is accepted.
1.188
This may be included in a contract, order or
similar document and may be in electronic form. This formal process of acceptance
ensures that both the OTN holder and supplier understand when an OTN quotation
comes into effect. [Part 3, clause 59], [Part 3, clause 60]
1.189
The notice of acceptance must set out:
• the
words ‘acceptance of quotation of OTN’ followed by the OTN;
• the
OTN holder’s name;
• if
the OTN holder has an ABN, that ABN;
• a
description of the supply or class of supplies;
• the
name of the natural gas supplier;
• if
the natural gas supplier has an ABN, that ABN; and
• any
other information that is specified in the regulations. [Part
3, clause 59(5)], [Part 3, clause 60(5)]
1.190
If the acceptance is voluntary and the supplier
chooses not to accept the quotation, the supplier may still choose to supply
to the OTN holder, however the supply would take place as if the quotation had
not been made. [Part 3, clause 59], [Part 3, clause 60]
That is, the supplier would be liable for the potential greenhouse gas
emissions embodied in the gas supplied to that customer.
Example 1.18 Notice
period for OTN quotation where acceptance of quotation is mandatory
Anastasios Enterprises Limited (AEL) operates the TS
Factory, a medium-sized facility. In the 2012-13 financial year, PY Gas will
supply natural gas with embodied emissions of 15,000 tonnes of
CO2-e to AEL for use at the TS Factory.
During this financial year, AEL intends to use some of
this natural gas as a feedstock at the TS Factory, which will result in no
emissions.
Upon application by AEL, the Regulator issues the
company an OTN because AEL intends to use natural gas as a feedstock.
AEL intends to quote its OTN to PY Gas on 1 July 2012
to take on liability for the supply of natural gas. In this case, acceptance
of an OTN quotation by PY Gas is mandatory, and AEL must notify PY Gas of its
intention to quote its OTN. AEL and PY Gas agree on a notice period of 14 days
rather than the default 28 days. AEL notifies PY Gas in writing of its
intention to quote its OTN on 17 June 2012. AEL then quotes its OTN to PY Gas
on 1 July 2012 to take on liability for emissions from natural gas from
this date.
Withdrawal
of OTN quotation
1.191
An OTN quotation can be withdrawn and, when
withdrawn, an OTN quotation ceases to be in place. An OTN holder may withdraw
an OTN quotation by notifying the supplier in writing when either:
• an
OTN holder ceases to be permitted to quote their OTN concerning a supply or
class of supplied to which the quotation relates[Part 3, clause 51];
or
• an
OTN holder has a voluntary OTN quotation in effect and the natural gas supplier
agrees to the withdrawal of a quotation concerning a supply or class of
supplies. [Part 3, clause 52]
1.192
An OTN quotation is deemed to have been withdrawn
if a person’s OTN is surrendered or cancelled and a quotation of that OTN was
in effect immediately prior to the surrender or cancellation. [Part
3, clause 49], [Part 3, clause 50]
1.193
In these circumstances, the natural
gas supplier would have little notice of the withdrawal. Therefore, to enable
the supplier time to read the customers meter and begin a new billing period
(in the case that the supplier continues to supply the customer), the OTN
holder will be liable for the potential greenhouse gas emissions in any supply
that occurs in the 28 days from when the surrender or cancellation takes effect.
However if the supplier and OTN holder agree to an earlier date, the OTN holder
will only be liable for supplies that occur up to that date. [Part
3, clause 54], [Part 3, clause 55]
1.194
To provide suppliers with early
notice of the cancellation or surrender of OTNs, suppliers may apply to the
Regulator to be in the OTN Register. Suppliers who register in this way will
receive an email from the Regulator informing them of any cancellations and
surrenders.
Misuse
of OTN
1.195
The fact that the Regulator issues an OTN does not
permit a person to quote it. When a person quotes an OTN for a particular
supply or class of supplies the person must, at the time of quotation, be
required or permitted to do so. An OTN holder breaches the provisions in the
bill if they quote an OTN in circumstances where they are not required or
permitted to do so. [Part 3, clause 63] For
the avoidance of doubt, a person does not misuse their OTN if they are no
longer permitted or required to to quote an OTN concerning a supply but an OTN
quotation is in effect concerning that supply because the person was permitted
or required to quote an OTN at the time that the quotation was made.
1.196
If a person quotes an OTN in circumstances where
they are not required or permitted to do so, the validity of the transaction is
not affected by the breach. This ensures that a supplier accepting the
quotation of a valid OTN is not penalised by having a liability for emissions
embodied in natural gas supplied under an OTN quotation that the supplier
believed was permitted or required under the Bill. That is, the quotation will
relieve the supplier of liability concerning that supply. However, unlike a
quotation which is required or permitted, a person who misuses an OTN is liable
for the potential greenhouse gas emissions embodied in the fuel supplied and
does not have the benefits of any netted out numbers. [Part
3, clause 36], [Part 3, clause 63(4)]
1.197
A person is liable to pay a civil penalty, if a
court finds that the person has contravened the requirement not to quote an OTN
in circumstances where it is not required or permitted or has, for example,
aided such a contravention.
[Part
3, clause 63(1)], [Part 21, clause 252]
Definitions
relevant to liability for emissions from natural gas
1.198
Liability for fugitive emissions from pipelines will
apply through the general facility rules. [Part 3, clause 20], [Part 3, clause 21], [Part
3, clause 22]
1.199
‘Natural gas’ will be defined in amended
regulations to the NGER Act. [Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘natural gas’] This definition will
exclude substances which are not intended to be captured by the upstream
liability arrangements but which can be conveyed in a pipeline, for example,
pure ethane.
1.200
‘Supply’ is defined as supply (including re-supply)
by way of sale, exchange or gift. [Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘supply’]
A supply of natural gas will be taken to occur
when the natural gas passes a point specified in the regulations or, if this
does not apply, when the gas is physically delivered. [Part
1, clause 6]
1.201
It is intended, where possible, to align a gas
supplier’s emissions liability with metering arrangements for end-use
customers, so that the measurement occurs when the gas supplied passes through
a meter used to measure the volume of gas supplied for billing purposes. However,
in the absence of a meter, liability for emissions should reflect the amount of
gas delivered to the customer under the contract, noting that the gas must also
be withdrawn from a gas supply pipeline.
1.202
These arrangements are not intended to apply
outside the natural gas supply pipeline system (including both transmission
system and distribution networks). For this reason, gas must be withdrawn from
a ‘gas supply pipeline’. A ‘gas supply pipeline’ will be defined, for these
purposes, in the regulations and will exclude specified types of pipelines to
which these arrangements will not apply, including pipelines that convey
natural gas between a gas well and a gas processing plant, or a gas well and an
LNG export plant. [Part 1, clause 5 definition of gas supply pipeline’] For
the avoidance of doubt, any emissions from the combustion of natural gas at
facilities that are supplied by way of such excluded pipelines will count
towards the covered emissions of those facilities.
1.203
Certain types of ‘natural gas supply pipeline’ can
be excluded in the regulations. This allows for the exclusion of gas supplies in
pipelines which do not form part of the wider system that conveys gas to
end-use customers, for example, gas that is transferred along a pipeline from a
gas well to a gas production facility and sold to the production facility.
1.204
‘Withdrawal’ will be defined in the regulations. This
definition will encompass situations where:
• natural
gas is taken out of a natural gas supply pipeline for combustion at residential
and commercial properties and upstream facilities; and
• amounts
of gas are combusted by pipeline operators in pipeline compressors in the
process of operating the pipeline. Including this situation in the definition
of ‘withdrawal’ will ensure comprehensive mechanism coverage of natural gas.
Potential greenhouse gas emissions
1.205
Liability for natural gas is based on potential
greenhouse gas emissions, rather than actual emissions, except where direct
emitters are liable for emissions from natural gas. This is because the
liability generally arises before the fuel is combusted and emissions are
released [Part 3, clause 33(1)(e)], [Part 3, clause 35(1)(d)], [Part
3, clause 36(1)(e)]
1.206
The potential greenhouse gas emissions embodied in
an amount of natural gas means the amounts of the greenhouse gas or gases that
would be released into the atmosphere as a result of its combustion. This is
defined by reference to the NGER Act, which will be amended to define this
concept [Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘potential greenhouse gas emissions’] (see Schedule 1, Part 2, items 309, 323
of the Consequential Amendments bill).
1.207
It is intended that the potential greenhouse gas
emissions embodied in an amount of natural gas will be calculated in two ways (see Schedule 1, Part 2, item
323 of the Consequential Amendments bill).
• Under
the first method, known as the default method, the calculation will involve
multiplying the amount of natural gas by a value specified in the regulations.
• Alternatively,
a person may elect to use a prescribed alternative method which involves, among
other things, testing one or more samples of the natural gas.
Opt-in
arrangements for entities otherwise covered by the fuel tax system
1.208
During the public exposure period for the Package
industry stakeholders expressed a desire to manage their carbon liability for
fuels under the carbon pricing mechanism instead of paying the equivalent
carbon price through the fuel excise and fuel tax credit systems. This
arrangement is given effect through the Opt-in Scheme.
1.209
The Regulator will be responsible for administering
the Opt-in Scheme. It will work with the Australian Taxation Office and
Australian Customs Service to ensure entities comply with their obligations
under the mechanism and the fuel tax system.
Establishment
of the Opt-in Scheme
1.210
Regulations may establish an Opt-in Scheme that
allows a person who meets the criteria under the Scheme to choose to have
emissions from fuels covered directly under the mechanism instead of paying an
equivalent carbon price through the fuel tax system. The regulations will
specify the types of fuels that are eligible for the Opt-in Scheme. [Part
3, clause 92A]
1.211
The bill sets out the parameters of the Opt-in
Scheme and its main design features. The regulations would prescribe matters
such as the eligibility criteria for opting-in (including which other persons
would need to consent to the opt-in), the timeframes for opting-in and
opting-out, and how the arrangement will take into account the pollution cap
setting process.
1.212
The use of regulations will allow the Government to
consult with stakeholders on the detailed design of the technical requirements
for the Opt-in Scheme, and to allow for their adaptation over time to respond
to changing regulatory and business circumstances. This is particularly
important given the need to maintain a degree of flexibility in the
arrangements to ensure the ongoing effectiveness of the interaction between the
mechanism and the fuel tax system.
1.213
The Minister must take all reasonable steps to
ensure that the regulations establishing the Opt-in Scheme are made before 15
December 2012. The phrase ‘take all reasonable steps’ is used because, despite
his or her best endeavours, a Minister cannot guarantee that the
Governor-General will make regulations. [Part 3, clause 92A(5)]
Main
design features of the Opt-in Scheme
1.214
The regulations establishing the Opt-in Scheme will
provide:
•
that the Regulator may declare a
person a designated opt-in person for an amount of fuel of a specified kind; [Part
3, clause 92A(1)(a)(i),(ii), (iii) and (5)]
•
the requirements that must be met before the
Regulator may declare a person a designated opt-in person; [Part
3, clause 92A(1)(a)(v)]
•
that a designated opt-in person will
be liable for the potential greenhouse gas emissions in the fuel (of a kind
specified in the regulations) for which they are opting-in. [Part
3, clause 92A(1)(a) and (b)]
1.215
As well as meeting criteria specified in
regulations, the designated opt-in person must, for the fuel for which they are
opting in:
•
be a member of a GST group where
that GST group is entitled to the fuel tax credits for that fuel; or [Part
3, clause 92A(4)(a)]
• be
a member of a GST joint venture where that GST joint venture is entitled to the
fuel tax credits for that fuel; or [Part
3, clause 92A(4)(b)]
• if
neither of these criteria apply, then be the entity entitled to the fuel tax
credits for that fuel. [Part 3, clause 92A(4)(c)]
1.216
The Clean Energy (Fuel Tax Legislation Amendment)
Bill 2011 provides that a designated opt-in person will no longer pay an
equivalent carbon price through the fuel excise and fuel tax credit systems for
the amount of fuel for which they have opted-in.
1.217
To ensure that a person liable under the Opt-In
Scheme is not liable for emissions that are not included in the carbon price,
the regulations will also allow for liability to be reduced if certain
conditions are met. [Part 3, clause 92B]
1.218
The regulations will also be able to provide for opting-out
of the Opt-in Scheme. The regulations will set out the process for doing so
and the obligations on the Regulator. [Part 3, clause 92A(1)(a)(v)]
1.219
To ensure consistency between the mechanism and the
taxation, excise and tariff systems, the Regulator will be required to notify
the Commissioner of Taxation and the Chief Executive Officer of Customs when
the Regulator makes a declaration under the Opt-in Scheme. [Part
3, clause 92G]
1.220
Application procedures, times and fees will be set
out in regulations. [Part 3, clause 92E]
1.221
To the extent that it is necessary t supplement the
reporting and record-keeping requirements for liable entities under the NGER
Act, further requirements will be set out in regulations. [Part
3, clause 92C and 92D]
Commencement
of the Opt-in Scheme
1.222
The Opt-in Scheme will take effect
from 1 July 2013, so that the 2013-14 financial year is the first year in which
designated persons can manage the liability for their fuel emissions under the
carbon pricing mechanism. [Part 3, clause 92A(2)]
1.223
The commencement of the Opt-in Scheme on 1 July
2013 will facilitate its implementation, enabling detailed consultation on its
practical requirements and implementation. For the 2012-13 financial year,
entities that would opt-in if the Opt-in Scheme was in operation are liable for
emissions under the fuel tax system.
Anti-avoidance
1.224
Chapter 7 outlines the provisions addressing
schemes entered into with the substantial purpose of obtaining the advantage of
a threshold. Put briefly, attempts to avoid the mechanism’s operation may
result in any benefit of the threshold provision being lost.
[Part
3, clause 29]
Outline of
chapter
2.1
Chapter 2 explains pollution caps. It covers Part
2.
Context
2.2
The pollution cap is a limit on the total number of
carbon units issued in an eligible financial year under the mechanism. Pollution
caps only apply to the flexible price period.
2.3
Pollution caps are fundamental to the operation of
the mechanism, the achievement of national targets and meeting Australia’s
international obligations.
2.4
Pollution caps will be reduced over time and will contribute
to meeting Australia’s emission reduction targets. Pollution caps can reflect
different trajectories towards the same emissions target.
2.5
In the first stage of the mechanism (covering the
eligible financial years beginning on 1 July 2012, 1 July 2013 and 1 July
2014), there will be no pollution caps. Liable entities can purchase carbon
units at a fixed charge and the Commonwealth will allocate a limited number of
free carbon units as industry assistance.
2.6
In the second stage of the mechanism (starting on 1
July 2015) there will be a pollution cap for each eligible financial year. Liable
entities can buy a limited number of carbon units at auction and the
Commonwealth will allocate a limited number of free carbon units as industry
assistance.
2.7
Covered emissions can exceed the pollution cap
where they are offset by the surrender of other eligible emissions units, such
as eligible international units or eligible ACCUs.
Summary
2.8
Pollution caps will be set in regulations, which
are to be prepared in accordance with the requirements of Part 2.
2.9
If regulations setting pollution caps are not
tabled or are disallowed by Parliament, default pollution caps apply. The
default caps are consistent with a trajectory implied by Australia’s
unconditional target of reducing national emissions to 5 per cent below 2000
levels by 2020.
Detailed
explanation of new law
Setting
national pollution caps
2.10
The Government sets a ‘pollution cap’ for each
eligible financial year (except for fixed charge years) of the mechanism, and
issues carbon units equal to the pollution cap. [Part 2, clause 13]
The ‘pollution cap number’ for an eligible financial year is set as a quantity
of greenhouse gases that has a carbon dioxide equivalence of a specified number
of tonnes. [Part 2, clause 13], [Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘carbon
dioxide equivalence’]
2.11
Pollution cap numbers for each eligible financial
year (except for fixed charge years) will be specified in regulations. [Part
2, clause 14] The Government intends that these
should be consistent with Australia’s national emissions reduction targets.
2.12
As the basis for pollution caps may be subject to
considerations which may change over time, it is appropriate that they be set
out in regulations. The regulations are subject to a number of controls:
• in
setting pollution caps, the Minister must have regard to specific matters and
may have regard to thirteen other matters (see below); [Part
2, clause 14(2)]
• one
of the matters the minister must have regard to is the most recent report of
the Authority, which must, in making recommendations to the Minister about
pollution caps, consider specific matters identified in the legislation; [Part
22, clause 289], [Part 22, clause 292]
• the
regulations may be disallowed if either House of Parliament passes a resolution
within 15 days of the regulations being tabled. [Part 2, clause 15]
2.13
The Authority will make recommendations to the
Government about pollution caps (see Chapter 10), having regard to each of the
specified matters. [Part 22, clause 289] The
Government must respond to these recommendations and table its response in
Parliament. This would include justification for any differences from the
recommendations of the Authority.
2.14
The Minister must take all reasonable steps to
ensure that regulations specifying the pollution cap numbers for the first five
flexible charge years of the mechanism (that is, the eligible financial years
beginning on 1 July 2015, 1 July 2016, 1 July 2017, 1 July 2018 and 1 July
2019) are tabled in Parliament no later than 31 May 2014. [Part
2, clause 16(1)] The Government will include the
pollution caps and its response to the Authority’s recommendations in the
2014-15 Budget. This will be in a new budget paper.
2.15
If not made or tabled by 31 May 2014, the initial
regulations setting pollution caps for the first five flexible charge years
must not be made or tabled. [Part 2, clause 16(2)]
2.16
If regulations establishing the first five years of
pollution caps did not come into effect by May 2015, then the Minister must, on
an annual basis by 31 May, take all reasonable steps to table regulations
setting pollution caps for five years until the regulations come into effect. [Part 2,
clause 16(3) and (4)]
2.17
Once regulations establishing five years of pollution
caps have come into effect, the Minister must take all reasonable steps to
ensure that regulations setting the pollution cap and declaring the pollution
cap number are in place at least five years before the end of the relevant year.
[Part
2, clause 16(5)] That is, the five years of
pollution caps will be extended by a year every year so that five years of
pollution caps are always known. This will provide a level of certainty to
investors and the market.
2.18
The phrase ‘take all reasonable steps’ is used
because, despite his or her best endeavours, a Minister cannot guarantee that
the Governor-General will make regulations.
Default
pollution caps
2.19
Default pollution caps exist in the event the
regulations setting pollution caps do not take effect. This is only a concern
when regulations setting pollution caps are either not tabled in the Parliament
by the deadline or are tabled and then disallowed.
2.20
Having a default in the legislation ensures that
the mechanism continues to operate in the event that regulations setting
pollution caps do not come into effect. The default caps follow a trajectory consistent
with Australia’s unconditional target of reducing national emissions to five
per cent below 2000 levels by 2020, taking into account projections for
emissions from uncovered sectors (including the impact of emissions reduction
measures on those sectors).
2.21
The default pollution cap for the first flexible
charge year, beginning 1 July 2015, is set at 38 megatonnes (Mt) less than the
total covered emissions from liable entities for the year beginning 1 July 2012.
The total covered emissions for the year beginning 1 July 2012 will be taken
from the Liable Entities Public Information Database administered by the
Regulator. [Part 2, clause 17]
2.22
The default pollution caps for all years beginning
on or after 1 July 2016 will be 12 Mt less than the previous year’s pollution
cap. [Part 2, clause 18]
Example 2.1 Regulations
not in place for the first five flexible price years
The Minister tables regulations setting the pollution
caps for the financial years beginning in 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018 and 2019 by 31 May
2014.
These regulations are disallowed by the House of
Representatives in June 2014. Because the 31 May 2014 deadline has passed, the
Minister is not able to table further regulations.
The carbon pollution cap for the year beginning 1 July
2015 will be the default as set in the legislation: the emissions for the
financial year beginning 1 July 2012 less 38,000,000.
By 31 May 2015, the Minister must take all reasonable
steps to ensure the tabling of regulations declaring the pollution caps for the
financial years beginning in 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019 and 2020.
If these regulations are not disallowed by either
house of Parliament, the pollution caps set in those regulations will be the
pollution caps for the respective years and the Minister will be required to
table regulations containing the pollution cap for 2021-22 by 30 June 2017.
Example 2.2 Regulations
not in place for a subsequent flexible price year
It is 2017 and the pollution caps have previously been
set in regulations for the flexible price years beginning 2015, 2016, 2017,
2018, 2019 and 2020. The Minister has tabled regulations setting the pollution
cap for the flexible price year beginning 1 July 2021. In July 2017, these
regulations are disallowed by the Senate. As it is now less than five years
before the end of the financial year beginning 1 July 2021 (that is, 30 June
2017 has passed), the Minister is not permitted to table or make further
regulations setting the pollution cap for the year beginning 1 July 2021.
The carbon pollution cap number for 2021-22 will
therefore be the default as set in the bill: the pollution cap number for
2020-21 (as was set in regulations) minus 12,000,000.
The Minister must then take all reasonable steps to
ensure that regulations setting the next pollution cap (2022-23) are tabled by
30 June 2018.
Matters to be
taken into account when setting pollution caps
2.23
In recommending to the Governor-General that she
make the regulations, the Minister must have regard to:
• Australia’s
international obligations under international climate change agreements. [Part
2, clause 14(2)(a)], [Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘international climate
change agreement’]
– The
mechanism will be the primary means by which Australia will meet its
international obligations. This includes the Climate Change Convention, Kyoto
Protocol and allows for future agreements to which Australia becomes a party.
• the
most recent report outlining recommendations for pollution caps and carbon
budgets by the Authority. [Part 2, clause 14(2)(b)]
– Pollution
caps are a fundamental component of the mechanism, and the provision of
independent expert advice enhances the transparency and accountability of cap
setting process. [Part 22, clause 292]
– A
carbon budget is defined as the total amount of net Australian emissions of
greenhouse gases during a specified period. [Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘carbon
budget’]
2.24
The Authority’s recommended carbon budgets
will be important in quantifying Australia’s short and long term emissions
reduction objectives and demonstrating how particular pollution caps contribute
to those objectives.
2.25
While taking into account Australia’s international
obligations and the most recent report of the Authority plays a central role in
setting pollution caps, the Minister may also have regard to thirteen additional
factors (as set out below).
2.26
Factor
1: Australia’s undertakings concerning the reduction of greenhouse
gas emissions that Australia has given under international climate change
agreements. [Part 2, clause 14(2)(c)(i)]
• In
addition to binding obligations under international agreements, Australia may
make high-level political undertakings concerning the reduction of greenhouse
gas emissions, such as under the Climate Change Convention. Although not
legally binding, Australia implements these undertakings solemnly and in good
faith and expects other countries to do likewise. Where such undertakings
relate to greenhouse gas emissions reductions, the Minister may take these into
account when setting pollution caps. For example, subject to a further
international agreement which quantifies Australia’s 2020 emissions reduction
obligations, the Government intends to take into account its emissions
reduction pledges made to the Climate Change Convention under the Copenhagen
Accord and the Cancun Agreements.
2.27
Factor 2: Australia’s
medium-term and long-term emissions reduction targets. [Part
2, clause 14(2)(c)(ii)]
• The
mechanism is the primary means for achieving the national emissions reduction
targets. Pollution caps therefore need to be set at a level consistent with
the carbon price playing its role in achieving these targets.
2.28
Factor 3:
Australia’s progress toward emissions reductions. [Part
2, clause 14(2)(c)(iii)]
• The
Minister may want to consider whether the Australian economy has sufficiently
reduced its emissions intensity and adopted low carbon practices to reach
medium and long-term emissions reduction targets. The Minister may also want
to ensure that such a transition to a low carbon economy is as smooth as
possible.
2.29
Factor 4:
global action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. [Part
2, clause 14(2)(c)(iv)]
• This
includes progress towards, and development of, comprehensive global action
under which all major economies commit to substantially restrain emissions and
advanced economies take on reductions comparable to Australia. It includes
consideration of the actions committed to and action which has been implemented
through domestic mitigation policies.
• Actions
by major economies are relevant to decisions on the trajectory of Australia’s
emissions and so should be considered when setting pollution caps.
2.30
Factor 5:
Estimates of the global greenhouse gas emissions budget. [Part
2, clause 14(2)(c)(v)]
• This
is to take into account Australia’s share in global efforts to reduce emissions
as well as the rate of progress in global action.
2.31
Factor 6: The
economic and social implications associated with various levels of pollution
caps, including implications of the carbon price. [Part
2, clause 14(2)(c)(vi)]
• Different
levels of pollution caps will have different economic and social implications,
including the flow of funds outside Australia to purchase eligible
international emissions units.
• Decisions
on the appropriate level of caps may take into account the carbon price and
economic and social impacts arising from observing the actual operation of the
cap in previous years.
• The
carbon price may be higher or lower than expected as a result of a number of factors.
For example, technological developments may mean that economic costs are lower
than expected as new unanticipated abatement opportunities come into play.
2.32
Factor 7:
The extent of actions voluntarily taken to reduce Australia’s greenhouse gas
emissions. [Part 2, clause 14(2)(c)(vii)]
• Voluntary
action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions can help ameliorate the economic
implications associated with various levels of national pollution caps,
increasing the likelihood that more stringent caps can be set over time.
• The
Government acknowledges that its national emissions target does not include
voluntary action, meaning that Australia can achieve emissions abatement beyond
its national emissions target.
• Voluntary
action can be achieved through voluntary cancellation of units, whereby a
person voluntarily gives up a greater number of units than they would otherwise
have to (voluntary cancellation is covered by Part 6 of the ANREU Act).
• As
a matter of policy, the Government is committed to taking account of GreenPower
purchases in setting pollution caps. Households and businesses that purchase
GreenPower increase the demand for renewable energy and assist in the
transition to cleaner energy sources. To recognise individual action in
purchasing GreenPower, the Government will take all GreenPower purchases into
account in setting future pollution caps.
• In
the fixed charge period the Government will measure GreenPower purchases on an
annual basis and take these into account when setting the initial pollution
caps. The Authority must provide recommendations on the initial pollution caps
by 28 February 2014. The Authority will take into account the GreenPower
purchases that have been reported by that time.
• In
the flexible price period, the Government would measure GreenPower purchases on
an annual basis and directly take these into account in setting pollution caps
five years into the future.
• Voluntary
action in addition to GreenPower and voluntary cancellation of units may also
be recognised, on advice from the Authority on whether a robust methodology can
be developed to recognise additional voluntary action.
2.33
Factor 8:
Estimates of emissions that are not covered by the mechanism. [Part
2, clause 14(2)(c)(viii)]
• The
Government will set pollution caps based on the difference between the
indicative national emissions trajectory (that is, its proposed path for
national emissions) and the latest projection of emissions that are not covered
by the mechanism (excluding abatement from the CFI). In this way, sufficient
‘room’ is left for uncovered emissions, and national targets can still be met.
This will take into account the impact of emissions which come into the
mechanism through the opt-in provisions in Part 3, Division 7.
2.34
Factor 9:
Estimates of the likely issue of ACCUs. [Part 2, clause 14(2)(c)(ix)], [Part 1,
clause 5, definition of ‘Australian carbon credit unit’]
• Abatement
from the CFI will decrease emissions from the uncovered sectors and ACCUs will
either be exported, voluntarily cancelled or used to offset increased emissions
covered by the mechanism, which will impact the accounting for national
emissions targets.
• The
Government will therefore need to be mindful of the likely volume of ACCUs
expected to be generated when setting pollution caps to ensure that these
emission reductions are not double counted.
2.35
Factor 10:
The extent of non-compliance under the mechanism. [Part
2, clause 14(2)(c)(x)]
• To
comply, liable entities can either surrender eligible emissions units or pay a
charge for each tonne of pollution that they generate (see Chapter 4). If
liable entities do not meet their obligations for an eligible compliance year
their emissions will not have been accounted for through the surrender of
eligible emissions units or through paying the charge.
• To
ensure Australia meets its national emissions targets, the Government may
tighten the pollution cap that will be set to make up for these unaccounted for
emissions.
2.36
Factor 11:
The extent (if any) to which liable entities have failed to surrender
sufficient units to avoid liability for unit shortfall charge. [Part
2, clause 14(2)(c)(xi)]
• If
liable entities do not surrender sufficient units, but instead meet their
obligations through payment of unit shortfall charges, the emissions will not
be backed by an emissions unit.
• To
ensure Australia meets its national emissions targets, the Government may
choose to use some of the revenue raised from the charge to purchase emissions
units to account for these emissions or tighten the next pollution cap to
account for the emissions.
2.37
Factor 12:
Any past or planned government purchase of international units. [Part
2, clause 14(2)(c)(xii)]
• If
the Government chooses to purchase eligible international units to meet
national emissions targets, the pollution cap could be increased to reflect
those purchases.
2.38
Factor
13: When setting caps, the Minister may take into account such other
matters (if any) as the Minister considers relevant. For example, the Minister
could take into account the precautionary principle or considerations of
intergenerational equity. [Part 2, clause 14(2)(c)(xiii)]
Outline of
chapter
3.1
Chapter 3 explains the nature of the various
emissions units (domestic and international) recognised under the mechanism. It
also explains the ways in which carbon units are issued under the mechanism and
key provisions around eligible international emissions units. This chapter
covers Part 4 of the bill.
Context
3.2
The central element of the mechanism is the ability
of liable entities to make a payment for or surrender eligible emissions units
for each tonne of emissions for which they are liable during an eligible
financial year (see Chapter 4).
3.3
A carbon unit is an eligible emissions unit issued
by the Regulator on behalf of the Commonwealth. Other eligible emissions units
include eligible ACCUs issued under the CFI and eligible international units.
3.4
During the fixed charge period from 1 July 2012 to
30 June 2015, the Regulator will allocate free carbon units under
Parts 7 and 8 (see Chapters 5 and 6) and entities can purchase carbon units for
a fixed charge from the Regulator. Entities cannot use eligible international
emissions units to meet domestic liabilities during the fixed charge period.
3.5
On 1 July 2015 the mechanism will transition to an
emissions trading scheme and a limited number of carbon units will be issued
which equals the pollution cap (see Chapter 2). Carbon units are tradeable,
establishing a carbon market that allows these units to be allocated to the
most highly valued uses across the economy.
3.6
Letting liable entities use eligible ACCUs from 1
July 2012 and eligible international units from 1 July 2015 to meet their
liabilities gives them additional flexibility under the mechanism. It means
that covered emissions can exceed the pollution cap, provided they are offset
by an eligible ACCU or eligible international unit.
3.7
Letting liable entities surrender eligible ACCUs
links the mechanism and the CFI. This will provide an incentive for those
actions that reduce emissions or increase carbon sinks to be part of the CFI.
3.8
Letting liable entities surrender international
units links the mechanism and international markets for emissions units. It
lets liable entities access lower cost abatement opportunities and allows for
emission reduction targets to be achieved in a flexible and cost-effective way.
However, the use of international units is subject to qualitative and
quantitative restrictions, to ensure the environmental integrity and ongoing
credibility of the mechanism.
3.9
Allowing for the sale and transfer to foreign
registries of Australian emissions units, such as carbon units and ACCUs, will
open up the mechanism to foreign markets and has the potential to increase the
flow of foreign capital, providing a stimulus for domestic abatement and
investment in low-pollution technologies. Export of ACCUs will be permitted
from 1 July 2012. Export of carbon units will not be permitted during the
fixed charge period and will also be restricted until 1 July 2018, except where
expressly permitted under a bilateral link to an international emissions
trading scheme.
3.10
In the first three flexible charge years, there
will be a transitional price ceiling and price floor. A price ceiling is a
maximum carbon price, while a price floor is a minimum carbon price. The
Government’s intention is that these be set at a level significantly higher
than the expected price for the price ceiling and lower than the expected price
for the price floor.
Summary
Issuing of
carbon units
3.11
Part 4, Division 2 sets out the way in which carbon
units are issued, when they may be issued and limits on the number of units
that may be issued.
Property in
carbon units
3.12
Part 4, Division 3 deals with property in carbon
units and the processes for transferring carbon units, including arrangements
for international transfers of carbon units.
Auctioning
carbon units
3.13
Part 4, Division 4 provides for the auctioning of
carbon units. The design of the auction process is to be set out in
regulations.
Cancellation and
buy-back of carbon units
3.14
Part 4, Division 5 provides for the cancellation
and buy-back of free carbon units issued under Part 7 (the Jobs and
Competitiveness Program) and Part 8 (assistance to coal-fired electricity
generators).
International
linking
3.15
Eligible international emissions units are defined
under section 4 of the ANREU Act. Restrictions on the surrender of these units
are set out in Part 6, Divisions 2 and 3 of the bill.
Detailed
explanation of new law
Eligible
emissions units
3.16
The Regulator may issue carbon units, which a
liable entity may surrender to meet its obligations under the mechanism. [Part
4, clause 93], [Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘carbon unit’], [Part 1, clause
5, definition of ‘surrender’]
3.17
An ‘eligible emissions unit’ is a carbon unit, an
eligible international emissions unit, or an eligible ACCU issued under the CFI.
[Part
1, clause 5, definition of ‘Australian carbon credit unit’], [Part 1, clause 5,
definition of ‘carbon unit’], [Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘eligible
Australian carbon credit unit’], [Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘eligible
emissions unit’]
Link
to the CFI
3.18
A liable entity may surrender eligible ACCUs to
meet its liabilities under the mechanism (see Chapter 4):
• in
the fixed charge period, a liable entity may surrender eligible ACCUs up to an
amount equal to five per cent of its total emissions liability; and
• in
the flexible charge period, a liable entity may surrender as many eligible
ACCUs as it wants to meet its emissions liability. [Part
1, clause 5, definition of ‘eligible Australian carbon credit unit’]
Carbon units
Issue
of carbon units and entry in the Registry
3.19
The Regulator may issue carbon units on behalf of
the Commonwealth. [Part 4, clause 94], [Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘carbon
unit’]
3.20
To hold a carbon unit, a person must have a
Registry account. [Part 4, clause 98(3)]
Such a person is the ‘registered holder’ of the units. [Part
1, clause 5, definition of ‘registered holder’]
The Regulator issues a carbon unit by making an entry for the carbon unit
against a Registry account in the Registry. [Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘Registry’],
[Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘Registry account’], [Part 4, clause 98(1)] The
carbon unit is represented by an electronic entry in the Registry, and not by
any form of paper certificate. [Part 4, clause 98(2)]
3.21
Each carbon unit will have a unique number known as
the ‘identification number’. [Part 4, clause 95], [Part 1, clause 5, definition of
‘identification number’] An entry in the Registry
for that unit will consist of its identification number. [Part
4, clause 98(2)]
Vintage
year of a carbon unit
3.22
Each carbon unit will have a specific vintage year,
which will be an eligible financial year. [Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘eligible
financial year’], [Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘vintage year’]
Part of the identification number of a carbon unit will represent the vintage
year of that carbon unit. [Part 4, clause 96]
3.23
The Regulator may issue a carbon unit with a
particular vintage year at any time before the end of 1 February following the
vintage year. [Part 4, clause 97]
Example 3.1 Allocation of
a carbon unit
The Regulator may, at any time before the end of 1
February 2014, issue a carbon unit with the vintage year that ends on 30 June 2013.
This will allow for an auction of units in the interval between the end of the
relevant financial year and 1 February, the final date for surrender.
Units
issued for flexible charge years
3.24
Carbon units that have a vintage year that is a
flexible charge year do not have a ‘use by’ date. They can be used for
surrender in their vintage year and any year after that. This is referred to
as ‘banking’. There is also limited capacity to surrender carbon units which
are of the following vintage year (‘borrowing’). [Part 6, clause 122(4)]
3.25
The purpose of allowing banking and limited
borrowing is to allow liable entities to shift the timing of their emissions
and abatement activities to reduce their costs. It will also have the effect
of smoothing the unit price over time (see Chapter 4 for an explanation of the
payment and surrender process).
Units
issued in fixed charge years
3.26
An unlimited number of carbon units whose vintage
year is a fixed charge year will be available to liable entities at a fixed
charge. These units will not be able to be banked for use in future years. [Part
1, clause 5, definition of ‘fixed charge year’]
3.27
Those carbon units that are issued free of charge
under Parts 7 and 8 (see Chapters 5 and 6) can only be surrendered for the
eligible financial year corresponding to their vintage year and, if not
surrendered, will be cancelled at the end of 1 February of the next financial
year. [Part 4, clause 115], [Part 6, clause 122(7)], [Part 1, clause 5,
definition of ‘eligible financial year’]
3.28
‘Borrowing’ will not be allowed during the fixed
charge years. [Part 6, clause 122(6)] A
liable entity cannot surrender a carbon unit of a later vintage to meet its
obligations for a fixed charge year.
3.29
Carbon units issued for a fixed charge are automatically
surrendered for the eligible financial year corresponding to their vintage year.
[Part
4, clause 100(7)] They cannot be banked.
Circumstances
in which the Regulator can issue carbon units
3.30
The Regulator can only issue carbon units in the
following circumstances: [Part 4, clause 99]
• as
the result of an auction conducted by the Regulator;
• when
it issues units for a fixed charge;
• under
Part 7 (see Chapter 5); and
• under
Part 8 (see Chapter 6).
Vintage
years and pollution caps
3.31
The Regulator must ensure that, when a particular
vintage year is a flexible charge year and there is a pollution cap for that
year, then the sum of carbon units for that vintage year:
• offered
at auction (whether before or during that year); [Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘auction’]
• allocated
under Part 7 (see Chapter 5); and
• allocated
under Part 8 (see Chapter 6),
does not exceed the pollution cap for that vintage
year. [Part 4, clause 102] This
provision does not apply to carbon units with vintage years that are fixed
charge years, as there will be no pollution cap for those years.
A
carbon unit is a property right
3.32
A carbon unit issued by the Regulator is personal
property and, subject to the requirements of the mechanism, transmissible by
assignment (that is, as a result of some form of agreement to transfer the
units to another person), by will (that is, as part of a deceased person’s
estate) and by other forms of transfer permitted by law. [Part
4, clause 103]
3.33
While a carbon unit is always equivalent to one
tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent emissions, the value of that unit will be
determined by the demand for that unit in the market. It is envisaged that any
decisions made under the mechanism concerning its operation, such as the
setting of pollution caps and allocation of free carbon units, may affect the
value of units, and that regard should be had to that in making those decisions
(see Chapter 10).
3.34
If there is an entry for a carbon
unit in a person’s Registry account, then that person is the legal owner of the
unit, subject to the requirements of the ANREU Act. [Part
4, clause 103A] Furthermore, a transfer of a
carbon unit is of no force until it is registered in the Registry. This
provision protects a bona fide purchaser of carbon units, if they purchased the
units for value and without knowledge of any
defects in the registered holder’s title to the affected carbon units. It
would, for example, permit the person to sell the units or use them as security.
[Part 4, clause 103A]
Example 3.2 Defects in
title
Defects in title might arise, for example:
• if
a carbon unit was transferred by the registered holder in error and sold
on by an unintended recipient before the error is detected;
• if
a carbon unit was transferred fraudulently, such as if evidence of a
transmission by operation of law was false; or
• there
is unauthorised access to a Registry account.
3.35
Transparent and secure property
rights over and legal interests in carbon units will
promote confidence in the integrity of the units and reduce uncertainty for
their holders, and further promote confidence in the development of the market
for carbon units. Similar provisions have been made for ACCUs, Kyoto units and
prescribed international units in consequential amendments to the CFI Act and
ANREU Act.
3.36
The bill does not affect the creation or
enforcement of, or any dealings with (including transfers of), equitable
interests in carbon units. [Part 4, clause 110] This
provision has been included for the avoidance of doubt. In addition, the bill
does not prevent the taking of security over carbon units.
3.37
Regulations may provide that legal interests in
carbon units that are conferred upon the registered holder are subject to any
equitable interests that might be registered, in the Registry, concerning the
units. Security interests for carbon units would be registered in the Personal
Property Securities Register in accordance with the Personal Property Securities Act 2009. [Part
4, clause 109A]
3.38
Once a carbon unit is surrendered, it is cancelled
(see Chapter 4). [Part 6, clause 122(10)]
Some units are cancelled following their relinquishment (see Chapter 7). [Part
11, clause 210]
Transfer
and transmission of carbon units
3.39
A person may transfer carbon units, except for
those that are issued for a fixed charge. In general, a transfer occurs when
the Regulator removes an entry for the unit from the Registry account of the
transferor and makes an entry for the unit in the Registry account of the
transferee. [Part 4, clause 104], [Part 1, clause 5, definition of
‘transfer’]
3.40
A person may:
• transmit
carbon units by assignment; [Part 4, clause 105]
• transmit
carbon units by operation of law; [Part 4, clause 106]
• transfer
carbon units between Registry accounts that are both in the name of that person;
and [Part 4, clause 107]
• transfer
carbon units to an account in a prescribed foreign registry held by that person
or another person, provided the instruction is on or after 1 July 2018, the
units have a flexible charge vintage year and the conditions specified in
regulations are met. [Part 4, clause 108], [Part 1, clause 5, definition of
‘foreign account’]
3.41
A transfer is initiated by an electronic
instruction from the transferor to the Regulator. The Regulator then removes
the entry for the carbon unit from the transferor’s account and makes a new
entry for that unit in the transferee’s account.
Transfers
of carbon units by operation of law etc
3.42
Transmissions that occur as a result of a will or
by operation of law (that is, a transfer that does not occur by assignment)
give rise to some additional issues arising from the nature of that transfer,
as the recipient of the units may need to prove his or her entitlement to the
units and may not have a Registry account of his or her own. [Part
4, clause 106]
Example 3.3 Transfer from
a deceased estate
Transmission of a unit to a person as the trustee of a
deceased person’s estate will require the transferee to establish evidence of
transmission and, if necessary, open a Registry account.
3.43
A person must provide the Regulator with a
‘declaration of transmission’, along with evidence of the transmission, within
90 days, to ensure that the new holder of the carbon units has ample time to
provide the proof of that ownership. The Regulator may extend the period
either on the application of the transferor or transferee or on its own
initiative. [Part 4, clause 106(7)]
Should the Regulator refuse to extend the period, then it must give the
transferor or the transferee (as the case may be) notice in writing. [Part
4, clause 106(2) and (8)]
3.44
A transferee must, if he or she does not have a
Registry account, also request that an account be opened in his or her name. [Part
4, clause 106(5)]
3.45
The Regulator must effect the transfer of carbon
units as soon as possible after receiving a declaration of transmission and the
required evidence from the transferee and set out a record of that transmission.
[Part
4, clause 106(9), (10) and (11)] If the
Commonwealth is the transferee of the units, then the Minister may give the
declaration of transmission and provide any required evidence. [Part
4, clause 106(12)]
Fixed charge
carbon units, including those issued under price ceiling arrangements
Fixed
charge carbon units
3.46
The Regulator will issue fixed charge carbon units
with vintage years that are a financial year between 1 July 2012 and 30 June
2018. This includes fixed charge carbon units issued for the fixed charge
years and fixed charge carbon units issued in the first three flexible charge
years under price ceiling arrangements. [Part 4, clause 100]
The
fixed charge for a unit
3.47
The fixed charge per carbon unit is:
• $23.00
in 2012-13;
• $24.15
in 2013-14; and
• $25.40
in 2014-15. [Part 4, clause 100], [Part
1, clause 5, definition of ‘charge’]
3.48
These charges rise by 2.5 per cent in real terms
allowing for 2.5 per cent inflation per year, which is the midpoint of the
Reserve Bank of Australia’s target range (that is, the fixed charge for the
preceding year × 1.025 × 1.025, rounded to the nearest 5 cents). [Part
4, clause 100(1)]
Price
ceiling
3.49
A price ceiling will apply to the first three
flexible charge years and be implemented by issuing carbon units at a fixed
charge. The amount of the fixed charge for carbon units issued in 2015-16 will
be prescribed in regulations. [Part 4, clause 100(1)], [Part 1, clause 5, definition
of ‘flexible charge year’] The Government has
announced that this will be set at $20 above the expected international price
in 2015-16. These regulations are to be made before the end of 31 May 2014 and
can be amended before 1 June 2015, in case the expected international price has
moved considerably from that originally estimated. [Part
4,
clause 100(14) and (15)]
3.50
The reason why regulations will set the level of
the price ceiling is so that circumstances in the period prior to 2015-16 can
be taken into account in setting the level, including decisions about what
eligible international emissions units can be surrendered, and what their
expected prices are.
3.51
The level of the price ceiling for fixed charge
units issued in 2016-17 and 2017-18 will rise by 5 per cent in real terms per
year, allowing for 2.5 per cent inflation per year, which is the midpoint of
the Reserve Bank of Australia’s target range (that is, the carbon price for the
preceding year × 1.05 × 1.025, rounded to the nearest 5 cents). [Part
4,
clause 100(1)]
3.52
To provide liable entities with certainty over the
level of the price ceiling, the Regulator will publish its exact value in
advance of each compliance year. [Part 4, clause 100(9)]
This will allow liable entities to determine the maximum cost of compliance.
Acquisition
of fixed charge units
3.53
In fixed charge years, a liable entity may apply to
the Regulator for an allocation of fixed charge carbon units for a particular
compliance year from 1 April in that compliance year until 15 June. [Part
4, clause 100(1)], [Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘acquire’]
These carbon units are for a liable entity to meet their liability to surrender
carbon units by 15 June (see Chapter 4).
3.54
A liable entity may also access
fixed charge units for a fixed charge year from a date that its emissions
number is published until 1 February of the following year (the final surrender
date). These carbon units are for a liable entity to meet its liability to
surrender carbon units by 1 February. [Part 4, clause 100(1)]
3.55
In the first three flexible charge
years, a liable entity may apply to the Regulator for an allocation of fixed
charge carbon units under the price ceiling for a particular compliance year
from 1 July in that compliance year until 1 February in the following
compliance year. [Part 4, clause 100(1)]
3.56
The period in which fixed charge carbon units
(including units issued under the price ceiling) can be issued may be extended
in certain circumstances; for example, as a result of a fault or malfunction concerning
a computer system under the control of the Regulator. [Part
4, clause 100A]
Safeguards
3.57
There are safeguards to prevent liable entities
from acquiring more fixed charge units than they need to meet their liabilities
under the mechanism. This is important because, as discussed below, fixed
charge units are automatically surrendered (see Chapter 4). [Part 4,
clause 100(7)]
3.58
The number of fixed charge carbon units that can be
acquired by a liable entity is limited as follows:
• in
the first issue period in a given year (1 April to 15 June), the limit is the
amount that must be surrendered at the provisional surrender date less the
number of eligible emissions units that have already been surrendered; and [Part
4, clause 100(3)]
• in
the second issue period (from the emissions number publication date to 1
February), the number of fixed charge units that can be acquired by a liable
entity is limited to the emissions number for the liable entity minus the
number of eligible emissions units that have already been surrendered. This
also applies to carbon units issued under price ceiling arrangements. [Part
4, clause 100(4)], [Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘emissions number
publication time’]
3.59
The Regulator must not issue a fixed charge carbon
unit to a person unless the person pays the charge. [Part
4, clause 99] This avoids the need for the
Regulator to collect debts owing on fixed charge carbon units, and lowers the
cost of administering the mechanism.
Auctions
3.60
The Regulator may issue carbon units through
auctions. [Part 4, clause 111], [Part 4, clause 112], [Part 1,
clause 5, definition of ‘auction’]
3.61
The primary policy objectives of the auction are to
promote allocative efficiency and efficient price discovery. Auctions will
also raise revenue that can be used for other policy objectives, such as
providing assistance to households and businesses.
3.62
The detailed policies, procedures and rules for the
conduct of auctions will be determined by the Minister in a legislative
instrument. [Part 4, clause 113], [Part 1, clause 5, definition of
‘auction’] This will be a disallowable legislative
instrument for the purposes of the LI Act
and will be finalised following consultation. The Regulator may
conduct auctions even when a legislative instrument is not in force but it is
intended that a legislative instrument be made. [Part 4, clause 113(9)]
3.63
The instrument may deal with, but is not limited
to, any or all of the following matters:
• the
types of auction;
• the
timing of auctions and advertising;
• participants
and entry fees (provided such fees do not amount to taxation);
• proxy
bidding and representatives of bidders;
• minimum
number of units in bids;
• variation
of bids;
• the
total number of carbon units with a specific vintage year that may be
auctioned;
• limits
on the number of carbon units of a type that may be acquired;
• reserve
prices for secondary market auctions of relinquished carbon units;
• deposits
and refunds of deposits;
• guarantees
for payments and securities that may be provided;
• the
timing and method of payment; and
• penalties
for defaulting purchasers and collateral matters. [Part
4, clause 113(2), (3) and (4)]
3.64
In particular, the Regulator is able to have regard
to the past behaviour of prospective participants in deciding whether they can
participate in auctions. [Part 4, clause 113(6)]
3.65
The Government has announced that there will be
advance auctions of future vintage carbon units. Advance auctions can assist
the development of forward price signals and help promote business certainty
about future carbon prices.
3.66
The Regulator must not issue a carbon unit as the
result of an auction unless the person pays the charge for the issue of units
to the Regulator on behalf of the Commonwealth. [Part 4, clause 111(2)]
This avoids the need for the Regulator to collect debts owing on units issued
following an auction, and lowers the cost of administering the mechanism.
3.67
The amount of the charge payable for a carbon unit
issued as the result of an auction must be an amount that the person bid in the
course of an auction, which was then accepted by the Regulator in the course of
the auction. This approach to defining the charge payable allows for the
prescription of forms of auction in which the clearing price is not necessarily
the final price bid by the person or the final price bid in the auction. [Part
4, clause 111(6)]
Advance
auctions of carbon units
3.68
In fixed charge years, the Regulator may auction
carbon units with vintage years that are flexible charge years. The amount of
carbon units that can be auctioned is limited to a maximum of 15 million carbon
units for each vintage per year, where the auction occurs more than 6 months
before the beginning of the relevant vintage year and there are no regulations
in force declaring a carbon pollution cap and the carbon pollution cap number
(see Chapter 2). [Part 4, clause 101]
3.69
Fifteen million carbon units is equivalent to
approximately 3 per cent of total Australian emissions in 2000, and
so does not limit the Government’s ability to set pollution caps. It is also
greater than one sixteenth of the total amount of units that are expected to be
auctioned in a particular vintage year.
3.70
The pollution cap for a vintage year will be known
with certainty no later than six months before the start of that year (either
by being set in regulations or by the operation of a default cap). This means
that the regulator will then be able to auction carbon units consistent with
the pollution cap, so no other limit is required.
3.71
The detailed auction schedule will be set out in
the auction design instrument. [Part 4, clause 113]
This arrangement will allow for the auction of carbon units with a flexible
year vintage during the fixed charge years in such a way that these auctions do
not limit the ability to set pollution caps.
Secondary
auctions
3.72
The Regulator may auction carbon units which have
been relinquished under Parts 10 and 11. Auctions of these units can be
combined with other auctions. [Part 4, clause 112]
3.73
In certain situations where excess carbon units
have been issued, a person may be required to relinquish carbon units (see
Chapters 5 and 7). These situations are:
• where
a person has received excess carbon units for emissions-intensive trade-exposed
activities that have ceased; and
• the
issue of carbon units as a result of fraudulent conduct by the recipient.
Benchmark
average auction charge
3.74
The benchmark average auction charge is calculated
and published by the Regulator as soon as practicable after the end of each
financial year. [Part 4, clause 114], [Part 1, clause 5, definition of
‘benchmark average auction charge’] It is used to
calculate:
• the
administrative penalty for a failure to comply with relinquishment
requirements; [Part 11, clause 212], [Part 11, clause 213]
• the
unit shortfall charge in a flexible price year (as specified in the Charges
bills, see Chapter 4); and
• the
manufacture levy and import levy of synthetic greenhouse gases (as set out in
the Ozone Protection and Synthetic Greenhouse Gas (Manufacture Levy) Amendment
Bill 2011 and the Ozone Protection and Synthetic Greenhouse Gas (Import Levy)
Amendment Bill 2011 (see the Explanatory Memorandum for the Consequential
Amendments bill for an explanation of these bills)).
3.75
In order for the benchmark average auction charge
to be close to the level of the carbon price paid by most liable entities, it
is the maximum of two numbers:
• the
average auction charge for the whole financial year (calculated by dividing the
auction proceeds by the number of units sold, including units sold with a
future vintage); and
• the
average auction charge for the final auction where the units auctioned have the
same vintage as the year of auctioning (also calculated by dividing the auction
proceeds by the number of units sold, including units sold with a future
vintage). [Part 4, clause 114], [Part 1, clause 5, definition of
‘benchmark average auction charge’]
3.76
The auction reserve price will be prescribed in
regulations. [Part 4, clause 111(5)]
The reason why the reserve price will be prescribed in regulations rather than
in legislation is that detailed auctioning arrangements are dealt with in a
legislative instrument, so there needs to be flexibility when determining reserve
prices. In 2015-16, 2016-17, and 2017-18, there will also be a minimum reserve
price (see below).
Publication
of auction results
3.77
The Regulator will publish and maintain a record of
all auction results (see also Chapter 9). This will include that date of each
auction, the vintages of carbon units issued at the auction, the per unit
charges for the carbon units that are auctioned, and the number of carbon units
auctioned for a given per unit charge. [Part 9, clause 195]
3.78
From 2015 onwards, the Regulator will publish the
average auction charge for the 6 months leading up to the end of May, and the 6
months leading up to the end of November. For the 6 months leading up to May
2015, this average will take into account all auctions (including advance
auctions). For every other 6 month period, this average will only take into
account auctions of carbon units whose vintage is the same as the financial
year in which the auction took place. [Part 9, clause 196]
Publication of price relevant information is discussed in more detail in
Chapter 9.
Charges for
the issue of units
3.79
If a charge for the issue of a unit is taxation within
the meaning of section 55 of the Constitution, the charge is not imposed by the
bill but by the relevant Charges bill (see the Explanatory Memorandum for the
Charges bills). [Part 4, clause 100(11)], [Part 4, clause 111(4)]
3.80
The Commonwealth does not consider that the charges
for the auction of carbon units amount to taxation. However, separate bills
impose the charges so far as they are taxation to ensure that there can be no
argument that there has not been compliance with section 55 of the Constitution.
3.81
If a charge is a tax, the Regulator must not
exercise powers or functions in a way which would contravene the constitutional
requirement that taxation must not be arbitrary. [Part 4, clause 111(7)]
Price Floor
3.82
A price floor will apply for the first three years
of the flexible charge period. A price floor is a minimum carbon price. The
responsible Minister will request the Authority to review, by 30 June 2017, the
role of the price floor beyond the first three years of the flexible price
period.
3.83
The price floor will be implemented through a
minimum auction reserve price and a fee on the surrender of international units.
If regulations establishing the fee on surrender of international units are not
made or are disallowed there will be no price floor in operation. [Part
4, clause 111(5)]
3.84
The level of the price floor, and the minimum
auction reserve price, will be:
• $15
in 2015-16;
• $16
in 2016-17; and
• $17.05
in 2017-18.
3.85
These prices increase by 4 per cent in real terms
allowing for 2.5 per cent inflation per year, which is the midpoint of the
Reserve Bank of Australia’s target range (that is, the carbon price for the
preceding year × 1.04 × 1.025, rounded to the nearest 5 cents). [Part
4, clause 111(5)]
3.86
For the first three flexible charge years, there
will be a charge imposed on the surrender of eligible international units. This
charge is imposed by the Clean Energy (International Unit Surrender Charge)
Bill 2011. [Part 6, clause 124]
3.87
The surrender charge will be established through
regulations and based on the difference between the estimated international
price for a unit type and the price floor, such that:
• If
the price for a type of eligible international unit is equal to or above the
price floor, the charge will be equal to zero.
• If
the price for a type of eligible international unit is below the price floor,
the charge will be equal to the amount specified in regulations so that it is
equal to the difference between the price floor and the estimated price for
that type of unit.
3.88
If regulations setting a surrender
charge for eligible international units are not in effect, then there will not
be a minimum auction reserve price, but the Regulator may still choose to have
an auction reserve price for reasons other than implementing a price floor. [Part
4, clause 111(5)]
Free carbon
units during the fixed charge period
3.89
Free carbon units may be allocated to liable
entities under Parts 7 and 8 (see Chapters 5 and 6). The rules for these free
carbon units ensure the integrity of future pollution caps. [Part
1, clause 5, definition of ‘free carbon unit’]
3.90
These free carbon units:
• can
only be surrendered for their vintage year; [Part 6, clause 122(7)]
• must
be cancelled by the Regulator if they have not been surrendered at the end of 1
February of the eligible financial year after their vintage year; [Part
4, clause 115], [Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘eligible financial year’]
• may,
on request, be bought-back and cancelled by the Regulator during the period
between 1 September of their vintage year and 1 February of the financial year
following from their vintage year at the fixed charge for the relevant year
discounted by a factor in the regulations; and [Part 4, clause 116]
• are
cancelled if they are relinquished, rather than transferred to the Commonwealth
relinquished units account. [Part 11, clause 210(3)]
3.91
Some liable entities that receive free carbon units
with fixed charge vintage years may not want to surrender these units against a
liability for that vintage year.
3.92
To ensure that persons who hold carbon units (which
can include persons who are not liable entities under the mechanism) can sell
these units when they do not wish to surrender them, the mechanism allows the
Regulator to ‘buy-back’ these units. [Part 4, clause 116(2)]
Example 3.4 Circumstances
where a person may not want to surrender free carbon units
A person may receive units for the cost increase it
faces from, for example:
• its
use of electricity in an emissions-intensive trade-exposed activity; or
• from
the cost increase it faces that is related to the upstream emissions from the
extraction, processing and transportation of natural gas and its components
used as feedstock in an emissions-intensive trade-exposed activity.
The person may wish to sell these units to receive
cash, which can then be used to offset the increase in monetary costs it faces
due to its use of electricity or natural gas and its components as a feedstock,
rather than hold these units for surrender.
3.93
The buy-back facility will be open
from 1 September of the vintage year of the carbon units until 1 February of
the next calendar year. It lets persons receive the corresponding level of the
fixed charge for each free carbon unit he or she wants to sell back to the
Regulator, discounted by a factor specified in the regulations. [Part
4, clause 116(2)]
3.94
In certain circumstances, the Regulator may, by
legislative instrument, grant an extension to the period in which the buy-back
facility can be accessed. This will be a disallowable legislative instrument
for the purposes of the LI Act. If such an extension is granted, the
automatic cancellation of freely allocated units issued for fixed charge years
would also be extended. An extension may be granted, for example, because of a
fault or malfunction concerning a computer system under the control of the
Regulator. [Part 4, clause 116A]
3.95
For buy-backs occurring in the period before 15
June of the relevant eligible financial year, the Government proposes that the
price paid by the Regulator for these carbon units will be discounted to 15
June of the relevant eligible financial year by the latest Reserve Bank of
Australia index of the BBB corporate bond rate, so that the buy-back price
reflects the present market value of the carbon unit. From 15 June onwards the
price paid will be equal to the fixed charge carbon units of that vintage. [Part
1, clause 5, definition of ‘eligible financial year’]
3.96
If the Regulator receives a request to buy-back
free carbon units, then it must, within a time period specified by the Regulations,
cancel the units and remove the entries for those units from the Registry
account of the liable entity that held them and, as soon as practicable after
that day, pay the buy-back amount to the person and set out a record of that cancellation.
[Part
4, clause 116(3) and (4)]
3.97
There will be a standing appropriation for the
Regulator for the purpose of making payments for the buy-back of free carbon
units. [Part 4, clause 116(5)] The scope of this
standing appropriation is limited in two ways:
• firstly,
the amount of the buy-back facility cannot exceed the maximum number of units
that can be issued under Parts 7 and 8 for fixed charge years (see Chapters 5
and 6) for which the price is fixed in each year; and
• secondly,
it is limited to the fixed charge years (that is from 1 July 2012 to 30
June 2015), and does not carry on indefinitely.
Linking to
international markets
3.98
The mechanism is linked to international emissions
trading markets by allowing liable entities to surrender eligible international
emissions units from the commencement of the flexible price period. These
links are, however, subject to certain conditions:
• eligible
international emissions units cannot be surrendered during the fixed charge
period; [Part 6, clause 122(8)]
• a
liable entity may surrender eligible international emissions units to meet its
surrender obligations under the mechanism in the flexible charge period,
subject to certain quantitative and qualitative restrictions; and [Part
6, clause 133(7)], [Part 6, clause 123]
• export
of carbon units will not be allowed in the fixed price period, nor, generally,
in the first three years of the flexible price period (that is, not prior to 1
July 2018). [Part 4, clause 108(3)] Exports
of carbon units may however be allowed in the period from 1 July 2015 where a
bilateral linking agreement with another country is in place. [Part
4, clause 108(3)]
Quantitative
restriction on the use of international units
3.99
In the flexible charge period, until 2020, liable
entities must meet at least 50 per cent of their annual liability with domestic
carbon units. During this period, if a liable entity surrenders a number of
eligible international emissions units that exceeds 50 per cent of its
emissions number, then the excess does not count toward the calculation of the
emissions number for that financial year. Instead, the excess counts toward
the calculation of the emissions number for the subsequent financial year. [Part
6, clause 133(7)], [Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘eligible international
emissions unit’]
Initial
list of eligible international emissions units
3.100
A unit is an ‘eligible international emissions
unit’ if it is defined to be such under section 4 of the ANREU Act. [Part
1, clause 5, definition of ‘eligible international emissions unit’]
The initial list of eligible international emissions units includes currently
traded Kyoto units which are likely to continue to be traded through to 2015.
3.101
The ANREU Act currently defines eligible
international emissions units to include:
• certified
emission reductions (CERs), other than long-term or temporary CERs;
• emission
reduction units (ERUs);
• removal
units (RMUs);
• any
further prescribed units issued in accordance with the Kyoto rules; and [Part
1, clause 5, definition of ‘Kyoto rules’]
• any
other international unit (which is prescribed in regulations).
Adding
to the list of eligible international units
3.102
Section 4 of the ANREU Act provides for addition of
further credible units from bilateral and/or other international agreements, as
well as any further Kyoto units (if agreed internationally). [Part
1, clause 5, definition of ‘eligible international emissions unit’]
The Government may allow other international units by regulation where:
• the
addition does not compromise the environmental integrity of the mechanism;
• the
addition is consistent with the objective of the mechanism and with Australia’s
international objectives; and
• there
has been consultation with stakeholders, and analysis of the expected impact on
the carbon unit price, by the Authority, and advance notification to the market
by the Government.
3.103
The Government has announced that the types of
units accepted and qualitative restrictions on use imposed by the European
Union Emissions Trading Scheme and the New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme will
be taken into account when determining what international units may be accepted
for compliance under the mechanism (as the considerations of these
jurisdictions can be drawn upon to maintain the integrity of the mechanism).
Qualitative
restrictions on the use of international units
3.104
The bill provides a power for the Government to
disallow, by regulation, eligibility of certain international units to ensure
that only credible international emissions units are used for compliance,
supporting the environmental integrity of Australia’s pollution reduction
efforts. [Part 6, clause 123], [Part 6, clause 122(9)] The
Authority will play a key advisory role on the integrity of international units
and recommend which units should be accepted and which should be prohibited.
3.105
The bill sets out key criteria that the Minister
may consider concerning prohibiting the surrender of eligible international
units. These include:
• Australia’s
international objectives and obligations (to ensure that credits accepted can
be counted towards international commitments);
• the
environmental integrity of the mechanism;
• the
expert recommendations of the Authority;
• whether
the units are accepted by either the European Union or New Zealand emissions
trading schemes; and
• such
other matters (if any) as the Minister considers relevant. [Part
6, clause 123(2)], [Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘associated provisions’], [Part
1, clause 5, definition of ‘international climate change agreement’]
3.106
The concept of ‘environmental integrity’ is not specifically
defined in the bill. However, the objects of the bill are relevant to this
concept, in that they explain the purpose of the mechanism and define its
environmental objectives. International units derived from poorly designed
emissions trading schemes may undermine the mechanism’s ability to achieve
these objectives.
3.107
Including these provisions is consistent with the
policy that a type of eligible international emissions unit can be disallowed
for surrender at any time to ensure the environmental integrity of the
mechanism and consistency with Australia’s international objectives and
obligations. However, the regulation-making power is restricted in that if an
eligible international emissions unit is disallowed, liable entities holding
such units in their Registry accounts will be able to surrender those units for
the compliance year in which the unit was disallowed, but not subsequently. [Part
6, clause 123(3)], [Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘eligible international
emissions unit’]
3.108
In addition to the exclusion of time limited CERs
(that is, long term or temporary CERs), the Government has already announced
that CERs and ERUs if they arise from:
• nuclear
projects;
• the
destruction of trifluoromethane;
• the
destruction of nitrous oxide from adipic acid plants; and
• large-scale
hydro-electric projects not consistent with criteria adopted by the EU (based
on the World Commission on Dams guidelines).
Surrender
charge
3.109
For the first three flexible charge years, there
will be a charge potentially imposed on the surrender of eligible international
units. This charge is imposed by the Clean Energy (International Unit
Surrender Charge) Bill 2011 where if observed international unit prices fall
below the specified price for the relevant year a charge will be imposed on
users of international units, representing the difference between the observed
price and the floor price. (See also the section headed ‘Price Floor’.) [Part
6, clause 124]
Linking
to other schemes
3.110
The Government has stated that linking with other
credible trading schemes, including the New Zealand and European Union schemes,
is in Australia’s national interest. The ability to prescribe other additional
units could be used to make other schemes’ units eligible, should linking
arrangements be agreed. Provision exists for recognising such agreements
through prescribing foreign registries by regulation. This is done under the
ANREU Act (as amended by the Consequential Amendments bill), which defines
‘foreign registry’.
3.111
The Government will only consider future bilateral
links with schemes that are of a suitable standard, based on a range of
criteria including:
• an
internationally acceptable (or, where applicable, a mutually acceptable) level
of mitigation commitment;
• adequate
and comparable monitoring, reporting, verification, compliance and enforcement
mechanisms; and
• compatability
in design and market rules.
Outline of
chapter
4.1
Chapter 4 explains how a liable entity determines
its liability for emissions under the mechanism and the process by which it
meets its liabilities through the payment and surrender process. This chapter
covers Parts 5, 6 and 11.
Context
4.2
The mechanism imposes a liability on a liable
entity for the emissions or potential emissions for which they are responsible.
4.3
Liable entities must report emissions or potential
emissions under the NGER Act, which is to be amended by the Consequential
Amendments bill (these changes are explained in a separate Explanatory
Memorandum for that bill).
4.4
The mechanism creates a system for:
• assessing
liability for emissions, which is how a liable entity knows whether it is
liable for emissions;
• meeting
liability for emissions through payment and surrender processes for eligible
emissions units, which cover the fixed charge and the flexible charge periods
of the mechanism; and
• in
certain circumstances, relinquishing units, which is where units are returned
to the Commonwealth without them being surrendered.
4.5
The surrender of eligible emissions units is
relevant to unit banking (where carbon units can be surrendered in years that
are later than their vintage year); unit borrowing; international linking;
linking with the CFI; and the price floor.
4.6
If a liable entity does not meet its emissions
obligations through the surrender of eligible emissions units, then it will be
subject to a unit shortfall charge for those units it has not surrendered. This
charge is set at 130 per cent of the fixed charge for the relevant fixed charge
year. Once the mechanism moves to the flexible charge phase, the unit
shortfall charge will be up to 200 per cent of the benchmark average auction
price for the relevant period. The amount of the charge is designed to provide
a clear incentive to liable entities to surrender units, and thereby avoid the
need to pay any charge.
4.7
Unit shortfall charges are imposed through the
Charges bills, so as to ensure compliance with the requirements of section 55
of the Constitution.
4.8
Quantitative and qualitative restrictions are also
imposed on the surrender of eligible international emissions units which help
safeguard the environmental integrity of Australia’s pollution reduction
efforts. (Chapter 3 sets out in detail the operation of these restrictions.)
Summary
Emissions
numbers
4.9
Part 5 deals with emissions numbers, the way in
which they are determined and what happens if a liable entity provides an
incorrect emissions number which the Regulator considers to be incorrect or
does not provide one at all.
Surrender of
eligible emissions units
4.10
Part 6, Division 2 sets out the process by which
eligible emissions units are surrendered, restrictions on surrender and the
charge applicable to surrendering eligible international units.
Unit
shortfalls
4.11
Part 6, Division 3 deals with the way in which
liable entities meet their liabilities for unit shortfalls under the mechanism.
Subdivision A sets out the payment and surrender process in fixed charge years,
including the provisional payment or surrender point on 15 June of each eligible
fixed charge year. Subdivision B sets out the payment and surrender process in
flexible charge years.
Unit
shortfall charges
4.12
Part 6, Division 4 deals with the way in which
liable entities pay units shortfall charges, including provisions about what
happens when payments are made late or not at all. Unit shortfall charges are
also addressed in the Charges bills (see the separate Explanatory Memorandum
for an explanation of these bills).
4.13
Part 6, Division 5 deals with the way in which the
Regulator assesses unit shortfalls and unit shortfall charges.
Extension of
surrender deadline
4.14
Part 6, Division 6 provides for the extension of
the surrender deadline in certain circumstances.
Relinquishment
of carbon units
4.15
Part 11 deals with the process by which carbon
units may be relinquished. Relinquishment may occur voluntarily or as a result
of a court order to relinquish units.
Detailed
explanation of new law
Emissions
number
4.16
Liability will be based on the emissions number
which liable entities must include in their report to the Regulator in accordance
with new section 22A of the NGER Act (see Schedule 1, Part 2, item 367 of the
Consequential Amendments bill). A person’s emissions number for an eligible
financial year is defined to be the sum of the person’s Provisional Emissions Number
(PENs) for the eligible financial year. [Part 4, clause 117], [Part 4, clause 118],
[Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘emissions number’]
4.17
A PEN represents the emissions which give rise to
liability under the mechanism. Part 3 of the bill describes the situations which
result in a PEN. The person with operational control of a facility, or the
holder of an LTC or a designated JV concerning a facility, may have a PEN
calculated by reference to the emission of greenhouse gases from that facility
during a financial year (Part 3, Division 2). Natural gas suppliers and others
may have PENs calculated by reference to potential emissions embodied in
natural gas supplied during a financial year (Part 3, Division 3). PENs
are discussed in Chapter 1 of this Explanatory Memorandum.
Example 4.1 Calculation
of emissions number
In 2014-15, Elhu Ltd has operational control over
three facilities.
The NSW Facility emits less than 25,000 tonnes of CO2-e
per annum and the facility is therefore not covered by the mechanism.
The Queensland Facility emits 530,000 tonnes of CO2-e
per annum.
The Victorian Facility emits 220,000 tonnes of CO2-e
per annum.
Elhu Ltd has PENs of 530,000 and 220,000, and an
emissions number of 750,000.
Example 4.2 Calculation
of emissions number
WilkCo is a natural gas supplier that supplies natural
gas with a CO2-e of 30,000 tonnes. It supplies the gas to
customers, none of which quote an obligation transfer number.
WilkCo has a PEN of 30,000. If it does not engage in
any other activity which gives it a PEN, its emissions number is 30,000.
Assessment of
a liable entity’s liability for emissions
4.18
There are two circumstances in which the Regulator
may make an assessment of the person’s emissions number for a financial year
and provide the person with written notice of it:
• when
a liable entity has provided a report under new section 22A of the NGER Act by
31 October but the Regulator has reasonable grounds to believe that the number
specified in the report as the person’s emissions number is incorrect; [Part
5, clause 119]
• where
no such report has been provided by 31 October and the Regulator has reasonable
grounds to believe that the person is a liable entity for the financial year. [Part
5, clause 120]
4.19
An assessment may be done by the Regulator either
on the application of the person to whom the assessment relates, or on the
Regulator’s own initiative. Should the Regulator refuse to make an assessment
or refuse to amend the assessment, then it must give notice in writing to the
person. [Part 5, clause 119(5) and (7)], [Part 5, clause 120(5)
and (7)]
4.20
If an assessment is made before 1 February
following the relevant eligible financial year, it will be accompanied by a
statement explaining that the person may need to acquire and surrender eligible
emissions units to avoid being liable for a unit shortfall charge and late
payment penalty. If an assessment is made after 1 February following the
relevant eligible financial year, it will be accompanied by a statement
explaining that the person may be liable to pay a unit shortfall charge and
late payment penalty. [Part 5, clause 119(3)], [Part 5, clause 120(3)]
4.21
Each of these assessments may be amended by the
Regulator at any time. If this is done, then written notice of it must be
provided. [Part 5, clause 119(4) and (6)], [Part 5, clause 120(4)
and (6)]
4.22
The original and any amended assessments are
advisory in nature. [Part 5, clause 119(9)], [Part 5, clause 120(9)] In
other words, the legal liability is not set by the assessment. The number of
units that need to be surrendered to avoid a unit shortfall charge depends on
the emissions number (emissions measured and attributable to the liable entity
in accordance with the law), not on any action taken by the Regulator.
Meeting
liabilities under the mechanism
4.23
Liable entities meet their liabilities under the
mechanism by either surrendering units or paying a shortfall charge. This
process differs between the fixed charge years and flexible charge years (see Diagrams 4.1 and 4.2). [Part 6,
clause 121]
Diagram 4.1 Payment and surrender
process in fixed charge years

Diagram 4.2 Payment and surrender
process in flexible charge years

Surrender:
unit shortfall and excess surrender
4.24
In each financial year, each liable entity must
surrender the number of eligible emissions units equal to its emissions number
to avoid a unit shortfall. [Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘unit shortfall’]
In general, liable entities must surrender eligible emissions units by 1
February of the following financial year in order to avoid having a unit shortfall.
If the liable entity has a unit shortfall, it will be required to pay a charge.
The mechanism is designed so that paying a charge would be more expensive than
surrendering units.
The
provisional surrender obligation
4.25
In the fixed charge period, most liable entities
must surrender sufficient units by 15 June to account for 75 per cent of the
entity's estimated emissions for the current financial year. If a liable
entity does not meet its provisional surrender obligation, it will have a
provisional unit shortfall and be required to pay a unit shortfall charge. [Part
6, clause 125], [Part 6, clause 134]
4.26
All liable entities will be required to make a provisional
surrender, with the exception that a provisional surrender will not be required
concerning direct emissions from facilities that:
• were
not required to provide a report under the NGER Act for the previous financial
year (noting that this exception does not apply to natural gas suppliers, which
will be required to make a progressive payment for supplies of natural gas);
• had
covered emissions of less than 35,000 tonnes in the previous year; or
• are
reasonably expected to have covered emissions of less than 35,000 tonnes in the
current financial year.
4.27
The emissions from these
facilities will be excluded from the calculation of interim emissions numbers.
[Part 6, clause 127]
4.28
Liable entities will then surrender the rest of the
eligible emissions units by 1 February of the following year, in order to avoid
a shortfall (the ‘true-up’). Where liable entities were not required to make a
provisional surrender concerning a facility they will be required to surrender
units for the total emissions from that facility by 1 February. [Part
6, clause 128]
4.29
The estimated emissions number used for the
provisional surrender obligation is known as the ‘interim emissions number’. [Part
6, clause 126], [Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘interim emissions number’] Liable
entities that are required to make a provisional surrender will be required to
submit a report to the Regulator by 15 June providing interim emission numbers
for each facility, or supplies of natural gas, for which they are liable to
make a progressive payment, under new section 22AA of the NGER Act (see
Consequential Amendments bill, Schedule 1, Part 2, item 367).
4.30
Entities with liabilities for direct emissions from
facilities under Part 2, Division 3 will have the option of estimating their
interim emissions numbers based on the reported PEN of each facility in the
previous year’s NGER report, or choosing to provide a reasonable alternative
estimate for one or more facilities. [Part 6, clause 126] The interim emissions number concerning
those facilities will be the total of the PENs multiplied by 0.75.
4.31
If a liable entity provides an estimate that is not
based on the previous year’s NGERS report, then that estimate will be subject
to an estimation error calculation that may give rise to a unit shortfall, as
discussed below.
4.32
The use of the previous year’s report for a
facility under the NGER Act is intended to be simple and minimise
administrative and compliance costs associated with the progressive obligation.
However, in some cases use of the previous year's emissions as an estimate for
the current year may result in an overestimate of the progressive obligation
(if emissions have decreased from the previous year). In this case the liable
entity will be able to choose to use an alternative estimate of emissions.
4.33
Natural gas suppliers will not have the option of
using a previous year’s NGERS report but will instead be required to provide an
estimate of actual emissions for the first three quarters of the financial year.
As these entities do not currently report under the NGER Act, natural gas
suppliers will not have a report on which to base an estimate in the first year
of the scheme. In addition, these entities are expected to have well-developed
reporting systems for the purposes of billing and accordingly have capacity to
estimate emissions in the current year.
4.34
The provisional surrender obligation during the
fixed charge period is similar to the approach taken to payments for some forms
of taxation, such as company tax and the GST. With a provisional surrender of
75 per cent, it is expected that the cash flow impact on business should be
minimal as they should receive revenue from production before they need to meet
their surrender obligation.
Example 4.3 The
provisional surrender obligation
A liable entity submits a report of its interim
emissions numbers under section 22AA of the NGER Act for the financial year
2013-14.
The report estimates the entity’s PEN based on the
previous year’s reported emissions for 2012-13 of 100,000.
By 15 June 2014, the liable entity will be required to
surrender 75,000 units (75 per cent of its PEN for 2012-13) in order to
discharge its provisional surrender obligation. In other words, the liable
entity’s interim emissions number for 2013-14 is 75,000.
Alternatively, the liable entity may elect to provide
an alternative estimate of emissions from a facility. If the liable entity
does so and estimates that its emissions number for 2013-14 will be 80,000, the
liable entity will be required to surrender 60,000 units in order to discharge
its provisional surrender obligation.
Unit
shortfalls for fixed charge years
4.35
Because of provisional surrender, unit shortfall
works slightly differently in fixed charge years compared to flexible charge
years.
4.36
For fixed charge years, there will be a unit
shortfall calculated in accordance with the obligation to surrender permits by
15 June during the compliance year – this is known as the ‘provisional unit
shortfall’. The provisional unit shortfall is equal to the total interim
emissions numbers minus the number of eligible emissions units surrendered for
the liable entity, rounded to the nearest whole number. If this number is
zero, there is no unit shortfall; if this number is negative, the entity has a
‘provisional surplus surrender number’ which is positive and equal to this
number; if this number is positive, the entity has a unit shortfall, which is
the provisional unit shortfall. [Part 6, clause 125]
4.37
During the fixed charge period, there will also be
a unit shortfall calculated in accordance with the obligation to surrender
permits by 1 February following the compliance year. This is known as the
‘final unit shortfall’. The final unit shortfall for a liable entity is
calculated by starting with the liable entity’s emissions number and then
subtracting:
• the
number of eligible emissions units surrendered after 15 June and before 1
February;
• the
number of units that needed to be surrendered to avoid having a provisional
unit shortfall (in other words, to comply with the provisional surrender
obligation); and
• the
surplus and estimation error adjustment. [Part 6, clause 128]
4.38
If the final unit shortfall is calculated to be
zero, the liable entity does not have a shortfall; if it is calculated to be
negative, the entity has a ‘final surplus surrender number’, which is positive
and equal in magnitude to the final unit shortfall; if the final unit shortfall
is calculated to be positive, the liable entity has a final unit shortfall for
the eligible financial year. [Part 6, clause 128]
4.39
If a liable entity has a positive final surplus
surrender number corresponding to a fixed charge year, the liable entity will
be refunded in cash. The refund is equal to the final surplus surrender number
multiplied by the level of the fixed charge for that year. The Consolidated
Revenue Fund is appropriated for the purpose of making these refunds. [Part
6, clause 132]
4.40
For the provisional surrender, it is possible for a
liable entity to provide its own estimate of emissions. [Part
6, clause 126] If the estimate is incorrect, then
there may be an estimation error unit shortfall on which unit shortfall charge
will be payable. The estimation error for each facility will be equal to the
difference between the estimated facility emissions (which was 75 per cent of
estimated emissions for the year) and 75 per cent of the actual emissions from
the facility for that year. [Part 6, clause 129], [Part 6, clause 134]
4.41
If a liable entity relies on its estimated
emissions from the NGERS Report and surrenders sufficient units to discharge
this liability but the estimated emissions do not represent the actual
emissions for the current compliance year, then that entity does not have a unit
shortfall arising from the discrepancy.
4.42
The purpose of the estimation error shortfall is to
provide a strong incentive for entities that choose to provide an alternative
estimate of emissions to provide an accurate estimate. However, the amount of
an estimation error is netted off against any surplus of units acquitted in the
provisional surrender (that is, the surplus can be used to reduce or eliminate
the estimation error) via the calculation of the surplus and estimation error
adjustment. This netting off is carried out as it could be unfair to impose a
130 per cent charge for an estimation error where the liable entity had in
total surrendered more than 75 per cent of actual emissions for the year as a
progressive payment. [Part 6, clause 128], [Part 6, clause 131]
4.43
The Regulator has power to remit some or all of a
unit shortfall charge arising out of an estimation error (but not any other
form of shortfall charge). [Part 6, clause 130] This
allows the Regulator to respond to particular circumstances where it would be
unfair or unreasonable to impose the estimation error unit shortfall charge. However,
when considering whether to remit the charge the Regulator must have regard to:
• whether
the person took reasonable steps to avoid having the unit shortfall;
• the
extent to which the unit shortfall is attributable to an increase in emissions
that could not reasonably have been foreseen by the person when the person gave
the Regulator an estimate under sub-clause 126(3);
• whether
the person has had a unit shortfall under clause 129 for a previous eligible financial
year;
•
such other matters (if any) as the
Regulator considers relevant.
Example 4.4 Unit
shortfall and the provisional surrender obligation
PK Limited has provided an alternative estimate of its
emissions number for the 2012-13 financial year of 80,000.
PK Limited must surrender 60,000 units by 15 June 2014
to avoid a provisional unit shortfall. The liable entity surrenders the
required 60,000 units on 15 June, and therefore has no provisional unit
shortfall or surplus.
When PK Limited submits its final emissions report for
the year to the Regulator, its actual emissions number reported for the
financial year 2012-13 is 100,000.
This means that PK Limited’s estimation error unit
shortfall will be 15,000 (the difference between the 75 per cent of its actual
emissions number (75,000) and the 60,000 units surrendered to meet the provisional
surrender obligation).
PK Limited will be required to surrender a further
25,000 units to meet its final surrender obligation, and will have an
estimation error shortfall of 15,000 that will give rise to a shortfall charge
of 1.3 times the shortfall multiplied by the fixed charge for that year.
Unit
shortfalls for flexible charge years
4.44
During the flexible charge period, the unit
shortfall corresponds to the obligation to surrender permits by 1 February. The
unit shortfall is calculated by taking the liable entity's emissions number,
subtracting the number of units surrendered before 1 February, and subtracting
the final surplus surrender number. If the unit shortfall is zero, the liable
entity has no unit shortfall; if the unit shortfall is positive, the liable
entity has a unit shortfall; if the unit shortfall is negative, the liable
entity has a surplus surrender number equal in magnitude to the unit shortfall.
[Part
6, clause 133]
Unit
shortfall charges
4.45
When a liable entity has a unit shortfall, a unit
shortfall charge is imposed, and is payable five business days after the
surrender date. [Part 6, clause 134], [Part 1, clause 5, definition of
‘business day’], [Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘unit shortfall charge’]
The amount of unit shortfall charge is specified by clause 9 of the Clean
Energy (Charges—Customs) Bill 2011 (so far as the charge is a duty of customs),
clause 9 of the Clean Energy (Charges—Excise) Bill 2011 (so far as the charge
is a duty of excise) or clause 8 of the Clean Energy (Unit Shortfall
Charge—General) Bill 2011 (so far as the charge is not a duty of customs or
excise). [Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘unit shortfall
charge’]
4.46
For the fixed charge period, the amount charged for
each unit in the shortfall is 130 per cent of the relevant fixed charge issue
charge under clause 100(1).
4.47
For the flexible charge period, the amount charged
for each unit in the shortfall is 200 per cent of the benchmark average auction
charge for the previous financial year. The charge can also be set in
regulations, but cannot be lower than 130 per cent, or exceed 200 per cent, of
the benchmark average auction charge for the previous financial year (see
clause 9(3) and (4) of the Clean Energy (Charges—Customs) Bill 2011, clause
9(3) and (4) of the Clean Energy (Charges—Excise) Bill 2011 or clause 8(3) and
(4) of the Clean Energy (Unit Shortfall Charge—General) Bill 2011).
4.48
After the time the unit shortfall charge becomes
payable, a late payment penalty will accrue at a rate of 20 per cent per annum
(or a lower rate if prescribed in regulations). The Regulator may remit the
late payment penalty in whole or part. [Part 6, clause 135]
4.49
The unit shortfall charge and the late payment
penalty are debts due to the Commonwealth which can be recovered by the
Regulator in a court with the relevant jurisdiction. [Part
6, clause 136]
4.50
Amounts of a kind specified in regulations and due
from the Commonwealth may be set off against the amount due to the Commonwealth
arising from the unit shortfall charge or late payment penalty. [Part
6, clause 137]
4.51
Overpayments of the unit shortfall charge or late
payment penalty can be refunded. [Part 6, clause 140]
4.52
Where liability has been transferred to another
member of a corporate group under an Liability Transfer Certificate (LTC), the
controlling corporation which consented to the transfer is taken to have
guaranteed the payment of the unit shortfall charge and late payment penalty. [Part
6, clause 138]
Remission
of unit shortfall charge – voluntary disclosure of error
4.53
The Regulator may remit part of a unit shortfall
charge if the liable entity voluntarily discloses to the Regulator that its
reported emissions number was underestimated. [Part 6 clause 134A]
For the Regulator to consider any remittal, the disclosure must:
• be
made after 1 February next following the relevant eligible financial year; and
• be
made before any relevant investigative action takes place.
4.54
The Regulator cannot remit the unit shortfall charge
by more than an amount that would result in the remaining charge being less
than:
• for
a fixed charge year, the number of units in the unit shortfall multiplied by
the fixed charge for that year; or
• for
a flexible charge year, the number of units in the unit shortfall multiplied the
benchmark average auction charge for the previous financial year. [Part 6
clause 134A(4)]
Assessment
of unit shortfall and unit shortfall charge
4.55
The Regulator may make an assessment of a liable
entity's unit shortfall and unit shortfall charge for a financial year and
provide the entity with written notice of its assessment. The Regulator may
rely on a report provided under the NGER Act in making the assessment. [Part
6, clause 141(2) and (5)]
4.56
The assessment may be amended by the Regulator at
any time either on the application of the person to whom the assessment relates
or the Regulator’s own initiative. If this is done, then written notice of it
must be provided. [Part 6, clause 141(3) and (4)]
4.57
The original and any amended assessments are
advisory in nature. [Part 6, clause 141(9)] In
other words, the legal liability is not set by the assessment. Calculation of
a unit shortfall and unit shortfall charge depends on the operation of the law
(the bill and related legislation), not on any action taken by the Regulator.
Surrender of
units
Which
units are eligible emissions units
4.58
Only ‘eligible emissions units’ can be used for
surrender. [Part 6, clause 122(1)]
This phrase is defined to mean carbon units, eligible international emissions
units and eligible Australian Carbon Credit Units (ACCUs). [Part
1, clause 5, definition of ‘eligible emissions unit’], [Part 1, clause 5,
definition of ‘eligible international emissions unit’]
‘Eligible international emissions units’ is defined to have the same meaning as
in section 4 of the Australian National
Registry of Emissions Units Act 2011 (ANREU Act) (see further below).
[Part
1, clause 5, definition of ‘eligible international emissions unit’]
Limits
on surrender
4.59
In any financial year, units can be surrendered
only for that financial year or an earlier financial year. [Part
6, clause 122(3)]
4.60
Carbon units of the current, later or the
immediately preceding vintage years may be surrendered. [Part
6, clause 122(4)] This in effect allows for
‘banking’ of units.
4.61
In the fixed charge period, a carbon unit cannot be
surrendered unless it has a vintage year of that financial year. [Part
6, clause 122(6)]
4.62
A carbon unit with a vintage year that is a fixed
charge year, which was issued in accordance with Parts 7 or 8, can only be
surrendered with respect to that year (see Chapters 5 and 6). [Part
6, clause 122(7)]
Borrowing
limit for flexible charge years
4.63
There is a limit on the number of ‘borrowed’ units
(that is, units of the next vintage year) which can be used for surrender. If
surrendered carbon units representing more than 5 per cent of the emissions
number are ‘borrowed’, then the excess number of units over the 5 per cent is
not regarded as surrendered for the relevant financial year when calculating
the unit shortfall and is instead treated as surrendered at the next surrender
date. [Part 6, clause 133(6)]
4.64
In addition, ‘borrowed’ units can only be
surrendered within a specified period when the entity’s emissions number is
known. [Part 6, clause 122(5)]
Example 4.5 Calculation
of shortfall
On 31 October 2018, PN Corp submits its report under
the NGER Act for the financial year 2017-18. The report indicates that PN
Corp’s emissions number is 100,000. On 15 December 2018, PN Corp transmits a
notice to the Regulator specifying the surrender of the following units for the
financial year 2017-18:
|
Vintage
of units
|
Number of units
|
|
2015-16
|
10,000
|
|
2016-17
|
10,000
|
|
2017-18
|
70,000
|
|
2018-19
|
10,000
|
|
Total
|
100,000
|
The surrender of units with vintages belonging to the
current year and previous financial years will be accepted. However, only 5 per
cent of 100,000 units, or 5,000 units, with a 2018-19 vintage may be
surrendered for the year 2017-18. PN Corp will therefore have a unit shortfall
of 5,000 for the financial year 2017-18.
Limits
on linking with the CFI
4.65
During the fixed charge period, liable entities may
surrender eligible ACCUs totalling no more than 5 per cent of their obligation.
There are provisions that ensure that if a liable entity surrenders ACCUs that
are in excess of 5 per cent of the liable entity's emissions number or interim
emissions number, the excess does not contribute to addressing any unit
shortfall. Excess ACCUs that are surrendered before 30 June are treated as if
they are surrendered as part of the 'true up' before 1 February of the
following year. Excess ACCUs that are surrendered after 15 June and before 1
February are treated as if they are surrendered in the corresponding period of
the next financial year. [Part 6, clause 125(7)], [Part 6, clause 128(7)-(9)]
4.66
In the flexible charge period, there will be no limit
on the surrender of ACCUs.
Quantitative
restrictions on eligible international emissions units
4.67
In the flexible charge period, until 2020, liable
entities must meet at least 50 per cent of their annual liability with domestic
carbon units. Chapter 3 sets out in more detail the operation of the
quantitative restriction. [Part 6, clause 133(7)], [Part 1, clause 5, definition
of ‘eligible international emissions unit’]
Qualitative
restrictions on eligible international emissions units
4.68
Eligible international units cannot be surrendered
in the fixed charge period as the fixed charge period is intended to provide
certainty over the price for carbon units over the period. [Part
6, clause 122(8)] During the flexible price
period such units can be surrendered subject to any restrictions. Any
restrictions placed on the acceptance of international units will be to ensure
the stability and ongoing credibility of the mechanism, and consistency with
Australia’s international objectives and obligations. Chapter 3 sets out in
detail the operation of qualitative restrictions on eligible international
emissions units.
How
eligible emissions units are surrendered
4.69
A person may surrender eligible emissions units by
electronic notice transmitted to the Regulator. [Part 6, clause 122(1)]
4.70
What constitutes an ‘electronic notice transmitted
to the Regulator’ is described in clause 7. [Part 1, clause 7], [Part 1, clause 5,
definition of ‘electronic notice transmitted to the Regulator’]
This allows the Regulator to require the use of particular information
technology requirements. [Part 1, clause 8]
4.71
The notice must specify the eligible emissions
units being surrendered, the financial year to which the surrender relates and
the person’s relevant account number. [Part 6, clause 122(2)], [Part 1, clause
5, definition of ‘account number’]
When
eligible emissions units must be surrendered
4.72
As indicated above, eligible emissions units must
be surrendered by 15 June or 1 February. However, to provide for the remote
possibility that entities cannot gain computer access to the Regulator in the
period shortly before the deadline, the Regulator is empowered to extend the
deadline by legislative instrument. If an extension is granted, the automatic
cancellation of freely allocated units issued for fixed charge years would also
be extended. [Part 6, clause 142]
What
happens when a unit is surrendered
4.73
When a carbon unit is surrendered, it is cancelled
and the Regulator must remove the entry for the unit from the Registry account
of the person who has surrendered it. [Part 6, clause 122(10)]
4.74
When an eligible ACCU is surrendered, it is
cancelled and the Regulator must remove the entry for the unit from the
Registry account of the person who has surrendered it. [Part
6, clause 122(12)]
4.75
When an eligible ACCU is surrendered, it is
cancelled and the Regulator must remove the entry for the unit from the
Registry account of the person who has surrendered it. [Part
6, clause 122(12)]
4.76
However, different processes are required concerning
eligible international emissions units. When an eligible international
emissions unit is surrendered, the Regulator must remove the unit from the
Registry account of the person who has surrendered it. In addition:
• If
any other international emissions unit is surrendered, then the action required
of the Regulator will be specified in the regulations. [Part
6, clause 122(11)] It is necessary to provide
that this action will be specified in the regulations because the concept of an
‘eligible international emissions unit’ provides for units issued under future
international agreements and units issued outside Australia under a law of a
foreign country. [Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘eligible
international emissions unit’], [Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘foreign country’],
[Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘prescribed international unit’], [Part 1,
clause 5, definition of ‘international agreement’] This
provision therefore seeks to provide for future recognition of new and
additional units without the need to amend the Act.
Surrender
charge for eligible international units
4.77
During the first three years of the flexible charge
period, there will be a price floor – a minimum carbon price. The price floor
will be implemented through a minimum reserve auction price and a surrender
charge for international units. [Part 6, clause 124]
The price floor is described in more detail in Chapter 3.
Relinquishment
When
is relinquishment required?
4.78
The situations in which relinquishment of carbon
units can be required are discussed in Chapters 5 and 7. In brief, persons
will be required to relinquish units in the following situations:
• in
the Jobs and Competitiveness Program, where, for example, units are provided at
or before the beginning of each financial year but planned production ceases
during a year. Relinquishment prevents windfall gains from units associated
with production that does not take place and reductions in the supply of units
that would otherwise be available for auction (see Chapter 5); [Part
7, clause 146], [Part 11, clause 211]
• where
a court has ordered relinquishment following conviction under specified
provisions of the Criminal Code, including those concerning false or misleading
statements in information provided to the Regulator. In this case,
relinquishment is required because the units would not have been issued if
fraudulent conduct had not occurred (see Chapter 7). [See
Part 10, clause 208(2)]
How
carbon units are relinquished
4.79
A person who holds carbon units can
relinquish them by electronic notice transmitted to the Regulator. The notice
must specify, among other things, the reason for relinquishment. [Part
1, clause 5, definition of ‘relinquish’], [Part 11, clause 210(1) and (2)]
What
happens to relinquished units
4.80
For a carbon unit for a fixed charge year, if it is
relinquished, then it is cancelled and the Regulator must remove it from its
owner’s Registry account. [Part 11, clause 210(3)]
4.81
For a carbon unit for a flexible charge year, if it
is relinquished, then it is transferred to the Commonwealth relinquished units
account (which is the Commonwealth Registry account designated for this
purpose) and property is transferred to the Commonwealth. [Part 11,
clause 210(4)], [Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘Commonwealth relinquished
units account’], [Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘Commonwealth Registry
account’] The Regulator may auction the units (see
Chapter 3). [Part 4, clause 112]
Failure
to comply with relinquishment requirements
4.82
The consequences of a failure to
comply with a relinquishment requirement are comparable to the consequences of
a unit shortfall described above. The most significant difference is that the
liable entity pays a penalty rather than a charge and that the penalty is
calculated at double the unit charge (subject to regulations to the contrary in
a flexible period year). [Part 11, clause 212], [Part 11, clause 213], [Part 11,
clause 214], [Part 11, clause 215], [Part 11, clause 216]
Outline of
chapter
5.1
Chapter 5 explains the Jobs and Competitiveness
Program (the Program). The Government may make regulations which allocate free
carbon units to persons who conduct emissions-intensive trade-exposed
activities. This chapter covers Part 7 and elements of Parts 9 and 11 of the
bill.
Context
5.2
As Australia moves towards a clean energy future, a
carbon price may impact on the international competitiveness of its industries
which undertake activities that are both emissions-intensive and trade-exposed.
The Program provides significant support for jobs and protects the
competitiveness of these emissions-intensive trade-exposed industries from
risks for emissions-intensive trade-exposed activities to be located in, or
relocated to, foreign countries as a result of different climate change
policies applying in Australia compared to foreign countries. The Program also
ensures that industry, local communities and workers have a smooth transition
to a clean energy future.
5.3
The Program is designed to target assistance in as
practical and effective a fashion as possible, within a transparent assistance
framework.
5.4
The Program is designed to provide assistance in an
economically and environmentally efficient manner. It accommodates growth in
industries conducting emissions-intensive trade-exposed activities by directly
linking allocations to the production levels of existing and new entities. The
Program is based on the expectation that all industries should contribute to
the national emissions reduction effort and maintains a strong price signal for
all entities to pursue abatement opportunities to reduce the pollution
intensity of their products.
5.5
Accordingly, the Program is:
• targeted
towards industries that conduct trade-exposed activities and have the most
significant exposure to a carbon price;
• provided
on an activity basis to ensure that assistance is targeted to the emissions-intensive
transformation taking place;
• linked
to production levels and provided on the basis that production continues in
Australia;
• balanced
against the needs of non-assisted sectors and households; and
• consistent
with Australia’s international trade obligations.
5.6
Assistance is designed to preserve the incentives
for entities conducting emissions-intensive trade-exposed activities to
transition to a clean energy future by:
• providing
assistance only for the most emissions-intensive activities carried out by an
entity;
• providing
assistance on the same basis to all entities, new and existing, conducting a
given eligible activity; and
• providing
assistance on the basis of historical information on the emissions from these
activities, to ensure that entities have an ongoing incentive to reduce their
emissions.
5.7
The linking of assistance to production levels, and
not future emissions levels, means that the allocation of free carbon units
will maintain the financial incentives for firms to reduce their emissions
intensity — that is, the number of emissions generated per unit of output
produced. Entities conducting emissions-intensive trade-exposed activities,
like all other entities in the economy, will therefore retain the incentive to
pursue abatement opportunities that are cost effective relative to the full
carbon price.
5.8
Assistance will be provided to entities that
conduct emissions-intensive trade-exposed activities through the issuance of
free carbon units by the Regulator early in each compliance period.
5.9
During the fixed charge period, all of the
allocations for indirect emissions and 75 per cent of the allocations for
direct emissions will be made early in a compliance year. The remaining 25 per
cent of the allocations for direct emissions will be deferred until early in
the following financial year. This is consistent with the payment and
surrender obligations of the mechanism (see Chapter 4). The Regulations will
provide detail on when this deferred payment will take place.
5.10
Assistance will be provided on an activity basis to
ensure that it is well targeted and is equitably distributed within and across
industries. The assistance will be provided for the following:
• the
direct emissions associated with an activity, that gives rise to an obligation
under the mechanism, which can be discharged by surrendering eligible emissions
units;
• the
emissions associated with the use of steam in an activity;
• the
cost increase associated with the indirect emissions from the use of
electricity in an activity, which is assessed as resulting from the
introduction of the mechanism;
• the
cost increase related to the upstream emissions from the extraction, processing
and transportation of natural gas and its components, such as methane, used as
feedstock and sequestered by an activity.
5.11
Eligibility for assistance will be assessed based
on an emissions intensity and trade exposure test:
• Trade-exposure
is to be assessed for trade shares (the ratio of the value of imports and
exports to the value of domestic production) being greater than 10 per cent in
any one of the 2004-05, 2005–06, 2006–07 or 2007–08 financial years, or there
being a demonstrated lack of capacity to pass-through costs due to the
potential for international competition.
• Emissions-intensity
is to be assessed as to whether the industry-wide weighted average emissions
intensity of an activity is above a threshold of:
–
1,000 tonnes CO2-e per million dollars
of revenue; or
–
3,000 tonnes CO2-e per million dollars
of value added.
5.12
Activity assessments and activity definitions that
were completed in the context of the Renewable Energy Target or the 2009-10
CPRS will remain valid and will be specified in the Regulations.
5.13
A Guidance Paper called Assessment of activities for the purposes of emissions-intensive trade-exposed
assistance program was published on 18 February 2009. Any revisions
to this Guidance will continue to advise entities on the process and
information required by Government to make an informed decision on the
eligibility of an activity for Program assistance and the rate of assistance
provided to the activity.
5.14
In making its decision on the eligibility of
activities and the allocative baselines for eligible activities (that is, the
number of free carbon units that will be issued for each unit of production or
eligible inputs, as specified by the regulations, of an emissions-intensive
trade-exposed activity), the Government will consider, in addition to data
supplied by entities, publicly available information on pricing, trade and
emissions intensity from Australian and international sources.
5.15
An Expert Advisory Committee is in place and
provides advice to the Government on the definition of activities and the
assessment of eligibility for the Program. Decisions taken by the Government
on the eligibility of activities were most recently published in March 2011, in
an explanatory paper called Establishing the
eligibility of emissions-intensive trade-exposed activities. This
paper will be updated and reflect additional activities as they become eligible
under the Program.
5.16
The Program will provide assistance at two
different rates, reflecting the need to provide relatively more assistance to
relatively more emissions-intensive activities in order to reduce the
likelihood of carbon leakage.
5.17
Initial assistance to eligible activities will be
set in the regulations at:
• 94.5
per cent of the allocative baseline for activities that have an emissions
intensity of at least 2,000 tonnes of CO2 e/million dollars of
revenue or 6,000 tonnes of CO2 e/million dollars of value added in
the specified assessment period; or
• 66
per cent of the allocative baseline for activities that have an emissions
intensity between 1,000 tonnes CO2 e/million dollars of revenue and
1,999 tonnes of CO2 e/million dollars of revenue, or between 3,000
tonnes of CO2 e/million dollars of value added and 5,999 tonnes of CO2
e/million dollars of value added in the specified assessment period.
5.18
The initial rates of assistance accorded each
emissions-intensive trade-exposed activity will be reduced in the Regulations
by the ‘carbon productivity contribution’ of 1.3 per cent a year. This is
intended to broadly ensure that entities conducting emissions-intensive
trade-exposed activities share in the national improvement of carbon
productivity.
5.19
The Program will deliver carbon units in accordance
with an entity’s payment and surrender obligations (see Chapter 4). However,
the units issued for each of the fixed charge years cannot be banked for use in
future years. In recognition that firms receiving assistance are likely to
want to use some units to meet increased electricity costs, the units are
transferable and the Regulator will operate a buy-back mechanism for these units
(see Chapter 3).
5.20
The allocative baselines for each activity will be
set in the regulations. They will take into account historic emissions and
production information submitted to the Department about emissions and
production levels in 2006-07 and 2007-08. To maximise abatement incentives,
the baselines for allocations will not be updated over time for changes in the
emissions intensity of entities conducting emissions-intensive trade-exposed
activities.
5.21
For electricity use baselines, an electricity
allocation factor will be set at one unit per megawatt hour (MWh) nationwide
for the purpose of the eligibility assessment and when setting allocative
baselines. This factor may be adjusted for existing large electricity supply
contracts for entities consuming greater than 2,000 gigawatt hours (GWh) per
annum, and where contractual arrangements entered into before 3 June 2007 are
still in force (without having been renegotiated or reviewed) by a date to be
set by regulations. In such a situation, these contracts will be considered by
the Regulator with a view to determine an entity-specific electricity
allocation factor as outlined in the regulations.
5.22
Allocations of assistance to entities conducting emissions-intensive
trade-exposed activities will be directly linked to the level of production of
individual entities conducting an activity. In any given year, the number of
free carbon units to be issued to an entity will be determined using the
previous financial year’s production of the activity by that entity adjusted
for any over or under allocation in the previous year, with the following
exceptions:
• concerning
new entrants and significant expansions, the Regulator will be afforded the
discretion to determine an allocation for the expected production in a given
year;
• entities
operating newly established facilities who will have their allocations limited
by regulations in a manner to avoid windfall gains from assistance;
• sub-threshold
facilities will have assistance adjusted through regulations such that
assistance is not provided for emissions which do not attract carbon costs; and
• LNG
projects will receive a supplementary allocation to ensure that they receive an
effective rate of assistance at or above 50 per cent.
5.23
To retain the full incentive to invest in emissions
reductions technologies, unit allocations will be uncapped for existing
facilities.
5.24
If an entity ceases conducting an
emissions-intensive trade-exposed activity, it will be required to relinquish
carbon units that had been issued to it for production that did not occur.
5.25
Where an emissions-intensive trade-exposed activity
is conducted at a single facility, the entity which has, or would have, direct
emissions liability from the facility may apply for assistance. Where more
than one entity has liability or potential liability, there must be a joint
application including each of those entities, and that joint application must
specify how the entities request that the assistance be allocated.
5.26
The Program will be reviewed by the Productivity Commission
in the third year of the mechanism (2014-15) and thereafter consistent with the
timing of general mechanism reviews.
5.27
A review of assistance provided to a particular
activity could be conducted earlier than 2014-15 if requested by the Government.
Where the Government refers specific activities to the Productivity Commission
for priority reviews, priority could be given as follows:
• industry
sectors receiving the greatest level of assistance;
• industry
sectors experiencing the fastest rates of growth in assistance; or
• industry
sectors where there is strong evidence of windfall gains as a result of the
assistance.
5.28
The Productivity Commission reviews will consider:
• the
operation of assistance arrangements under the Program; and
• the
impact of the Clean Energy Act and associated provisions on emissions-intensive
trade-exposed industries; and
• the
economic and environmental efficiency of assistance arrangements under the
Program.
5.29
Changes made to regulations concerning the Program
will be made in a way which has regard to:
• the
aims of the Program, including to provide assistance in an economically and
environmentally efficient manner to reduce the risks of carbon leakage from
emissions-intensive trade-exposed industries and help these industries transition
under a carbon price;
• the
most recent reports from the Productivity Commission on matters concerning the
Program;
• the
principle that changes to regulations that will have a negative effect on
recipients of assistance under the Program should not take effect before the
later of the following:
– 1
July 2017;
– the
end of the 3-year notice period that begins when the reduction is announced;
and
• other
matters (if any) as the Minister considers relevant. These matters could, for
example, include Australia’s ongoing international trade obligations. However,
the Government’s intention is that the factors listed in the legislation are
the primary criteria that determine that assistance is no longer warranted.
5.30
Changes to regulations that will have a negative
effect on recipients of assistance means changes to the assistance rates,
beyond the carbon productivity contribution, or other elements of the program
set out in the regulations which results in a net decrease in assistance. The
Government has also agreed to implement the approach proposed by the Garnaut
Review Update 2011 if the Productivity Commission recommends that it is the
most effective and efficient means of preventing carbon leakage and assisting
the industry to transition and that it is feasible and data is available for the
Government adopt this approach. This would be subject to the considerations
and minimum notice period set out above.
5.31
The Government will publish draft regulations to
set up the Program and engage with relevant entities. As at September 2011, 31
activities were found to be eligible under the criteria and process outlined
above.
Summary
Introduction
5.32
Part 7, Division 1 provides that the Program
recognises the issues concerning the impact that the mechanism may have on the
international competitiveness of emissions-intensive trade-exposed activities
carried on in Australia.
5.33
An object of the Program is to provide transitional
assistance to entities conducting emissions-intensive trade-exposed activities
in a manner that is both economically and environmentally efficient in order to
reduce the risk of carbon leakage.
Formulation
of the Jobs and Competitiveness Program
5.34
Part 7, Division 2 sets out the core components of
the Program. In particular it provides for:
• the
creation of a program in regulations that involves the allocation of free
carbon units for activities that are taken to be emissions-intensive trade-exposed
activities and are carried on in Australia during a particular financial year;
• a
requirement under the Program that those persons who are issued free carbon
units relinquish units in specified circumstances. This is intended to be used
to provide for relinquishment of units on the closure of a facility;
• the
imposition of reporting and record-keeping requirements for persons issued free
carbon units under the Program. This is intended to be used to ensure that the
Regulator is aware of potential closures and whether production levels claimed
in assistance applications were actually achieved; and
• comprehensive
application and assessment requirements under the Program.
Compliance
5.35
Part 7, Division 3 requires that persons comply
with reporting and record-keeping requirements under the Program. Failure to
comply will incur a civil penalty.
Special
information-gathering powers
5.36
Part 7, Division 4 allows the Minister to request
from constitutional corporations information relevant to decisions about the
formulation of the assistance under the Program. This information gathering
power is limited to the circumstances where an activity is not yet listed as an
emissions-intensive trade-exposed activity and a party has requested that the
activity be added to the regulations.
Productivity
Commission inquiries
5.37
Part 7, Division 5 provides for a series of reviews
of the assistance under the Program to be undertaken by the Productivity
Commission.
5.38
Part 7, Division 5 outlines the timing of such
reviews, the matters to be considered and the requirements for the Government
response to the report.
5.39
These reviews will consider whether an alternative
pattern and level of assistance would meet the Program’s objectives,
particularly economic and environmental efficiency, more effectively. Further
details of the issues to be taken into account are set out below.
5.40
During the general reviews the Productivity
Commission must consult with the Authority on whether the established pattern
of assistance is avoiding carbon leakage and facilitating industry transition,
and whether it is supporting emissions reduction objectives.
Aspects of
the Jobs and Competitiveness Program outside of Part 7
5.41
Part 9 requires the Regulator to publish
information about the Program. The general enforcement and accountability
framework for the Regulator is also relevant to the Program.
5.42
Part 11, Divisions 2 and 3 set up the legal
architecture around compliance with the relinquishment requirements which will
operate on the closure of a facility. Accordingly, if a person does not
relinquish carbon units as necessary they will be required to pay a penalty,
for any units not relinquished, of 200 per cent of the benchmark average
auction charge of the previous financial year or another amount specified in
regulations. In the fixed charge period, the penalty charge will be specified
for each year. If this is not paid, a penalty of 20 per cent per annum is
payable or another lower rate specified in regulations.
Detailed
explanation of provisions
Introduction
Aims
and objects
5.43
The aim of Part 7 is to recognise issues concerning
the impact of the mechanism on the international competitiveness of emissions-intensive
trade-exposed activities carried on in Australia. [Part
7, clause 143(1)] References to assistance in this
chapter are references to assistance under Part 7, unless otherwise indicated.
5.44
Unless the Program is implemented, the costs
associated with the mechanism may adversely impact the competitiveness of
entities conducting emissions-intensive trade-exposed activities in Australia
in the period before broadly comparable emissions reduction policies or carbon
constraints are applied in other countries at an industry or economy-wide level.
Entities conducting these activities may be constrained in their ability to
pass on the costs of the carbon price, while competitors do not face similar
costs which have been imposed through market based or regulatory mechanisms.
5.45
Part 7 allows the delivery of assistance for
emissions-intensive trade-exposed activities. [Part 7, clause 144], [Part 7, clause
143(2)(a)] Carrying out defined activities in
Australia creates eligibility for assistance, rather than a firm’s historic or
future emissions.
5.46
The Government provides assistance to reduce the
risks for emissions-intensive trade-exposed activities to be located in, or
relocated to, foreign countries as a result of different climate change policies
applying in Australia compared to foreign countries. [Part
7, clause 143(2)(b)], [Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘foreign country’] This
risk exists for both current businesses and new investments in the future. The
Government also provides assistance to give transitional support to entities
undertaking such activities when they are carried out in Australia. [Part
7, clause 143(2)(c)] Given the significant
differences between the emissions profiles of industries, the impact of the
carbon price will be greater for some than for others. Transitional assistance
is provided through the administrative allocation of free carbon units under
the Program to the most emissions-intensive and trade-exposed of Australia’s
industries.
5.47
Assistance will be given in a way that ensures that
the level of assistance for emissions-intensive trade-exposed activities is
both economically and environmentally efficient. [Part 7, clause 143(2)(d)]
5.48
The objects of Part 7 recognise that circumstances
may change such that assistance may no longer be warranted. In particular, it
outlines two important considerations in determining where this may be the
case:
• where
comparable or more stringent measures to reduce emissions of carbon dioxide
and other greenhouse gases have been implemented for the markets in which
entities conducting emissions-intensive trade-exposed activities in Australia
compete; and [Part 7, clause 143(2)(e)]
• where
other countries responsible for a substantial majority of global emissions have
implemented comparable measures to reduce those emissions. [Part
7, clause 143(2)(f)]
5.49
The Government will determine whether the
assistance is no longer warranted after considering advice from the
Productivity Commission review of the assistance under the Program.
5.50
Measures to reduce emissions do not necessarily
need to consist of a cap on emissions, and other approaches to reduce emissions
are also intended to be considered in the analysis. It will be important to
consider whether all relevant market-based and regulatory measures, taken
together, impose broadly comparable carbon constraints as those in Australia,
taking into account assistance arrangements in both Australia and in these
competitor countries.
5.51
Other factors may also come into play which renders
the assistance unwarranted in terms of its aim and primary objective of
reducing carbon leakage and providing transitional assistance. [Part
7, clause 143(2)(g)] However, the Government’s
intention is that the factors listed in the legislation are the primary criteria
that determine that assistance is no longer warranted.
Formulation
of the Jobs and Competitiveness Program
5.52
Part 7, Division 2 lets the Government set up the
Program in regulations. [Part 7, clause 145], [Part 1, clause 5, definition of
‘Jobs and Competitiveness Program’] This approach
reflects the wide range of activities covered by the Program, the extensive
consultation being undertaken as part of its development and the need to ensure
that the treatment of each activity is appropriately geared to its specific
circumstances.
5.53
The technical aspects of precisely defining the
range of emissions-intensive trade-exposed activities, the eligibility criteria
and relevant production units, and the need for flexibility to make changes and
to include new activities over time, make it appropriate to set out the detail
of the Program’s operation and application in regulations, within the broad
framework of Part 7. The regulations may be disallowed if either House of
Parliament passes a resolution within 15 sitting days of the regulations being
tabled.
5.54
After the Government has assessed detail on
emissions, electricity use, revenue and/or value added for a given activity,
the regulations can provide a relatively simple allocation methodology per unit
of production which provides investment certainty, minimises ongoing compliance
costs and reduces the risk of assistance decisions being subject to lengthy
appeal and review processes which may divert resources.
Creating
the Program
5.55
The Program will allow for the issue of free carbon
units for defined emissions-intensive trade-exposed activities. [Part
7, clause 145(1)(a)]
5.56
Such activities must be carried on in Australia
during an eligible financial year. [Part 7, clause 145(1)(b)]
For this purpose, Australia includes external territories, the exclusive
economic zone, the continental shelf and the Joint Petroleum Development Area.
[Part
1, clause 5, definition of ‘Australia’], [Part 1, clause 5, definition of
‘Joint Petroleum Development Area’] Assistance may
be delivered before an activity is carried on so long as the activity is
actually carried out in the relevant eligible financial year.
5.57
While the eligibility of activities will be
determined by the Government in decisions on whether or not to list activities
in the regulations, the individual eligibility requirements for the assistance
will be specified in the Program. [Part 7, clause 145(2)(a)]
5.58
A Registry account is a prerequisite to receiving assistance.
[Part
7, clause 145(2)(b)] Without a Registry account,
it would not be possible for the Regulator to issue the free carbon units. Otherwise
it is intended that eligibility will essentially rest upon whether a defined
emissions-intensive trade-exposed activity is being carried out, what relevant
levels of production have been achieved and that the person applying is the one
ordinarily liable for the emissions from the relevant activity under the mechanism.
5.59
Coal mining is not to be defined as an eligible emissions-intensive
trade-exposed activity. [Part 7, clause 145(3)]
The Government has outlined its intention to provide a separate program of
transitional assistance to support emissions-intensive coal mines.
5.60
The Minister must take all reasonable steps to
establish the Program in regulations before 1 March 2012. [Part
7, clause 145(4)] Activities found eligible after
this point will be added to the Program through amendments to the regulations.
5.61
Reviews of the assistance under the Program will
play an important role in advising the Government on the consistency of the
assistance with these aims and objects and the likelihood of the assistance
being unwarranted because of international developments. The Minister, in
making a recommendation to the Governor-General about changes to the
regulations, will have regard to:
• the
aims of the Program, including to provide assistance in an economically and
environmentally efficient manner to reduce the risks of carbon leakage from
emissions-intensive trade-exposed industries and help these industries
transition under a carbon price;
• the
most recent reports from the Productivity Commission on matters concerning the
Program;
• the
principle that changes to regulations that will have a negative effect on
recipients of assistance under the Program should not take effect before the
later of the following:
– 1
July 2017;
– the
end of the 3-year notice period that begins when the reduction is announced;
and
• other
matters (if any) as the Minister considers relevant. These matters could, for
example, include Australia’s international trade obligations. However, the
Government’s intention is that the factors listed in the legislation are the
primary criteria that determine that assistance is no longer warranted. [Part
7, clause 145(5)]
5.62
Changes to regulations that will have a negative effect
on recipients of assistance means changes to the assistance rates, beyond the
carbon productivity contribution or other elements of the Program set out in
the regulations, which results in a net decrease in assistance.
Relinquishment
requirement
5.63
The Program may provide for the relinquishment of
free carbon units. [Part 7, clause 146] This
is intended to be utilised for the closure of a facility. Accordingly, where
free carbon units are issued early in a financial year attributable to
production that is to take place in that year, and production ceases during the
year (other than for maintenance or similar temporary closures), units
attributable to the production which did not take place will be required to be
relinquished.
5.64
Such a requirement may be defined about events,
circumstances or a decision of the Regulator according to criteria in the
Program. [Part 7, clause 146(1)(b)]
This provision will ensure that the assistance is contingent upon continued
production by the activity and will avoid the potential for an entity to
receive a windfall gain from being issued free carbon units for production
which is then closed or moved offshore.
5.65
Relinquishment requirements only apply to persons
issued units under the Program [Part 7, clause 146(1)(a)]
and cannot exceed the number of units issued to the person under the Program. [Part
7, clause 146(2)]
5.66
The relinquishment of units to comply with the
Program can be done by submitting an electronic notice to the Regulator. [Part
11, clause 210] The relinquishment process is
described in Chapter 4.
Reporting
requirements
5.67
The Program can include reporting requirements on
persons issued units under it, which will allow the Regulator to adequately
monitor situations where a closure may have occurred and be alerted to
situations where it may need to trigger a relinquishment requirement. [Part
7, clause 147]
Record-keeping
requirements
5.68
The Program can include record-keeping requirements
on persons issued units under it. [Part 7, clause 148]
This will allow the Regulator to monitor any closure of a facility and ensure
that the production records which determined assistance levels are kept for
subsequent validation or investigation. These records are needed because
production levels will be the central factor which determines the levels of
assistance and these levels will not be collected and reported under the NGER
Act.
5.69
Part 14, also gives power to impose record-keeping
requirements (see Chapter 7). However, it is intended that these requirements
will relate to the broader carbon price mechanism. The record-keeping
obligations for the Program will not duplicate other reporting mechanisms or
significantly increase the regulatory burden on business.
Other
matters and ancillary or incidental provisions
5.70
Other aspects of the Program will be in the
regulations. [Part 7, clause 149], [Part 7, clause 150]
In particular, the regulations can provide for the form and content of
applications for assistance.
5.71
Given the value of the free carbon units to be
issued, it will be important for the Regulator to have enough verified
information about relevant production levels to allow it to determine how many free
carbon units to issue as assistance to a particular person in a particular year.
[Part
7, clause 149(1)-(3)]
5.72
Verification could include that a relevant company
officer verify the information by statutory declaration or that the information
is accompanied by particular documents or reports, such as an assurance report
as to whether the level of production was actually undertaken in the previous
financial year or engineering reports to demonstrate that a particular activity
is in fact conducted.
5.73
The regulations may prescribe in full the process
and procedural requirements for the Regulator to deal with applications. It is
anticipated that applications will be made between 1 July and 31 October of
each year and assessed by the Regulator on a case-by-case basis. Entities will
be able to apply for an extension of this timeline to allow them until 31
December to apply. The Regulator will be able to issue units to applicants as
soon as it is satisfied about each application.
5.74
The Regulator may also issue guidelines to assist
entities in including information in their applications for assistance under
the Program, such as how production should be measured, and other information
that would assist the Regulator in assessing an application for assistance. [Part
7, clause 149(4)]
5.75
The Program can also include ancillary or
incidental provisions to facilitate its operation. [Part 7,
clause 150]
5.76
It is also intended that the Program will, where
necessary, adopt various industry standards and confer administrative decision
making functions on the Regulator. [Part 23, clause 309], [Part 23, clause
310]
Compliance
with reporting and record-keeping requirements under the Jobs and
Competitiveness Program
Compliance
with record-keeping and reporting requirements
5.77
There is a direct obligation on persons under the
Program to comply with any record-keeping or reporting requirements. A person
under such an obligation, along with others involved, who contravenes
reporting or record-keeping requirements is liable for their behaviour. [Part
7, clause 151] This is a civil penalty provision
(see Chapter 7). [Part 7, clause 151(4)]
Special
information-gathering powers
5.78
The simplicity, effectiveness, fairness and timely
implementation of the Program will be greatly helped when the Government has
the verified detailed information it needs to decide whether an activity is
covered by the Program.
5.79
The Government has received verified information
about a number of activities, which is sufficient for the Government to make
decisions on them. There are a number of potential emissions-intensive
trade-exposed activities that are yet to be formally assessed.
5.80
It is important that all participants in an
industry that may have information that may materially impact an assessment
have provided that information to the Government. This ensures that historical
information can be the primary input into the decision-making process. Good
quality historical information will reduce the need for detailed comparison of
international information as part of decisions on eligibility and baselines.
5.81
Division 4 deals with situations where an entity
has come forward and requested an assessment of an emissions-intensive
trade-exposed activity and the Government cannot decide whether to include that
activity in the regulations without formally requesting information from other
companies with information relevant to the decision.
5.82
If a person has indicated to the Government that an
activity, which is not listed in the regulations as being covered by the
Program, may be or should be covered by it, then the Minister may issue notices
to a constitutional corporation to provide information and verify reports
relevant to the activity. [Part 7, clause 152], [Part 1, clause 5, definition of
‘constitutional corporation’] It is intended that
this power would be exercised as a last resort where a potential recipient of
assistance is unwilling to provide the necessary information.
5.83
If only information is requested, then the Minister
must give at least 30 days to a corporation to comply with the notice. If a
report is also requested to accompany that information, then the Minister must
give 60 days to comply with the notice. [Part 7, clause 152(5)], [Part 7, clause 152(3)]
5.84
If a corporation refuses or fails to comply with a
notice, then it may be ineligible for assistance under the Program for the
first two eligible financial years which begin after the date of the notice. The
corporation will be ineligible for assistance if they were capable of complying
with the notice and the Minister informs the Regulator that its non-compliance
was significant. [Part 7, clause 153] This
consequence is proportionate, given the potential for the withholding of such
information to result in windfall gains for a particular entity over the course
of the Program.
5.85
The Minister may also disclose this information to
the Regulator to assist it in the exercise of its functions and powers. [Part
7, clause 154]
Compliance
with relinquishment requirements
5.86
A person who does not relinquish carbon units as
required under the Program will be subject to an administrative penalty (see
Chapter 7). [Part 11, clause 212]
Public
information on the Jobs and Competitiveness Program
5.87
The Regulator must inform the public about carbon
units issued under the Program (see also Chapter 9). [Part
9, clause 198], [Part 9, clause 199] This will
inform the market as to how many units are available for auctioning and will
provide public accountability for the application of the assistance for
emissions-intensive trade-exposed activities.
5.88
In particular, the Regulator must publish on its
website:
• a
notice when carbon units are issued to a person under the Program which
includes the number of units issued to that person and the activity for which
they were issued; [Part 9, clause 198(1)]
•
the total number of carbon units
issued during a particular quarter for each activity; and [Part
1, clause 5, definition of ‘quarter’], [Part 9, clause 199]
• the
total number of carbon units claimed under the Program but for which no
decision has been made, so as to indicate to the market the potential number of
units which may not be available for auctioning. [Part 9, clause 199(c)]
Administration,
enforcement and monitoring of the Program
5.89
The Regulator will run the Program, in keeping with
governance arrangements in the Regulator bill. These include the secrecy
provisions to protect confidential information submitted concerning the
Program, subject to disclosure in specified circumstances.
5.90
The Regulator’s decisions on eligibility and
delivery of carbon units under the Program will be subject to a review
procedure, including merits review in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (see
Chapter 8).
5.91
The Regulator will be able to draw upon its
investigation and enforcement powers in Parts 13 to 21 to enforce the
requirements of the Program. This will support the application requirements to
ensure that the Regulator has clear, verified and comprehensive information to
make decisions under the Program.
Productivity
Commission reviews
5.92
Part 8, Division 5 covers the Productivity
Commission’s role in conducting scheduled reviews of the assistance under the
Program.
5.93
The Government will ask the Productivity Commission
to conduct reviews of the Program and advise the Government on whether the Program
is meeting the aims and objectives of the Program.
5.94
The first review by the Productivity Commission
(the ‘first scheduled review’) will be conducted in the 2014-15 financial year.
[Part
7, clause 155(1)(a)] Subsequent reviews will be
consistent in timing with general mechanism reviews. [Part
7, clause 155(1)(b) – (e)]
5.95
In accordance with the Productivity Commission Act 1998 (PC Act), the Minister
responsible for the Productivity Commission, currently the Assistant Treasurer
(referred to in the bill as the Productivity Minister) must, during the reviews
mentioned above, refer matters about the operation of the assistance under the
Program, the impact of the Act and associated provisions on emissions-intensive
trade-exposed industries and the economic and environmental efficiency of the
assistance to the Productivity Commission for enquiry. [Part
7, clause 155(2)(a) to (c)], [Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘Productivity
Minister’] This does not limit the Productivity
Minister’s powers under the PC Act. [Part 7, clause 158]
5.96
The Productivity Minister must specify the review
period to which each inquiry applies which includes the timeframe within which
the Productivity Commission must submit its report. [Part
7, clause 155 (3)]
5.97
Under the PC Act, each matter the Productivity
Commission review covers must relate to industry, industry development and
productivity. [Part 7, clause 155(4)]
5.98
The Productivity Commission must have regard to,
but is not limited to, the following matters in conducting each review of the
Program: [Part 7, clause 156]
• the
aims and objects of the Program and the objects of the Act;
• the
feasibility, and data availability, of amending the emissions-intensive
trade-exposed assessment framework to one based on an assessment of the
estimated expected global uplift of prices of individual emissions-intensive trade-exposed
products if other countries had implemented a carbon price equivalent to that
applied in Australia, as proposed by the Garnaut Review Update 2011. This
review will consider whether it is the most effective and efficient means of
preventing carbon leakage and assisting the industry to transition and whether
the Government should adopt this approach;
• whether
emissions-intensive trade-exposed activities are making progress towards best
practice energy and emissions efficiency for the industrial sector to which
those activities relate;
• whether
additional activities should be added to the Program on account of commodity
price movements or other relevant matters;
• whether
windfall gains are being conferred on entities carrying out emissions-intensive
trade-exposed activities;
• the
effect of existing facilities having no cap on unit allocations;
• the
growth in the emissions-intensive trade-exposed sector and implications for
total free unit allocations under an emissions cap;
• whether
the assistance under the Program is supporting Australia’s emissions reduction
objectives including the medium-term and long-term targets and other targets
that are adopted;
• the
existence of broadly comparable carbon constraints applying internationally;
• the
appropriateness of the LNG supplementary allocation policy;
• the
impact of carbon pricing on the competitiveness of emissions-intensive
trade-exposed industries, including an analysis of carbon cost pass-through,
the level of abatement achieved and the effect of the carbon productivity
contribution on emissions-intensive trade-exposed activities over time, and
whether the carbon productivity contribution should be changed for a specific
industry; and
• whether
less than 70 per cent of relevant competitors in each industry have introduced
comparable carbon constraints, taking into account all mitigation policies and
relevant assistance policies, and hence whether the application of the carbon
productivity contribution rate for a specific industry should pause when the
assistance rate for a particular activity reaches 90 per cent for highly
emission-intensive activities, or 60 per cent for moderately
emissions-intensive activities.
5.99
In responding to the Productivity Commission’s
recommendations, the Government may have regard to advice from the Regulator,
particularly concerning the implementation of any recommended changes to
assistance, and the Authority, particularly concerning broader issues such as
pollution caps. [Part 7, clause 156(5)]
5.100
The Productivity Commission must publish review
reports on its website as soon as practicable after those reports are tabled in
Parliament. [Part 7, clause 157(6)]
5.101
The Productivity Commission will also be
commissioned under the Productivity
Commission Act 1998 to undertake:
• ongoing
work to quantify mitigation policies in other major economies;
• a
review of assistance provided to a particular activity earlier than 2014-15, if
requested by the Government, if this is appropriate having regard to industry
sectors receiving the greatest level of assistance, experiencing the fastest
rates of growth in assistance or where there is strong evidence of windfall
gains as a result of the assistance;
• an
examination of the impact of a carbon price and associated Government
assistance measures on the coal mining sector, taking into account advice from
the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) and
industry on the availability of cost-effective abatement technology;
• ad
hoc assessments of impacts of the mechanism on particular industries once the mechanism
has commenced. Firms may make a request to the Government to have the impact
of the mechanism on their sector assessed. These assessments will take into
account the industry’s circumstances, including a range of factors related and
unrelated to the mechanism that affect the competitiveness of the industry, and
any assistance provided to the industry; and make recommendations to the
Government about whether it should adjust support to the industry and the
appropriate mechanism for that assistance; and
• a
review of fuel excise/taxation, with any changes to be implemented after three
years (that is, 2015-16). It is anticipated that this review will include
examination of the merits of a regime based explicitly and precisely on the
carbon/energy content of fuels.
Outline of
chapter
6.1
Chapter 6 explains the provision of free carbon
permits to coal-fired generators under the Energy Security Fund (the Fund),
including:
• the
way that the Regulator will determine the number of free carbon units to issue
to eligible coal-fired electricity generators under the Fund;
• the
issue of free carbon units subject to compliance with certain conditions,
namely the ‘power system reliability test’ and the submission of a clean energy
investment plan (CEI plan); and
• the
interaction of the allocation of free carbon units under this Part with the
Government’s policy that it proposes to enter into closure contracts with very
highly emissions-intensive coal-fired generators, which forms another component
of the Fund.
6.2
Chapter 6 also covers the appropriations for:
• loans
to coal-fired electricity generators for the purchase of future year carbon
units at advance auctions;
• loans
to coal-fired generators for refinancing existing debt; and
• contracts
and arrangements to protect energy security.
6.3
Chapter 6 covers Part 8 and Part 23, insofar as it
concerns special appropriations.
Context
Energy
Security package
6.4
The Government announced a package of measures to
address energy security under carbon pricing in Securing a clean energy future: the Australian Government’s climate
change plan. The package comprises three key elements: the Fund,
Government loans and an Energy Security Council.
6.5
The Fund comprises:
• assistance
to highly emissions-intensive coal-fired generators in the form of 41.705
million free carbon units provided annually over 2013-14 to 2016-17 under Part
8;
• assistance
to highly emissions-intensive coal-fired generators in the form of $1 billion
in cash payments in 2011-12; and
• payments
for the closure of some of Australia’s most emissions-intensive generation
capacity, which the Government will seek to negotiate to make room for
investment in lower pollution plant.
6.6
Part 8 deals with the provision of free carbon
units to highly emissions-intensive coal fired generators.
6.7
The provision of cash assistance and payments for
closure are largely dealt with outside the bill, except that:
• the
interaction between any payments for closure and the allocation of free carbon
units is dealt with under Part 8, Division 6; and
• the
application form, eligibility criteria and allocation methodology for cash
payments in 2011-12 will be the same as that outlined in Part 8.
6.8
To further underpin energy security and recognising
difficult borrowing conditions faced by coal-fired generators the Government
also outlined in the Securing a clean energy
future: the Australian Government’s climate change plan
complementary measures to address risks to energy security under carbon pricing.
These include the establishment of the Energy Security Council and a commitment
to offer Government loans in certain circumstances.
• The
Government announced the establishment of an Energy Security Council, which
will include energy and financial market experts to advise the Government in
the event that systemic risks to energy security emerge from the financial
impairment of power stations arising from any source, including form the
introduction of carbon pricing. The Energy Security Council is largely dealt
with outside the bill.
• The
Government also announced loans for the purchase at auction of future carbon
units and that it may make loans available where generators need to refinance
their debt but finance is not available from the market on reasonable terms. Applications
for loans for refinancing will be considered by the Energy Security Council.
• While
details of these arrangements are largely dealt with outside the bill, Part 23
provides special appropriations to underpin them.
Free carbon units
and energy security
6.9
The transition to a carbon price has significant
transformational implications for the electricity generation sector. The
object of providing assistance in the form of free carbon units under Part 8
and associated cash payments is to help maintain energy security by reducing
the negative impacts of a carbon price on the operation of highly
emissions-intensive generators in the short-term.
6.10
This will help generators that face sizable losses
in the value of their assets. This assistance will also support investor
confidence in the electricity generation sector, which will underpin investment
in the new energy infrastructure needed to meet our future energy needs.
6.11
The mechanism will make fossil fuel-fired
electricity generators pay for the cost of the carbon pollution they emit.
6.12
Highly emissions-intensive coal-fired generators
are likely to face an increase in their operating costs greater than the
general increase in the level of electricity prices. Competition from less
emissions‑intensive generators, which face lower costs under the mechanism, may
cause more emissions-intensive generators to lose profitability.
6.13
With the start of the mechanism, investors in new
generation assets can account for the impact of a carbon price in their
investment decisions. For this reason, the issue of free carbon units is only
available for highly emissions-intensive coal-fired generation assets operating
between 1 July 2008 and 30 June 2010.
6.14
In this way, allocations of free carbon units and
cash support a smooth transition for highly emissions-intensive coal-fired
generators to a carbon price by reducing the short-term financial impact on
them and maintaining long-term investor confidence in the sector, without
supporting investment in new coal-fired generation.
6.15
Allocations of free carbon units and cash payments
under the Fund are not designed to change incentives of recipient generators to
reduce emissions. The liabilities of recipient generators are not reduced by
the allocation of carbon units under the Fund. Recipient generators are free
to sell the carbon units that they receive from the Government, bank them for
future use, or use them to meet liabilities under the mechanism. This is
achieved by delivering assistance based on the historical energy and emissions
intensity of eligible generation complexes and not on ongoing production or
ongoing emissions.
6.16
In this regard, assistance under the Fund is
unrelated to ongoing liabilities of recipients under the mechanism and is
separated from assistance provided in respect of the Program.
6.17
The allocation of free carbon units is conditional
on eligible generators complying with a power system reliability test. This
will support energy security during the shift to a carbon price by minimising
the risk of premature retirement of emissions-intensive generation capacity
ahead of sufficient replacement capacity being available.
6.18
The allocation of free carbon units will also be
conditional on the publication of a CEI plan, to identify proposals by
recipients of assistance to reduce their emissions, invest in research and
development, invest in new low emissions capacity, and to include possible
projects identified under the Energy Efficiency Opportunities program.
6.19
The Government also recognises the importance of
the proper regulation of electricity markets to ensure continued efficient investment
in the generation sector. The issue of free carbon units complements the
continued reform of energy market regulatory frameworks to promote efficient
investment in and reliable supply by Australia’s electricity markets.
Summary
Issue of free
carbon units
6.20
Part 8, Division 2 requires the Regulator to issue
free carbon units for particular generation complexes based on the annual
assistance factors set out in certificates of eligibility for coal-fired
generation assistance for those complexes. It also clarifies those persons who
may be allocated free carbon units by the Regulator.
Certificate
of eligibility for assistance
6.21
Part 8, Division 3 sets out the circumstances in
which the Regulator should issue a certificate of eligibility for coal-fired generation
assistance. It also sets out how the Regulator should determine an annual
assistance factor in each of those certificates.
Power system
reliability
6.22
Part 8, Division 4 provides that generation
complexes covered by certificates of eligibility for coal-fired generation
assistance must comply with the power system reliability test before they can
receive free carbon units.
Clean Energy
Investment Plans
6.23
Part 8, Division 5 provides that no free carbon
units will be issued to a generator unless it gives a CEI plan to the Minister
for Resources and Energy for a particular generation complex.
Closure
contracts
6.24
Part 8, Division 6 provides that the Regulator
cannot issue carbon units to generators that have separately entered into a
closure contract with the Commonwealth, where this contract acknowledges that
these units will be withheld.
Energy
security – special appropriation
6.25
Part 23 provides that the Consolidated Revenue Fund
is appropriated for amounts payable under contracts or arrangements authorised
by the Treasurer for the purpose of protecting energy security in Australia. The
Consolidated Revenue Fund is appropriated for making loans authorised by the
Treasurer to persons who own, control or operate an emissions-intensive
coal-fired generation complex, for the purpose of refinancing existing debt or
for the purchase of future carbon units.
Detailed
explanation of new law
6.26
The objective of Part 8 is to support energy
security and maintain investor confidence through financial support for highly
emissions-intensive coal-fired generators in adjusting to a carbon price. [Part
8, clause 159], [Part 8, clause 160]
Important
definitions used in this Part
6.27
Assistance under Part 8 is not provided for a
particular person, such as the person making an application for assistance, but
rather is provided for a collection of equipment used for the generation of
electricity known as a ‘generation complex’. [Part 1, clause 5, definition of
‘generation complex’] References to assistance in
this chapter are references to assistance under Part 8, unless otherwise
indicated.
6.28
The concept of a ‘generation complex’ is not the
same as the concept of a ‘facility’ as defined in the NGER Act. Assistance is
focused on coal-fired electricity generators, which must meet certain
eligibility criteria. However, a ‘facility’ under the NGER Act could include,
for example, the activities of a co-located coal-fired generator and coal mine.
For this reason, the separate definition of a ‘generation complex’ is used to
capture those elements of a facility that may be eligible for coal-fired
generation assistance.
6.29
For operational reasons, equipment used for the
generation of electricity is often engineered such that, within a ‘generation
complex’, there are multiple sets of equipment that can generate electricity
independently of one another (although they may share some common
infrastructure, such as cooling systems or coal conveyor belts). Each
independent set of generating equipment is a ‘generation unit’. [Part
1, clause 5, definition of ‘generation unit’] A
‘generation complex’ consists of one or more ‘generation units’ at the same
location.
6.30
Assistance under Part 8 is provided for ‘generation
complexes’ rather than ‘generation units’. There is no requirement for
applicants for assistance to aggregate generation units at the same location
together to form one generation complex, although it may be practical to do so.
Applying for
assistance
6.31
If a person wants to apply to the Regulator for a
certificate of eligibility for coal-fired generation assistance covering a
particular generation complex, then he or she must do so within 30 days of the
commencement of the provision. [Part 8, clause 162(1)]
The provision is one of the substantive provisions of the bill (clauses 3 to
303, 304 to 311) which will all commence on the same date. [Part
1, clause 2]
6.32
A person must own, operate or control a generation
complex to make an application for assistance. [Part 8, clause 162(2)]
Each application for assistance must cover different generation units. Multiple
applications for the same generation units cannot be made. [Part
8, clause 162(3)]
6.33
The Regulator may extend the time limit for
applications by up to 30 days, but may only do so up to an extended time limit
of 60 days after the commencement of the provision and provided the
application does not cover generation units which are the subject of other
applications. [Part 8, clause 162(7)]
6.34
If an application is submitted after the time limit
(whether extended or not), then it is not a valid application and the Regulator
cannot issue a certificate of eligibility for coal-fired generation assistance
for that generation complex.
6.35
An application must be made for a generation
complex, not the applicant. [Part 8, clause 162(1)]
The act of applying for assistance does not entitle the applicant to free
carbon units issued for a given generation complex. Instead, the recipient of
assistance is defined by reference to the relationship of a person to a
generation complex receiving assistance, not by reference to the applicant. [Part
8, clause 161(6)and (7)]
6.36
The concept of ‘owning, controlling or operating’ a
generation complex is intended to have the same meaning as the equivalent terms
in laws on the regulation of energy markets that require the registration of
electricity generators. The primary laws (and subordinate instruments)
relevant to the application of Part 8 are:
• for
the National Electricity Market (NEM), the National Electricity Rules as made
and amended under Part 7 of the Schedule to the National Electricity (South Australia) Act 1996 (SA) and
given force of law in other jurisdictions through application legislation; and
• for
the Western Australian Wholesale Electricity Market (WA WEM), the Wholesale
Electricity Market Rules provided for under section 123 of the Electricity Industry Act 2004 (WA) and the
Electricity Industry (Wholesale Electricity
Market) Regulations 2004 (WA).
6.37
A person may not make multiple applications for all
or part of a generation complex. [Part 8, clause 162(3)] Overlapping
assistance could lead to the Regulator issuing too many certificates of
eligibility for coal-fired generation assistance and annual assistance factors
and delivering additional, unwarranted assistance for some generation complexes.
6.38
An application must be made in the approved
combined form for free carbon units under Part 8. [Part
8, clause 163(1)(b) and 163(2)] This is also the
same form for applications for cash assistance of $1 billion to be
provided in 2011-12 from the Fund.
6.39
In addition an application for free carbon permits
must satisfy specific requirements set out in regulations. These include
particular information, documents or prescribed reports to be provided with an
application for coal-fired generation assistance. [Part
8, clause 163(1)(c)-(e)] The information, document
and prescribed report requirements will be the same for applications for cash
assistance of $1 billion to be provided under the Fund.
6.40
Having received an application, the Regulator may
consider that it needs more information to assess it properly. [Part
8, clause 164] The Regulator must ensure that any
additional information requested is relevant to its consideration of the
application and must exercise this power reasonably. [Part
23, clause 297]
The
Regulator’s assessment
6.41
Ordinarily, the Regulator will use its best
endeavours to assess an application within 90 days of the date of the
application. [Part 8, clause 165(4)(b)(i)]
However, the Regulator may make its assessment up to 150 days after the
commencement of the substantive provisions of the bill. [Part
8, clause 165(4)(b)(ii)] This is because the
Regulator cannot reasonably ensure that an application is mutually exclusive in
its coverage of generation units until it has all valid applications.
6.42
To ensure that the Regulator has sufficient time to
make a decision, it may have an additional 90 days to decide on an application
where it has requested additional information. [Part 8, clause 165(4)(a)]
6.43
This may be an iterative process in which the
Regulator requests information more than once to clarify the issues involved. The
time for making a decision may be extended multiple times. Where more than one
request for information is made, the extension of time applies to the last of
those requests. However, nothing prevents the Regulator from making a decision
before the end of the initial or extended period where it can do so.
6.44
The Regulator’s assessment of an application has
two key elements:
• determining
the eligibility of the generation complex for assistance; and
• determining
an ‘annual assistance factor’ for that generation complex.
The annual assistance factor is needed to determine
the total number of free carbon units to be issued for that generation complex.
Determining
eligibility
6.45
The Regulator must apply the ‘generation complex
assistance eligibility test’ to decide whether to issue a certificate of
eligibility for coal-fired generation assistance. [Part
8, clause 165(2)], [Part 8, clause 166(1)]
6.46
The test has two elements:
• A
generation complex must have been in operation at any time during the period
beginning on 1 July 2008 and ending on 30 June 2010. [Part
8, clause 166(2)(a)] This ensures that a new
generation complex that entered service after 1 July 2010 is not eligible
for assistance. Similarly, this requirement ensures that a generation complex
that retired from service prior to 1 July 2008 is not eligible for
assistance.
• A
generation complex must also have an emissions intensity of greater than 1.0
kilotonnes (kt) of CO2-e per GWh of electricity generated. [Part
8, clause 166(2)(c)] Emissions intensity is
defined in the same way as when determining the annual assistance factor of a
generation complex (see below). [Part 1, clause 5, definition of
‘emissions intensity’]
–
This requirement is needed to ensure that
assistance is effectively targeted to the most emissions-intensive generation
complexes. The most acute impacts of a carbon price are likely to emerge for
highly emissions-intensive coal-fired generators, and therefore assistance to these
generators will be most effective in addressing energy security risks.
6.47
Assistance is only available for coal-fired
electricity generators. To be eligible, a generation complex must use coal as
its primary energy supply, such that 95 per cent of the electricity
it generated in the period from 1 July 2008 to 30 June 2010 is attributed to
the combustion of coal. [Part 8, clause 166(2)(b)]
6.48
To warrant assistance under the Fund, the
Government has decided that a generation complex must be connected to an
electricity grid of a size sufficient to expose it to significant competition.
Emissions-intensive coal-fired generators not exposed to competition from low
emissions generation are likely to be able to pass on carbon costs to
electricity consumers and therefore will are not likely to be acutely impacted
in a way that impacts energy security.
6.49
On this basis, generation complexes must be
connected to a grid with a capacity of at least 100 MW to pass the generation
complex assistance eligibility test. [Part 8, clause 166(2)(a)]
This is the same as the threshold size of an electricity grid used in the Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 2000
(Renewable Act) to determine the sales of electricity liable under that Act. The
method for calculating the capacity of a grid is also the same as that used in
the Renewable Act and regulations made under the Renewable Act, in that it
excludes standby and privately-owned domestic generation sources. [Part
8, clause 166(3)]
6.50
If the Regulator refuses to issue a certificate of
eligibility for coal-fired generation assistance, it must notify the applicant
of the decision. [Part 8, clause 165(5)]
Determining
the annual assistance factor
6.51
A certificate of eligibility for coal-fired
generation assistance must include an ‘annual assistance factor’. [Part
8, clause 165(3)] This is used to determine the
correct number of carbon units to issue for a particular generation complex. [Part 8,
clause 161(2) and (3)]
6.52
The two key elements used in the formula to
determine the annual assistance factor for a generation complex are its
‘historical energy’ and its ‘emissions intensity’. [Part
8, clause 167(a)], [Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘emissions intensity’]
6.53
These elements are combined such that the annual
assistance factor for a generation complex is the product of its historical
energy and the difference between its emissions intensity in kilotonnes (kt) of
carbon dioxide equivalence of emissions per GWh of electricity and 0.86 kt of CO2-e
per GWh of electricity generated. 0.86 kt of CO2-e per GWh of
electricity generated reflects the average estimated emissions intensity of
electricity generation in Australia. [Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘carbon
dioxide equivalence’], [Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘emissions intensity’]
Historical
energy
6.54
For generation complexes that entered service on or
before 1 July 2008, the measure of ‘historical energy’ is actual output
over the two year period from 1 July 2008 to 30 June 2010. [Part
8, clause 167(a)]
6.55
Importantly, historical energy for these assets is
defined as being the amount of electricity generated ‘as measured in GWh at all
generator terminals of the generation complex’, including electricity
associated with auxiliary use (that is, electricity consumed by the generation
complex). [Part 8, clause 167(a)]
Historical energy is determined on an ‘as generated’ basis, rather than a ‘sent
out’ basis.
6.56
Using this measure for generation complexes that
entered service after 1 July 2008 would unfairly reduce their annual assistance
factor, and the number of free carbon units they receive. Therefore, for
generation complexes or generation complex projects that entered service after
1 July 2008, the ‘nameplate rating’ of the generation complex is used to
calculate a proxy for its likely energy output over a notional two year period.
[Part
8, clause 167(b)]
6.57
The nameplate rating of a generation complex is its
maximum generation capacity in megawatts published by the Australian Energy
Market Authority (AEMO) or the Independent Market Operator of WA (IMOWA). [Part
1, clause 5, definition of ‘nameplate rating’] Accordingly,
the output of the generation complex can be estimated by considering its
nameplate rating and its likely ‘capacity factor’, that is, the percentage of
its maximum output that an asset produces on average over a period of time.
6.58
Multiplying the nameplate rating of the generation
complex in MW by 14.016 approximates the energy output in GWh of such a
generation complex over a notional two year period, if it operates at an
80 per cent capacity factor over that period (that is, if its average
output over the period is 80 per cent of its maximum output).
6.59
The number 14.016 is worked out as follows:
|
14.016 =
|
(365 days x 24 hours x
2 years)
|
x 0.8
|
|
|
1,000
|
|
Emissions
intensity
6.60
The ‘emissions intensity’ of a generation complex
is its emissions divided by the amount of electricity it generates, estimated
over a specified period of time. [Part 1, clause 5, definition of
‘emissions intensity’]
6.61
For the purposes of calculating a generation complex’s
annual assistance factor, its emissions intensity is estimated by reference to
its actual emissions and actual energy output over the two year period from
1 July 2008 to 30 June 2010. [Part 8, clause 168(1)], [Part 1, clause
5, definition of ‘emissions intensity’]
6.62
Importantly, these emissions must be ‘emitted from
the combustion of fuel in the generation complex’ and do not include, for
example, emissions from the combustion of fuel to operate mining equipment. Further,
fuel combustion must be for ‘the purposes of the generation of electricity’ and
does not include, for example, emissions created for the purposes of the
production of steam in a cogeneration plant.
6.63
The concept of ‘gigawatt hours of electricity
generated’, which is used as the denominator for calculating the emissions
intensity of these generation complexes, is defined as being the amount of
electricity generated ‘as measured at all generator terminals of the generation
complex’. [Part 8, clause 168(1)]
The emissions intensity estimate derived in this way is therefore defined on an
‘as generated’ basis, rather than a ‘sent out’ basis.
6.64
For a generation complex that entered service on or
before 1 July 2008, the energy output of the generation complex (described
as the ‘gigawatt hours of electricity generated’) is exactly the same number as
its ‘historical energy’. [Part 8, clause 167]
However, for a generation complex that entered service after 1 July 2008,
historical energy and ‘gigawatt hours of electricity generated’ will differ.
6.65
For the purposes of assistance, the emissions
intensity of a generation complex cannot exceed 1.3 kt of CO2-e per GWh. [Part
8, clause 168(2)], [Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘carbon dioxide
equivalence’] This ensures that assistance is not
inappropriately skewed towards the most emissions-intensive generation
complexes.
Example 6.1 A generation
complex that entered service on or before 1 July 2008
To estimate the historical energy of a generation
complex that entered service on or before 1 July 2008, the applicant
should provide, and the Regulator should assess, historical data concerning the
generation of electricity by that generation complex over the period from
1 July 2008 to 30 June 2010.
The Regulator could verify this data through comparison
with data publicly available from independent bodies such as the market
operator in the market in which the generation complex operates. For example,
this investigation might find that the historical energy of a generation
complex over the two year period in question was 16,000 GWh of electricity.
To estimate the emissions intensity of a generation
complex, the applicant should also provide, and the Regulator should assess,
historical information concerning the emissions produced by the generation complex
over the period 1 July 2008 to 30 June 2010.
The primary source for this information is likely to
be information reported to the Australian Government as required under the NGER
Act. For example, data provided under the NGER Act might substantiate that the
generation complex in question produced approximately 20,000 kt of CO2-e
over the two year period in question.
Based on these estimates, the Regulator’s reasonable
estimate of the generation complex’s emissions intensity would be:
20,000 kt of CO2-e per GWh
|
=
|
1.250 kt of CO2-e per GWh
|
|
16,000 GWh
|
|
|
Accordingly, the Regulator would find the generation
complex’s annual assistance factor to be:
|
16,000 × (1.250 - 0.86)
|
=
|
6,240
|
Example 6.2 A generation
complex that entered service after 1 July 2008
To estimate the historical energy of a generation
complex that entered service after 1 July 2008, the applicant should provide
the Regulator with the nameplate rating of the generation complex as registered
with the relevant market operator as of 1 July 2010.
For example, the generation complex’s nameplate rating
might be 500 MW. This being the case, the Regulator would estimate the
historical energy of the generation complex over a notional two year period to
be:
However, the Regulator must use the actual emissions
and actual electricity output of this generation complex over the period
1 July 2008 to 30 June 2010 for the purpose of determining its emissions
intensity. If the generation complex did not generate any electricity during
this period it would not be eligible for assistance and so it does not matter
that it would not be possible to estimate its emissions intensity in this way.
Accordingly, the applicant should provide, and the
Regulator should assess, historical information concerning the emissions
produced by the generation complex over the period 1 July 2008 to 30 June 2010
such as that reported under the NGER Act. This data might substantiate that
the generation complex produced approximately 4,000 kt of CO2-e over
the two year period in question.
To estimate the ‘GWh of electricity generated’ by this
generation complex the applicant should provide, and the Regulator should
assess, historical data concerning the generation of electricity by that
generation complex over the period from 1 July 2008 to 30 June 2010.
In this example, the Regulator finds that the
historical energy of the generation complex over the two year period in
question was 3,750 GWh (this number is less than the deemed ‘historical
energy’ of the generation complex, reflecting that it was not in service for
the full two year period from 1 July 2008 to 30 June 2010).
Based on these estimates, the Regulator’s reasonable
estimate of the generation complex’s emissions intensity would be:
|
4,000 kt of CO2-e per GWh
|
=
|
1.067 kt of CO2-e per GWh
|
|
3,750 GWh
|
|
|
Based on these estimates, the Regulator would find the
generation complex’s annual assistance factor to be:
|
7,008 ×
(1.067- 0.86)
|
=
|
1,450.656
|
Issuing
assistance
6.66
The Regulator must decide whether to issue a
certificate of eligibility for coal-fired generation assistance for each
application it receives and, if so, what the annual assistance factor in the
certificate should be. [Part 8, clause 165] Each
of these decisions may be reconsidered or reviewed under Part 21 (see Chapter
8).
6.67
The number of free carbon units that should be
issued for a generation complex is a function of both the annual assistance
factor specified for that generation complex and of all other annual assistance
factors for all other generation complexes. [Part 8, clause 161(2)]
6.68
This is because the Regulator must take the annual
assistance factor in each certificate of eligibility for coal-fired generation
assistance and divide it by the sum of all annual assistance factors in all
such certificates (the ‘total annual assistance factors for that eligible
financial year’).
6.69
For the eligible financial years beginning on 1
July 2013, 1 July 2015 and 1 July 2016, the result of this calculation (which
must be less than 1) is then multiplied by 41,705,000 (being the total number
of free carbon units that may be issued) to determine the share of the total
pool of free carbon units available in those years to be issued for a
generation complex. [Part 8, clause 161(2)]
This calculation is subject to rounding provisions. [Part
8, clause 161(4)]
6.70
In the eligible financial year beginning on 1 July
2014, a different formula is adopted (see below).
6.71
In this way, the available pool of free carbon
units per year is distributed among all eligible recipients of these units in
each year in which allocations of free carbon units are made, which achieves
the Government’s policy of ‘capping’ the total number of free carbon units to
be issued under the Fund.
Example 6.3 Calculating
the number of free carbon units to issue to particular generation complexes
Example 6.1 and Example 6.2 outlined the calculation
of annual assistance factors for two hypothetical generation complexes. These
generation complexes, which we shall call ‘Generation complex A’ and
‘Generation complex B’, had annual assistance factors of 6,240 and 1,450.656
respectively.
Other generation complexes are likely to be found to
be eligible for assistance, and to be issued certificates of eligibility for
coal-fired generation assistance containing annual assistance factors. For
example, these annual assistance factors, including those of Generation complex
A and Generation complex B, might add up to 39,100.000.
In this case, Generation complex A and Generation
complex B would receive the following number of free carbon units in each of
the eligible financial years beginning on 1 July 2013, 1 July 2015 and
1 July 2016 (provided they comply with the power system reliability test,
that a CEI plan has been submitted for these generation complexes, and that
they are not party to a closure contract fitting the requirements of Part 8,
Division 6 that specifies units will be withheld in given years):
Generation complex A
|
6,240
|
×
|
41,705,000
|
=
|
6,655,734.015
|
|
39,100
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
=
|
6,655,700
(after rounding)
|
Generation complex B
|
1,450.646
|
×
|
41,705,000
|
=
|
1,547,293.898
|
|
39,100
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
=
|
1,547,300
(after rounding)
|
In the year beginning on 1 July 2014, the number of
free carbon units issued to these generation complexes would depend on changes
to the number of units issued as a result of review events. In the event that
no successful reviews of annual assistance factors were concluded prior to
1 September 2014, these generation complexes would effectively receive the
same number of units as calculated above in that year (with some slight
difference possible due to rounding).
6.72
Ordinarily, a review that changes the annual
assistance factor determined for a generation complex would change the ‘total
annual assistance factors for that eligible financial year’. This would change
the number of free carbon units that should have been issued for all other
generation complexes with certificates of eligibility for coal-fired generation
assistance. This may create uncertainty for recipients of assistance as it
could, for example, involve the relinquishment of incorrectly issued units.
6.73
To prevent alterations to all previous issues of
assistance, the definition of the ‘total annual assistance factors for that
eligible financial year’ includes certificates purportedly issued by the
Regulator. This means that it includes annual assistance factors in
certificates later found through a review process to have been issued
incorrectly. [Part 8, clause 161(2)]
6.74
The ‘total annual assistance factors for that
eligible financial year’ cannot change after 1 September of each financial
year and previous provisions of assistance to a given generation complex cannot
be altered due to a review of an annual assistance factor for a different
generation complex.
6.75
A review could require the issue or relinquishment
of additional free carbon units for the generation complex subject to review. The
fact that other allocations are not adjusted could mean that the number of
units issued in a given financial year exceeds the Government’s cap for that
year.
6.76
If, after a review, no adjustment is made, the
Regulator could issue more free carbon units than was intended by the
Government in setting up the Fund. While the number of units to be issued for
the eligible financial years beginning on each of 1 July 2013, 1 July 2015 and
1 July 2016 is set at 41,705,000, the total number of units allocated in the
eligible financial year beginning 1 July 2014 may differ from this amount and
is calculated according to a different formula. [Part 8, clause 161(3)]
6.77
The formula firstly looks at the number of free
carbon units that would be issued for a given generation complex for the
eligible financial years beginning on 1 July 2013 and 1 July 2014, in the event
that that all annual assistance factors for all generation complexes had never
varied from their value on 1 September 2014. This amount is equal to:
|
annual assistance
factor in respect of that generation complex as of 1 September 2014
|
×
|
83,410,000
|
|
total annual assistance
factors for that eligible financial year
|
|
|
6.78
To determine the amount of free carbon units that
should be allocated for each generation complex on 1 September 2014, the
Regulator then must consider how many free carbon units have already been
issued for that generation complex (term ‘A’), and how many units would have
been issued for that generation complex but were not due to the operation of
various other provisions of the bill (term ‘B’). [Part 8, clause 161(3)]
6.79
The amount of units already issued in term ‘A’
should include units issued on 1 September 2013 and any additional units
allocated as a result of a review of a decision on the generation complex’s
annual assistance factor. This formula ensures that no more than 83,410,000
free carbon units can be issued over the first two years of allocations, and
that the total allocation to individual assets over those two years reflects
their annual assistance factor as of 1 September 2014 (including any
adjustments as a result of a review of decisions).
6.80
The full formula is given as:
|
|
annual assistance factor in respect of that generation complex as of 1 September
2014
|
×
|
83,410,000
|
|
-
|
the total number of
free carbon units issued before 1 September 2014 for the generation
complex
(‘A’)
|
-
|
the Regulator’s
reasonable estimate of the number of free carbon units with a vintage year
beginning on 1 July 2013 that were not issued for a generation complex
because of the operation of Part 8, Divisions 4, 5, or 6
(‘B’)
|
|
|
total annual assistance
factors for that eligible financial year
|
|
|
|
|
|
6.81
However,
the number of free carbon units issued could still exceed the level anticipated
by the Government, notwithstanding the true up arrangements in the payment and
surrender process (see Chapter 4), in the unlikely event that a review of a
generation complex’s annual assistance factor did not conclude until after
1 September 2014.
6.82
The Regulator’s allocation decisions under clause
161 are not subject to review by the Authority as they simply involve the
mechanical application of a formula to determine the correct number of free
carbon units to issue for a generation complex, and the correct application of
the provisions that determine the correct recipient of assistance for that
generation complex. Judicial review is available if, for example, the
incorrect number of units is issued for a generation complex or free carbon
units are issued to the wrong recipient. [Part 8, clause 161(6) and (7)]
6.83
The Regulator must publish each certificate of
eligibility for coal-fired generation assistance as soon as practicable after
it is issued. [Part 8, clause 165(6)] This
is important because, as outlined above, the number of free carbon units issued
for a generation complex is a function of not only the annual assistance factor
specified in the certificate of eligibility for coal-fired generation
assistance issued for that asset, but also all other annual assistance factors
specified for all other generation complexes.
6.84
The public disclosure of the issue of all
certificates of eligibility for coal-fired generation assistance, and the
annual assistance factors in those certificates, is important to ensure that
all potential recipients of assistance have access to information that impacts
on the allocation of units. This means that the Regulator can publish annual
assistance factors despite the secrecy provisions of Part 4 of the NGER
Act.
6.85
Free carbon units issued for a particular
generation complex are issued to the entity that was liable for the emissions
created from the operation of that asset as of the end of the previous
financial year. To achieve this, it is assumed that the generation complex was
a facility as defined under the NGER Act, and that this facility created
sufficient greenhouse gas emissions to meet the mechanism’s threshold for
liability (see Chapter 1).
6.86
The rules for determining liability for emissions
under the mechanism are then applied to identify the person who would be liable
for the emissions from the generation complex given those assumptions (see Chapter
1). This person is the recipient of assistance. [Part 8, clause 161(6)] In
this way, the recipient of assistance identified under this clause is one of
three possible persons:
• the
controlling corporation of a group where one or more members of the group has
operational control of the generation complex; or [Part 1, clause 5, definition of
‘controlling corporation’]
• the
non-group entity with operational control of the generation complex; or [Part
1, clause 5, definition of ‘non-group entity’]
• the
person with an LTC for the facility that includes the generation complex (for
example, a company with financial control of the facility). [Part
1, clause 5, definition of ‘financial control’]
6.87
In the case of a ‘designated joint venture’ the
recipient of free carbon units may be two or more participants, divided in
respect of their respective interests in the facility. [Part
8, clause 161(7)], [Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘designated joint
venture’], [Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘participating percentage’]
6.88
The issue of free carbon units for a generation
complex is subject to:
• compliance
with the power system reliability test; and [Part 8, clause 161(10)]
• a
CEI plan being provided to the Resources and Energy Minister for that
generation complex; or [Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘Resources and Energy
Minister’], [Part 8, clause 161(11)]
•
whether a person who owns, controls
or operates the generation complex has entered into a ‘closure contract’ and
recognised in that contract that the effect of doing so is to forego some or
all of their free carbon units under Part 8. [Part 8, clause 161(12)]
Where a person who owns, controls or operates a
generation complex has entered into a ‘closure contract’ for that generation
complex, free carbon units are subject to conditions outlined in the contract
and not to the power system reliability test and the CEI plan. [Part
8, clause 181A]
Power system
reliability test
6.89
To ensure energy security at the beginning of the
mechanism, the Government has imposed conditions on assistance. This is
designed to reduce the risk of unexpected behaviour from owners, controllers or
operators of generation assets (or their creditors) affecting the supply
reliability in Australia’s electricity markets. For example, a reduction in
asset value of a generator may cause its creditors to force it to shut down
even though it still has to operate to maintain sufficient supply in an
electricity market.
6.90
Generation complexes must comply with the ‘power
system reliability test’ in order to receive assistance. The power system
reliability test uses the value of free carbon units to influence the decisions
of owners, operators or controllers of some generation complexes about when to
withdraw generating capacity, to promote the secure supply of electricity. [Part
8, clause 169], [Part 8, clause 170]
6.91
Depending on electricity market conditions, a
decision to withdraw generating capacity could affect energy security by
reducing the maximum amount of electricity that can be generated below the
level needed to reliably meet peak demand.
6.92
The power system reliability test focuses on
changes to a generation complex’s ‘nameplate rating’ because the reliability of
a power system depends, in part, on the maximum continuous electrical output of
all generators connected to the system being sufficient to supply the maximum
likely demand for electricity in the system, allowing for contingencies like
malfunctions of generators and technical constraints on the safe system
operation.
6.93
The power system reliability test is structured
around concepts and processes set out in laws regulating energy markets. The
primary laws (and instruments made under those laws) likely to be applied in
the Regulator’s assessments of the power system reliability test are:
• for
the NEM, the National Electricity Rules; and
• for
the WA WEM, the Wholesale Electricity Market Rules.
6.94
These laws require generators to register with the
operator of the energy market in which they operate:
• Rule
2.2 of the National Electricity Rules requires a person who engages in the
activity of owning, controlling or operating a generator in the NEM to register
with AEMO, unless it is the subject of an exemption.
• Regulations
14 and 19 of WA’s Electricity Industry (Wholesale Electricity Market)
Regulations 2004 require a person who engages in the activity of owning,
controlling or operating a generator in the WA WEM to register with IMOWA,
subject to exemptions and a minimum capacity requirement.
Registration as a generator under these two laws
requires compliance with a range of technical and operational conditions, which
supports the reliable and safe operation of the NEM and WA WEM, and gives AEMO
and IMOWA powers necessary to manage system security.
6.95
By using the value of assistance to create
incentives that influence the decision of a recipient of assistance to cease
its registration as a generator, or reduce its nameplate rating, the power
system reliability test supports the reliable and safe operation of the NEM and
WA WEM.
6.96
A generation complex’s ‘nameplate rating’ is
defined as its maximum generation in MW, as published by AEMO or an equivalent
number defined by the Regulator in consultation with IMOWA. The National
Electricity Rules and the WA Wholesale Electricity Market Rules require
registered generators to register various parameters concerning the generating
capacity of their various generation units and generation complexes. [Part
1, clause 5, definition of ‘nameplate rating’]
6.97
If AEMO performs the functions of the energy market
operator in the place where the generation complex is located, the nameplate
rating is the maximum generation in MW of the generation complex, as published
by AEMO. [Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘nameplate rating’]
6.98
If the IMOWA performs the functions of the energy market
operator in the place where the generation complex is located, the nameplate
ratin is the maximum generation in MW of the generation complex as determined
by the Regulator. The Regulator in making this determination may have regard
to any information provided to the Regulator by IMOWA. [Part
1, clause 5, definition of ‘nameplate rating’] The
Regulator’s determination on the nameplate ratings in the WEM is intended to be
equivalent in concept to the nameplate rating published by AEMO.
6.99
Where a generator provides a particular parameter
for individual generation units, the various values might need to be aggregated
to the level of the generation complex (to which assistance applies) for the
purpose of the power system reliability test.
6.100
The Regulator must not issue free carbon units for
a generation complex where it does not meet the power system reliability test.
[Part
8, clause 169(2)] This test must be applied to
each generation complex individually each time carbon units are issued for that
asset. [Part 8, clause 161(2) and (3)], [Part 8, clause 161(10)]
6.101
A generation complex can pass the power system
reliability test in three ways:
• the
nameplate rating of the generation complex is not reduced over time, meaning
that it continues to contribute to power system reliability (the status quo
approach); or
• the
nameplate rating of the generation complex is reduced over time, but AEMO or
IMOWA certifies that, despite these reductions, there is unlikely to be a
breach of relevant power system reliability standards within two years (the
‘certification approach’); or
• the
nameplate rating of the generation complex is reduced, but the person that is
registered as a generator for that generation complex also constructs new
‘replacement capacity’ that complies with relevant requirements set out in the
bill and regulations (using the Low Emissions Transition Incentive).
The
status quo approach
6.102
A generation complex passes the power system
reliability test if the nameplate rating of that generation complex remains the
same as, or exceeds, the level it was on 1 July 2010.
6.103
In this case, the generation complex receiving
assistance has not reduced its maximum continuous generation capacity, and so
has not reduced its ability to contribute to satisfying the maximum likely
demand for electricity within the system. Further, the generation complex that
is registered with this capacity is, through the act of remaining registered,
required to comply with technical and operational requirements that improve the
likelihood that it will be physically capable of supplying that amount of
electricity at times of high demand when it is most required.
6.104
Therefore, breaches of relevant power system
reliability standards cannot be reasonably attributed to the actions of
generation complexes that comply with these clauses, but are more likely to be
due to insufficient investment in new generation capacity to satisfy growth in
demand for electricity.
The
certification approach
6.105
It is possible that the mechanism will change the
relative cost of different generators in an energy market such that the owner,
operator or controller of a generation complex will seek to retire all or part
of that generation complex from service.
6.106
Such a retirement is generally necessary to ensure
a gradual transition to a lower emissions electricity generation sector. However,
such a retirement would be concerning if it were to be likely to lead to a
breach of relevant power system reliability standards, and jeopardise energy
security.
6.107
Given this, the certification approach to passing
the power system reliability test lets a generator reduce the nameplate rating
of a generation complex where there is unlikely to be a breach of relevant
power system reliability standards within two years after that event, taking
into account the reduction in generation capacity from the generation complex.
[Part
8, clause 170(2)(c)]
6.108
The power system reliability test also lets a
generator cease its registration where there is unlikely to be a breach of
relevant power system reliability standards applicable to the energy market it
operates in within two years, taking into account the removal of the generation
capacity of the generation complex from the market. [Part
8, clause 170(2)(d)]
6.109
Both the National Electricity Rules and the WA
Wholesale Electricity Market Rules set out various power system reliability
standards that assess the likelihood of the system being able to satisfy the
maximum likely demand within the system. However, not all of these power
system reliability standards will be relevant to an assessment of whether a
change in the nameplate rating of a generation complex will affect energy
security. In assessing the likely maximum demand the impact of policies which
reduce that demand are taken into account.
6.110
Assessing whether the reduction in the nameplate
rating of a generation complex is likely to breach power system reliability
standards, and which power system reliability standards are relevant to that
assessment, are best performed by AEMO or IMOWA, rather than the Regulator.
6.111
For this reason, the Regulator must rely on an
appropriate certification by AEMO or IMOWA, rather than on its own judgement of
the circumstances. [Part 8, clause 170]
Owners, operators or controllers of generation complexes receiving assistance
must obtain appropriate documentation from AEMO or IMOWA to the satisfaction of
the Regulator if they wish to cease their registration as a generator or reduce
the nameplate rating of a generation complex.
6.112
A person who owns, controls or operates a generation
complex may apply to AEMO or IMOWA for a certification to the effect that a
reduction in the generation complex’s nameplate rating, or a cessation of its
registration, would pass the power system reliability test. [Part
8, clause 174], [Part 8, clause 175]
6.113
AEMO or IMOWA may consider a range of power system
reliability standards that might be affected by a reduction in a generation
complex’s nameplate rating, or the cessation of a generator’s registration,
when:
• considering
whether to provide such a certification; and
• making
a judgement as to which power system reliability standards are relevant to the
assessment,
because they are directly impacted by changes to the
nameplate rating of the generation complex in question. AEMO or IMOWA may
choose not to certify positively or negatively in response to the application.
6.114
If, within 120 days after the application, AEMO or
IMOWA has not certified positively or negatively in response to the
application, the Regulator must take AEMO or IMOWA to have certified that the
reduction or cessation is unlikely to breach relevant power system reliability
standards within two years of the reduction or cessation. [Part
8, clause 174(4)], [Part 8, clause 175(4)]
6.115
This places an effective time limit on the
considerations of AEMO or IMOWA, giving recipients of assistance certainty that
their applications for certifications for the power system reliability test
will be considered in a timely manner.
6.116
Nothing prevents a person who owns, controls or
operates a generation complex from applying to AEMO or IMOWA for a
certification in writing after a reduction in a generation complex’s nameplate
rating has already taken place, or after a cessation of its registration has
occurred.
6.117
If the person does not receive the certification
before 1 September of a given eligible financial year, free carbon units
available to be issued in that year for the generation complex in question
would be withheld under the power system reliability test, except where AEMO or
IMOWA has not certified or refused to certify the application within 120 days
of receiving an application. [Part 8, clause 174(4)], [Part 8, clause 175(4)]
The
Low Emissions Transition Incentive (LETI)
6.118
As an alternative to the certification approach, a
generator may also seek to reduce the registered capacity of a generation
complex, or cease its registration, using the LETI. This approach sharpens
incentives for these generators receiving assistance to invest in low emissions
replacement capacity by allowing them to receive direct credit for such
investments when assessing compliance with the power system reliability test.
6.119
The LETI allows recipients of assistance to retire
existing emissions-intensive generation capacity without relying on a
certification from AEMO or IMOWA (which takes into account a range of factors
in the energy market that are beyond the control of the recipient of
assistance, such as growth in demand and retirement of other generation units).
As a result, the LETI supports a smooth and timely transition to a lower carbon
generation sector, whilst protecting energy security.
6.120
To use the LETI, the generator that is registered
for a generation complex subject to a certificate of eligibility for coal-fired
generation assistance must also be registered for one or more new generation
units that satisfy a range of conditions set out in the bill and therefore
constitute replacement capacity for the purpose of the incentive. [Part
8, clause 170(2)(e)], [Part 8, clause 171], [Part 8, clause 172]
6.121
A generation complex is deemed to pass the power
system reliability test if it has:
• previously
passed the power system reliability test using the LETI and satisfies
particular conditions in subsequent years; [Part 8, clause 170(2)(f) and (g)]
• previously
reduced its nameplate rating, has been found to have passed the power system
reliability test using the LETI and has not subsequently reduced its nameplate
rating. [Part 8, clause 170(2)(f)] This reflects
that the passing of the test in the earlier year occurred through the full
replacement of the retiring generation capacity at that time, protecting energy
security, and that no reductions in the capacity of the generation complex have
occurred since that time;
• has
previously ceased its registration and has been found to have passed the power
system reliability test under the LETI. [Part 8, clause 170(2)(g)]
This reflects the fact that the generation complex was fully retired from
service on the cessation of its registration, and that capacity was fully
replaced at that time. As the nameplate rating of a retired generation complex
cannot reduce any further, the generation complex can appropriately be
considered to pass the power system reliability test in all future years.
6.122
It is not necessary to consider the existence of
replacement capacity if a particular generation complex passes the power system
reliability test because it has never reduced its nameplate rating. [Part
8, clause 171(2) and (3)]
6.123
If replacement capacity is needed to pass the power
system reliability test, the generation unit(s) providing the replacement
capacity must be registered by the same person who is registered for the
generation complex subject to a certificate of eligibility for coal-fired
generation assistance. [Part 8, clause 171(4)]
Replacement capacity must have been nominated by that person for this purpose.
[Part
8, clause 171(4)(a)] The requirements for
nomination are specified. [Part 8, clause 172]
6.124
Replacement capacity must not be part of the
generation complex subject to a certificate of eligibility for coal-fired
generation assistance. [Part 8, clause 171(4)(b)]
Otherwise, the replacement capacity would be counted twice for the purpose of
the power system reliability test:
• as
part of the nameplate rating of the generation complex that is subject to a
certificate of eligibility for coal-fired generation assistance; and [Part
8, clause 171(5)(a)]
• as
replacement capacity. [Part 8, clause 171(5)(b)]
6.125
This does not mean that generation units providing
replacement capacity cannot be co-located with the generation complex subject
to a certificate of eligibility for coal-fired generation assistance.
6.126
A new generation unit built at the same location
should not be considered to form part of the generation complex subject to a
certificate of eligibility for coal-fired generation assistance. This is
because the extent of this generation complex was defined at the time the
certificate was issued. A new generation unit can be built at the same
location without being considered to be part of the original generation complex.
6.127
Replacement capacity must also be connected to the
same interconnected electricity system as the generation complex subject to a
certificate of eligibility for coal-fired generation assistance. [Part
8, clause 171(4)(c)] If the market related to the
system is divided into regions, replacement capacity must be located in the
same region. [Part 8, clause 171(4)(d)]
This is because retiring capacity can only be replaced in a way that maintains
power system reliability when the new generation unit or units supply
electricity to the same interconnected electricity system.
6.128
The NEM is divided into regions, which generally
reflect physical constraints on the transmission of electricity between
different parts of the system. Replacement capacity located in a different
region to the retiring capacity would be unlikely to provide the same amount of
electricity to that region at times of high demand because of transmission
constraints. For this reason, replacement capacity must be located in the same
region to maintain energy security.
6.129
To maintain energy security, replacement capacity
must enter service on or before 1 December of a given financial year. [Part
8, clause 171(4)(e)] This is because extreme peaks
in electricity demand are most likely to occur on very hot summer days when
air-conditioning loads peak.
6.130
The difficulty of meeting these summer peaks is
compounded because some generation units cannot produce their maximum
electrical output on very hot days. This feature of the power system
reliability test allows a generator to retire capacity after 1 April of a given
year (1 April being the date against which the power system reliability test is
assessed).
6.131
The generator can then bring replacement capacity
into service on or before 1 December of that same calendar year (the
subsequent eligible financial year). This replacement capacity would then be
assessed on the subsequent 1 April to determine whether carbon units should be
issued for a given generation complex on the subsequent 1 September. [Part
8, clause 161(2)] The concept of entering service
is defined in the bill. [Part 8, clause 171(9)]
6.132
Finally, it is essential that the generation
capacity of the replacement capacity equals or exceeds the amount of capacity
that is being retired so as to maintain energy security. Without this, there
is a risk of shortfalls to supply that may jeopardise energy security. This
broad requirement can be fulfilled in a range of ways set out in the bill. [Part
8, clause 171(5)]
6.133
This assessment relies on looking at the amount of
generation capacity that a particular generator can provide to the system at a
particular point in time to support energy security. Accordingly, the
nameplate rating of the generation complex which has a certificate of
eligibility for coal-fired generation assistance is assessed on the various
days on which the power system reliability test is applied, that is, on 1 April
of each relevant eligible financial year. [Part 8, clause 171(5)(a)] Changes
to this nameplate rating indicate a situation where the ability of that
generation complex to contribute to energy security has changed, and therefore
where it may be in breach of the power system reliability test.
6.134
Firstly, if a generation complex’s nameplate rating
has not reduced since the previous 1 April, the generation complex passes the
power system reliability test in the absence of any replacement capacity having
been commissioned. [Part 8, clause 170(2)(a)], 170(2)(b), 170(2)(c) and
170(2)(f)(iii)] Where this is not the case, the
nameplate rating of the generation complex will reflect some reduction in
generating capacity that must be made up with replacement capacity. This
reduced nameplate rating is summed with the replacement capacity that satisfies
the various requirements set out in the bill. [Part 8, clause 171(5)(b)]
6.135
Replacement capacity can only be taken into account
once for the purpose of the power system reliability test. [Part
8, clause 171(4)(f)] The nameplate rating of the
generation complex can also be summed with any ‘relevant excess megawatts’,
where this is an amount of replacement capacity that was excess to requirements
when the LETI was used previously. [Part 8, clause 171(5)(c)]
6.136
To pass the power system reliability test using the
LETI, the amounts added together under paragraphs 171(5)(a)-(c) must equal or
exceed the lowest of three different ‘target’ generation capacities. [Part 8,
clause 171(5)(a)-(c)], [Part 8, clause 171(5)(d)-(f)]
6.137
These target generation capacities reflect the minimum
amount of generation capacity that must be retained in the system (consisting
of both the original generation capacity and some replacement capacity) to
maintain energy security under three difference circumstances, these being
when:
• the
nameplate rating of the generation complex is reduced for the first time; [Part
8, clause 171(5)(d)]
• the
nameplate rating of the generation complex has previously been reduced but the
generation complex has satisfied the power system reliability test under the
certification approach; or [Part 8, clause 171(5)(e)]
• the
nameplate rating of the generation complex has previously been reduced but the
generation complex has satisfied the power system reliability test using the
LETI. [Part 8, clause 171(5)(f)]
6.138
When the nameplate rating of the generation complex
is reduced for the first time, the sum of the (reduced) nameplate rating as of
the most recent 1 April and the nameplate rating of all generation unit(s) that
constitute replacement capacity must equal or exceed the original nameplate
rating to maintain energy security. [Part 8, clause 171(5)(d)]
6.139
In that case, the reduction in capacity has been
fully replaced and energy security has been maintained. Where the original
nameplate rating is exceeded, the excess constitutes the relevant excess MW and
can be used subsequently, if needed. [Part 8, clause 171(5)]
6.140
When the nameplate rating of the generation complex
has previously been reduced and the generation complex has passed the power
system reliability test under the certification approach, maintaining energy
security requires the sum of:
• the
(reduced) nameplate rating as of the most recent 1 April;
• the
nameplate rating of all generation unit(s) that constitute replacement
capacity; and
• any
relevant excess MW,
to equal or exceed the reduced nameplate rating that
applied at the most recent time the certification was awarded. [Part
8, clause 171(5)(e)]
6.141
In that event, the replacement capacity will
overcome the reduction in capacity since AEMO or IMOWA last certified that power
system reliability standards were not likely to be breached, and will therefore
maintain that situation.
6.142
When the nameplate rating of the generation complex
has previously been reduced and the generation complex has passed the power
system reliability test using the LETI, maintaining energy security requires
the sum of:
• the
(reduced) nameplate rating as of the most recent 1 April; and
• the
nameplate rating of all generation unit(s) that constitute replacement
capacity; and
• any
relevant excess MW,
to equal or exceed the reduced nameplate rating that
applied following the most recent retirement and replacement of capacity. [Part
8, clause 171(5)(f)]
6.143
In that event, the replacement capacity will
overcome the reduction in capacity that has occurred since that prior
reduction, thereby maintaining energy security.
6.144
The structure of the power system reliability test
involves the ‘target’ nameplate rating required to maintain energy security
being ‘reset’ each time the generator passes the power system reliability test
using the certification approach or the LETI. Once replacement capacity has
been used to pass the test once using the LETI, this capacity has contributed
to lowering the ‘target’ nameplate rating used in subsequent assessments of the
test, and so should not be considered again. As a result, replacement capacity
can only be counted once under the LETI. [Part 8, clause 171(4)(f)]
This is illustrated in Example 6.4 and Example 6.5 below.
Example 6.4 Complying
with the power system reliability test using the certification approach and the
Low Emissions Transition Incentive
A generation complex, ‘Hillside A’, is a coal-fired
electricity generator consisting of four units of 400 MW each. It is located
in the NEM region of NSW. It is owned and operated by the company Hillside
Electricity.
Following the introduction of the mechanism, Hillside
Electricity decide to progressively retire units of Hillside A from service due
to their high emissions intensity.
Hillside Electricity seeks a certification from AEMO
that a reduction in Hillside A’s nameplate rating from 1,600 MW to 1,200 MW on
2 April 2013 (reflecting the retirement of one unit) will be unlikely to
cause a breach of power system reliability standards in the two year period
ending on 2 April 2015.
AEMO certifies that application in accordance with
clause 174(3), and so Hillside Electricity reduces Hillside A’s nameplate
rating to 1,200 MW on 2 April 2013. On 1 September 2014, the
Regulator assesses whether or not Hillside A complied with the power system
reliability test on 1 April 2014.
The Regulator finds that, by virtue of the
certification, Hillside A does comply with the test and so Hillside Electricity
can continue to receive Fund assistance for the Hillside A generation complex, providing
they also meets the other conditions of receiving the assistance.
In the meantime, Hillside Electricity has progressed
development of three 180 MW open cycle gas turbine generation units that are
necessary to meet increasing peaking demand in NSW. The gas turbines are not
co-located with Hillside A, but remain within the NEM region of NSW.
Anticipating this development, Hillside Electricity
retires a second generation unit at Hillside A from service on 2 April 2014,
reducing the nameplate rating of Hillside A to 800 MW. Hillside Electricity
progresses development of the three open cycle gas turbine generation units
such that they enter service during November 2014.
Before 1 April 2015, Hillside Electricity nominates
these three units under clause 172(2). On 1 September 2015, the Regulator
considers whether or not Hillside A passed the power system reliability test on
1 April 2015.
The Regulator finds that Hillside A did pass the power
system reliability test because:
• the
three new open cycle gas turbine generation units satisfied the conditions set
out in clause 171(4) and so constitute replacement capacity of 540 MW;
• the
sum of the nameplate rating of Hillside A as of 1 April 2015 (800 MW) and the
nameplate rating of the three new generation units (540 MW) is 1,340 MW; and
• this
sum exceeds the nameplate rating of Hillside A on 1 April 2014 (1,200
MW), and so satisfies clause 171(5)(e).
Hillside Electricity would continue to receive
allocations of free carbon units for the Hillside A generation complex,
providing it also meets the other conditions of receiving the assistance, and
would have a ‘relevant excess megawatts’ amount of 140 MW as provided for by
clause 171(5).
Hillside Electricity subsequently retires a third unit
at Hillside A on 2 April 2015 while it constructs and commissions a new
combined cycle gas turbine generation unit of 500 MW at the same site. This
new generation unit enters service during November 2015. Hillside Electricity
nominates this new unit under clause 172(2) before 1 April 2016.
On 1 September 2016, the Regulator finds that Hillside
A passed the power system reliability test as of 1 April 2016 because:
• the
new combined cycle gas turbine generation unit satisfies the conditions set out
in clause 171(4) and so constitutes replacement capacity of 500 MW;
• the
sum of the nameplate rating of Hillside A as of 1 April 2016 (400 MW), the
nameplate rating of the new generation unit (500 MW) and the relevant excess MW
(140 MW) is 1,040 MW; and
• this
sum exceeds the nameplate rating of Hillside A on 1 April 2015 (800 MW)
(satisfying clause 171(5)(f)).
Hillside Electricity receives its final allocation of
free carbon units on 1 September 2016, providing it also meets the other
conditions of receiving the assistance.
Example 6.5 Complying
with the power system reliability test using the Low Emissions Transition
Incentive to retire a generator
A generation complex, “Smithtown power station”, is a
coal-fired electricity generator consisting of four units of 100 MW each. It
is located in the NEM Region of Queensland. It is owned and operated by the
company Smithtown Energy.
Following the start of the mechanism, Smithtown Energy
decides to retire the entire Smithtown power station as soon as it can be
replaced under the LETI.
Smithtown Energy constructs four 120 MW open cycle gas
turbines, which enter service during November 2015. Before 1 April 2015,
Smithtown Energy nominates these four units under clause 172(2).
Anticipating this development, Smithtown Energy
retires the Smithtown power station on 2 April 2015. On 1 September 2015, the
Regulator considers whether or not the Smithtown power station passed the power
system reliability test on 1 April 2015.
The Regulator finds that the Smithtown power station
did pass the power system reliability test because:
• the
four new open cycle gas turbine generation units satisfied the conditions set
out in clause 171(4) and so constitute replacement capacity of 480 MW;
• the
sum of the nameplate rating of the Smithtown power station as of 1 April 2015
(0 MW) and the nameplate rating of the four new generation units (480 MW) is
480 MW; and
• this
sum exceeds the nameplate rating of the Smithtown power station on 1 April 2014
(400 MW) (satisfying clause 171(5)(e)).
The Smithtown power station is now fully retired and
its registration as a generation complex has ceased.
On 1 September 2016, the Smithtown power station will
be able to pass the power system reliability test under clause 170(2)(g) and
Smithtown Energy will receive its final allocation of free carbon units for
that generation complex, providing they also meet the other conditions of
receiving the assistance.
6.145
Replacement capacity may need to comply with
further conditions in the regulations. [Part 8, clause 171(6)]
6.146
The replacement capacity provisions consider new
generation units separately, rather than considering combinations of generation
units as a generation complex. For the purpose of these provisions, the term
‘nameplate rating’ is defined with respect to generation units. [Part
8, clause 171(7)] By contrast, the definition of
‘nameplate rating’ generally applies with respect to generation complexes
throughout the bill. [Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘nameplate rating’]
6.147
To make clear that a particular generation unit is
being used to provide replacement capacity, the person who owns, controls or
operates that generation unit (the ‘first person’) must nominate it for this
purpose. [Part 8, clause 172(1)(a) and (2)]
6.148
The first person must also have been registered as
a generator for that generation unit when it was first registered under a law concerning
the regulation of energy markets. [Part 8, clause 172(1)(a) and (c)] This
is intended to ensure continuity of registration from the time the generation
unit is first registered until it is used as replacement capacity, thereby
increasing the coordination between the decision to develop the new generation
unit and the decision to retire existing generation capacity.
6.149
If this provision was not in place, new generation
units developed by persons who are not potential recipients of assistance would
be able to be transferred into the control of a person registered for a
generation complex that is subject to a certificate of eligibility for
coal-fired generation assistance and then used as replacement capacity. In
such an instance, the new generation unit could not be genuinely considered to
have been developed for the purpose of replacing a particular quantum of
generation capacity, and so would not support the objectives of sharpening
incentives for recipients of free carbon units to invest in new low emissions
capacity to replace existing emissions-intensive capacity.
6.150
To provide replacement capacity, a generation unit
must have been first registered on or after 1 July 2011. [Part
8, clause 172(1)(b)] Further, this project should
not have been fully committed as of 1 July 2011 having regard to a range of
factors reflecting the definition of a ‘committed project’ set out in the
National Electricity Rules. [Part 8, clause 172(1)(d)] These
provisions ensure that replacement capacity is genuinely new capacity and had
not been committed to be constructed prior to the announcement of the LETI.
6.151
To maintain energy security, replacement capacity
must have output that is readily predictable and not significantly dependent on
factors beyond the control of the operator. [Part 8, clause 172(1)(e)]
If these conditions are not satisfied, there is a significant risk that the
replacement capacity will not be able to generate electricity near its maximum
output at times of peak demand when it is most needed to maintain energy
security.
6.152
These conditions broadly reflect the definitions of
‘intermittent’ generation in the National Electricity Rules and WA’s Wholesale
Electricity Market Rules, such that the replacement capacity must not be
intermittent. Some technologies may not be used as replacement capacity, most
likely wind generation and some solar and hydro technologies, unless proponents
can realistically demonstrate that the output is readily predictable and not
significantly dependent on factors beyond the control of the operator.
6.153
Solar or hydro generation with significant storage
capability could be considered to be suitable as replacement capacity if the
storage capacity allows its output to be readily predictable and significantly
within the control of the operator. It is expected that gas-fired generation
technologies could generally satisfy these conditions and be used as
replacement capacity.
6.154
To ensure that the LETI supports a transition to a
lower emissions generation sector, replacement capacity must also have an
emissions intensity lower than the emissions intensity of current best-practice
coal-fired generation capacity in Australia.
6.155
This emissions intensity is set at the level of
0.80 kt of CO2-e of emissions per GWh of electricity generated. [Part
8, clause 172(1)(f)] This is mathematically
equivalent to 0.80 tonnes of CO2-e of emissions per MWh of
electricity generated. To substantiate that this condition is satisfied, a nomination
must be accompanied by a report setting out an independent estimate of the
likely emissions intensity of the replacement capacity over the two year period
beginning when the generation unit enters service. [Part 8,
clause 172(3) and (4)]
6.156
The report must focus on the generation unit’s
likely emissions intensity over its first two years of service, because
longer-term technological developments (such as carbon capture and storage) or
fuel substitutions (such as gas for coal) could substantially alter the
emissions intensity of a particular generation unit. Accordingly, this
assessment is focused on the more immediate technical characteristics of the
generation unit in question and cannot take into account more uncertain
longer-term developments.
6.157
Within 60 days of receiving a nomination the
Regulator must take all reasonable steps to inform the person of whether or not
the Regulator is satisfied that the nomination or purported nomination is
validly made. [Part 8, clause 173] This
will give generators greater certainty as to whether their nomination is likely
to be valid, and therefore greater certainty to pursue plans to retire existing
generation capacity.
Dealing
with intermediaries
6.158
Compliance with the power system reliability test
requires a person who owns, controls or operates the generation complex to be
registered as a generator under a law of the Commonwealth, a State or Territory
on the regulation of energy markets.
6.159
In respect of some generation complexes, an
‘intermediary’ may be registered instead of the owner, controller or operator
of the asset. There may be legal doubt as to whether the intermediary either
operates or controls the generation complex. This applies particularly to
intermediaries registered under rule 2.9.3 of the National Electricity Rules as
well as intermediaries created by jurisdictional derogations (such as rule
9.34.6 of the National Electricity Rules).
6.160
To remove any legal doubt, the provisions apply as
if the intermediary controlled the generation complex. [Part
8, clause 176] A generation complex that is
registered in the name of the intermediary under a law of the Commonwealth, a
State or a Territory concerning the regulation of energy markets will be able
to comply with one of the necessary conditions of the power system reliability
test. [Part 8, clause 170(2)(a)(i)], [Part 8, clause 170(2)(b)(i)], [Part 8,
clause 170(2)(c)(ii)], [Part 8, clause 170(2)(d)(ii)], [Part 8, clause 171(4)]
6.161
This deeming provision will not have effect for
other purposes, such as the application for assistance elsewhere under the Part.
[Part
8, clause 162(2) and 162(3)]
Clean Energy
Investment Plans (CEI plans)
6.162
Generators that receive assistance must develop and
submit a CEI plan for publication. This provides a transparent public
statement of the measures these companies are taking to reduce their emissions
and transition to lower-carbon energy sources.
6.163
A person who owns, controls or operates a
generation complex must give the Resources and Energy Minister a CEI plan to
receive assistance for that generation complex. [Part 8, clause 177],
[Part
8, clause 178] This must occur by 15 August of a
given financial year, in order for free carbon units to be issued on
1 September of the same financial year.
6.164
The person must submit a CEI plan in each eligible
financial year. [Part 8, clause 177(1)]
The plan for any given year can be an updated version of the previous year’s
plan. There are no specific requirements on the extent of updating required to
substantiate that the updated plan is in fact a new plan. For example, if only
limited changes to the generation complex’s circumstances or related corporate
entities occurred in the intervening year, then the updated plan could outline
this and set out the reasons.
6.165
The Minister for Resources and Energy must provide
a copy of the CEI plan to the Regulator. [Part 8, clause 179]
6.166
A CEI plan could include a range of information
about the steps that the person who owns, controls or operates the generation
complex in question, or related corporate entities, is undertaking to reduce
emissions from its operations.
6.167
A CEI plan should include the following
information:
• the
plans (if any) the person has for investment in new generation capacity. This
new generation capacity could be co-located with, or entirely separate from,
the generation complex in question. Technically, a generation complex could be
owned, controlled or operated by another person (for example, due to the choice
of corporate structure), in which case it would not be mandatory for such
investment to be reported. However, in such circumstances it would be best
practice for this to be included in the CEI plan. [Part
8, clause 178(a)(i)]
• the
plans (if any) the person has for investing to reduce the emissions intensity
of the generation complex for which free carbon units are issued. For example,
efficiency improvements and use of alternative fuels or installation of a
carbon capture unit with future storage or CO2 re-use applications could
be used to reduce the emissions intensity of these generation complexes. [Part 8,
clause 178(a)(ii)]
• the
plans (if any) the person has for investment in research and development in
clean energy technologies. For example this could include trials or pilots
taking place at the generation complex in question, or at another generation
complex, or could include in kind or direct support for research and
development programs undertaken elsewhere. [Part 8, clause 178(a)(iii)]
• a
copy of, or internet URL for, the most recent publicly available report
outlining energy efficiency opportunities identified for the generation complex
or related corporate entity in question as required under the Energy Efficiency Opportunities Act 2006.
[Part
8, clause 178(b)]
6.168
The CEI plan must be published on the website by
the Department administered by the Minister for Resources and Energy. [Part
8, clause 180]
Closure
contracts
6.169
As part of the Fund, the Government will also seek
to negotiate the closure of some of Australia’s most emissions-intensive
coal-fired power stations. This initiative will contribute to the process of
transforming the Australian electricity generation sector to cleaner
technologies.
6.170
The Government intends that eligibility to
participate in negotiations is limited to very highly-emissions-intensive
coal-fired generators with an emissions intensity greater than 1.2 tonnes of CO2-e
per MWh of electricity on an ‘as generated’ basis.
6.171
This initiative will be implemented outside of the
bill, and provisions on closure arrangements are not included in the bill. The
Government intends to make cash payments to honour closure contracts, in return
for commitments by the generator counter-parties, such as a schedule of
retirement, requirements that support energy security during the retirement
process, payment of workers’ entitlements and arrangements for appropriate
remediation of the site of the power station (and related coal mines where
appropriate).
6.172
Without specific provisions, it could be possible
that the obligations of Part 8 could conflict with the terms and conditions
contained in closure contracts. For example, the power system reliability test
established in Part 8, Division 4 requires a generator to seek certification
from AEMO or IMOWA before deregistering generation capacity, or to replace this
capacity with new low-emissions capacity.
6.173
Failure to do either of these things would result
in free carbon units being withheld for that generation complex. As a closure
contract will require deregistration of generation capacity, it may be difficult
for the generation complex to comply with both the power system reliability
test and the requirements of a closure contract.
6.174
The Government intends to negotiate closure
contracts that replace the value of free carbon units for the generation
complex in question, with additional payments as needed to secure closure and
compliance with the associated conditions.
6.175
To this end, there is a mechanism to prevent the
allocation of free carbon units for generation complexes subject to a closure
contract, if this is specified in the contract. [Part 8, clause 181(1)]
6.176
Withholding of free carbon units under Part 8,
Division 6 is triggered by the act of entering into a closure contract, not the
ongoing operation of a closure contract. [Part 8, clause 181(1)(a) and (2)(a)] This
is needed to give the Government certainty at the time the contract is struck
that it will not duplicate payments to the generation complex through both
payments under the closure contract and allocations of free carbon units.
6.177
The person who enters into the contract must own,
control or operate the generation complex. [Part 8, clause 181(1)(a) and (2)(a)]
Unless the person fits this description they could not give effect to the
closure as anticipated by the closure contract. The Commonwealth must be the
other party to the contract.
6.178
The contract must explicitly acknowledge that it is
a closure contract for the purposes of the mechanism. [Part
8, clause 181(1)(b) and 181(2)(b)] This ensures
that the person who owns, controls or operates the generation complex in
question is aware of and has consented to the possible withholding of free
carbon units, and gives other generators confidence that other contracts they
enter into as a normal part of their operations are not inadvertently deemed to
be closure contracts for the purposes of Part 8, Division 6.
6.179
The bill provides for two separate circumstances to
apply:
• where
the closure contract indicates the withholding of free carbon units in all four
years they are available; and [Part 8, clause 181(1)]
• where
the closure contract indicates that free carbon units are provided in respect
of all or some years. [Part 8, clause 181(2)]
6.180
These provisions do not adjust or remove the annual
assistance factor of the relevant generation complexes in any way. Importantly,
this means that the annual assistance factor of a generation complex that is
party to a closure contract is still captured in the definition of ‘total
annual assistance factors for that eligible financial year’. [Part
8, clause 161(2) and (3)], [definition of ‘total annual assistance factors for
that eligible financial year’]
6.181
In turn, this ensures that the pro-rata allocation
approach implemented in Division 2 is not distorted by the operation of
Division 6 and that units that are withheld as a result of Division 6 are not
then distributed to other generation complexes.
Fixed charge
carbon units
6.182
Persons who are issued free carbon units should
note the special nature of the carbon units issued with a vintage year
beginning on 1 July 2013 or 1 July 2014. In particular, free carbon units
allocated in these eligible financial years cannot be used for subsequent years
of the mechanism. [Part 6, clause 122(6)]
6.183
The limited nature of the carbon market during the
fixed charge years means that it is necessary to implement a buy-back
arrangement for carbon units issued for the fixed charge years. [Part
4, clause 116] The facility will be open to
requests from 1 September to 1 February in the relevant eligible financial
year. It allows persons to receive the fixed charge applying for carbon units
in the relevant eligible financial year for each unit they wish to sell back to
the Regulator, discounted by a factor specified in the regulations.
6.184
Further information on the buy-back facility is
contained in Chapter 3.
Energy
security – special appropriation
6.185
In addition to the Energy Security Fund, the
Government is implementing complementary measures to address any further risks
to energy security under carbon pricing. These include the establishment of an
Energy Security Council and government loans.
6.186
The Energy Security Council and possible government
loans are largely dealt with outside the bill. However, Part 23 provides
special appropriation mechanisms for:
• any
contracts or arrangements authorised by the Treasurer for the purpose of
protecting energy security in Australia; and
• any
loans authorised by the Treasurer to persons who own, control or operate an
emissions-intensive coal-fired generation complex, for the for purpose of
refinancing existing debt or the purchase of future carbon units. [Part
23, clause 303A], [Part 23, clause 303B]
6.187
While the Treasurer already has the executive power
to authorise the making of relevant loans, contracts or arrangements, an
appropriation is authorised for associated payments required under these
instruments. This ensures that any such measures can be funded and implemented
quickly if required. As the provisions are limited to arrangements entered
into with constitutional corporations, and therefore rely on the corporations
power of the Constitution, the alternative constitutional bases for the bill do
not apply. [Part 23, clause 303A(3)], [Part 23, clause 303B(8)]
6.188
The bill does not limit, nor is it intended to
limit, any other powers of the Treasurer to authorise the making of contracts
or arrangements, or the making of loans, by the Commonwealth.
Contracts
and arrangements to protect energy security
6.189
The Treasurer may authorise the making of contracts
and arrangements by the Commonwealth, where the contract or arrangement is made
with a constitutional corporation for the purpose of protecting energy security
in Australia. [Part 23, clause 303A(1)]
6.190
Examples of outcomes that may be relevant when
considering entering into a contract or arrangement for the purpose of
protecting energy security in Australia include:
• continued
physical supply of electricity to consumers – that is, actions could be for the
purpose of protecting the reliability and security of supply of electricity; or
• the
avoidance of systemic risks to electricity markets or associated financial
markets (electricity derivatives markets) caused by financial impairment – that
is, actions could be for the purpose of protecting Australia’s electricity
markets, or associated financial markets, from systemic risks that may emerge
from the financial impairment of one or more market participants. This could
include ensuring financial settlement of obligations of the financially
impaired participant on these markets.
6.191
If a contract or arrangement is authorised under
this section, an appropriation is made from the Consolidated Revenue Fund for
the purpose of paying amounts payable by the Commonwealth under the contract or
arrangement. [Part 23, clause 303A(2)]
6.192
While it is expected that this provision would be
only be used in rare circumstances following receipt of advice from the Energy
Security Council, the Treasurer’s power to act is not restricted to cases where
such advice has been received. Similarly, it is expected, but not required,
that the Treasurer will consult with the Resources and Energy Minister after receiving
advice from the Energy Security Council.
Loans
to purchase future carbon units or to refinance existing loans
6.193
There are two situations where the Treasurer may
authorise loans of money by the Commonwealth to a constitutional corporation
that owns, controls or operates an emissions-intensive coal-fired generation
complex: [Part 23, clause 303B]
• the
Treasurer may authorise loans for the purpose of purchasing future carbon units
at advance auctions conducted by the Regulator during the first financial year
during which future carbon units are issued or in either of the next two
financial years. [Part 23, clause 303B(1)] Future
carbon units are units of a particular vintage year, issued in an auction by
the Regulator before the start of that year. [Part 23, clause 303B(6)]
• during
the period of three years from commencement, the Treasurer may authorise loans
for the purpose of refinancing another loan that relates (in whole or in part)
to an emissions-intensive coal fired generation complex. [Part
23, clause 303B(2)]
6.194
In each case, if the Treasurer authorises a loan,
an appropriation is made from the Consolidated Revenue Fund for the purposes of
making the loan. [Part 23, clause 303B(3)]
6.195
An ‘emissions-intensive coal-fired generation
complex’ is a complex where 95 per cent of electricity has been generated from
coal in the period from 1 July 2008 to 30 June 2010, and is a complex that has
an emissions-intensity that exceeds 0.80 tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalence
per megawatt hours (tCO2-e/MWh) of electricity generated. [Part
23, clause 303B(4)] For the purposes of working
out emissions intensity reference may be had to clause 168, but clause 168(2)
does not apply in this situation. [Part 8, clause 168],
[Part
23, clause 303B(5)]
6.196
These arrangements commence on the
day after the date on which the bill receives the Royal Assent. [Part
1, clause 2] A transitional provision ensures that
relevant definitions apply from commencement of the section until the
definitions commence. [Part 23, clause 303B(7)]
6.197
The potential provision of Government loans is not
intended to act as a substitute for private sector financing, if that is
available, even if it is at a price that the generator finds unattractive. The
Government has indicated that loans would be available where a coal-fired
generator with an emissions intensity that exceeds 0.80 tCO2-e/MWh
needs finance but is unable to obtain it from the market on reasonable terms. Loans
will be on terms that encourage generators to obtain finance from private
lenders, with interest rates set above a relevant commercial benchmark rate. Loans
will be subject to an assessment that there is a clear capacity to repay the
loan by the recipient. The Energy Security Council will provide advice on
loans for refinancing of existing debt. Loans and loan terms will be subject
to the approval of the Treasurer.
Outline of
chapter
7.1
Chapter 7 explains the way in which the mechanism
is supported through measures promoting compliance and providing for
enforcement. These include provisions on information gathering, record
keeping, monitoring, enforceable undertakings, administrative penalties,
infringement notices, civil penalties, criminal sanctions, liability of company
officers, and anti-avoidance. Chapter 7 covers Parts 3, 10, 11 and 13 to 21.
Context
7.2
Effective enforcement arrangements are vital to
promote compliance with the mechanism and to achieving its objectives.
7.3
The Regulator is responsible for administering the
mechanism. It has investigation and enforcement powers to enforce the rules
governing the mechanism’s operation to ensure compliance by those covered by it.
These powers give it a range of proportionate tools to use when administering
the mechanism, which are similar to those available to other regulators under
Commonwealth laws.
Summary
Information
obligations and investigation powers
7.4
Liable entities are subject to general obligations
to keep records, and the Regulator has powers to seek and obtain information to
ensure compliance with the mechanism. In some cases, the exercise of these
powers is subject to court supervision.
7.5
The relevant parts of the bill are:
• requirements
to make and keep records; [Part 14, clause 226]
• information-gathering
powers; and [Part 13, clause 220]
• monitoring
powers. [Part 15, clause 229]

Enforcement
powers, civil penalties and criminal sanctions
7.6
Enforcement powers range in seriousness from
administrative penalties for failing to pay on time, to criminal sanctions for
dishonest or fraudulent behaviour. The relevant parts of the bill are:
• administrative
and late payment penalties; [Part 19, clause 272], [Part 6, clause 135], [Part 11,
clause 213]
• enforceable
undertakings; [Part 20, clause 277]
• infringement
notices; [Part 18, clause 264]
• civil
penalties; [Part 17, clause 250]
• relinquishment
orders; [Part 11, clause 209]
• offences,
including offences concerning administrative penalties and fraudulent conduct; [Part
10, clause 207], [Part 19, clause 272]
• provisions
concerning liability of officers of bodies corporate; and [Part
16, clause 247]
•
anti-avoidance provisions. [Part
3, clause 29]

7.7
The Regulator’s investigation and enforcement
powers, such as those covering information gathering and monitoring, are
consistent with those of other national economic regulators.
Detailed
explanation of new law
7.8
The Regulator has broad powers to gather
information to let it monitor compliance with the mechanism, investigate
possible contraventions and, where necessary, take enforcement action. These
powers reflect the nature of the mechanism, under which liable entities must
actively comply with its requirements, as well as avoid contravening the law.
The
Regulator’s information-gathering powers
7.9
If the Regulator believes on reasonable grounds
that a person has information or a document that is relevant to the mechanism,
then it may require, by written notice, that person to give information or
documents, or to provide copies of documents, within at least 14 days of the
notice. [Part 13, clause 220], [Part 13, clause 221] A
person, in complying with a notice, is entitled to reasonable compensation for
making copies of documents. [Part 13, clause 222]
7.10
A failure to respond to a notice is subject to a
civil penalty. A court may order the payment of pecuniary penalties of up to
10,000 penalty units for a corporation and up to 2,000 penalty units for
any other person.
[Part
17, clause 252(5) and (6)]
7.11
Once a person has complied with a notice, the
Regulator may inspect the documents or copies produced and make its own copies
of or take extracts from those documents. It may retain possession of any
copies it makes. [Part 13, clause 223]
7.12
The Regulator may take and retain possession of
documents produced for as long as is necessary. If a person is otherwise
entitled to possess the document (for example, the person who supplied it),
then that person is also entitled to a certified copy of the document provided
by the Regulator. [Part 13, clause 224]
7.13
A person is not excused from giving information or
producing a document because it might incriminate them or expose them to a
penalty. However, the information or documents produced are not admissible in
evidence against an individual in:
• civil
proceedings for the recovery of a pecuniary penalty under a civil penalty
order; and
• criminal
proceedings, unless the proceedings are for an offence that relates to
information-gathering by the Regulator, involving the provision of false or
misleading information or documents.
[Part
13, clause 225]
Record-keeping
requirements for liable entities
7.14
To support the operation of the mechanism,
participants must keep records to record and support their compliance with
their obligation to report to the Regulator. [Part 14, clause 226] The
Regulator and, where relevant, inspectors and auditors, may check the accuracy
and completeness of information provided by participants, for example
information provided in applications leading to the administrative allocation
of free carbon units.
7.15
The Regulator’s ability to audit emissions data is
essential to monitoring compliance and ensuring the integrity of the mechanism.
The NGER Act includes obligations for liable entities to maintain records
concerning greenhouse and energy reports. These obligations are expanded to
cover the new requirements of the mechanism through amendments in the
Consequential Amendments Bill.
7.16
Record-keeping obligations may be prescribed in
regulations, where additional specified information is relevant to the Act and
related legislation. [Part 14, clause 227]
7.17
Records must be kept by natural gas suppliers:
• where
a recipient quotes its OTN for the supply and the supplier accepts the
quotation, thereby passing liability to the recipient; and [Part
14, clause 228]
• where
the recipient has quoted its OTN but the supplier has rejected the quotation in
order to retain liability. [Part 14, clause 228]
7.18
The OTN reporting provisions will allow the
Regulator to ensure that OTN requirements are being met and OTNs are not
misused by either suppliers or purchasers of natural gas.
7.19
Records must be kept for five years. This period
is consistent with obligations under the taxation system. A failure to comply
is subject to a civil penalty. [Part 14, clause 227], [Part 14, clause
228] A court may order the payment of pecuniary
penalties of up to 10,000 penalty units for a corporation and up to 2,000
penalty units for any other person.
[Part
17, clause 252(5) and (6)]
The
Regulator’s monitoring powers
7.20
The Regulator has powers to enter facilities
operated by liable entities to monitor their activities under the mechanism and
to investigate potential contraventions. The Regulator may appoint inspectors
who may enter premises for these purposes. [Part 1, clause 5, definition of
‘inspector’], [Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘monitoring powers’]
7.21
Generally, an inspector would examine records kept
by liable entities and operators of facilities covered by the mechanism, but
may undertake other monitoring functions. Inspectors are subject to specific
rules concerning whether and how they may enter premises and conduct themselves.
The occupier of the premises also has specific rights and responsibilities
concerning the exercise of monitoring powers. [Part 15, clause 229]
Appointment
of inspectors
7.22
An inspector is appointed by the Regulator and may
be a member of the Regulator’s staff or an Australian Federal Police officer. [Part
1, clause 5, definition of ‘official of the Regulator’]
7.23
If a member of the Regulator’s staff, the inspector
must be either an Senior Executive Service employee or acting Senior Executive Service
employee; an employee who holds Australian Public Servant Executive Level 1 or
2 positions or an equivalent position (or is performing those functions). This
means that junior Australian Public Servant officers cannot be appointed as
inspectors. In appointing an inspector, the Regulator must also be satisfied
that he or she has suitable qualifications and experience to properly exercise
the functions of an inspector. [Part 15, clause 230]
7.24
An inspector must comply with any direction given
by the Regulator in exercising his or her powers. [Part
15, clause 230(3) and (4)] A written direction is
not a legislative instrument. It is not of a legislative character and is
therefore not within the meaning of section 5 of the LI Act. The
provision is included to indicate that an exemption from the LI Act is not
sought or required.
7.25
Inspectors require detailed knowledge of the
mechanism and the ability to identify and interpret technical data, such as
data used in the measurement of emissions at the facility or organisational
level, which are used to calculate a liable entity’s emissions number. For
this reason, inspectors should be Senior Executive Service or Australian Public
Servant Executive Level 1 and 2 staff.
7.26
The Regulator must issue inspectors with an
identity card which the inspector must carry. The card must contain a
photograph of the inspector and its form is to be prescribed in regulations. Failure
to return the card is an offence with a penalty of one penalty unit, unless it
was lost or destroyed.
[Part
15, clause 231]
Powers
of inspectors
7.27
With the consent of the occupier or a warrant
issued by a court, an inspector can enter premises and exercise monitoring
powers to determine whether the Act or the associated provisions have been
complied with or for the purpose of substantiating information provided under
the Act or associated provisions. [Part 1, clause 5, definition of
‘associated provisions’] The inspector can only
enter premises with the consent of the occupier or under a monitoring warrant.
[Part
15, clause 232], [Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘monitoring warrant’]
7.28
Having entered the premises, an inspector may
search the premises and anything on them, to examine any activity; to inspect,
examine, measure or test anything; to photograph or record the premises and
anything on them; to inspect and copy documents; and to take such equipment
onto the premises to exercise these powers. An inspector may also operate
electronic equipment to see whether it contains relevant information and transfer
this to a storage device. [Part 15, clause 233]
Example 7.1 Inspectors’
powers
An inspector could examine emissions monitoring
equipment at a facility or search computer files concerning greenhouse gas
emissions either at the facility or an office of the liable entity or the
controlling corporation.
7.29
The inspector may also secure things for up to 24
hours if entry to the premises was under a monitoring warrant in specific
circumstances. This period can be extended by a magistrate, provided the
inspector has given notice to the occupier of the premises or their
representative. An extension may not be granted more than three times. [Part
15, clause 233(5), (6), (7), (8) and (9)]
7.30
In exercising their powers,
inspectors may be assisted by other persons if this is necessary and reasonable.
A person assisting an inspector may enter the premises and exercise monitoring
powers, but only in accordance with a direction given to him or her by the
inspector. Inspectors may only give directions that are consistent with the
exercise of their functions under the bill. This will ensure that monitoring
activities are at all times carried out by or under the direction of a properly
qualified person, and that the person assisting cannot exercise any monitoring
powers on his or her own initiative. [Part 15, clause 234]
7.31
The inspector may require assistance to operate
specific equipment or access premises. It is envisaged that persons assisting
an inspector will be people with specific technical skills required to enable
the inspector to undertake his or her functions in obtaining documents or
information. The actions of the person assisting an inspector will be taken,
at all times, to be the actions of the inspector. This means that the
inspector is accountable for any actions taken by the person assisting the
inspector. [Part 15, clause 234]
7.32
A written direction given by an inspector is not a
legislative instrument. It is not of a legislative character and is therefore
not within the meaning of section 5 of the LI Act. The provision is
included to indicate that an exemption from the LI Act is not sought or
required.
7.33
If the inspector has entered the premises with the
consent of the occupier, then he or she may ask the occupier to answer
questions relevant to the Act or associated provisions or to produce relevant
documents. If the inspector has entered the premises under a monitoring
warrant, then the inspector may require the occupier to answer relevant
questions or produce relevant documents. [Part 15, clause 235], [Part 1, clause 5,
definition of ‘associated provisions’]
7.34
It is an offence for the person not to comply with
such a requirement.
A court may impose a maximum penalty of 6 months’ imprisonment or 30 penalty
units, or both.
[Part
15, clause 235]
Limits
on the powers of inspectors
7.35
In the exercise of their functions, inspectors are
subject to a range of obligations aimed at protecting the rights and interests
of the occupiers of premises, including:
• the
inspector must obtain the voluntary consent of the occupier before entering
premises, including informing the occupier that consent may be refused, subject
to limitations or withdrawn. If consent is withdrawn, the inspector and any
person assisting him or her must leave the premises. [Part
15, clause 237]
• where
a monitoring warrant has been obtained, the inspector must, before entering the
premises, announce that he or she is authorised to enter the premises, show his
or her identity card and give the occupier of the premises the opportunity to
permit entry into the premises. [Part 15, clause 238]
• when
executing a monitoring warrant, the inspector must be in possession of the
warrant. [Part 15, clause 239]
• the
inspector must provide a copy of the monitoring warrant to the occupier who is
present and inform him or her of the rights and responsibilities of the
occupier. [Part 15, clause 240]
• specific
requirements for securing electronic equipment (for example, computers
containing relevant data) until an expert assistant is able to attend and
operate the equipment. [Part 15, clause 241]
• the
Commonwealth must provide compensation for damage to electronic equipment due
to a failure to exercise sufficient care. [Part 15, clause 242]
7.36
The occupier can be present when a monitoring
warrant is executed, but cannot impede its execution. [Part
15, clause 243]
7.37
The occupier must provide the inspector, and
persons assisting the inspector, with all reasonable facilities and assistance
where a monitoring warrant applies to the premises. Failure to do so is an
offence, with a maximum penalty of 30 penalty units.
[Part
15, clause 244]
Monitoring
warrants
7.38
An inspector must apply to a magistrate for a
monitoring warrant, which must contain specified information. [Part
15, clause 245(4)] The magistrate may issue a
warrant if he or she is satisfied, based on information given under oath or
affirmation (including further information sought by the magistrate), that
access to the premises is needed to determine whether the Act or the associated
provisions are being complied with or to substantiate information provided
under the Act or the associated provisions. [Part 15, clause 245], [Part 1, clause 5,
definition of ‘associated provisions’]
7.39
The power to issue a monitoring warrant is
conferred on a magistrate in his or her personal capacity. The power need not
be accepted, but when it is exercised the magistrate has the same protection
and immunity as if he or she were exercising the power as a member of the court
of which the magistrate is a member. [Part 15, clause 246]
7.40
A magistrate for these purposes is a magistrate of
a state or territory court, and not a Federal Magistrate (see section 16C of
the Acts Interpretation Act 1901).
Self-incrimination
Requirement
to provide information, subject to use/derivative use immunity
7.41
As indicated above, a person may be required to
give information or produce a document to the Regulator under clause 221 or to
answer an inspector’s questions or produce a document to an inspector under
clause 235. The person cannot refuse to produce the information or documents
or answer questions because it might incriminate them or expose them to a
penalty.
7.42
However, any information and documents produced and
answers given, and anything obtained as a direct or indirect consequence, are
not admissible in evidence against an individual in:
• civil
proceedings for the recovery of a penalty (other than the penalty for failing
to relinquish units and late payment penalty); and
• criminal
proceedings, unless the proceedings are for an offence that relates to
information-gathering by the Regulator, involving the provision of false or
misleading information or documents. [Part 13, clause 225(1)], [Part 15, clause
236(1)]
7.43
Thus the provisions in the bill regulating the
privilege against self-incrimination are in the usual form for overriding the
privilege subject to a ‘use and derivative use’ immunity. They ensure
self-incriminatory disclosures cannot be used against the person who makes the
disclosure, either directly in court (known as ‘use’ immunity) or indirectly to
gather other evidence against the person (known as ‘derivative use’ immunity).
However, the information could be used against a third party, such as an accomplice.
Reasons
for the approach taken in the bill
7.44
The treatment of self-incrimination in the bill is
consistent with enforcement powers in other equivalent Commonwealth legislation
is consistent with the views of the Senate Standing Committee for the Scrutiny
of Bills, as well as the Australian Government’s legal policy regarding the
privilege against self-incrimination as set out in A Guide to Framing Commonwealth Offences, Civil Penalties and
Enforcement Powers.
7.45
The removal of the privilege, subject to a
use/derivative use immunity, will enhance the ability of the Regulator to
monitor and ensure compliance with the mechanism and therefore assist in the
effective administration of the mechanism. The effective administration of the
mechanism is an issue of major public importance with a significant impact on
the Australian community and the conduct of business. Non-compliance could
undermine the capacity of the mechanism to drive reductions in greenhouse gas
emissions so as to meet Australia’s international climate change obligations,
result in unfair competition between compliant and non-compliant businesses,
and reduce the revenues collected from the issue of carbon units, which are to
be used to assist households and businesses in adjusting to the mechanism.
Enforceable
undertakings
7.46
The Regulator may accept enforceable undertakings
from liable persons about their compliance with the Act or associated
provisions. [Part 20, clause 278], [Part 1, clause 5, definition of
‘associated provisions’] A person may, for
example, undertake to do a particular thing directed to compliance with their
obligations under the Act, or to not do specific things which are not in
compliance with the Act.
7.47
These undertakings may only be accepted from
persons who are covered by the mechanism, such as liable entities, recipients
of free carbon units under Part 7 or assistance under Part 8, and OTN holders.
They cannot be imposed on members of the public or persons who do not have
compliance obligations under the mechanism.
7.48
The Regulator must publish such undertakings on its
website. [Part 20, clause 278(5)]
7.49
Where a Regulator considers that the person has
breached any of the terms of the undertaking, it may apply to the court for an
order:
• directing
the person to comply with the term of the undertaking;
• directing
the person to pay the Commonwealth an amount up to the amount of any financial
benefit reasonably attributable to the breach of the term of the undertaking;
• directing
the person to compensate any other person who has suffered loss or damage as a
result of the breach; and
• any
other orders. [Part 20, clause 279]
7.50
Enforceable undertakings are a useful tool for the
Regulator to promote compliance, without the need to take court action. They
are used extensively by other national economic Regulators.
Example 7.2 Enforceable
undertakings
An undertaking might be accepted when a liable entity
has lodged inadequate reports and its data collection and quality assurance
systems are found to have deficiencies that make it difficult to comply with
reporting obligations. The entity may be willing to enter into an enforceable
undertaking setting out the steps it will take to improve its systems and
procedures, so that it can produce compliant reports in the future.
Late payment
and administrative penalties
7.51
The bill provides that where a person under an
obligation to pay a unit shortfall charge or to relinquish units under Part
11does not do so, then they are liable to pay an administrative penalty or a
late payment penalty (see Table 7.1 for a list of administrative penalty
provisions).
7.52
These administrative penalties may only be imposed
on persons who are covered by the mechanism and are liable to pay a unit
shortfall charge or to relinquish units under Part 11.
Table 7.1 Administrative and late payment penalties
and amounts
|
Clause
|
Description
|
Administrative penalty
|
|
135(1)
|
Late payment penalty – unit shortfall charge
|
An amount calculated at the rate of 20 per cent per
annum or such rate as is specified in regulations
|
|
212(2)
|
Administrative penalty - Failure to relinquish units
at all
|
Determined according to the formula in sub-clause
212(2)
|
|
212(3)
|
Administrative penalty - Failure to relinquish
sufficient units
|
Determined according to the formula in sub-clause
212(3)
|
|
213(1)
|
Late payment penalty - relinquishment
|
An amount calculated at the rate of 20 per cent per
annum or such rate as is specified in regulations
|
7.53
Liability for administrative and late payment
penalties is an automatic consequence of non-compliance and the Regulator has
no discretion about whether the person is liable.
Remission
of late payment penalties
7.54
The Regulator may remit:
• a
late payment penalty for failing to pay a unit shortfall charge (but not the
charge itself except in the limited circumstances set out in clauses 130 and
134A); or
• a
late payment penalty for failing to pay a penalty for failing to surrender
units under Part 11 (but not the penalty itself),
to the person liable to pay that penalty. [Part
6, clause 135], [Part 11, clause 213] This may
occur on the application of the person liable to pay the penalty or on the
Regulator’s own initiative. The Regulator cannot remit an administrative
penalty for failing to relinquish units under Part 11.
7.55
The Regulator does not have a general power to
remit late payment penalties but must apply specified criteria in determining
whether to remit a late payment penalty, namely:
• the
person did not contribute to the delay in payment and has taken reasonable
steps to mitigate the causes of the delay; or
• the
person contributed to the delay in payment and has taken reasonable steps to
mitigate the causes of the delay and, having regard to the reasons for the
delay, it would be fair and reasonable to remit some or all of the amount; or
• the
Regulator is satisfied that there are special circumstances that make it
reasonable to remit some or all of the amount. [Part 6, clause 135(2)], [Part 11, clause
213(2)]
7.56
Late payment penalties are debts due and payable to
the Commonwealth and may be recovered by the Regulator, on the Commonwealth’s
behalf, in a court of competent jurisdiction [Part 6, clause 136], [Part 11, clause
214]
7.57
The Regulator may set off such
penalties against other amounts owing to the Commonwealth, if the amount owing
is of a kind specified in the regulations. [Part 6, clause 137], [Part 11, clause
215] The Commonwealth must refund an overpayment
of a late payment penalty made by a person. [Part 6, clause 140], [Part 11, clause
216]
Infringement
notices
7.58
The bill provides that infringement notices may be
issued for contraventions of certain provisions. These infringement notices
may only be issued to persons who are covered by the mechanism. They cannot be
issued to members of the public more generally.
The
role of infringement notices
7.59
The Regulator may issue an infringement notice for
any civil penalty provision. [Part 18, clause 264]
Infringement notices allow the Regulator to take action against minor
contraventions more efficiently and effectively than through court action
alone, and provide the potential for a speedier resolution of matters than is
possible through the courts (although this would depend on the complexity of
each matter).
7.60
A person who receives an infringement notice is
under no legal obligation to pay the penalty set out in that notice. However,
should the person choose not to do so, then he or she is exposed to the
possibility that the Regulator will commence proceedings to recover a civil
penalty for the contravention.
7.61
The capacity to issue an infringement notice is not
intended to amount to the imposition of a financial penalty by the Regulator. It
is a mechanism through which a person, in circumstances where the Regulator has
reasonable grounds to believe has contravened a civil penalty provision, may
forestall an application to the court by the Regulator for the imposition of a
civil penalty. [Part 18, clause 265(1)]
Formal
requirements
7.62
The Regulator must give the person an infringement
notice within 12 months after the day on which the alleged conduct took place.
[Part
18, clause 265(2)]
7.63
The notice must include specified information,
namely:
• the
name of the person to whom it is given and the name of the person giving the
notice;
• brief
details of the alleged contravention and the date on which it is alleged to
have occurred;
• a
statement to the effect that proceedings will not be brought concerning the
alleged contravention if the penalty specified in the notice is paid to the
Regulator, on behalf of the Commonwealth, within 28 days of the notice being
given or, if allowed by the Regulator, a longer period;
• an
explanation of how to pay the penalty;
• information
about what occurs if the Regulator withdraws the notice; and
• any
other matters required by regulations to be included. [Part
18, clause 266]
7.64
The Regulator may withdraw an infringement notice
by giving the person a withdrawal notice. This must be given within 28 days of
the infringement notice being given to the person. If the person has already
paid the penalty prior to receiving the withdrawal notice, then the Commonwealth
is liable to refund the penalty. [Part 18, clause 268]
7.65
Other matters concerning infringement notices may
be set out in regulations. [Part 18, clause 271]
Infringement
notice penalties
7.66
An infringement notice penalty must equal one-fifth
of the maximum civil penalty amount (see Table 7.2 for infringement notice
provisions and the penalties that may be obtained). [Part
18, clause 267]
7.67
The amounts of infringement notice penalties are
set in accordance with the guidance in A
Guide to Framing Commonwealth Offences, Civil Penalties and Enforcement Powers.
They are substantially less than the maximum amounts that apply to a
contravention of a civil penalty,
but are still significant, reflecting the seriousness of any potential
contravention and the potential impact of such conduct on the operations and
integrity of the mechanism.
Table 7.2 Infringement notice penalties
|
Clause
|
Description
|
Infringement Notice penalty
|
|
47(1)
|
Notification of change of name or address of OTN
holder
|
100 penalty units (currently $11,000) for a
corporation
20 penalty units (currently $2,200) for any other
person
|
|
63
(1)-(2)
|
Misuse of OTN
|
2,000 penalty units (currently $220,000) for a
corporation
400 penalty units (currently $44,000) for any other
person
|
|
66
(1), (2), (3), (4)
|
Notification of mandatory designated JVs
|
|
71A
|
Notification of mandatory designated JVs
|
|
151
(1)-(3)
|
Compliance with JCP reporting and record-keeping
requirements
|
|
218
(2), (4)
|
Notification of significant
holding — controlling corporation of a group
|
|
219
(2), (4)
|
Notification of significant
holding — non-group entity
|
|
221
(4), (5)
|
Regulator may obtain information and documents
|
|
227
(2), (3)
|
Record-keeping requirements — general
|
|
228
(2), (3)
|
Record-keeping requirements — quotation of
OTN
|
|
64
(1)-(4)
|
Quotation of bogus OTN
|
Section 64 (1) or (2) – three times the total
benefit received by a corporation
Section 64 (3) or (4) - 100 penalty units (currently
$11,000) for a corporation
Section 64(3) or (4) – 20 penalty units (currently
$2,200) for any other person
|
|
248(1)
|
Civil penalties for executive officers of bodies
corporate
|
400 penalty units (currently $44,000)
|
7.68
A ‘penalty unit’ is defined by reference to the Acts Interpretation Act 1901.
At present, a penalty unit is $110.
Effect
on civil penalty proceedings
7.69
Where the person pays the penalty, then any
liability that person has for the contravention of the relevant civil penalty
provision is discharged and the Regulator may not bring proceedings against
that person for the alleged contravention. [Part 18, clause 269]
7.70
The Regulator is not required to issue an
infringement notice where there is an allegation of a contravention of a civil
penalty provision, and the Regulator is free to take such enforcement action as
is appropriate in the circumstances. [Part 18, clause 270(a)]
7.71
An infringement notice does not give rise to an
enforceable requirement to pay the financial penalty. If a person does not
comply with the infringement notice within the period of time specified, the
Regulator cannot enforce the infringement notice. Instead, the Regulator may
bring civil proceedings against the person for the same alleged contravention,
but not for failure to pay the penalty in the infringement notice, and the fact
that a notice has been issued does not affect the liability of the person for
any contravention of a civil penalty provision. [Part 18, clause 270(b)]
7.72
An infringement notice does not limit the court’s
discretion when determining the amount of a penalty where it finds that there
has been a contravention of a civil penalty provision. [Part
18, clause 270(c)]
Civil
penalties
7.73
The bill provides that civil penalties may be
imposed for contraventions of certain provisions. These civil penalties may
only be imposed on persons who have obligations under the mechanism. They
cannot otherwise be imposed on members of the public more generally.
Civil
penalty provisions and amounts
7.74
The Regulator may apply to the court for a civil
penalty order against a person who has contravened a civil penalty provision. [Part
17, clause 253], [Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘civil penalty order’]
Apart from the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions, no other person
may apply for a civil penalty order. The Regulator must seek the order no
later than six years after the contravention. [Part 17, clause 255]
The court may order a civil penalty if it is satisfied a person has contravened
a civil penalty provision. [Part 17, clause 252]
7.75
The bill applies to the Australian, state and
territory governments (that is, the Crown in right of each Australian
jurisdiction). However, no government is liable to a pecuniary penalty. This
protection does not apply to authorities of the Crown or to administrative
penalties or late payment penalties. [Part 1, clause 9]
7.76
The majority of penalty provisions in the bill are
civil penalty provisions (see Table 7.3 for a list of civil penalty provisions).
Ancillary contraventions, such as aiding a contravention, are also civil
penalty provisions.
7.77
Each civil penalty provision has a specified maximum
pecuniary penalty (see Table 7.3 for each maximum penalty amount).
7.78
These are civil penalty provisions because
contravening them does not involve conduct of such serious moral culpability
that criminal prosecution and sanctions are warranted. Further, as most liable
entities are expected to be bodies corporate, the financial disincentives to
misconduct provided by civil penalties are a more proportionate and effective
enforcement tool, reflecting the practice of other areas of business regulation.
Reasons
for the level of civil pecuniary penalties
7.79
The levels of civil penalties in the bill reflect
the seriousness of the contraventions and represent clear and strong
disincentives for non-compliance. The integrity of the mechanism could be
compromised by liable entities failing to maintain records adequately or at
all, failing to report accurately or at all or misusing OTNs.
7.80
For example, liable entities must adhere to
requirements for reporting emissions and the use of OTNs (which determine
whether an entity has a liability under the mechanism for natural gas it
receives). This is essential to maintaining the integrity of the mechanism,
ensuring that there is no unfair competition and ensuring that Australia meets
current and future emissions reduction targets in accordance with its
international obligations.
7.81
Indeed, a person who does not comply could obtain
substantial financial gains through holding and selling units under the
mechanism, while not meeting his or her emissions obligations. For this reason,
penalties are significant.
Table 7.3 Civil penalties and amounts
|
Clause
|
Description
|
Maximum Amount
|
|
47(1)
|
Notification of change of name or address of OTN
holder
|
500 penalty units (currently $55,000) for a
corporation
100 penalty units (currently $11,000) for any other
person
|
|
63
(1)-(2)
|
Misuse of OTN
|
10,000 penalty units (currently $1.1 million) for a
corporation
2,000 penalty units (currently $220,000) for any
other person
|
|
66
(1), (2), (3), (4)
|
Notification of mandatory designated JVs
|
|
71A
|
Notification of mandatory designated JVs
|
|
151
(1)-(3)
|
Compliance with JCP reporting and record-keeping
requirements
|
|
218
(2), (4)
|
Notification of significant
holding — controlling corporation of a group
|
|
219
(2), (4)
|
Notification of significant holding — non-group
entity
|
|
221
(4), (5)
|
Regulator may obtain information and documents
|
|
227
(2), (3)
|
Record-keeping requirements — general
|
|
228
(2), (3)
|
Record-keeping requirements — quotation of
OTN
|
|
64
(1)-(4)
|
Quotation of bogus OTN
|
Section 64(1) or (2) – three times the total benefit
received by a corporation
Section 64(3) or (4) – 500 penalty units
(currently $55,000) for a corporation
Section 64(3) or (4) – 100 penalty units
(currently $11,000)
|
|
248(1)
|
Civil penalties for executive officers of bodies
corporate
|
2,000 penalty units (currently $220,000) for an
individual
|
Example 7.3 The scale of
penalties under the bill
The maximum penalty of 10,000 penalty units (currently
$1,100,000) is equivalent to 47,826 carbon units at $23 per unit. At present,
more than half of liable entities are expected to emit more than this annually.
7.82
The penalty for a body corporate for quoting a
bogus OTN may be up to three times the total benefits that are reasonably
attributable to the contravention. [Part 17, clause 252(5)] This
is included because there are circumstances in which a civil penalty would
otherwise be equivalent to a small proportion of the benefit gained from
quoting a bogus OTN.
7.83
This is designed to penalise the liable entity in a
way which directly reflects the considerable profit that could be made from
quoting a bogus OTN, acquiring natural gas without a carbon price, selling it
on the basis that the carbon price has been paid and not surrendering units to
the Regulator as a holder of an OTN would usually be required to do. The
financial advantage to the entity quoting the bogus OTN would be borne by the
Commonwealth and, accordingly, the Australian people.
7.84
The profit that could be made out of this conduct
could amount to several lifetimes’ worth of imprisonment on the standard
penalty/imprisonment ratio. It is for this reason that the standard ratio is
varied. This is consistent with A Guide to
Framing Commonwealth Offence, Civil Penalties and Enforcement Powers
that the penalty should be adequate for the worst possible case and that it
should reflect the seriousness of the offence in the legislative scheme.
7.85
Lower penalties apply to a natural gas supplier who
fails to identify a bogus OTN by checking the OTN register (as there is a
greater onus on the user of the OTN, that is, the recipient of natural gas
supplies) and for failure by an OTN holder or natural gas supplier to notify
the Regulator of changes of the name or address entered in the OTN register. [Part
17, clause 252(4)(b) and (6)(a)]
7.86
Amendments to the civil penalties included in the
NGER Act are included in the Consequential Amendments bill. They reflect the
significance of the reporting and auditing regime for the mechanism as a whole.
The
role of the court
7.87
The Federal Court of Australia and State and
Territory courts with sufficient jurisdiction may make civil penalty orders. [Part
17, clause 251], [Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘Federal Court’]
For these purposes a State and Territory court is a court with jurisdiction to
decide matters covered by the bill. This is generally determined by any limits
on the amount of pecuniary orders that may be made by a court.
7.88
If a court is satisfied that a person has
contravened a civil penalty provision, then it may order the person to pay a
civil penalty. [Part 17, clause 252]
7.89
The court may have regard to all relevant matters
in determining the amount of the penalty. To assist the court, the bill
identifies specific matters to which it may have regard, including the nature
and extent of the contravention and the loss or damage it resulted in, the
circumstances in which the contravention took place, whether the person has
engaged in similar conduct and whether they have cooperated with the
authorities, and, if the person is a body corporate, the seniority of the
involved officers and employees, whether any due diligence was undertaken and
whether the corporation has a corporate culture conducive to compliance. [Part
17, clause 252(3)]
7.90
These factors reflect the approach indicated in A Guide to Framing Commonwealth Offences, Civil
Penalties and Enforcement Powers and follow the recommendations of
the Australian Law Reform Commission’s
Report 95: Principled Regulation: Federal Civil and Administrative
Penalties in Australia.
Evidential
burden
7.91
Civil pecuniary penalties are imposed by the courts
according to civil standard of proof. [Part 17, clause 256], [Part 1, clause 5,
definition of ‘evidential burden’] As such, a
matter brought to the court seeking a civil pecuniary penalty is not subject to
criminal standard of proof, but the lower standard of proof of ‘on the balance
of probabilities’, though the court will construe the standard more strictly
the higher the penalty sought.
7.92
A person is not liable to have a civil penalty
order made against him for a contravention of a civil penalty provision if the
person considered whether or not facts existed and was under a mistaken but
reasonable belief about those facts and had those facts existed, the conduct
would not have constituted a contravention of the civil penalty provision. [Part
17, clause 261]
7.93
This is framed in such a way as to alter the usual
evidential burden, to place it on the defendant in certain circumstances. This
approach is consistent with the guidance in A
Guide to Framing Commonwealth Offence, Civil Penalties and Enforcement Powers,
concerning situations where matters are peculiarly within the defendant’s
knowledge and not available to the prosecution.
7.94
In seeking a civil penalty order, the Regulator
does not need to prove the person’s intention, knowledge, recklessness,
negligence or any other state of mind with regard to specified civil penalty
provisions in the bill. [Part 17, clause 262] This
provision makes it clear, for the avoidance of any doubt, that it is not
necessary to prove a matter concerning a person’s state of mind at the time the
conduct occurred. It is simply a matter of proving whether the relevant
provision has been contravened. Where a person’s state of mind is relevant to
the issue at hand, then this is specifically dealt with in the relevant
provision.
Continuing
contraventions
7.95
A person who contravenes specified civil penalty
provisions which involve, for example, a requirement to do something within a
particular period, commits a separate contravention on each of the days on
which he or she fails to comply. [Part 17, clause 263]
7.96
Generally, the daily amount of the penalty is
limited to 5 per cent of the maximum penalty for the initial
contravention. However, in the case of a contravention of a requirement by the
Regulator to provide information or documents [Part 13, clause 221(4)]
the daily amount of the penalty is up to 10 per cent of the maximum
civil penalty applicable to the initial contravention. [Part
17, clause 263(3)]
7.97
This approach is consistent with the guidance in A Guide to Framing Commonwealth Offence, Civil
Penalties and Enforcement Powers, which suggests that the daily
amounts for continuing penalties should be significantly less than where the
penalty is a global maximum, while still providing sufficient disincentive for
ongoing non-compliance.
7.98
The applicable daily penalties are set out in Table
7.4.
Table 7.4 Continuing civil penalties and amounts
|
Clause
|
Description
|
Maximum Daily Amount
|
|
47(1) and (2)
|
Notification of change of name or address of OTN
holder
|
25 penalty units (currently $2,750) for a
corporation
5 penalty units (currently $550) for any other
person
|
|
66(1), (2),(3), (4)
|
Notification of a mandatory designated JV
|
500 penalty units
(currently $55,000) for a corporation
100 penalty units (currently
$11,000) for any other person
|
|
71A(1)
|
Notification of a declared designated JV
|
|
151(1)
|
Compliance with JCP reporting and record-keeping
requirements
|
|
218(2)
|
Notification of significant
holding — controlling corporation of a group – notice requirement
|
|
219(2)
|
Notification of significant
holding — non-group entity – notice requirement
|
|
221(4)
|
Regulator may obtain information and documents –
compliance with notice
|
1,000 penalty units (currently $110,000) for a
corporation
200 penalty units (currently $22,000) for any other
person
|
Other
provisions about civil penalties
7.99
A court may direct that two or more proceedings for
a civil penalty may be heard together. [Part 17, clause 254] For
example, the court may do this for proceedings concerning multiple
contraventions by a single entity or members of a corporate group.
7.100
If a person has been convicted of a criminal
offence concerning conduct which is substantially the same as that to which the
alleged contravention relates, then the court must not make a civil pecuniary
penalty order against the person. [Part 17, clause 257]
However, criminal proceedings may be commenced even if a civil penalty has been
imposed for substantially similar conduct. [Part 17, clause 259]
7.101
Civil proceedings for a contravention of the Act
must be stayed if criminal proceedings are commenced concerning conduct which
is substantially the same as that to which the alleged contravention relates, [Part
17, clause 258] but evidence given in civil
proceedings is not admissible in subsequent criminal proceedings, unless that
evidence concerns the question of whether the evidence in the civil proceedings
was false. [Part 17, clause 260]
Court-ordered
relinquishment of units
7.102
On an application by the Commonwealth Director of
Public Prosecutions or the Regulator a court may order the relinquishment of
units, and specify the time within which those units must be relinquished,
where a person has obtained those units as a result of fraudulent conduct and
has been convicted of an offence under the Criminal Code concerning that
conduct. [Part 10, clause 208(1) and (2)]
The relevant provisions of the Criminal Code are specified in the bill.
7.103
An application may be made to:
• the
court that convicted the person of the offence;
• the
Federal Court of Australia; or
• the
Supreme Court of a State or a Territory. [Part 10, clause 208(8)]
7.104
Before making such an order, the court must be
satisfied that the issue of any or all of the units was attributable to the
offence. [Part 10, clause 208(1)(c)]
7.105
A person must comply with such an order. This
includes where he or she is not the registered holder of any carbon units or
the holder of the units to be relinquished. [Part 10, clause 208(5)]
7.106
The court must provide a copy of the order to the
Regulator. [Part 10, clause 208(7)]
Example 7.4 Relinquishment
of units
JillCo Ltd is a liable entity under the mechanism
which receives assistance through the Jobs and Competitiveness Program.
In November 2012, JillCo Ltd applies for assistance
under the Program. Tom Dodge, the Chief Financial Officer of JillCo Ltd,
knowingly includes false information in the report, which increases JillCo
Ltd’s reported production output beyond their actual level so as to increase
the allocation of carbon units to JillCo Ltd.
As a result, JillCo Ltd receives 100,000 more units
than it is entitled to receive.
The fraudulent conduct is discovered and JillCo Ltd
and Tom Dodge are found guilty of offences under the Criminal Code, including
providing false and misleading statements in applications (section 136.1). The
court orders JillCo Ltd to relinquish 100,000 carbon units.
JillCo Ltd then fails to relinquish the units by the
specified time, and is further exposed to an administrative penalty under
clause 212(2), which is worked out according the the formula in clause 212(2),
that is 100,000 x $46 (the prescribed amount before 31 July 2013) = $4.6
million.
Offences
7.107
The bill provides for criminal offences in certain
circumstances (see Table 7.5). These offences apply to persons who are covered
by the mechanism, either as liable entities, officers or employees of those
entities or officers of the Regulator. They do not apply to members of the
public more generally.
7.108
These are offences which generally relate to
behaviour which involves dishonest or fraudulent conduct, or could involve
considerable harm to society or the environment and involve such culpability
that criminal penalties are justified.
7.109
The maximum penalties for each offence are
justified by the potential financial incentives for liable entities to avoid
their liabilities under the mechanism. In general, the penalties are designed
to ensure there is an adequate penalty for the worst possible case.
Table 7.5 Offences and criminal sanctions
|
Clause
|
Description
|
Maximum Sanction
|
|
62
|
False or misleading declarations under clause 61(4)
|
Imprisonment for 12 months
|
|
231
|
Identity cards for inspector – failure to return
|
1 penalty unit (currently $110)
|
|
235
|
Inspector may ask questions and seek production of
documents – failure to comply
|
Imprisonment for 6 months or 30 penalty units
(currently $3,300), or both
|
|
244
|
Occupier to provide inspector with facilities and
assistance
|
30 penalty units (currently $3,300)
|
|
273(5), 274(5), 275(5) and 276(5)
|
Scheme to avoid liability to pay unit shortfall charge
or administrative penalty – objective purpose
|
Imprisonment for 3 years or 850 penalty units
(currently $93,500) or both
|
|
273(1)-(3), 274(1)-(3), 275(1)-(3), 276(1)-(3)
|
Scheme to avoid liability to pay unit shortfall
charge or administrative penalty– intention, knowledge or belief
|
Imprisonment for 10 years or 10,000 penalty units
(currently $1.1 million) or both
|
Reasons
for the level of criminal sanctions and related matters
Failing
to comply with requests for information or failing to provide facilities or
assistance
7.110
Liable entities are likely to have far more
information about their emissions than the Regulator, particularly if they have
failed to report. It is therefore essential that the Regulator’s information
gathering and monitoring powers are adequate and that the requirements of
inspectors are complied with. For this reason, the maximum sanction for a
failure to answer questions or produce documents to an inspector is
6 months imprisonment or 30 penalty units or both. [Part
15, clause 235] The maximum sanction for a failure
to provide assistance to an inspector under a monitoring warrant is 30 penalty
units. [Part 15, clause 244]
Scheme
or avoid existing or future unit shortfall charge or administrative penalty
7.111
Entering into ‘schemes’ aimed at ensuring that a
body corporate or trust, for example, becomes unable to pay an existing or
future liability to pay:
• a
unit shortfall charge; and [Part 19, clause 273], [Part 19, clause 274]
• an
administrative penalty, [Part 19, clause 275], [Part 19, clause 276]
is a criminal offence. [Part
1, clause 5, definition of ‘scheme’]
7.112
These provisions are comparable to those which
apply to various taxes. They are aimed at artificial schemes involving, for
instance, ‘asset-stripping’ whereby a corporation’s assets are moved leaving
only liabilities, and creating a situation where the corporation is forced into
liquidation. For this reason, the maximum sanction is 10 years imprisonment or
10,000 penalty units, or both. These are significant and are justified by
the potentially very large financial gains that dishonest liable entities can
obtain by avoiding their liabilities under the mechanism.
Failing
to return an identity card
7.113
The offence of a failure by an inspector to return
his or her identity card promptly after ceasing to be an inspector is an
offence of strict liability. [Part 15, clause 231] This
is justified because the criminal sanction is small (a fine of 1 penalty unit)
and is intended to place those appointed as inspectors on notice to guard against
the possibility of any contravention.
7.114
This is consistent with the guidance in A Guide to Framing Commonwealth Offences, Civil
Penalties and Enforcement Powers, which sets out three criteria, all
of which are relevant in this case, concerning strict liability offences,
namely:
• the
penalty imposed is no more than 60 penalty units for an individual and 300
penalty units for a body corporate;
• the
punishment of offences not involving fault is likely to significantly enhance
enforcement; and
• there
are legitimate grounds for penalising persons lacking ‘fault’.
7.115
If an identity card is lost or destroyed, the onus
rests with the person to prove that this occurred, consistent with sub-section
13.3(3) of the Criminal Code. Knowledge
of the fact that an identity card is lost or destroyed is solely within the
knowledge of the person responsible for the identity card. Therefore it is
appropriate that the onus should rest with the defendant to prove that this is
the case. [Part 15, clause 231(5)] This
approach is consistent with the guidance in A
Guide to Framing Commonwealth Offence, Civil Penalties and Enforcement Powers,
concerning situations where matters are peculiarly within the defendant’s
knowledge and not available to the prosecution.
7.116
It should also be noted that the only persons who
may commit this offence are persons who are appointed inspectors and whose
appointment ceases.
Other
matters
7.117
Ancillary contraventions, such as aiding a
contravention, are addressed by the Criminal Code.
7.118
The bill applies to the Australian, state and
territory governments (that is, the Crown in right of each Australian
jurisdiction). However, consistent with A
Guide to Framing Commonwealth Offences, Civil Penalties and Enforcement Powers,
the Crown is not liable to a criminal sanction. This protection does not apply
to servants or authorities of the Crown. [Part 1, clause 9]
7.119
In addition to the offences listed in Table 7.5 above, conduct concerning the
mechanism may constitute contravention of provisions of the Criminal Code. Conviction
for an offence against specified provisions of the Criminal Code is one of the
preconditions for a court order to relinquish units. [Part
10, clause 208] The offences specified include
making a statement in information provided to the Regulator or in an
application for a benefit, knowing that it is false. An example is a false
statement in an application for an OTN or for free carbon units.
7.120
The specified provisions in the Criminal Code are
also defined as being ‘associated provisions’ of the Act. [Part
1, clause 5, definition of ‘associated provisions’]
Liability of
executive officers of bodies corporate
7.121
The bill provides that executive officers of bodies
corporate are liable for a contravention of a civil penalty provision by that
body corporate in certain circumstances.
7.122
It is appropriate that extended accessorial
liability applies to such officers, given the importance of ensuring compliance
with the mechanism is taken seriously at all levels within liable entities, and
particularly at high levels. Liability is not being imposed simply because the
person is an office holder at the relevant time, but requires a degree of
responsibility on the part of the officer concerned before a civil penalty may
be imposed.
Example 7.5 Liability of
an executive officer
A chief financial officer is aware that her company is
quoting a bogus OTN and receiving natural gas supplies without a carbon price,
and is in a position to influence this conduct, but fails to take all
reasonable steps to prevent this.
The Chief Financial Officer could be found liable for
the company’s contravention and subject to a civil penalty order.
7.123
An ‘executive officer’ is a director, chief
executive officer, chief financial officer or secretary of the body corporate.
[Part
1, clause 5, definition of ‘director’], [Part 1, clause 5, definition of
‘executive officer’]
7.124
Where a body corporate contravenes a civil penalty
provision, and one of its executive officers knew that (or was reckless or
negligent as to whether) the contravention would occur, then the officer is
subject to a civil penalty if he or she was in a position to influence the
conduct of the body corporate concerning the contravention, but failed to take
all reasonable steps to prevent it. [Part 16, clause 248]
7.125
An executive officer is ‘reckless’ if he or she is
aware of a substantial risk that the contravention would occur and, having
regard to the circumstances known to him or her, it is unjustifiable to take
that risk. [Part 16, clause 248(2)]
7.126
An executive officer is ‘negligent’ if his or her
conduct involves such a great falling short of the standard of care that a
reasonable person would exercise in the circumstances, and his or her conduct
involves such a high risk that the contravention would occur, that a pecuniary
penalty should be imposed. [Part 16, clause 248(3)]
7.127
The terms ‘reckless’ and ‘negligent’ are explained
because the provisions are civil penalty provisions and the required standard
of conduct should be made clear to enable corporate officers to comply with the
law.
7.128
Executive officers have a defence
that they took reasonable steps to prevent the contravention. In considering
whether an officer failed to take reasonable steps, the court may have regard
to all relevant matters. These matters may include what action (if any) the
officer took towards ensuring (to the extent that the action is relevant to the
contravention) that the body corporate arranges regular professional
assessments of its compliance with civil penalty provisions. The word ‘professional’
refers to the qualifications and experience of the person undertaking the
assessment and does not require, on every occasion that the assessment be
undertaken by a person outside the organisation. [Part 16, clause 249]
Justification of the approach taken to liability for
executive officers
7.129
The bill takes the same approach as the liability
imposed on executive officers in other Commonwealth laws, including under
section 154N of the Renewable Energy
(Electricity Act) 2000, section 40B of the Hazardous Waste (Regulation of Exports and Imports)
Act 1989 and section 494 of the Environmental
Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999. It also reflects
the approach taken in clause 217 of the Carbon Credits (Carbon Farming
Initiative) Bill 2011.
7.130
It ensures compliance with obligations under the
mechanism is taken seriously at a high level within liable entities. By
imposing liability on the basis of knowledge, negligence or recklessness,
liability only applies if there is a degree of blame that can be attributed to
the office holder. This approach ensures fairness and offers some protection
to the individuals involved. It is also consistent with the recommendations of
the Australian Law Reform Commission in Report
95: Principled Regulation: Federal Civil and Administrative Penalties in
Australia.
Anti-avoidance
provisions
7.131
The bill addresses the avoidance of liability under
the mechanism by artificial schemes designed to bring facilities or activities
below thresholds without reducing emissions from those facilities. A
significant threshold which is used in a number of provisions in the bill is
25,000 tonnes of CO2-e emissions per facility for direct emitters.
7.132
Where a person enters into an artificial scheme with
the sole or dominant purpose of obtaining the benefit of being below an
applicable threshold, then the Regulator may determine that the relevant
provisions apply to the corporation as if it was above the threshold. The bill
lists the sections to which a threshold relates. The Regulator must make its
determination in writing and publish it on its website. [Part
3, clause 29]
7.133
The Regulator, in making a determination, must have
regard to:
• the
manner in which the scheme was entered into or carried out;
• the
form and substance of the scheme;
• the
time at which the scheme was entered into and the length of the period during
which the scheme was carried out;
• the
result concerning the operation of the mechanism that, but for the enforcement
and penalty provisions of the bill, would be achieved by the scheme;
• whether
the scheme involves increasing the number of facilities without achieving any
significant reductions in the total amount of covered emissions from the
operation of the facilities; and
• whether
the scheme involves establishing a particular number of facilities (rather than
a lesser number) without achieving any significant reductions in the total
amount of covered emissions from the operation of the facilities. [Part
3, clause 29(1)]
7.134
A determination is not a legislative instrument. It
is not of a legislative character and is therefore not within the meaning of
section 5 of the LI Act. The provision is included to indicate that an
exemption from the LI Act is not sought or required.
7.135
The Regulator may make a determination about a
scheme entered into or commenced after 15 December 2008, when the Government
first announced the details of the CPRS. [Part 3, clause 29(1)]
Example 7.7
Anti-avoidance prior to the announcement of the mechanism
In 2010, PW Limited decided that it would take steps
to ensure that any future emissions trading scheme would not cover it by
entering into a scheme designed to give the appearance that its facility, which
has annual emissions of 40,000 tonnes, is two separate facilities emitting
20,000 tonnes each.
PW Limited makes the changes gradually and does not
register under the NGER Act nor does it surrender any eligible emissions units
by 15 June 2013.
The Regulator is empowered to ‘look through’ the
scheme and to apply liability for PW Limited’s facilities. The corporation
would be liable for a provisional shortfall charge under Part 6.
Outline of
chapter
8.1
Chapter 8 explains the provisions in the bill on internal
and external merits review of administrative decisions made by the Regulator. It
covers Parts 21 and 23.
Summary
8.2
The mechanism allows the Regulator to make a wide
range of administrative decisions and allows for a robust review process for
these decisions, including judicial review under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 and
merits review by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT).
Diagram 8.1 Reconsideration,
review and appeal under the carbon pricing mechanism

Detailed
explanation of new law
Reviewable
decisions
8.3
The bill sets out those decisions by the Regulator
that are ‘reviewable decisions’. A ‘reviewable decision’ is a decision
identified by the bill as being such a decision (see Table 8.1). [Part
1, clause 5, definition of ‘reviewable decision’], [Part 21, clause 280], [Part
21, clause 281]
Table 8.1 Reviewable decisions
|
Clause
|
Decision
|
|
5
|
A decision to make a determination under paragraph
(b) in the definition of ‘nameplate rating’
|
|
29(3)
|
A determination concerning the application of the
Act to an entity which has engaged in a scheme to avoid its liabilities
|
|
40
|
A decision to refuse to issue an OTN
|
|
42
|
A decision to refuse to give consent to the
surrender of an OTN
|
|
43
|
A decision to cancel an OTN
|
|
56(2)
|
A decision to refuse to declare that a person is an
approved person
|
|
70
|
A decision to refuse to make a declaration about a declared
designated JV
|
|
72(3)
|
A decision to revoke a declaration about a declared
designated JV
|
|
76(2)
|
A decision about a participating percentage
declaration
|
|
77(1)
|
A decision about a participating percentage
declaration made on the Regulator’s initiative
|
|
83, 87
|
A decision to refuse to issue a liability transfer
certificate
|
|
89
|
A decision to refuse to give consent to the
surrender of a liability transfer certificate
|
|
90
|
A decision to cancel a liability transfer
certificate
|
|
Part 3, Division 7
|
A prescribed decision under the Opt-in Scheme
|
|
106(6)
|
A decision to refuse to extend a period
|
|
109
|
A decision to refuse to make an entry in a Registry
account
|
|
113(1)
|
A prescribed decision under a determination concerning
policies, procedures and rules for auctioning carbon units
|
|
119
|
A decision concerning the assessment of an emissions
number
|
|
119(4)
|
A decision concerning amending an assessment of an
emissions number
|
|
119(4)
|
A decision concerning a refusal to amend an
assessment of an emissions number
|
|
120
|
A decision concerning the assessment of an emissions
number where no report is given by a liable entity
|
|
120(4)
|
A decision concerning amending an assessment of an
emissions number where no report is given by a liable entity
|
|
120(4)
|
A decision concerning a refusal to amend an
assessment of an emissions number where no report is given by a liable entity
|
|
130(2)
|
A decision to refuse to remit the whole or part of
an unit shortfall charge imposed on an estimation error unit shortfall
|
|
134A(2)
|
A decision to refuse to remit a late payment penalty
|
|
135(2)
|
A decision to refuse to remit the whole or part of a
late payment penalty
|
|
Part 7
|
A prescribed decision under the Jobs and
Competitiveness Program
|
|
141
|
An assessment of a unit shortfall charge
|
|
141(3)
|
An decision to amend or refuse to amend an
assessment of a unit shortfall charge
|
|
165
|
A decision to refuse to issue a certificate of
eligibility for coal-fired electricity assistance
|
|
165(3)
|
A decision to state that a specified number is the
annual assistance factor in respect of a generation complex
|
|
171(7)(b)
|
A decision to make a determination about replacement
capacity
|
|
184
|
A decision to refuse to remove an entry for a person
in the Information Database
|
|
213(2)
|
A decision to refuse to remit the whole or part of a
late payment penalty
|
8.4
A decision made by the Regulator includes decisions
made by officers of the Regulator or other departments under a delegation made
under clause 35 of the Regulator bill.
Reconsideration
of decisions by a delegate of the Regulator
8.5
A person affected by a decision made by a delegate
of the Regulator may apply to the Regulator within 28 days of being informed of
the decision (or a longer period, if it is extended by the Regulator) for a
reconsideration of that decision if that person is dissatisfied with the
decision. [Part 21, clause 282(4)]
8.6
An application must be in writing, set out the
person’s reasons for seeking a reconsideration and include any applicable fee.
The application must be in a form approved by the Regulator and the fee must be
in a form specified in a legislative instrument made by the Regulator. [Part
21, clause 282(3)]
8.7
On receiving an application, the Regulator must
reconsider the decision and either, affirm, vary or revoke the decision within
90 days of receiving the application. [Part 21, clause 283], [Part 21, clause
284(1)] The Regulator’s reconsideration has the
same legal basis and effect as the original decision.
8.8
The Regulator must give written reasons for its
decision on the reconsideration within 28 days of making this decision. [Part
21, clause 283(4)]
8.9
If the Regulator does not make a decision on the
reconsideration within 90 days, its original decision is deemed to be affirmed.
[Part
21, clause 284(2)]
Review
by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal
8.10
A person affected by a decision may apply to the
AAT for a review of a reviewable decision if the Regulator has affirmed or
varied that decision under clause 283 or it is a decision that was not made by
a delegate of the Regulator. [Part 21, clause 285]
Stay
of proceedings
8.11
If a person is the subject of an
action in a court to recover a shortfall charge, or a late payment penalty for
a failure to pay a unit shortfall charge, then the court may stay those proceedings
pending the completion of a review or reconsideration under Part 21 of a
decision of the Regulator in relation to making an assessment of the relevant
shortfall. [Part 21, clause 286]
Computerised
decision-making by the Regulator
8.12
The Regulator has the capacity to make use of a
computer program for the purposes of decision making provided that it makes
arrangements to do so by means of a legislative instrument. [Part
23, clause 296]
Outline of
chapter
9.1
Chapter 9 explains how information about the
mechanism is made public. It covers Part 9 of the bill.
Context
9.2
The transparency of the mechanism is key to
ensuring its effectiveness and efficiency. To this end, aggregated information
about transactions is to be made public. The regular publication of market
information by the Regulator will assist participants and financial market and
other analysts to identify and understand the supply and demand conditions for
carbon units, enabling efficient price discovery and facilitating trade and
efficient business decision making.
Summary
9.3
The Regulator must publish information about the
operation of the mechanism, emissions, participants and compliance. [Part
9, clause 182]
Diagram 9.1 The
Regulator’s obligations to publish information under the carbon pricing
mechanism

Detailed
explanation of new law
Liable
Entities Public Information Database
9.4
The Regulator must keep a database known as the
Liable Entities Public Information Database (the Information Database), which
records the persons who are liable entities under the mechanism. [Part
9, clause 183], [Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘Information Database’]
9.5
Since liability in some situations is determined at
the end of the financial year, persons may be included in the Information
Database if the Regulator has reasonable grounds to believe that a person is or
is likely to be a liable entity for a particular financial year. [Part
9, clause 184] This allows the Information
Database to be maintained continuously on the basis of information available to
the Regulator, such as emissions from previous years.
9.6
When the Regulator makes, removes or refuses to
remove an entry, it must give written notice of it to the person. [Part
9, clause 184(2), (5) and (6)] There is provision
for removal of entries [Part 9, clause 184] and
for correction of the Information Database. [Part 9, clause 193]
9.7
The Regulator must enter the following information
onto the Information Database:
• as
soon as possible after the report or assessment is made, each liable entity’s
emissions number, which will be drawn from a report under the NGER Act or an
assessment or amended assessment of the Regulator; [Part
9, clause 185]
• before
the end of 28 February of the next eligible financial year, the Regulator’s
estimate of the total of emissions numbers; [Part 9, clause 186]
• at
the time the Regulator makes its assessment or estimate, any unit shortfall and
any unit shortfall charge payable:
– based
on an assessment made by the Regulator [Part 6, clause 141]
(including, where appropriate, the details of the Regulator’s assessment and
annotations if the assessment is being reconsidered by the Regulator or
reviewed by the AAT); [Part 9, clause 187(3)]
– based
on an estimate by the Regulator (which may be based on a report under the NGER
Act); [Part 9, clause 187(4)]
• at
the time the reconsideration or review commences, annotations indicating that
particular administrative decisions concerning the mechanism are being
reconsidered by the Regulator or are under review by the AAT; [Part
9, clause 187(5)]
• after
the time for payment of the charge has passed, any unpaid unit shortfall
charge; [Part 9, clause 188]
• as
soon as practicable after receiving a notice under clause 122 surrendering
units, details of the number and types of eligible emissions units surrendered
by each liable entity; [Part 9, clause 189]
• at
the time the Regulator makes its assessment or estimate, the details of any
relinquishment requirement under the bill or the Jobs and Competitiveness
Program, including annotations if the relinquishment decision is being
reconsidered by the Regulator or subject to review by the AAT; [Part
9, clause 190]
• after
the time for payment of the charge has passed, any unpaid administrative
penalties for a failure to relinquish units as required under the bill or the
Jobs and Competitiveness Program; and [Part 9, clause 191]
• as
soon as practicable after receiving the notice of relinquishment, the number of
units relinquished by a person as required under the mechanism. [Part
9, clause 192]
Information
about holders of Registry accounts
9.8
The Regulator must publish on its website the name
of each person with a Registry account and the person’s address last known to
the Regulator and must keep that information up to date. [Part
9, clause 194]
Information
about units
9.9
The Regulator must publish on its website the
following information about units:
• as
soon as practicable, the date of each auction of carbon units, the vintage year
of carbon units, and for each vintage year auctioned, the per unit charge
payable and the total of units issued for that per unit charge; [Part
9, clause 195]
• within
7 days of the end of May 2015 and May of every year after that and November
2015 and November of every year after that, the average auction price of
current eligible financial year units for the six month period prior to that,
worked out in accordance with the formula:
|
Total auction proceeds
|
|
Number of units issued
as the result of auctions
|
–
This is relevant to the adjustments to fuel taxes
which will take place every 6 months; [Part 9, clause 196(1) and (2)]
• as
soon as practicable after 1 February of 2014, the total number of carbon
units issued for a fixed charge from 2012-13; [Part 9, clause 197(1)]
• as
soon as practicable after 15 February of the eligible financial year after the
end of that financial year, the total number of carbon units issued for a fixed
charge for each subsequent year following 2012-13 until 2017-2018; [Part
9, clause 197(2)-(6)]
• as
soon as practicable after the issue of units, the identity of recipients, the
number of units provided free of charge under Parts 7 and 8, and details of the
activities to which they relate; [Part 9, clause 198]
• as
soon as practicable after the end of each quarter, a quarterly report of the
following information:
–
the total number of free carbon units with a
particular vintage year issued under Part 7;
–
for each activity under Part 7, the total number of
free carbon units with a particular vintage year that relate to that activity;
–
the total number of free carbon units with a
particular vintage year which relate to pending applications under Part 7; and
–
the total number of free carbon units with a
particular vintage year issued under Part 8. [Part 1, clause 5, definition of
‘quarter’], [Part 9, clause 199]
• as
soon as practicable after 15 February of the next eligible financial year, the
total number of borrowed carbon units for the relevant year and the total
number of banked carbon units for the relevant year; [Part
9, clause 200]
• as
soon as practicable after 1 March following an eligible financial year, a
calculation of total emissions numbers and total unit shortfalls for the
relevant year; and [Part 9, clause 201]
• as
soon as practicable after the establishment of the Regulator; a statement
setting out a concise description of carbon units, which must be kept up to
date. [Part 9, clause 202]
Information
about relinquishment by persons other than liable entities
9.10
The Regulator must publish on its website the
following information about relinquishment requirements by persons other than
liable entities:
• when
the requirement arises, the name of a person and details of the relinquishment
requirement to which that person is subject, where that person is under a
liability to relinquish under the bill or the Program and there is no entry
included on the Information Database for that person (see above); [Part
9, clause 203(1) and (2)]
• when
the reconsideration or review commences, annotations indicating that particular
decisions concerning relinquishment requirements are being reconsidered by the
Regulator or are under review by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal; [Part
9, clause 203(3)]
• after
the time for the payment of the penalty has expired, details of any unpaid
administrative penalties for a failure to relinquish units as required; and [Part
9, clause 204]
• as
soon as practicable after receiving the notice of relinquishment, the name of a
person and the details of the carbon units relinquished under the bill or the
Program where there is no entry included on the Information Database for that
person. [Part 9, clause 205]
Information
about designated landfill facilities
9.11
The Regulator must, if required by regulations,
publish on its website, at a time specified in the regulations, a list of the
landfill facilities that, in the Regulator’s opinion, were designated landfill
facilities for the previous eligible financial year (including, for these
purposes, the year commencing on 1 July 2011). This should include the
location of each listed landfill facility. [Part 9, clause 206] It
is appropriate for this to be contained in regulations as it allows flexibility
in determining whether a list is necessary at any particular time, and allows
any such list to be published at the most appropriate time and in the most
appropriate manner.
9.12
This list will help landfill operators determine
whether they are a liable entity operating a facility within the prescribed
distance of a designated large landfill facility. [Part
1, clause 5, definition of ‘designated large landfill facility’]
Information
about significant holdings
9.13
Significant holdings of carbon units must be
disclosed to the Regulator and this information is published. [Part
12, clause 217] This disclosure provides
additional information to the market about major holdings which may be relevant
to price and the operation of the market.
9.14
A controlling corporation must, where the members
of that controlling corporation’s group hold a total of 5 per cent or more of
the national pollution cap number for the particular vintage year, give written
notice of this to the Regulator, in a form which includes the required
information. [Part 12, clause 218] In
other cases, the obligation rests on the entity holding the units. [Part
12, clause 219] The controlling corporation or the
entity holding the units must also give written notice to the Regulator if it
no longer holds a significant number of units or the percentage total of their
significant holding changes, when rounded down to the nearest whole number. [Part
12, clause 218], [Part 12, clause 219]
9.15
Civil penalties and infringement notices apply to a
contravention of these provisions (see also Chapter 7). [Part
12, clause 218(2) and (4)], [Part 12, clause 219(5)]
9.16
In the case that the Regulator receives a notice
about a significant holding of units, the Regulator must publish on its
website:
• the
name and address of the controlling corporation or entity holding the units;
• the
level of the holding expressed as a percentage, rounded down to the nearest
whole number (that is, for a holding of 10.8 per cent, the number
published should be 10 per cent; and
• where
the controlling corporation or entity holding the units no longer has a
significant holding, a statement to that effect. [Part 12, clause 218(6)], [Part 12, clause
219(6)]
Other
information
9.17
The Regulator must maintain other published
information concerning the mechanism and its participants, including:
• the
OTN Register; [Part 3, clause 45]
• the
‘benchmark average auction charge’ by the Regulator (which relates to setting
the administrative penalties for failure to pay unit shortfalls and the failure
to relinquish units); and [Part 4, clause 114(4)(b)]
• certificates
of eligibility for coal-fired generation assistance. [Part
8, clause 165(6)]
9.18
Related legislation also permits public disclosure
of relevant information. This includes:
• clause
52 of the Regulator bill, for example, permits the disclosure of summaries and
statistics of protected information, where they are not likely to enable the
identification of a person; and
• the
NGER Act, which is to be amended by the Consequential Amendments bill (see for
example items 370-377, 378, 380, 382-386 and 415).
Outline of
chapter
10.1
Chapter 10 explains how the Authority conducts
reviews of the Clean Energy Act 2011
(once enacted) and aspects of the mechanism. It covers Part 22 of the bill.
Context
10.2
The carbon pricing mechanism (the mechanism) is a
significant, long-term reform. It is essential that regular, expert,
independent and public reviews are carried out to ensure its ongoing relevance,
robustness and integrity.
10.3
In particular, reviews are required to provide a
considered basis for decisions on the level of pollution caps and changes to
the design of the mechanism.
Summary
Periodic
reviews of the Clean Energy Act 2011
10.4
Part 22, Division 2 provides for periodic reviews
by the Authority of specified matters, namely:
• reviews
of the mechanism;
• reviews
of the level of the pollution caps, the indicative national trajectory and
carbon budget;
• reviews
of progress towards meeting emissions reduction targets and carbon budgets; and
• reviews
requested by the Minister or by both Houses of Parliament.
Other reviews
10.5
Part 22, Division 3 provides that the Authority may
undertake such other reviews as requested by the Minister or the Parliament.
Detailed
explanation of new law
10.6
The Authority must undertake reviews of the
mechanism every 5 years. The Authority will also carry out reviews of the
level of pollution caps and progress towards meeting emissions reduction
targets and carbon budgets. In addition, the Authority must conduct special
reviews concerning the mechanism as requested. [Part 22, clause 287]
10.7
The Authority bill constitutes the Authority as a
statutory agency and provides for its membership and administration (see the Explanatory
Memorandum for that bill for further detail).
Periodic
reviews of the carbon pricing mechanism
10.8
The Authority must undertake periodic reviews of
the mechanism as follows:
• the
first periodic review must be completed before 31 December 2016; [Part
22, clause 288(2)]
• the
second review must be completed before 31 December 2018; [Part
22, clause 288(3)]
• subsequent
periodic reviews must be completed within five years, measured from the
deadline for the completion of the previous review. [Part
22, clause 288(4)]
10.9
The Authority, in conducting a periodic review,
will cover certain matters:
• the
effectiveness and efficiency of the mechanism;
• whether
national targets and any carbon budget concerning emissions of greenhouse gases
should be changed or extended;
• the
process for setting pollution caps;
• the
arrangements for the auctioning of units;
• the
operation of the price ceiling and price floor;
• whether
other units besides carbon units should be able to be surrendered and the way
in which the payment and surrender process operates;
• the
governance and administration of the mechanism;
• the
relationship of the mechanism to other legislation, including the CFI Act; and
• such
other matters concerning the mechanism, if any, that the Minister specifies.[Part 22, clause 288(1)]
Reviews
recommending the level of pollution caps, and the indicative national emissions
trajectory and national carbon budget
10.10
The Authority must conduct reviews:
• recommending
the level of pollution caps; and
• any
indicative national emissions trajectory and national carbon budget,
under the mechanism as follows:
• the
first review must be completed by 28 February 2014. [Part
22, clause 289(3)] This review must include
recommendations on the pollution caps for the first five years of the flexible
price period (namely 2015-16, 2016-17, 2017-18, 2018-19, and 2019-20) and must
also provide advice on an indicative national trajectory or carbon budget. [Part
22, clause 289(4), (8) and (10)]
• subsequent
reviews must be completed annually by 28 February. [Part
22, clause 289(5) and (9)]
10.11
Any report dealing with an indicative national
emissions trajectory and national carbon budget, must address how these are
expected to be met by emissions covered and not covered by the mechanism and
the purchase of eligible international emissions units by the Australian
Government or by other persons. [Part 22, clause 289(11)]
10.12
The Authority, in conducting a review, must
consider:
• Australia’s
international obligations under international climate change agreements;
• Australia’s
medium-term and long-term targets and any carbon budget for reducing net
greenhouse gas emissions;
• progress
towards the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions;
• global
action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions;
• estimates
of the global greenhouse gas emissions budget;
• the
economic and social implications associated with various levels of carbon
pollution caps;
• voluntary
action to reduce Australia’s greenhouse gas emissions;
• estimates
of greenhouse gas emissions not covered by the bill;
• estimates
of the number of ACCUs that are likely to be issued;
• the
extent (if any) of non-compliance with the bill and the associated provisions;
• the
extent (if any) to which liable entities have failed to surrender sufficient
units to avoid liability for unit shortfall charge;
• any
acquisitions, or proposed acquisitions, by the Commonwealth of eligible
international emissions units;
• such
other matters (if any) as the Authority considers relevant. [Part
22, clause 289(2)], [Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘associated provisions’], [Part
1, clause 5, definition of ‘carbon pollution cap’]
10.13
These considerations are intended to have the same
meaning as the Minister’s considerations in formulating the pollution cap
regulations (see Chapter 2).
10.14
If, on 1 November 2014, there are no regulations
that declare a carbon pollution cap and the carbon pollution cap number for the
flexible charge year commencing on 1 July 2015, then the Authority must conduct
an additional review of the carbon pollution cap for the flexible charge year
commencing on 1 July 2020. [Part 22, clause 290(1)and (2)], [Part 1,
clause 5, definition of ‘carbon pollution cap’], [Part 1, clause 5, definition
of ‘carbon pollution cap number’]
10.15
This review must be completed before the end of
February 2015. [Part 22, clause 290(4)]
Reviews of
progress in achieving emissions reduction targets and carbon budgets
10.16
The Authority must review the progress in achieving
emissions reductions targets and any carbon budgets [Part
22, clause 291(1)] as follows:
• the
first review must be completed by 28 February 2014; [Part
22, clause 291(3)]
• subsequent
reviews must be completed annually by 28 February. [Part
22, clause 291(4)]
10.17
The Authority, in conducting a review, must
consider:
• the
level of domestic emissions;
• the
level of purchases of international units;
• the
level of emissions in the uncovered sectors; and
• the
level of voluntary action. [Part 22, clause 291(2)]
Other reviews
of the mechanism
10.18
In addition to the mandatory periodic reviews:
• the
Minister (by a written instrument to the Chair of the Authority);
or
• both
Houses of Parliament (by a resolution),
may request that the Authority conduct a review of the
matters specified in the written instrument or the resolution [Part
22, clause 293(1)]
10.19
A review under this section may cover:
• the
effectiveness and efficiency of the mechanism;
• whether
national targets concerning emissions of greenhouse gases and any carbon budget
should be changed or extended;
• the
process for setting pollution caps;
• the
arrangements for the auctioning of units;
• the
operation of the price ceiling and price floor;
• whether
other units besides carbon units should be able to be surrendered and the way
in which the payment and surrender process operates;
• the
governance and administration of the mechanism;
• the
relationship of the mechanism to other legislation, including the CFI Act; and
• such
other matters concerning the mechanism, if any, that the Minister specifies. [Part
22, clause 293(4)]
10.20
The Government has announced
that the Minister will request the Authority to examine the role of the price
floor and the price cap beyond the first three years of the flexible price
period. The Minister will also request the Authority to review methodologies
for recognising additional voluntary action. It is intended that this
provision will be used to give effect to this policy.
Procedures
for conducting reviews
Procedures
10.21
In conducting a review the Authority must make
provision for public consultation. [Part 22, clause 288(6)], [Part 22, clause
289(7)], [Part 22, clause 290(6)], [Part 22, clause 291(6)], [Part 22, clause
293(3)]
10.22
For these purposes, a review is ‘completed’ when
the report of the review is given to the Minister. [Part
22, clause 288(5)], [Part 22, clause 289(6)], [Part 22, clause 290(5)], [Part
22, clause 291(5)]
10.23
The Authority must give a report to the responsible
Minister. [Part 22, clause 292(1)], [Part 22, clause 294(1)] The
Authority must publish reports on its website as soon as practicable after
delivering them to the Minister. [Part 22, clause 292(1)], [Part 22, clause
294(1)]
10.24
The Minister must, within 15 sitting days of
receiving the report, cause the report to be tabled in both Houses of
Parliament. [Part 22, clause 292(2)], [Part 22, clause 294(2)]
Recommendations
10.25
If a report includes recommendations to the Australian
Government, then the report must set out reasons for the recommendations. [Part
22, clause 292(6)], [Part 22, clause 294(6)] In
formulating a recommendation that the Government take a particular action, the
Authority must analyse the costs and benefits of that action, although that
does not prevent the Authority from taking other matters into account. [Part
22, clause 292(4) and (5)], [Part 22, clause 294(4) and (5)]
10.26
If a report makes recommendations to the Australian
Government, the Government must respond to each of those recommendations as
soon as practicable. The Minister must table this response in each House of
Parliament within 6 months from receipt of the report. It is expected that the
response will outline the Government’s reasons for each response. [Part 22,
clause 292(7)-(8)], [Part 22, clause 294(7)-(8)]
Written
instruments
10.27
An instrument provided by the Minister to the Chair
of the Authority about a review is not a legislative instrument. [Part
22, clause 288(7)], [Part 22, clause 293(5)] It is
not of a legislative character and is therefore not within the meaning of
section 5 of the LI Act. This provision is included to indicate that an
exemption from the LI Act is not sought or required.
Outline of
chapter
11.1
Chapter 11 covers the provisions in the bill which
relate to:
• its
commencement and objects;
• administrative
arrangements, both within the Australian Government and with the States and
Territories;
• its
constitutional basis; and
• regulations
and specific legal issues.
It covers Parts 1 and 23.
Summary
Commencement,
objects and definitions
11.2
Part 1 covers the commencement of the bill and its
objects, as well as definitions and key concepts.
Miscellaneous
provisions
11.3
Part 23 provides for:
• miscellaneous
functions of the Regulator under the bill;
• concurrent
operation of state and territory laws, arrangements with state and territory
governments and delegations by state and territory ministers;
• administrative
matters within the Australian Government;
• the
alternative constitutional bases of the mechanism;
• regulations;
• liability
for damages; and
• legal
professional privilege.
Detailed
explanation of new law
Short title,
objects and simplified outline
11.4
The short title of the bill is the Clean Energy Act 2011. [Part
1, clause 1]
11.5
The objects of the bill are:
• to
give effect to Australia’s international obligations on addressing climate
change under the Climate Change Convention and the Kyoto Protocol; [Part
1, clause 5, definition of ‘Climate Change Convention’], [Part 1, clause 5,
definition of ‘Kyoto Protocol’]
• to
support the development of an effective global response to climate change,
consistent with Australia’s national interest in ensuring that average global
temperatures increase by not more than 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial
levels;
• to
take action directed towards meeting Australia’s long-term target of reducing
net greenhouse gas emissions to 80 per cent below 2000 levels by 2050 and take
that action in a flexible and cost effective way; and
• to
put a price on greenhouse gas emissions in a way that encourages investment in
clean energy, supports jobs and competitiveness in the economy and supports
Australia’s economic growth while reducing pollution. [Part
1, clause 3]
11.6
The essential features of the mechanism are set out
in a simplified outline. [Part 1, clause 4] More
information on the policy context and outline of the mechanism is set out in
the chapters headed ‘Policy context’ and ‘General outline of the Clean Energy
Bill 2011’ above. The mechanism puts a price (in the economic sense) on carbon
emissions with a view to meeting Australia's international obligations and
targets.
Commencement
11.7
The provisions on the bill’s short title and
commencement commence on the day on which the bill receives the Royal Assent. [Part
1, clause 2]
11.8
The provisions concerning:
• contracts
and arrangements to protect energy security;
• loans
to the owners and others concerned with emissions-intensive coal-fired
generation complexes; and
• the
general power to make regulations,
commence on the day after the day on which the bill
receives the Royal Assent. [Part 1, clause 2], [Part 23, clause
303A], [Part 23, clause 303B], [Part 23, clause 312] The
energy security provisions commence on the day after Royal Assent because the
special appropriations need to be operating to potentially provide assistance
in advance of the commencement of the carbon price on 1 July 2012.
11.9
The substantive provisions of the bill (clauses 3
to 303, 304 to 311) commence on a date to be fixed by Proclamation. [Part
1, clause 2]
11.10
The commencement date set by the Proclamation
should not be earlier than the date on which the last bill in the Clean Energy
Legislative Package receives the Royal Assent. [Part 1, clause 2]
This means that the mechanism cannot commence until all aspects of it to be
implemented through the bills in the Clean Energy Legislative Package are
passed by the Parliament and receive the Royal Assent. This reflects the
linkages between the bill and the other bills in the Clean Energy Legislative
Package, and the need for all of the bills to take effect for the mechanism to
be operative.
11.11
If the substantive provisions do not
commence on a date within the period of 6 months of the date on which the last
bill in the Clean Energy Legislative Package receives the Royal Assent, then
the provisions commence on the day after the end of that 6 month period. [Part
1, clause 2]
Territorial
application of the mechanism
11.12
The mechanism will cover Australia and extend to
every external territory of Australia. [Part 1, clause 9], [Part
1, clause 5, definition of ‘Australia’] It will
also extend to the coastal sea in accordance with section 15B of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901.
11.13
It will extend to a matter concerning the exercise
of Australia’s sovereign rights in the exclusive economic zone or the
continental shelf. [Part 1, clause 10], [Part 1, clause 5, definition of
‘Australia’] This means that those responsible for
oil and gas facilities and for carbon capture and storage facilities in the
exclusive economic zone or the continental shelf will be responsible under the
general provisions of the bill for any emissions from these facilities. The
‘continental shelf’, ‘exclusive economic zone’ and ‘territorial sea’ are
defined in the Acts Interpretation Act 1901.
11.14
However, the mechanism will not apply to the extent
that its application would be inconsistent with the exercise of rights of
foreign ships in the territorial sea, exclusive economic zone or waters of the
continental shelf in accordance with the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. [Part
1, clause 12], [Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘continental shelf’], Part 1,
clause 5, definition of ‘territorial sea’], [Part 1, clause 5, definition of
‘United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea’]
11.15
The operation of the bill extends to the Joint
Petroleum Development Area because Australia is responsible for a proportion of
the emissions from this region under the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto
Protocol. [Part 1, clause 11] The
regulations will specify the percentage of the emissions from facilities in the
Joint Petroleum Development Area and the Greater Sunrise Unit Area which are
subject to the mechanism. These regulations will specify percentages
consistent with Australia’s responsibilities under international law. [Part
3, clause 26], [Part 3, clause 27], [Part 3, clause 28], [Part 1, clause 5,
definition of ‘Australia’], [Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘Greater Sunrise
unit area]
11.16
The express application of the Act to the Joint
Petroleum Development Area — an agreed joint development area under
the Timor Sea Treaty [2003] ATS
13 — is consistent with the obligations of Australia under article
4(1) of the Treaty between Australia and
Timor-Leste on Certain Maritime Arrangements in the Timor Sea [2007]
ATS 12.
11.17
Apart from these provisions, reliance is placed on
the general presumption that legislation does not have extraterritorial effect and
section 21 of the Acts Interpretation Act
1901 to limit the scope of the legislation.
Miscellaneous
functions of the Regulator under the bill
11.18
As well as the specific functions of the Regulator
provided through the bill, the Regulator will monitor and promote compliance,
conduct and co-ordinate education programs and advise and assist persons (and
their representatives) concerning their obligations. [Part
23, clause 295(a), (b), (c), (d), (h) and (f)] This
is expected to be a significant part of the Regulator’s work in the period
leading to the commencement of the mechanism and the initial period of the
mechanism’s operation.
11.19
The Regulator will also be empowered to collect,
analyse, interpret and disseminate statistical information concerning the
operation of the mechanism. [Part 23, clause 295(j)] This
is expected to add to the body of information available to participants in the
carbon market and other people who are interested in how the mechanism is
operating. Other sources of information are the public information released
under Part 9 and the Regulator’s annual report.
11.20
The Regulator will also liaise with regulatory and
other relevant bodies about co-operative arrangements for matters concerning the
mechanism or emissions trading schemes more generally. [Part
23, clause 295(i)] This liaison may be with
domestic or overseas bodies, and will be important in handling the
international transfers of units and will enable the Regulator to learn from
experience with other trading schemes.
11.21
The Regulator will also advise the Minister on
matters concerning the mechanism and other emissions trading schemes. [Part
23, clause 295(e)]
Agency
11.22
A person may use an agent for the purposes of
undertaking tasks to comply with the mechanism. These tasks include:
• making
or withdrawing an application;
• making
a request;
• giving
a notice (including an electronic notice);
• giving
an instruction;
• giving
information;
• giving
a report;
• giving
a plan;
• making
a payment. [Part 23, clause 297A]
States and
Territories
Concurrent
operation of State and Territory law
11.23
The bill is not intended to exclude or limit the
operation of a law of a State or Territory that is capable of operating
concurrently with it. [Part 23, clause 301]
Arrangements
with the States and Territories
11.24
The Minister may make arrangements with a Minister of a
State, the ACT, Northern Territory or Norfolk Island about the administration
of the bill, including arrangements for the performance of the functions by
magistrates. A copy of each instrument by which such an arrangement is made is
to be published in the Commonwealth Gazette, but it is not a legislative
instrument. [Part 23, clause 303]
These instruments are not of a legislative character and are therefore not
within the meaning of section 5 of the LI Act. The provision is included to
indicate that an exemption from the LI Act is not sought or required
11.25
This provision may be used, for example, to
establish arrangements for magistrates to exercise power concerning the
granting of monitoring warrants (see above). [Part 15, clause 245]
Delegation
by a State Minister or a Territory Minister
11.26
The Minister of a State or Territory may delegate
any functions or powers under the bill to a person who is an officer or
employee of the State or Territory and who holds or performs duties that are
equivalent to a position occupied by a Senior Executive Service (SES) employee
in the Australian Public Service (APS). [Part 23, clause 299]
Administrative
matters within the Australian Government
Delegation
by the Minister
11.27
The Minister may delegate any or all of his or her
functions or powers under the Act or regulations to the Secretary, SES, or
acting SES, employee of the Department. This power does not extend to making,
varying or revoking legislative instruments. The delegate must comply with any
direction of the Minister. [Part 23, clause 298], [Part 1, clause 5, definition of
‘Secretary’]
Executive
power
11.28
The Act does not, by implication, limit the
executive power of the Commonwealth. [Part 23, clause 305] This
makes it clear that the bill does not, for example, limit the Commonwealth’s
executive power to take various actions to meet Australia’s obligations under international
climate change agreements.
Notional
payments by the Commonwealth
11.29
The Crown, in each of its capacities, will be bound
by the bill, except in respect of a pecuniary penalty or an offence. [Part 1,
clause 8]
11.30
Provision is made for the Minister administering
the Financial Management and Accountability
Act 1997 to give written directions relating to, among other things,
transfers of amounts within or between accounts operated by the Commonwealth to
allow for payment of notional amounts by the Commonwealth. [Part
23, clause 306] This provision accommodates the
fact that the Commonwealth may be a liable entity under the mechanism but
cannot tax itself. The provision will be used to ensure that the Commonwealth
can be made notionally liable for any liabilities it incurs under the mechanism.
The Commonwealth pays other taxes notionally (see, for example, section 177.1
of A New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax)
Act 1999).
Compensation
for acquisition of property
11.31
If the operation of the Act or
regulations would result in an acquisition of property from a person other than
on just terms, the Commonwealth is liable to pay a reasonable amount of
compensation to the person. The bill provides for the institution of
proceedings to recover such compensation if agreement has not been reached. The
terms ‘acquisition of property’ and ‘just terms’ have the same meaning as in
section 51(xxxi) of the Constitution. [Part 23, clause 308]
11.32
The Commonwealth does not consider that the bill
would result in an acquisition of property on other than just terms. However,
clause 308 ensures that the Act cannot be invalid on the basis that it does.
Constitutional
basis
11.33
The bill and the Charges bills are supported by the
Commonwealth’s power to make laws with respect to external affairs in section
51(xxxi) of the Constitution. The object of the bill is to implement
Australia’s obligations under the Climate Change Convention and the Kyoto Protocol.
[Part
1, clause 3(a)]
11.34
The bill and the Charges bills are also supported,
wholly or partly, by several other Commonwealth legislative powers. [Part
23, clause 307]
11.35
For instance, subclause 307(3) gives
the provisions of the bills the effect they would have if they applied only to
the extent that they related to taxation. The unit shortfall charge is a tax
and the provisions imposing and otherwise dealing with the charge are laws with
respect to taxation and relate to taxation. The provisions of the bills which
do not deal directly with the unit shortfall charge nevertheless deal with the
charge because they establish the liability for the charge or are incidental to
establishing that liability. The provisions are supported by the taxation
power in the alternative to the external affairs power. [Part
23, clause 307(3)]
11.36
Another example is subparagraph 307(4)(b)(i) which
gives the provisions of the bills the effect they would have if they applied
only to a liable entity which was a constitutional corporation. A
constitutional corporation is a corporation to which the corporations power in
section 51(xx) of the Constitution applies (foreign, trading and financial
corporations). [Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘constitutional
corporation’] The corporations power gives the
Commonwealth power to impose legal obligations on constitutional corporations,
including the obligations imposed by the bills on liable entities. To the
extent that they apply to liable entities which are constitutional corporations,
the provisions are supported by the corporations power in the alternative to
the external affairs power. [Part 23, clause 307(4)]
11.37
Two sets of provisions are confined in their
application to constitutional corporations and rely on the corporations power:
• the
power of the Minister to obtain certain information relevant to the Jobs and
Competitiveness Program; [Part 7, Division 4]
• the
power of the Treasurer to enter into contracts and arrangements and to make
loans to certain constitutional corporations. [Schedule 1,Part 23, clause 303A], [Part
23, clause 303B]
Regulations
11.38
The bill includes a general regulation-making power.
[Part
23, clause 312]
11.39
The regulations may apply, adopt, or incorporate
with or without modification, a matter contained in another instrument as it
exists from time to time, despite subsection 14(2) of the LI Act. The
instrument referred to must be published on the Regulator’s website, unless
this would infringe copyright. [Part 23, clause 309]
11.40
The function of this provision is to allow for the
adoption of current regulatory approaches, without the need for a duplicative
process of amendment to both the original instrument and regulations made under
the bill.
11.41
The adoption of such instruments through
regulations would be subject to the disallowance procedure. While a
legislative instrument is subject to disallowance, a House of the Parliament
may require any document incorporated by reference into the instrument to be
made available for inspection by that House at a particular place and time.
Example 11.1 An
instrument adopted by reference
Regulations may specify the adoption of a matter
contained in a standard published by the International Organization for
Standardisation, as in force from time to time. This is designed to facilitate
consistent compliance by liable entities under the mechanism by reference to
commonly used and understood requirements.
11.42
This is in accordance with the Legislative Instruments Handbook,
which states that:
2.22 A legislative
instrument may make provision for matters by applying, adopting or
incorporating the provisions of any other written instrument as in force or
existing at the time when the legislative instrument takes effect. Unless the
enabling legislation allows instruments in this category to be applied, adopted
or incorporated as in force from time to time, they may only be applied,
adopted or incorporated in the form in which the instrument exists at the date
when the legislative instrument takes effect.
and
11.21 ... the [LI Act]
provides that legislative instruments may incorporate documents by reference in
accordance with section 14. The benefit of incorporation by reference is that
the incorporated document, which could be lengthy, is taken to be a part of the
legislative instrument even though it is not required to be registered or
tabled. However, an agency will be asked to provide information about any
document incorporated by reference in the instrument when lodging the
instrument for registration and OLDP will arrange for this information to be
available on the FRLI. The explanatory statement tabled in Parliament will
also describe any documents incorporated by reference, so this will draw the
attention of Parliament to use of this mechanism.
11.43
Incorporating complex technical documents directly
into the primary legislation or regulations would significantly increase the
volume of the legislation giving effect to the mechanism and, more generally,
the Commonwealth statute book, and would be inconsistent with the Government's
Clearer Commonwealth Laws initiative which aims to reduce the complexity of
legislation. By incorporating such documents by reference and requiring their
publication on an easily accessible webpage, the bill provides guidance to the
Regulator and liable entities while avoiding unnecessary length and complexity.
11.44
In addition, the regulations may confer a power to
make a decision of an administrative character on the Regulator. [Part
23, clause 310]
11.45
An instance where this provision is
expected to be used is in connection with the Jobs and Competitiveness Program,
which will be implemented through regulations. In particular, the Regulator
will need to make administrative decisions about a person’s eligibility for,
and quantum of, assistance in accordance with the requirements in the
regulations. It may also need to make administrative decisions to require the
relinquishment of carbon units, such as on the closure of a facility. [Part
7, clause 146]
11.46
Regulations may be made after the
bill receives the Royal Assent and prior to the commencement of the substantive
provisions of the bill (clauses 3 to 312), in accordance with section 4 of the Acts
Interpretation Act 1901.
Transitional
– definitions
11.47
Where a concept in the bill is defined by reference
to the NGER Act, then those references apply to the NGER Act as it is amended
by the Consequential Amendments bill. [Part 23, clause 311]
Legal
professional privilege
11.48
The doctrine of legal professional privilege has
been described by the High Court in Daniels
Corporation International Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer
Commission (2002) 213 CLR 543 as follows:
‘It is now settled
that legal professional privilege is a rule of substantive law which may be
availed of by a person to resist the giving of information or the production of
documents which would reveal communications between a client and his or her
lawyer made for the dominant purpose of giving or obtaining legal advice or the
provision of legal services, including representation in legal proceedings.’
11.49
The Act will not affect the law concerning legal
professional privilege. [Part 23, clause 302]
Liability for
damages
11.50
Certain specified persons are not liable to an
action for damages for acts (or omissions) done in good faith in the
performance of their functions or powers under the bill or the associated
provisions. The provision includes where such acts or omissions are done in
the purported performance of functions or powers. [Part 23, clause 304] Immunity
provisions of this sort are often included in Commonwealth laws to ensure that
administrators are not unduly hindered in undertaking their duties in good
faith by threats of legal action.
11.51
The persons include the Minister, the Regulator,
the Regulator’s staff and delegates of either the Minister or the Regulator. Furthermore,
the appropriate energy market operators in relation to a
generation complex are also not liable concerning the performance of functions
under Part 8 and, specifically, functions associated with determining power
system reliability. [Part 23, clause 304], [Part 1, clause 5, ‘appropriate
energy market operator’]
Part 1: Preliminary
|
|
|
|
Part 1, clause 1
|
11.4
|
|
Part 1, clause 2
|
6.31, 6.196, 11.7, 11.8, 11.9, 11.10, 11.11
|
|
Part 1, clause 3
|
11.5
|
|
Part 1, clause 3(a)
|
11.33
|
|
Part 1, clause 4
|
11.6
|
|
Part 1, clause 5 definition of gas supply pipeline’
|
1.202
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘ABN’
|
1.172
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘account number’
|
4.71
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘acquire’
|
3.53
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘associated
provisions’
|
1.167, 3.105, 7.27, 7.33, 7.38, 7.46, 7.120, 10.12
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘auction’
|
3.31, 3.60, 3.62
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘Australia’
|
5.56, 11.12, 11.13, 11.15
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘Australian carbon
credit unit’
|
2.34, 3.17
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘benchmark average
auction charge’
|
3.74, 3.75
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘business day’
|
4.45
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘carbon budget’
|
2.23
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘carbon dioxide
equivalence’
|
2.10, 6.53, 6.65
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘carbon pollution
cap number’
|
10.14
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘carbon pollution
cap’
|
10.12, 10.14
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘carbon unit’
|
3.16, 3.17, 3.19
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘charge’
|
3.47
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘civil penalty
order’
|
7.74
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘Climate Change
Convention’
|
11.5
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘Commonwealth
Registry account’
|
4.81
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘Commonwealth
relinquished units account’
|
4.81
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘compressed natural
gas’
|
1.26, 1.29
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘constitutional
corporation’
|
5.82, 11.36
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘continental shelf’
|
11.14
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘controlling
corporation’
|
6.86
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘corporate group
transfer test’
|
1.91
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘covered emission’
|
1.14
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘covered emissions’
|
1.20, 1.41
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘declared designated
joint venture’
|
1.69
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘decommissioned
underground mine’
|
1.34
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘designated joint
venture’
|
1.60, 6.87
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘designated large
landfill facility’
|
9.12
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘director’
|
7.123
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘distribution
pipeline’
|
1.126
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘electronic notice
transmitted to the Regulator’
|
4.70
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘eligible Australian
carbon credit unit’
|
3.17, 3.18
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘eligible emissions
unit’
|
3.17, 4.58
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘eligible financial
year’
|
3.22, 3.27, 3.90, 3.95
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘eligible
international emissions unit’
|
3.99, 3.100, 3.102, 3.107, 4.58, 4.67, 4.76
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘emissions
intensity’
|
6.46, 6.52, 6.53, 6.60, 6.61
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘emissions number
publication time’
|
3.58
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘emissions number’
|
4.16
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘evidential burden’
|
7.91
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘executive officer’
|
7.123
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘facility’
|
1.14
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘Federal Court’
|
7.87
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘feedstock’
|
1.142, 1.148
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘financial control
transfer test’
|
1.93
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘financial control’
|
1.93, 6.86
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘fixed charge year’
|
3.26
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘flexible charge
year’
|
3.49
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘foreign account’
|
3.40
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘foreign country’
|
4.76, 5.46
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘foreign person’
|
1.94
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘free carbon unit’
|
3.89
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘fugitive emissions’
|
1.34
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘generation complex’
|
6.27
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘generation unit’
|
6.29
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘Greater Sunrise
unit area
|
11.15
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘greenhouse gas’
|
1.14
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘group’
|
1.17, 1.55
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘identification
number’
|
3.21
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘Information
Database’
|
9.4
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘inspector’
|
7.20
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘interim emissions
number’
|
4.29
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘international
agreement’
|
4.76
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘international
climate change agreement’
|
2.23, 3.105
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘Jobs and
Competitiveness Program’
|
5.52
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘Joint Petroleum
Development Area’
|
5.56
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘joint venture’
|
1.60
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘Kyoto Protocol’
|
11.5
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘Kyoto rules’
|
3.101
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘landfill facility’
|
1.35, 1.120
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘large gas consuming
facility’
|
1.44
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘legacy emissions’
|
1.35
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘liability transfer
certificate’
|
1.90
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘liable entity’
|
1.14
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘liquid petroleum
fuel’
|
1.28
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘liquified natural
gas’
|
1.26, 1.29
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘liquified petroleum
gas’
|
1.26, 1.29
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘local governing
body’
|
1.115
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘mandatory
designated joint venture’
|
1.61
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘member’
|
1.102
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘monitoring powers’
|
7.20
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘monitoring warrant’
|
7.27
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘nameplate rating’
|
6.57, 6.96, 6.97, 6.98, 6.146
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘natural gas
supplier’
|
1.128
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘natural gas’
|
1.14, 1.199
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘non-group entity’
|
6.86
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘official of the
Regulator’
|
7.22
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘operational
control’
|
1.16
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘participating
percentage’
|
6.87
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘person’
|
1.115
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘potential
greenhouse gas emissions’
|
1.206
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘prescribed
international unit’
|
4.76
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘Productivity
Minister’
|
5.95
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘provisional
emissions number’
|
1.57
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘quarter’
|
5.88, 9.9
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘registered holder’
|
3.20
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘Registry account’
|
3.20
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘Registry’
|
3.20
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘relinquish’
|
4.79
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘Resources and
Energy Minister’
|
6.88
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘reviewable
decision’
|
8.3
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘scheme’
|
7.111
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘scope 1 emission’
|
1.20, 1.41
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘supply’
|
1.128, 1.200
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘surrender’
|
3.16
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘transfer’
|
3.39
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘trust estate’
|
1.115
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘trust’
|
1.115
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘trustee’
|
1.115
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘unit shortfall
charge’
|
4.45
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘unit shortfall’
|
4.24
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea’
|
11.14
|
|
Part 1, clause 5, definition of ‘vintage year’
|
3.22
|
|
Part 1, clause 6
|
1.128, 1.131, 1.200
|
|
Part 1, clause 7
|
4.70
|
|
Part 1, clause 8
|
1.116, 4.70, 11.29
|
|
Part 1, clause 9
|
7.75, 7.118
|
|
Part 1, clause 10
|
11.13
|
|
Part 1, clause 11
|
11.15
|
|
Part 1, clause 12
|
11.14
|
Part 2: Pollution Caps
|
|
|
|
Part 2, clause 13
|
2.10
|
|
Part 2, clause 14
|
2.11
|
|
Part 2, clause 14(2)
|
2.12
|
|
Part 2, clause 14(2)(a)
|
2.23
|
|
Part 2, clause 14(2)(b)
|
2.23
|
|
Part 2, clause 14(2)(c)(i)
|
2.26
|
|
Part 2, clause 14(2)(c)(ii)
|
2.27
|
|
Part 2, clause 14(2)(c)(iii)
|
2.28
|
|
Part 2, clause 14(2)(c)(iv)
|
2.29
|
|
Part 2, clause 14(2)(c)(ix)
|
2.34
|
|
Part 2, clause 14(2)(c)(v)
|
2.30
|
|
Part 2, clause 14(2)(c)(vi)
|
2.31
|
|
Part 2, clause 14(2)(c)(vii)
|
2.32
|
|
Part 2, clause 14(2)(c)(viii)
|
2.33
|
|
Part 2, clause 14(2)(c)(x)
|
2.35
|
|
Part 2, clause 14(2)(c)(xi)
|
2.36
|
|
Part 2, clause 14(2)(c)(xii)
|
2.37
|
|
Part 2, clause 14(2)(c)(xiii)
|
2.38
|
|
Part 2, clause 15
|
2.12
|
|
Part 2, clause 16(1)
|
2.14
|
|
Part 2, clause 16(2)
|
2.15
|
|
Part 2, clause 16(3) and (4)
|
2.16
|
|
Part 2, clause 16(5)
|
2.17
|
|
Part 2, clause 17
|
2.21
|
|
Part 2, clause 18
|
2.22
|
Part 3: Liable entities
|
|
|
|
Part 3, clause 19
|
1.14, 1.114
|
|
Part 3, clause 20
|
1.198
|
|
Part 3, clause 20(1)
|
1.44, 1.52, 1.55, 1.57, 1.138
|
|
Part 3, clause 20(1)-(3)
|
1.15
|
|
Part 3, clause 20(4)
|
1.43
|
|
Part 3, clause 20(5)
|
1.54
|
|
Part 3, clause 20(8)-(9)
|
1.138
|
|
Part 3, clause 21
|
1.198
|
|
Part 3, clause 21(1)
|
1.44, 1.52, 1.55, 1.57, 1.138
|
|
Part 3, clause 21(1)-(3)
|
1.15
|
|
Part 3, clause 21(4)
|
1.43
|
|
Part 3, clause 21(5)
|
1.54
|
|
Part 3, clause 21(7)-(8)
|
1.138
|
|
Part 3, clause 22
|
1.198
|
|
Part 3, clause 22(1)
|
1.44, 1.52, 1.56, 1.57, 1.138
|
|
Part 3, clause 22(1)-(3)
|
1.15
|
|
Part 3, clause 22(4)
|
1.43
|
|
Part 3, clause 22(5)
|
1.54
|
|
Part 3, clause 22(6)-(7)
|
1.138
|
|
Part 3, clause 23(1)
|
1.52, 1.55, 1.57, 1.138
|
|
Part 3, clause 23(1)-(3)
|
1.15
|
|
Part 3, clause 23(4) and (10)
|
1.47
|
|
Part 3, clause 23(5)
|
1.54
|
|
Part 3, clause 23(8)-(9)
|
1.138
|
|
Part 3, clause 24(1)
|
1.52, 1.55, 1.57, 1.138
|
|
Part 3, clause 24(1)-(3)
|
1.15
|
|
Part 3, clause 24(4) and (10)
|
1.47
|
|
Part 3, clause 24(5)
|
1.54
|
|
Part 3, clause 24(7)-(8)
|
1.138
|
|
Part 3, clause 25(1)
|
1.52, 1.56, 1.57, 1.138
|
|
Part 3, clause 25(1)-(3)
|
1.15
|
|
Part 3, clause 25(4) and (8)
|
1.47
|
|
Part 3, clause 25(5)
|
1.54
|
|
Part 3, clause 25(6)-(7)
|
1.138
|
|
Part 3, clause 26
|
11.15
|
|
Part 3, clause 27
|
11.15
|
|
Part 3, clause 28
|
11.15
|
|
Part 3, clause 29
|
1.224, 7.6, 7.132
|
|
Part 3, clause 29(1)
|
7.133, 7.135
|
|
Part 3, clause 30(1) and (2)
|
1.20
|
|
Part 3, clause 30(10)
|
1.38
|
|
Part 3, clause 30(11) and (9)
|
1.40
|
|
Part 3, clause 30(2)
|
1.26, 1.29
|
|
Part 3, clause 30(2)-(12)
|
1.25
|
|
Part 3, clause 30(3)
|
1.30
|
|
Part 3, clause 30(4)
|
1.31
|
|
Part 3, clause 30(5)
|
1.32
|
|
Part 3, clause 30(6) and (7)
|
1.33
|
|
Part 3, clause 30(8)
|
1.34
|
|
Part 3, clause 30(9)
|
1.35
|
|
Part 3, clause 32
|
1.37
|
|
Part 3, clause 33
|
1.128, 1.133
|
|
Part 3, clause 33(1)(e)
|
1.205
|
|
Part 3, clause 33(3)
|
1.134
|
|
Part 3, clause 35(1)(d)
|
1.205
|
|
Part 3, clause 35(2)
|
1.138
|
|
Part 3, clause 35(3)
|
1.157
|
|
Part 3, clause 35(4)-(8)
|
1.158
|
|
Part 3, clause 35(4)-(9)
|
1.158
|
|
Part 3, clause 35(5)
|
1.159
|
|
Part 3, clause 35(6)
|
1.159
|
|
Part 3, clause 35(7)
|
1.159
|
|
Part 3, clause 35(8)
|
1.159
|
|
Part 3, clause 35(9)
|
1.159
|
|
Part 3, clause 36
|
1.196
|
|
Part 3, clause 36(1)(e)
|
1.205
|
|
Part 3, clause 37
|
1.161
|
|
Part 3, clause 39
|
1.164
|
|
Part 3, clause 40
|
1.162
|
|
Part 3, clause 41
|
1.162
|
|
Part 3, clause 42
|
1.169
|
|
Part 3, clause 42(4)
|
1.165
|
|
Part 3, clause 43
|
1.166
|
|
Part 3, clause 43(2)(a)
|
1.167
|
|
Part 3, clause 43(2)(b)
|
1.167
|
|
Part 3, clause 43(3)
|
1.168
|
|
Part 3, clause 44
|
1.162
|
|
Part 3, clause 45
|
1.171, 1.172, 1.175, 9.17
|
|
Part 3, clause 47
|
1.176
|
|
Part 3, clause 48
|
1.177
|
|
Part 3, clause 48(1)
|
1.178
|
|
Part 3, clause 49
|
1.192
|
|
Part 3, clause 50
|
1.192
|
|
Part 3, clause 51
|
1.191
|
|
Part 3, clause 52
|
1.191
|
|
Part 3, clause 53
|
1.186
|
|
Part 3, clause 54
|
1.193
|
|
Part 3, clause 55
|
1.193
|
|
Part 3, clause 55A
|
1.15, 1.44
|
|
Part 3, clause 55B
|
1.143
|
|
Part 3, clause 55B(2)
|
1.137, 1.180
|
|
Part 3, clause 55B(3)
|
1.136
|
|
Part 3, clause 56
|
1.140, 1.144
|
|
Part 3, clause 56(1)
|
1.142
|
|
Part 3, clause 56(1)(e)(i)
|
1.142
|
|
Part 3, clause 56(1)(e)(ii)
|
1.142
|
|
Part 3, clause 56(3)
|
1.146
|
|
Part 3, clause 56(4), (5) and (6)
|
1.146
|
|
Part 3, clause 56(8)
|
1.146
|
|
Part 3, clause 57
|
1.140, 1.142, 1.148
|
|
Part 3, clause 57(2)
|
1.180
|
|
Part 3, clause 58
|
1.140, 1.142, 1.152
|
|
Part 3, clause 58(2)
|
1.180
|
|
Part 3, clause 59
|
1.140, 1.188, 1.190
|
|
Part 3, clause 59(3)
|
1.155
|
|
Part 3, clause 59(4)
|
1.137, 1.154
|
|
Part 3, clause 59(5)
|
1.189
|
|
Part 3, clause 60
|
1.140, 1.188, 1.190
|
|
Part 3, clause 60(3)
|
1.155
|
|
Part 3, clause 60(4)
|
1.137, 1.154
|
|
Part 3, clause 60(5)
|
1.189
|
|
Part 3, clause 62
|
1.155
|
|
Part 3, clause 63
|
1.195
|
|
Part 3, clause 63(1)
|
1.197
|
|
Part 3, clause 63(4)
|
1.196
|
|
Part 3, clause 64
|
1.185
|
|
Part 3, clause 64(1)
|
1.182
|
|
Part 3, clause 64(3)
|
1.183
|
|
Part 3, clause 65
|
1.61
|
|
Part 3, clause 65(1)(a)
|
1.64
|
|
Part 3, clause 66(1), (2) and (3)
|
1.65
|
|
Part 3, clause 66(4)
|
1.66
|
|
Part 3, clause 66(5)
|
1.67
|
|
Part 3, clause 66(6)
|
1.68
|
|
Part 3, clause 67
|
1.69, 1.78
|
|
Part 3, clause 67A
|
1.71
|
|
Part 3, clause 68
|
1.72
|
|
Part 3, clause 69
|
1.72
|
|
Part 3, clause 70
|
1.73
|
|
Part 3, clause 71
|
1.75, 1.78
|
|
Part 3, clause 71A
|
1.79
|
|
Part 3, clause 72
|
1.76, 1.78
|
|
Part 3, clause 73
|
1.80
|
|
Part 3, clause 74
|
1.80
|
|
Part 3, clause 75
|
1.80
|
|
Part 3, clause 76
|
1.81, 1.84
|
|
Part 3, clause 77
|
1.85
|
|
Part 3, clause 78
|
1.82, 1.86
|
|
Part 3, clause 78A
|
1.89
|
|
Part 3, clause 79
|
1.83, 1.86
|
|
Part 3, clause 80
|
1.91, 1.112
|
|
Part 3, clause 81
|
1.91, 1.112
|
|
Part 3, clause 81(c)
|
1.102
|
|
Part 3, clause 82
|
1.103
|
|
Part 3, clause 83
|
1.104
|
|
Part 3, clause 84
|
1.93, 1.94
|
|
Part 3, clause 85(3)
|
1.102
|
|
Part 3, clause 86
|
1.103
|
|
Part 3, clause 87
|
1.98, 1.99, 1.104
|
|
Part 3, clause 88
|
1.105
|
|
Part 3, clause 88(4)
|
1.106
|
|
Part 3, clause 89
|
1.107, 1.109, 1.111
|
|
Part 3, clause 89(5)
|
1.108
|
|
Part 3, clause 90
|
1.110, 1.111
|
|
Part 3, clause 91
|
1.113
|
|
Part 3, clause 92
|
1.96, 1.97
|
|
Part 3, clause 92A
|
1.210
|
|
Part 3, clause 92A(1)(a) and (b)
|
1.214
|
|
Part 3, clause 92A(1)(a)(i),(ii), (iii) and (5)
|
1.214
|
|
Part 3, clause 92A(1)(a)(v)
|
1.214, 1.218
|
|
Part 3, clause 92A(2)
|
1.222
|
|
Part 3, clause 92A(4)(a)
|
1.215
|
|
Part 3, clause 92A(4)(b)
|
1.215
|
|
Part 3, clause 92A(4)(c)
|
1.215
|
|
Part 3, clause 92A(5)
|
1.213
|
|
Part 3, clause 92B
|
1.217
|
|
Part 3, clause 92C and 92D
|
1.221
|
|
Part 3, clause 92E
|
1.220
|
|
Part 3, clause 92G
|
1.219
|
Part 4: Carbon units
|
|
|
|
Part 4, clause 93
|
3.16
|
|
Part 4, clause 94
|
3.19
|
|
Part 4, clause 95
|
3.21
|
|
Part 4, clause 96
|
3.22
|
|
Part 4, clause 97
|
3.23
|
|
Part 4, clause 98(1)
|
3.20
|
|
Part 4, clause 98(2)
|
3.20, 3.21
|
|
Part 4, clause 98(3)
|
3.20
|
|
Part 4, clause 99
|
3.30, 3.59
|
|
Part 4, clause 100
|
3.46, 3.47
|
|
Part 4, clause 100(1)
|
3.48, 3.49, 3.51, 3.53, 3.54, 3.55
|
|
Part 4, clause 100(11)
|
3.79
|
|
Part 4, clause 100(14) and (15)
|
3.49
|
|
Part 4, clause 100(3)
|
3.58
|
|
Part 4, clause 100(4)
|
3.58
|
|
Part 4, clause 100(7)
|
3.29, 3.57
|
|
Part 4, clause 100(9)
|
3.52
|
|
Part 4, clause 100A
|
3.56
|
|
Part 4, clause 101
|
3.68
|
|
Part 4, clause 102
|
3.31
|
|
Part 4, clause 103
|
3.32
|
|
Part 4, clause 103A
|
3.34
|
|
Part 4, clause 104
|
3.39
|
|
Part 4, clause 105
|
3.40
|
|
Part 4, clause 106
|
3.40, 3.42
|
|
Part 4, clause 106(12)
|
3.45
|
|
Part 4, clause 106(2) and (8)
|
3.43
|
|
Part 4, clause 106(5)
|
3.44
|
|
Part 4, clause 106(7)
|
3.43
|
|
Part 4, clause 106(9), (10) and (11)
|
3.45
|
|
Part 4, clause 107
|
3.40
|
|
Part 4, clause 108
|
3.40
|
|
Part 4, clause 108(3)
|
3.98
|
|
Part 4, clause 109A
|
3.37
|
|
Part 4, clause 110
|
3.36
|
|
Part 4, clause 111
|
3.60
|
|
Part 4, clause 111(2)
|
3.66
|
|
Part 4, clause 111(4)
|
3.79
|
|
Part 4, clause 111(5)
|
3.76, 3.83, 3.85, 3.88
|
|
Part 4, clause 111(6)
|
3.67
|
|
Part 4, clause 111(7)
|
3.81
|
|
Part 4, clause 112
|
3.60, 3.72, 4.81
|
|
Part 4, clause 113
|
3.62, 3.71
|
|
Part 4, clause 113(2), (3) and (4)
|
3.63
|
|
Part 4, clause 113(6)
|
3.64
|
|
Part 4, clause 113(9)
|
3.62
|
|
Part 4, clause 114
|
3.74, 3.75
|
|
Part 4, clause 114(4)(b)
|
9.17
|
|
Part 4, clause 115
|
3.27, 3.90
|
|
Part 4, clause 116
|
3.90, 6.183
|
|
Part 4, clause 116(2)
|
3.92, 3.93
|
|
Part 4, clause 116(3) and (4)
|
3.96
|
|
Part 4, clause 116(5)
|
3.97
|
|
Part 4, clause 116A
|
3.94
|
|
Part 4, clause 117
|
4.16
|
|
Part 4, clause 118
|
4.16
|
Part 5: Emissions number
|
|
|
|
Part 5, clause 119
|
4.18
|
|
Part 5, clause 119(3)
|
4.20
|
|
Part 5, clause 119(4) and (6)
|
4.21
|
|
Part 5, clause 119(5) and (7)
|
4.19
|
|
Part 5, clause 119(9)
|
4.22
|
|
Part 5, clause 120
|
4.18
|
|
Part 5, clause 120(3)
|
4.20
|
|
Part 5, clause 120(4) and (6)
|
4.21
|
|
Part 5, clause 120(5) and (7)
|
4.19
|
|
Part 5, clause 120(9)
|
4.22
|
Part 6: Surrender of eligible emissions units
|
|
|
|
Part 6 clause 134A
|
4.53
|
|
Part 6 clause 134A(4)
|
4.54
|
|
Part 6, clause 121
|
4.23
|
|
Part 6, clause 122(1)
|
4.58, 4.69
|
|
Part 6, clause 122(10)
|
3.38, 4.73
|
|
Part 6, clause 122(11)
|
4.76
|
|
Part 6, clause 122(12)
|
4.74, 4.75
|
|
Part 6, clause 122(2)
|
4.71
|
|
Part 6, clause 122(3)
|
4.59
|
|
Part 6, clause 122(4)
|
3.24, 4.60
|
|
Part 6, clause 122(5)
|
4.64
|
|
Part 6, clause 122(6)
|
3.28, 4.61, 6.182
|
|
Part 6, clause 122(7)
|
3.27, 3.90, 4.62
|
|
Part 6, clause 122(8)
|
3.98, 4.68
|
|
Part 6, clause 122(9)
|
3.104
|
|
Part 6, clause 123
|
3.98, 3.104
|
|
Part 6, clause 123(2)
|
3.105
|
|
Part 6, clause 123(3)
|
3.107
|
|
Part 6, clause 124
|
3.86, 3.109, 4.77
|
|
Part 6, clause 125
|
4.25, 4.36
|
|
Part 6, clause 125(7)
|
4.65
|
|
Part 6, clause 126
|
4.29, 4.30, 4.40
|
|
Part 6, clause 127
|
4.27
|
|
Part 6, clause 128
|
4.28, 4.37, 4.38, 4.42
|
|
Part 6, clause 128(7)-(9)
|
4.65
|
|
Part 6, clause 129
|
4.40
|
|
Part 6, clause 130
|
4.43
|
|
Part 6, clause 131
|
4.42
|
|
Part 6, clause 132
|
4.39
|
|
Part 6, clause 133
|
4.44
|
|
Part 6, clause 133(6)
|
4.63
|
|
Part 6, clause 133(7)
|
3.98, 3.99, 4.67
|
|
Part 6, clause 134
|
4.25, 4.40, 4.45
|
|
Part 6, clause 135
|
4.48, 7.6, 7.54
|
|
Part 6, clause 135(2)
|
7.55
|
|
Part 6, clause 136
|
4.49, 7.56
|
|
Part 6, clause 137
|
4.50, 7.57
|
|
Part 6, clause 138
|
1.92, 4.52
|
|
Part 6, clause 140
|
4.51, 7.57
|
|
Part 6, clause 141
|
9.7
|
|
Part 6, clause 141(2) and (5)
|
4.55
|
|
Part 6, clause 141(3) and (4)
|
4.56
|
|
Part 6, clause 141(9)
|
4.57
|
|
Part 6, clause 142
|
4.72
|
Part 7: Jobs and Competitiveness Program
|
|
|
|
Part 7, clause 143(1)
|
5.43
|
|
Part 7, clause 143(2)(a)
|
5.45
|
|
Part 7, clause 143(2)(b)
|
5.46
|
|
Part 7, clause 143(2)(c)
|
5.46
|
|
Part 7, clause 143(2)(d)
|
5.47
|
|
Part 7, clause 143(2)(e)
|
5.48
|
|
Part 7, clause 143(2)(f)
|
5.48
|
|
Part 7, clause 143(2)(g)
|
5.51
|
|
Part 7, clause 144
|
5.45
|
|
Part 7, clause 145
|
5.52
|
|
Part 7, clause 145(1)(a)
|
5.55
|
|
Part 7, clause 145(1)(b)
|
5.56
|
|
Part 7, clause 145(2)(a)
|
5.57
|
|
Part 7, clause 145(2)(b)
|
5.58
|
|
Part 7, clause 145(3)
|
5.59
|
|
Part 7, clause 145(4)
|
5.60
|
|
Part 7, clause 145(5)
|
5.61
|
|
Part 7, clause 146
|
4.78, 5.63, 11.45
|
|
Part 7, clause 146(1)(a)
|
5.65
|
|
Part 7, clause 146(1)(b)
|
5.64
|
|
Part 7, clause 146(2)
|
5.65
|
|
Part 7, clause 147
|
5.67
|
|
Part 7, clause 148
|
5.68
|
|
Part 7, clause 149
|
5.70
|
|
Part 7, clause 149(1)-(3)
|
5.71
|
|
Part 7, clause 149(4)
|
5.74
|
|
Part 7, clause 150
|
5.70, 5.75
|
|
Part 7, clause 151
|
5.77
|
|
Part 7, clause 151(4)
|
5.77
|
|
Part 7, clause 152
|
5.82
|
|
Part 7, clause 152(3)
|
5.83
|
|
Part 7, clause 152(5)
|
5.83
|
|
Part 7, clause 153
|
5.84
|
|
Part 7, clause 154
|
5.85
|
|
Part 7, clause 155 (3)
|
5.96
|
|
Part 7, clause 155(1)(a)
|
5.94
|
|
Part 7, clause 155(1)(b) – (e)
|
5.94
|
|
Part 7, clause 155(2)(a) to (c)
|
5.95
|
|
Part 7, clause 155(4)
|
5.97
|
|
Part 7, clause 156
|
5.98
|
|
Part 7, clause 156(5)
|
5.99
|
|
Part 7, clause 157(6)
|
5.100
|
|
Part 7, clause 158
|
5.95
|
Part 8: Coal-fired electricity generation
|
|
|
|
Part 8, clause 159
|
6.26
|
|
Part 8, clause 160
|
6.26
|
|
Part 8, clause 161(10)
|
6.88, 6.100
|
|
Part 8, clause 161(11)
|
6.88
|
|
Part 8, clause 161(12)
|
6.88
|
|
Part 8, clause 161(2)
|
6.67, 6.69, 6.73, 6.131
|
|
Part 8, clause 161(2) and (3)
|
6.51, 6.100, 6.180
|
|
Part 8, clause 161(3)
|
6.76, 6.78
|
|
Part 8, clause 161(4)
|
6.69
|
|
Part 8, clause 161(6)
|
6.86
|
|
Part 8, clause 161(6) and (7)
|
6.82
|
|
Part 8, clause 161(6)and (7)
|
6.35
|
|
Part 8, clause 161(7)
|
6.87
|
|
Part 8, clause 162(1)
|
6.31, 6.35
|
|
Part 8, clause 162(2)
|
6.32
|
|
Part 8, clause 162(2) and 162(3)
|
6.161
|
|
Part 8, clause 162(3)
|
6.32, 6.37
|
|
Part 8, clause 162(7)
|
6.33
|
|
Part 8, clause 163(1)(b) and 163(2)
|
6.38
|
|
Part 8, clause 163(1)(c)-(e)
|
6.39
|
|
Part 8, clause 164
|
6.40
|
|
Part 8, clause 165
|
6.66
|
|
Part 8, clause 165(2)
|
6.45
|
|
Part 8, clause 165(3)
|
6.51
|
|
Part 8, clause 165(4)(a)
|
6.42
|
|
Part 8, clause 165(4)(b)(i)
|
6.41
|
|
Part 8, clause 165(4)(b)(ii)
|
6.41
|
|
Part 8, clause 165(5)
|
6.50
|
|
Part 8, clause 165(6)
|
6.83, 9.17
|
|
Part 8, clause 166(1)
|
6.45
|
|
Part 8, clause 166(2)(a)
|
6.46, 6.49
|
|
Part 8, clause 166(2)(b)
|
6.47
|
|
Part 8, clause 166(2)(c)
|
6.46
|
|
Part 8, clause 166(3)
|
6.49
|
|
Part 8, clause 167
|
6.64
|
|
Part 8, clause 167(a)
|
6.52, 6.54, 6.55
|
|
Part 8, clause 167(b)
|
6.56
|
|
Part 8, clause 168
|
6.195
|
|
Part 8, clause 168(1)
|
6.61, 6.63
|
|
Part 8, clause 168(2)
|
6.65
|
|
Part 8, clause 169
|
6.90
|
|
Part 8, clause 169(2)
|
6.100
|
|
Part 8, clause 170
|
6.90, 6.111
|
|
Part 8, clause 170(2)(a)
|
6.134
|
|
Part 8, clause 170(2)(a)(i)
|
6.160
|
|
Part 8, clause 170(2)(b)(i)
|
6.160
|
|
Part 8, clause 170(2)(c)
|
6.107
|
|
Part 8, clause 170(2)(c)(ii)
|
6.160
|
|
Part 8, clause 170(2)(d)
|
6.108
|
|
Part 8, clause 170(2)(d)(ii)
|
6.160
|
|
Part 8, clause 170(2)(e)
|
6.120
|
|
Part 8, clause 170(2)(f)
|
6.121
|
|
Part 8, clause 170(2)(f) and (g)
|
6.121
|
|
Part 8, clause 170(2)(g)
|
6.121
|
|
Part 8, clause 171
|
6.120
|
|
Part 8, clause 171(2) and (3)
|
6.122
|
|
Part 8, clause 171(4)
|
6.123, 6.160
|
|
Part 8, clause 171(4)(a)
|
6.123
|
|
Part 8, clause 171(4)(b)
|
6.124
|
|
Part 8, clause 171(4)(c)
|
6.127
|
|
Part 8, clause 171(4)(d)
|
6.127
|
|
Part 8, clause 171(4)(e)
|
6.129
|
|
Part 8, clause 171(4)(f)
|
6.135, 6.144
|
|
Part 8, clause 171(5)
|
6.132, 6.139
|
|
Part 8, clause 171(5)(a)
|
6.124, 6.133
|
|
Part 8, clause 171(5)(a)-(c)
|
6.136
|
|
Part 8, clause 171(5)(b)
|
6.124, 6.134
|
|
Part 8, clause 171(5)(c)
|
6.135
|
|
Part 8, clause 171(5)(d)
|
6.137, 6.138
|
|
Part 8, clause 171(5)(d)-(f)
|
6.136
|
|
Part 8, clause 171(5)(e)
|
6.137, 6.140
|
|
Part 8, clause 171(5)(f)
|
6.137, 6.142
|
|
Part 8, clause 171(6)
|
6.145
|
|
Part 8, clause 171(7)
|
6.146
|
|
Part 8, clause 171(9)
|
6.131
|
|
Part 8, clause 172
|
6.120, 6.123
|
|
Part 8, clause 172(1)(a) and (2)
|
6.147
|
|
Part 8, clause 172(1)(a) and (c)
|
6.148
|
|
Part 8, clause 172(1)(b)
|
6.150
|
|
Part 8, clause 172(1)(d)
|
6.150
|
|
Part 8, clause 172(1)(e)
|
6.151
|
|
Part 8, clause 172(1)(f)
|
6.155
|
|
Part 8, clause 172(3) and (4)
|
6.155
|
|
Part 8, clause 173
|
6.157
|
|
Part 8, clause 174
|
6.112
|
|
Part 8, clause 174(4)
|
6.114, 6.117
|
|
Part 8, clause 175
|
6.112
|
|
Part 8, clause 175(4)
|
6.114, 6.117
|
|
Part 8, clause 176
|
6.160
|
|
Part 8, clause 177
|
6.163
|
|
Part 8, clause 177(1)
|
6.164
|
|
Part 8, clause 178
|
6.163
|
|
Part 8, clause 178(a)(i)
|
6.167
|
|
Part 8, clause 178(a)(ii)
|
6.167
|
|
Part 8, clause 178(a)(iii)
|
6.167
|
|
Part 8, clause 178(b)
|
6.167
|
|
Part 8, clause 179
|
6.165
|
|
Part 8, clause 180
|
6.168
|
|
Part 8, clause 181(1)
|
6.175, 6.179
|
|
Part 8, clause 181(1)(a) and (2)(a)
|
6.176, 6.177
|
|
Part 8, clause 181(1)(b) and 181(2)(b)
|
6.178
|
|
Part 8, clause 181(2)
|
6.179
|
|
Part 8, clause 181A
|
6.88
|
Part 9: Publication of information
|
|
|
|
Part 9, clause 182
|
9.3
|
|
Part 9, clause 183
|
9.4
|
|
Part 9, clause 184
|
9.5, 9.6
|
|
Part 9, clause 184(2), (5) and (6)
|
9.6
|
|
Part 9, clause 185
|
9.7
|
|
Part 9, clause 186
|
9.7
|
|
Part 9, clause 187(3)
|
9.7
|
|
Part 9, clause 187(4)
|
9.7
|
|
Part 9, clause 187(5)
|
9.7
|
|
Part 9, clause 188
|
9.7
|
|
Part 9, clause 189
|
9.7
|
|
Part 9, clause 190
|
9.7
|
|
Part 9, clause 191
|
9.7
|
|
Part 9, clause 192
|
9.7
|
|
Part 9, clause 193
|
9.6
|
|
Part 9, clause 194
|
9.8
|
|
Part 9, clause 195
|
3.77, 9.9
|
|
Part 9, clause 196
|
3.78
|
|
Part 9, clause 196(1) and (2)
|
9.9
|
|
Part 9, clause 197(1)
|
9.9
|
|
Part 9, clause 197(2)-(6)
|
9.9
|
|
Part 9, clause 198
|
5.87, 9.9
|
|
Part 9, clause 198(1)
|
5.88
|
|
Part 9, clause 199
|
5.87, 5.88, 9.9
|
|
Part 9, clause 199(c)
|
5.88
|
|
Part 9, clause 200
|
9.9
|
|
Part 9, clause 201
|
9.9
|
|
Part 9, clause 202
|
9.9
|
|
Part 9, clause 203(1) and (2)
|
9.10
|
|
Part 9, clause 203(3)
|
9.10
|
|
Part 9, clause 204
|
9.10
|
|
Part 9, clause 205
|
9.10
|
|
Part 9, clause 206
|
9.11
|
Part 10: Fraudulent conduct
|
|
|
|
Part 10, clause 208(7)
|
7.106
|
|
Part 10, clause 207
|
7.6
|
|
Part 10, clause 208
|
7.119
|
|
Part 10, clause 208(1) and (2)
|
7.102
|
|
Part 10, clause 208(8)
|
7.103
|
|
Part 10, clause 208(1)(c)
|
7.104
|
|
Part 10, clause 208(5)
|
7.105
|
Part 11: Relinquishment of carbon units
|
|
|
|
Part 11, clause 209
|
7.6
|
|
Part 11, clause 210
|
3.38, 5.66
|
|
Part 11, clause 210(1) and (2)
|
4.79
|
|
Part 11, clause 210(3)
|
3.90, 4.80
|
|
Part 11, clause 210(4)
|
4.81
|
|
Part 11, clause 211
|
4.78
|
|
Part 11, clause 212
|
3.74, 4.82, 5.86
|
|
Part 11, clause 213
|
3.74, 4.82, 7.6, 7.54
|
|
Part 11, clause 213(2)
|
7.55
|
|
Part 11, clause 214
|
4.82, 7.56
|
|
Part 11, clause 215
|
4.82, 7.57
|
|
Part 11, clause 216
|
4.82, 7.57
|
Part 12: Notification of significant holding of carbon
units
|
|
|
|
Part 12, clause 217
|
9.13
|
|
Part 12, clause 218
|
9.14
|
|
Part 12, clause 218(2) and (4)
|
9.15
|
|
Part 12, clause 218(6)
|
9.16
|
|
Part 12, clause 219
|
9.14
|
|
Part 12, clause 219(5)
|
9.15
|
|
Part 12, clause 219(6)
|
9.16
|
Part 13: Information-gathering powers
|
|
|
|
Part 13, clause 220
|
7.5, 7.9
|
|
Part 13, clause 221
|
7.9
|
|
Part 13, clause 221(4)
|
7.96
|
|
Part 13, clause 222
|
7.9
|
|
Part 13, clause 223
|
7.11
|
|
Part 13, clause 224
|
7.12
|
|
Part 13, clause 225
|
7.13
|
|
Part 13, clause 225(1)
|
7.42
|
Part 14: Record-keeping requirements
|
|
|
|
Part 14, clause 226
|
7.5, 7.14
|
|
Part 14, clause 227
|
7.16, 7.19
|
|
Part 14, clause 228
|
7.17, 7.19
|
Part 15: Monitoring powers
|
|
|
|
Part 15, clause 229
|
7.5, 7.21
|
|
Part 15, clause 230
|
7.23
|
|
Part 15, clause 230(3) and (4)
|
7.24
|
|
Part 15, clause 231
|
7.26, 7.113
|
|
Part 15, clause 231(5)
|
7.115
|
|
Part 15, clause 232
|
7.27
|
|
Part 15, clause 233
|
7.28
|
|
Part 15, clause 233(5), (6), (7), (8) and (9)
|
7.29
|
|
Part 15, clause 234
|
7.30, 7.31
|
|
Part 15, clause 235
|
7.33, 7.34, 7.110
|
|
Part 15, clause 236(1)
|
7.42
|
|
Part 15, clause 237
|
7.35
|
|
Part 15, clause 238
|
7.35
|
|
Part 15, clause 239
|
7.35
|
|
Part 15, clause 240
|
7.35
|
|
Part 15, clause 241
|
7.35
|
|
Part 15, clause 242
|
7.35
|
|
Part 15, clause 243
|
7.36
|
|
Part 15, clause 244
|
7.37, 7.110
|
|
Part 15, clause 245
|
7.38, 11.25
|
|
Part 15, clause 245(4)
|
7.38
|
|
Part 15, clause 246
|
7.39
|
Part 16: Liability of executive officers of bodies
corporate
|
|
|
|
Part 16, clause 247
|
7.6
|
|
Part 16, clause 248
|
7.124
|
|
Part 16, clause 248(2)
|
7.125
|
|
Part 16, clause 248(3)
|
7.126
|
|
Part 16, clause 249
|
7.128
|
Part 17: Civil penalty orders
|
|
|
|
Part 17, clause 250
|
7.6
|
|
Part 17, clause 251
|
7.87
|
|
Part 17, clause 252
|
7.74, 7.88
|
|
Part 17, clause 252(3)
|
7.89
|
|
Part 17, clause 252(4)(b) and (6)(a)
|
7.85
|
|
Part 17, clause 252(5)
|
7.82
|
|
Part 17, clause 252(5) and (6)
|
7.10, 7.19
|
|
Part 17, clause 253
|
7.74
|
|
Part 17, clause 254
|
7.99
|
|
Part 17, clause 255
|
7.74
|
|
Part 17, clause 256
|
7.91
|
|
Part 17, clause 257
|
7.100
|
|
Part 17, clause 258
|
7.101
|
|
Part 17, clause 259
|
7.100
|
|
Part 17, clause 260
|
7.101
|
|
Part 17, clause 261
|
7.92
|
|
Part 17, clause 262
|
7.94
|
|
Part 17, clause 263
|
7.95
|
|
Part 17, clause 263(3)
|
7.96
|
Part 18: Infringement notices
|
|
|
|
Part 18, clause 264
|
7.6, 7.59
|
|
Part 18, clause 265(1)
|
7.61
|
|
Part 18, clause 265(2)
|
7.62
|
|
Part 18, clause 266
|
7.63
|
|
Part 18, clause 267
|
7.66
|
|
Part 18, clause 268
|
7.64
|
|
Part 18, clause 269
|
7.69
|
|
Part 18, clause 270(a)
|
7.70
|
|
Part 18, clause 270(b)
|
7.71
|
|
Part 18, clause 270(c)
|
7.72
|
|
Part 18, clause 271
|
7.65
|
Part 19: Offences relating to unit shortfall charge
and administrative penalties
|
|
|
|
Part 19, clause 272
|
7.6
|
|
Part 19, clause 273
|
7.111
|
|
Part 19, clause 274
|
7.111
|
|
Part 19, clause 275
|
7.111
|
|
Part 19, clause 276
|
7.111
|
Part 20: Enforceable undertakings
|
|
|
|
Part 20, clause 277
|
7.6
|
|
Part 20, clause 278
|
7.46
|
|
Part 20, clause 278(5)
|
7.48
|
|
Part 20, clause 279
|
7.49
|
Part 21: Review of decisions
|
|
|
|
Part 21, clause 252
|
1.185, 1.197
|
|
Part 21, clause 280
|
8.3
|
|
Part 21, clause 281
|
8.3
|
|
Part 21, clause 282(3)
|
8.6
|
|
Part 21, clause 282(4)
|
8.5
|
|
Part 21, clause 283
|
8.7
|
|
Part 21, clause 283(4)
|
8.8
|
|
Part 21, clause 284(1)
|
8.7
|
|
Part 21, clause 284(2)
|
8.9
|
|
Part 21, clause 285
|
8.10
|
|
Part 21, clause 286
|
8.11
|
Part 22: Reviews by the Climate Change Authority
|
|
|
|
Part 22, clause 287
|
10.6
|
|
Part 22, clause 288(1)
|
10.9
|
|
Part 22, clause 288(2)
|
10.8
|
|
Part 22, clause 288(3)
|
10.8
|
|
Part 22, clause 288(4)
|
10.8
|
|
Part 22, clause 288(5)
|
10.22
|
|
Part 22, clause 288(6)
|
10.21
|
|
Part 22, clause 288(7)
|
10.27
|
|
Part 22, clause 289
|
2.12, 2.13
|
|
Part 22, clause 289(11)
|
10.11
|
|
Part 22, clause 289(2)
|
10.12
|
|
Part 22, clause 289(3)
|
10.10
|
|
Part 22, clause 289(4), (8) and (10)
|
10.10
|
|
Part 22, clause 289(5) and (9)
|
10.10
|
|
Part 22, clause 289(6)
|
10.22
|
|
Part 22, clause 289(7)
|
10.21
|
|
Part 22, clause 290(1)and (2)
|
10.14
|
|
Part 22, clause 290(4)
|
10.15
|
|
Part 22, clause 290(5)
|
10.22
|
|
Part 22, clause 290(6)
|
10.21
|
|
Part 22, clause 291(1)
|
10.16
|
|
Part 22, clause 291(2)
|
10.17
|
|
Part 22, clause 291(3)
|
10.16
|
|
Part 22, clause 291(4)
|
10.16
|
|
Part 22, clause 291(5)
|
10.22
|
|
Part 22, clause 291(6)
|
10.21
|
|
Part 22, clause 292
|
2.12, 2.23
|
|
Part 22, clause 292(1)
|
10.23
|
|
Part 22, clause 292(2)
|
10.24
|
|
Part 22, clause 292(4) and (5)
|
10.25
|
|
Part 22, clause 292(6)
|
10.25
|
|
Part 22, clause 292(7)-(8)
|
10.26
|
|
Part 22, clause 293(1)
|
10.18
|
|
Part 22, clause 293(3)
|
10.21
|
|
Part 22, clause 293(4)
|
10.19
|
|
Part 22, clause 293(5)
|
10.27
|
|
Part 22, clause 294(1)
|
10.23
|
|
Part 22, clause 294(2)
|
10.24
|
|
Part 22, clause 294(4) and (5)
|
10.25
|
|
Part 22, clause 294(6)
|
10.25
|
|
Part 22, clause 294(7)-(8)
|
10.26
|
Part 23: Miscellaneous
|
|
|
|
Part 23, clause 295(a), (b), (c), (d), (h) and (f)
|
11.18
|
|
Part 23, clause 295(e)
|
11.21
|
|
Part 23, clause 295(i)
|
11.20
|
|
Part 23, clause 295(j)
|
11.19
|
|
Part 23, clause 296
|
8.12
|
|
Part 23, clause 297
|
1.103, 6.40
|
|
Part 23, clause 297A
|
11.22
|
|
Part 23, clause 298
|
11.27
|
|
Part 23, clause 299
|
11.26
|
|
Part 23, clause 301
|
11.23
|
|
Part 23, clause 302
|
11.49
|
|
Part 23, clause 303
|
11.24
|
|
Part 23, clause 303A
|
6.186, 11.8, 11.37
|
|
Part 23, clause 303A(1)
|
6.189
|
|
Part 23, clause 303A(2)
|
6.191
|
|
Part 23, clause 303A(3)
|
6.187
|
|
Part 23, clause 303B
|
6.186, 6.193, 11.8, 11.37
|
|
Part 23, clause 303B(1)
|
6.193
|
|
Part 23, clause 303B(2)
|
6.193
|
|
Part 23, clause 303B(3)
|
6.194
|
|
Part 23, clause 303B(4)
|
6.195
|
|
Part 23, clause 303B(5)
|
6.195
|
|
Part 23, clause 303B(6)
|
6.193
|
|
Part 23, clause 303B(7)
|
6.196
|
|
Part 23, clause 303B(8)
|
6.187
|
|
Part 23, clause 304
|
11.50, 11.51
|
|
Part 23, clause 305
|
11.28
|
|
Part 23, clause 306
|
11.30
|
|
Part 23, clause 307
|
11.34
|
|
Part 23, clause 307(3)
|
11.35
|
|
Part 23, clause 307(4)
|
11.36
|
|
Part 23, clause 308
|
11.31
|
|
Part 23, clause 309
|
5.76, 11.39
|
|
Part 23, clause 310
|
5.76, 11.44
|
|
Part 23, clause 311
|
11.47
|
|
Part 23, clause 312
|
11.8, 11.38
|