
Regulation Impact Statement
for proposed changes to prices surveillance of Australia Post reserved letter
services
Background
Australia Post’s reserved services
Australia’s postal service is delivered by Australia Post, a
Government Business Enterprise (GBE). The Australian Postal Corporation Act
1989 (the APC Act) imposes a community service obligation (CSO) on Australia
Post to supply a letter service. A CSO arises when a service provider is
tasked to undertake a non-commercial business activity to meet social
objectives. The APC Act requires Australia Post to supply a letter service that
is ‘reasonably accessible to all people in Australia on an equitable basis,
wherever they reside or carry on business’.
In particular, the letter service must be available at a single uniform rate
for standard letters carried by ordinary post (‘the basic postage rate’). Subordinate
legislation sets the performance standards Australia Post must meet in
providing its services.
Under the APC Act, Australia Post has the exclusive right to
collect, carry and deliver letters within Australia that (subject to
exceptions) weigh not more than 250 grams. These statutory monopoly services,
along with the right to issue postage stamps, are termed Australia Post’s
‘reserved services’[3].
Australia Post was given this statutory monopoly so that revenue from its reserved
services could fund the cost of meeting its CSOs.
However, Australia Post must deliver its CSOs regardless of whether revenue
from its reserved services is sufficient to cover the costs of the CSOs.
Other letter services
Within the domestic reserved
letter service Australia Post offers a number of different categories of mail. Ordinary
letter services are offered at three postage prices—currently $0.60 for small
letters (the basic postage rate), $1.20 for large letters up to 125 grams, and
$1.80 for large letters over 125 grams and up to 250 grams. Other
letter services—used mainly by businesses, government agencies and
not-for-profit organisations—are generally offered at prices lower than those
of equivalent ordinary letter services, as follows.
·
The PreSort Letters service offers discounted prices to
customers who can apply barcodes when addressing their letters, sort them into
a particular order, place them in appropriately-labelled trays, and complete
documentation prior to lodgement at designated postal outlets. Australia Post
offers the PreSort Letters service with regular and off-peak delivery time
frames. The minimum lodgement volume is 300 barcoded letters of the same size
and weight step.
·
Charity Mail provides discounted prices for barcoded
PreSort small letters sent by income tax-exempt charities. Mailings must meet
all other requirements of the PreSort Letters service.
·
The Acquisition Mail service allows customers to
geographically target an addressed-mail campaign to residential addresses in
specific postcodes, suburbs or Census Collection Districts. Letters must be
barcoded, sorted into appropriately-labelled trays and lodged at designated
postal outlets. The Acquisition Mail service is provided on the off-peak delivery
time frame and has a minimum lodgement volume of 30 000 letters.
·
Clean Mail is a service for smaller machine-addressed
letters prepared in accordance with specific addressing and presentation
requirements. Addressing conditions include certain mandatory requirements such
as layout and font size and style. Articles do not require sorting but must be
lodged in trays at designated postal outlets. Clean mail is provided at the
regular delivery time frame and has a minimum lodgement volume of 300 letters.
·
Impact Mail covers non-rectangular mail (such as shaped
postcards, form-cut brochures, die-cut booklets or multidimensional folds) and
attracts higher prices than ordinary postage prices. The minimum lodgement
volume is 300 articles.
·
Under the Metered/Imprint Mail service, a discount is
available against ordinary postage rates where the postage is paid for by
postage meter, or via the use of the ‘Postage Paid’ imprint (and payment by an
Australia Post charge account).
·
The Local Country Letters service provides for discounts
where senders who reside or carry on a business in specified postcodes lodge
letters at an Australia Post delivery office for delivery in that, or an
adjoining, delivery area. The minimum lodgement volume is 50 letters (or 10 in
small communities with fewer than 1000 delivery points).
·
The Reply Paid letters service provides for the charging
of mail recipients rather than senders. Some Reply Paid postage prices are
higher than the equivalent ordinary postage prices as there are additional
costs associated with extracting and counting the letters to bill recipients.
Additionally, Australia Post sells a range of prepaid
envelopes and postcards, and offers a discount on postage for seasonal greeting
cards during November and December.
The term ‘other letter services’ is used in this paper to
cover all those domestic reserved letter services that are not ordinary letter
services, as listed in Appendix A. This includes categories of
letters commonly referred to as ‘bulk mail’, given minimum volume requirements.
Other letter services represent just over 80 per cent of
Australia Post’s domestic reserved letters service business, both by volume and
revenue.
PreSort Letters are the single largest category of mail and represent approximately
half of total letter volumes and revenue. Some other letter services are
offered at a significantly lower rate than the equivalent ordinary letter
service. For example, the least expensive price for an Acquisition Mail small
letter is approximately half the basic postage rate at $0.31, while the least
expensive price for a small PreSort letter is less than three quarters of the
basic postage rate at $0.424. However, other non-ordinary services are offered
at rates much closer to the equivalent ordinary letter service. So, for
example, postage for metered/imprint letters is only 3 per cent less than
equivalent ordinary rates. (Appendix A details current prices for
domestic reserved letter services.)
Other letter services are used by a range of businesses,
charities and government agencies, either directly or through mailhouses. Australia
Post estimates that there were some 7500 users of PreSort, Charity, Acquisition,
Impact and Clean Mail in 2010–11. Almost 60 per cent of letters in these
categories were in lodgements of 10 000 or more. Approximately three
quarters of all letters in these categories are sent by business in the communications
and financial and insurance industry segments, and by government agencies. The
top 50 PreSort, Charity, Acquisition, Impact and Clean Mail customers were
responsible for approximately 60 per cent of such letters in 2010–11. Table 1
shows numbers of customers by annual lodgement volumes.
|
|
|
|
|
Less than 5000
|
2930
|
6
|
|
5001–10 000
|
1090
|
8
|
|
10 001–100 000
|
2380
|
79
|
|
100 001–1 000 000
|
|
|
|
1 000 001+
|
|
|
|
Total
|
7510
|
2181
|
† These numbers reflect customers paying by account—a
further 17 million letters were sent by customers paying by other means.
Additionally, around 60 000 businesses and
organisations use Australia Post charge accounts for Imprint Mail, and around
14 000 have postage meters. Around 19 000 customers have permits to use
Reply Paid.
Other letter services are predominantly used for
transactional and promotional purposes. Transactional mail covers the
communication of information to existing customers concerning their existing
dealings, and includes things such as bills, statements, invoices, changes to
terms and conditions, new credit or membership cards, business/membership/subscription
renewals, payments, etc. Promotional mail covers the communication of offers
and requests to new or existing customers, and includes things such as offers
of goods or services, requests to donate.
Prices surveillance of the reserved services
Australia Post’s reserved letter
services are notified services (and Australia Post is a declared person) under
the prices surveillance provisions of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010
(the CCA)[7],
previously the Trade Practices Act 1974. This means that
Australia Post must notify the Australian Competition and Consumer
Commission (the ACCC) if it proposes to:
·
increase the price of a reserved letter service
·
introduce a new service that would fall within the definition of
reserved letter services
·
provide an existing reserved letter service under terms and
conditions that are not the same or substantially similar to the existing terms
and conditions of that service.
The ACCC must notify Australia Post that it has no objection
to the proposed changes prior to Australia Post giving effect to them. This
scrutiny by the ACCC is intended to promote efficient pricing and consumer
protection where there is reduced competition.
The current prices surveillance provisions can be traced
back to the enactment of the Prices Surveillance Act 1983 (the PSA). The
PSA was introduced at a time of relatively high inflation, and was intended to
bring about pricing restraint among private and public sector business
enterprises. However, since then the economic environment has changed and the
focus of prices surveillance has moved from a prices and income policy role to
one of competition policy. Today, the criterion for declaring areas for prices
surveillance is focused on those markets where competitive pressures are insufficient
to achieve efficient prices and to protect consumers.
Australia Post’s commercial obligations
Australia Post is prescribed by the Commonwealth Authorities
and Companies Regulations 1997 as a GBE
A principal objective for each GBE is that it adds to shareholder value by,
among other things, earning at least a commercial rate of return. Earning a
commercial rate of return includes fully recovering the costs of resources
employed, including capital, and working towards a financial target and a
dividend policy agreed with shareholder ministers. The rate of return should be
at least sufficient to justify the long-term retention of assets in the
business, and to pay commercial dividends from those returns.
Similarly, the APC Act imposes commercial obligations on
Australia Post. Section 26 of the APC Act imposes an obligation on
Australia Post, as far as practicable, to perform its functions in a manner
consistent with sound commercial practice. Section 38 specifies a number
of matters that Australia Post must have regard to in setting financial
targets, including the need to earn a reasonable rate of return on Australia
Post’s assets, the expectation of the Commonwealth that Australia Post will pay
a reasonable dividend, and the need to maintain Australia Post’s financial
viability.
Additionally, Australia is a member of the Universal Postal
Union (UPU) of the United Nations. Under article 3.4 of the UPU
convention, Australia is required to ensure that its universal postal service
is provided on a viable basis, thus guaranteeing its sustainability.
For Australia Post to meet these commercial and
international obligations, it is important that, to the maximum extent
possible, its reserved letter services operate on a financially self-sustaining
basis.
The problem
Increased competition from digital communications such as
email and social networking websites has lead to a decline in letter volumes. Domestic
letter volumes declined by 4.1 per cent in 2008–09 and a further 4.2 per cent
in 2009–10, or approximately 400 million items over two years. Without
increased flexibility to respond to market opportunities and customer needs in
its letters products and services, Australia Post’s ability to counter this decline
will reduce. This, in turn, will compromise Australia Post’s capacity to fund
the delivery of its CSOs from monopoly reserved services revenue. If losses
from reserved services continue to grow, they could not only adversely impact
Australia Post’s ability to deliver a universal letter service but also reduce
Australia Post’s capacity to make dividend payments to government.
The physical letter market has changed substantially over
the last two decades and there is now considerable and increasing competition
to letters from digital communications, such as email and social networking
websites. These digital services provide competitive pressures on the reserved
letter services and so reduce Australia Post’s ability to exercise monopoly
market power. As long as ordinary letter postage rates continue to be subject
to scrutiny by the ACCC, these will act as a natural ceiling to the prices that
Australia Post can charge for other letter services. These two factors combine
to mean that ACCC scrutiny of changes to the prices of other letter services is
no longer necessary.
Flexibility in reserved services
Given the complexity of the issues considered by the ACCC
and the need to consult with stakeholders, prices surveillance processes can be
time-consuming—the ACCC took approximately five months to consider price
notifications in 2008 and in 2009—and reduce Australia Post’s flexibility to
respond quickly to market changes and opportunities. Following receipt of a
draft notification from Australia Post, the ACCC typically releases an issues
paper and a draft decision, and calls for public submissions on each of these
documents, prior to making a final decision. The regulatory requirement for
prices surveillance itself, along with the lengthy processes to implement it,
restrict Australia Post’s ability to plan and to innovate in the design of the
products it offers to businesses and organisations in response to their needs.
Australia Post has introduced a number of new reserved
letter services to meet market needs—Impact Mail in October 2004 and
Acquisition Mail in September 2008—and
changed the terms and conditions of existing services—revisions to Off Peak
delivery timeframes for PreSort letters, Charity Mail and Acquisition Mail in
July 2011.
However, in each of these cases, Australia Post had to submit its proposed
changes to the ACCC, thus delaying their introduction. In its non-reserved mail
business, Australia Post has been able to introduce new products and services—such
as the eBay co-branded flat-rate satchels and Click and Send service, eLetter
ticket, Sample Post and new 24/7 parcel collection hubs—without reference to
the ACCC.
Funding the community service obligation
Until about 2000, a strong
correlation existed in Australia between growth in letter volumes and growth in
GDP. This is no longer the case—the decoupling of mail volume from GDP is shown
in Figure 1. Similar trends have occurred worldwide and reflect changes in
technology and consumer behaviour, which are driving a global decline in letter
volumes as consumers substitute physical mail with electronic communications.
This decline was exacerbated by the global financial crisis. In effect, digital
communications such as email and social networking websites are competing with
physical letters in markets where postal operators such as Australia Post have
had a traditional monopoly. Postal operators around the world are revising
their business models to adapt to the loss of revenue from this decline in mail
volumes.

At the same time as mail volumes
have been decreasing, the size of Australia Post’s delivery network has increased.
This is because Australia Post is obliged to deliver to all addresses in
Australia, and new business and household addresses are increasing by around
200 000 per annum.
In 1999–00 Australia Post handled some 5.2 billion mail articles and
delivered to approximately 8.8 million delivery points, or approximately
590 mail articles per delivery point. In 2009–10 the equivalent figures
were 5.1 billion mail articles handled, 10.7 million delivery points
and 480 mail articles per delivery point.
Declining letter volumes and rising costs have led to
unsustainable financial losses in Australia Post’s domestic reserved letter
services in recent years. Reported losses were $58 million in 2008–09 and
$127 million (excluding one-off restructuring expenses) in 2009–10.
Additionally, Australia Post is forecasting a loss of more than
$100 million for 2010–11. Losses from the reserved services are currently
covered by other, profitable, commercial activities undertaken by Australia
Post. Table 2 shows the decline in letter business revenue, both outright
and as a proportion of goods and services revenue. It also shows the impact on
the decline in dividends to government in recent years.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Goods and services revenue
|
$4.57 billion
|
$4.76 billion
|
$4.85 billion
|
$4.75 billion
|
|
Profit before tax
|
$562 million
|
$592 million
|
$381 million
|
$103 million‡
|
|
Dividend
|
$297 million
|
$335 million
|
$334 million†
|
$79 million
|
|
Mail volume
|
5.52 billion
|
5.61 billion
|
5.32 billion
|
5.15 billion
|
|
Domestic reserved letters volume
|
4.19 billion
|
4.27 billion
|
4.10 billion
|
3.88 billion
|
|
Domestic reserved services revenue
|
$1.82 billion
|
$1.84 billion
|
$1.87 billion
|
$1.78 billion
|
|
Domestic reserved services EBIT
|
$36 million
|
$12 million
|
–$67 million
|
–$218 million‡
|
|
CSO ‘cost’
|
$97 million
|
$109 million
|
$114 million
|
$121 million
|
† Includes impact of special
dividend of $150m paid in 2008–09. ‡ Includes impact of one-off
restructuring expenses of $150 million.
There is a financial ‘cost’ associated with meeting the CSOs.
The cost arises where the charges for mandated services do not recover the
costs of providing them—the cost is measured on a net basis after reduction of
related revenue. CSO costs have increased over time, and have been in the order
of $120 million over the last two years.
Australia Post was given its statutory monopoly over reserved letter services
in order to meet the costs of delivering its CSO. At the time the APC Act was
enacted 22 years ago it was envisaged that profits from reserved services
would be sufficient to fund CSO costs. In effect, Australia Post has previously
funded its CSOs by means of an internal cross-subsidy within its reserved
letter services. However, in 2008–09 and 2009–10, domestic reserved letter
services as a whole have operated at a loss. Given that Australia Post must
deliver its CSO regardless of whether the reserved services statutory monopoly
delivers sufficient profits to fund the costs of the CSO, it has effectively
had to be funded by Australia Post’s non-reserved mail business and other
commercial activities.
How long this can continue will depend on the level of future losses from the
reserved service and profits from Australia Post’s commercial activities. Without
action in the short-to-medium term, it is likely that Australia Post’s letter
services will become a drain on the Commonwealth Budget.
Consequences of no action
As a result of the current pricing surveillance
arrangements, Australia Post is not able to make rapid changes to reserved
services postal products to respond to changing market conditions.
Financial losses from the reserved services are currently
covered by profits from Australia Post’s other non-reserved mail and commercial
activities. If no action is taken and losses from reserved letter services
continue to grow, they will undermine Australia Post’s ability to fund its CSO
to provide a universal letter service, along with financial dividends to the government.
Is there relevant regulation in place?
There is now significant competition to letters from digital
communications such as email and social networking websites, making Australia
Post’s reserved services increasingly unprofitable. In this environment, Australia
Post needs to be able to position itself flexibly in the communications market
and respond to market opportunities and changing consumer demands, so that it
can maintain a sustainable letters business and meet its CSOs.
Given the growing take-up of electronic communications, the
competitive pressures on Australia Post’s reserved letter services are
increasing, and the value of its statutory monopoly is declining. While there
may be limited price elasticity of demand for letters (see discussion below),
in the wider context of the overall communications market the continued
application of ACCC prices surveillance to the entirety of Australia Post’s
reserved letter services could be considered to be unnecessary regulation. The
regulatory framework has clearly not kept pace with changes in communications
technology, and business and society’s adoption of these changes.
Objectives
The government’s objective is to provide a regulatory
framework that contributes to Australia Post’s flexibility to operate a viable
and sustainable letters business, in the context of the CSOs identified in the
APC Act and the Australian Postal Corporation (Performance Standards)
Regulations 1998. At the same time, the government has an objective of ensuring
that an appropriate level of protection continues for consumers of Australia
Post’s monopoly services.
Options
The Prime Minister has agreed
that the following two options be considered in this regulation impact assessment:
1.
removal of ACCC surveillance of other letter services prices, and
2. retention
of current arrangements.
Under the first option, notified services would be limited
to Australia Post’s ordinary letter services (currently the basic postage rate
of $0.60, and large letter rates of $1.20 and $1.80) and all other letter
services listed in Appendix A would be removed from the CCA
declaration. Postage rates for ordinary letters would remain subject to ACCC
scrutiny and would effectively operate as ceilings for most other reserved
letter services. Additionally, Australia Post would have the flexibility to
introduce new reserved letter services without reference to the ACCC.
Impact analysis
General
The impact on stakeholders of the proposed change will
depend on the nature of new reserved letter products that Australia Post
introduces and the level of future price increases it puts in place. The ACCC
has not generally objected to price notifications for other letter services. If future
price variations are reasonable and not excessive, all other things being equal
it is likely that removing prices surveillance will make little difference to
stakeholders over the long term, relative to what would have occurred if prices
surveillance had remained in place.
Price elasticity of demand for letters
Price elasticity of demand is a measure of the
responsiveness of the quantity demanded of a good or service to a change in its
price. A price elasticity of 0.5, for example, means that for a 10 per cent
increase in price there will be a 5 per cent reduction in demand. In general,
the demand for a good is said to be inelastic when the price elasticity is less
than one and changes in prices have a less than proportional effect on the
level of demand.
In the recent price notification process for selected other
letter services[21],
Australia Post asserted that such letters are inelastic to price, and that
econometric modelling for PreSort letters has not identified real price as
being statistically significant[22].
On this basis, Australia Post assumed that the proposed notification price
increases would not affect aggregate letter volumes.
However, Major Mail Users Australia has argued that ‘postage
budgets’ are being replaced by ‘communications budgets’, and that any increase
in postage prices will hasten the search for e-alternatives to paper mail.
Allowing Australia Post to set prices for other letter
services is expected to have some impact on aggregate mail volumes.
·
A 2006 meta-study of 45 previous studies across a number of
advanced economies and postal products identified a range of price elasticities
between 0.2 and 0.8[24].
·
A study commissioned by the United States Postal Service Office
of Inspector General implies a price elasticity of demand for the US Postal
Service of 0.4[25].
·
A recent report from the Postal Services Commission of the UK
supports Royal Mail’s estimate of an overall price elasticity of mail of around
0.35, with different price elasticities for different mail segments—0.2 for
transactional mail, 0.4 for social mail and 1.0 for advertising mail[26].
·
Similarly, when conducting a sensitivity analysis of Australia
Post’s price notification earlier this year, the ACCC assumed a price
elasticity of 0.4.
It is likely that price elasticity of demand will vary
between Australia Post customers. For example, businesses and organisations that
deal with people who tend not to use online services, such as the elderly or
communities without access to the internet, are likely to have lower price
elasticities. Similarly, it is likely that price elasticity will not be
constant, but rather will be stepped and depend on the size of any price
increase. A large price increase may have a higher price elasticity, whereas
smaller price increases may have much smaller or negligible price elasticities.
While there is considerable and increasing competition to letters from digital
communications such as email and social networking websites, there are some
documents that must be sent by post. In 2009, an Australia Post analysis
identified some 2500 references in legislation, regulations and codes of
practice across all Australian jurisdictions to sending or serving of documents
such as notices, decisions or ballot papers by post or mail. Over 80 per
cent of these provide for alternative means of communication. However, a
number of consumer codes, for example, do not allow for e-communications on
documents related to repossession or default proceedings. Australia Post
estimates that less than 150 of these legislative references have anything
other than a minimal impact on mail volumes. While it is difficult to estimate
the volumes of transactional mail that are mandated by legislation as the only
method of communication, they are likely to decrease as governments move to
develop other communications channels in the context of the developing digital
economy.
1.
Removal of prices surveillance from other letter services prices
Impact on Australia Post
Australia Post is likely to be a significant beneficiary of
any move to remove ACCC prices surveillance from other letter services.
Removal of ACCC prices surveillance of other letter services
would allow Australia Post to respond more quickly to market opportunities and
to innovate and introduce new products. At the same time, it would provide
Australia Post with more certainty in its financial planning, as it would be
able to plan for price increases without the uncertainty of ACCC processes. It
would also lead to reduced costs to Australia Post in the order of $1 million
a year associated with no longer having to prepare and pursue price
notifications for other letter services[30]. These factors would assist
Australia Post to counter the decline in the profitability of its domestic
letters business, and hence increase its ability to meet its CSOs.
It is not possible to predict precise price changes to other
letter services in the absence of ACCC scrutiny, nor whether these changes
would have occurred anyway. However, they are more likely to increase than
decrease, given the current losses made by reserved letter services as a whole.
If, for example, Australia Post was to increase its prices for PreSort Letters,
Acquisition Mail and Charity Mail by 5 per cent, it would generate some
$25 million (GST-exclusive) in additional revenue in a full year, assuming
a price elasticity of 0.4[31].
The equivalent increase for a 2 per cent price rise would be $10 million.
Impact on business and not-for-profit organisations
Businesses and not-for-profit organisations would benefit
from these changes to the extent that Australia Post works with them to
introduce new reserved letter products and services to meet their needs. As
noted above, Australia Post has previously introduced new products to meet
market needs. They would now benefit from quicker implementation of such
changes. Businesses and not-for-profit organisations are likely to have a
greater range of letter products available with which to tailor their
communication with their customers.
As noted above, it is not possible to predict precise price
changes to other letter services in the absence of ACCC scrutiny but it is
likely that they would increase. A 5 per cent increase to prices for PreSort
Letters, Acquisition Mail and Charity Mail would be likely to increase cost to
a business sending 20 000 small PreSort letters somewhere in the order of
$420 to $500 (GST-inclusive). The equivalent increases for a 2 per cent
price rise would be $170 to $200.
Postage rates for ordinary letters would remain subject to
ACCC scrutiny and would effectively operate as ceilings for most other letter
services. Price differentials between ordinary letters and services such as
PreSort Letters, Acquisition Mail and Charity Mail in part reflect the
additional costs incurred by senders in preparing and lodging their letters in
such a way that reduces costs to Australia Post. If Australia Post reduces
these price differentials such that senders no longer consider they adequately
compensate for their preparation costs they could chose to use ordinary letter
services instead, thus shifting costs back to Australia Post. Similarly, for
those services where current prices are higher than ordinary postage rates
Australia Post would be constrained by what customers are willing to pay for
these value-added services. Customers could choose to use ordinary letter
services where it is more cost-effective for them to do so. Therefore, while
demand for postal services may be relatively price-inelastic, there will still
be constraints on how much Australia Post can increase postage rates.
Increases to other letter services postage rates would have
an adverse impact on businesses and not-for-profit organisations to the extent
that such mail is an input cost. Some businesses and organisations produce
significant volumes of transactional mail, and/or use promotional mail to
generate new business and revenue. To the extent that price increases result in
reduced mail volumes over and above decreases already occurring as a result of
e-substitution, secondary businesses such as printers, stationery providers and
mailhouses may face adverse impacts.
Impact on ordinary consumers
Consumers are likely to benefit from an increased range of
letter-service options by which businesses and not-for-profit organisations are
able to communicate with them.
It is likely, though unknown, whether any increase in
postage rates would result in senders of mail increasing their prices to
consumers of their products and services. Postage costs are likely to be just
one of many costs that feed into the determination of their prices. Postage is
not the only cost associated with sending letters, as there are also costs such
as stationery and printing.
Impact on the ACCC
Removal of prices surveillance may allow the ACCC to
redirect its limited resources more efficiently to other priorities. However,
the ACCC has advised that it expects realisable resource savings associated
with proposed changes to be negligible.
The ACCC will, however, retain two other legislated roles in
relation to Australia Post. Section 32B of the APC Act and Part 3 of
the Australian Postal Corporation Regulations 1996 (APC Regulations) provide
for the ACCC to inquire into certain disputes about bulk mail services. These
provisions relate to the terms and conditions of rate reductions (including the
amount of rate reductions) for the delivery of bulk quantities of letters by
Australia Post in return for the customer performing functions in relation to
the letters that could otherwise be performed by Australia Post. The object of
the provisions is to ensure that customers who use bulk mail services receive
fair and reasonable rate reductions. While there have not yet been any disputes
notified to the ACCC under these provisions, they would act as a deterrent to
Australia Post increasing prices significantly.
Part 4A of the APC Act provides for the ACCC to require
Australia Post to keep records and to provide these records to the ACCC. One of the
purposes of these powers is to address concerns raised by some of Australia
Post’s competitors that it is unfairly competing by using revenue from its
reserved letter services to cross-subsidise the services it provides in
competition with other businesses. Each year the ACCC issues a report of its
analysis of Australia Post’s regulatory accounts for the previous year and identifies
whether there are any potential cross-subsidies both between and within its
reserved (monopoly) and non-reserved (competitive) services. In the case of
removal of prices surveillance from other letter services, these cross-subsidy
reports would assist in identifying if Australia Post was abusing its price
setting powers to achieve monopoly profits.
Impact on the Commonwealth
To the extent that Australia Post becomes more profitable,
the risk of the Commonwealth’s overall Budget position being adversely affected
will be ameliorated, as Australia Post may be able to make higher dividend
payments. Additionally, the government’s postal policy objectives in terms of CSOs
will be supported by a more sustainable and viable letters business. However,
at the same time, to the extent that government agencies as senders of mail are
subject to price increases greater than indexation of their funding, there
could be some impact on program budgets.
Summary of costs and benefits
Removal of ACCC prices surveillance from other letter
services would benefit Australia Post by providing greater flexibility in its
ability to respond to the market, and greater certainty in its financial
planning. To the extent that Australia Post is able to counter the current
decline in letter volumes by offering new letter products, it may improve the
sustainability of its letters business. To the extent that it increases prices
for other letter services, Australia Post may improve the sustainability of its
letters business. Australia Post’s customers may benefit from an increased
range of letter services with which to communicate with their customers. Any
prices increases would adversely impact mail users such as businesses,
charities and government agencies. However, price increases occur under
existing arrangements in any event. Additionally, the ACCC would maintain a
role in helping to ensure that Australia Post could not abuse its monopoly
position, through continuing to scrutinise ordinary letter prices and its other
legislated roles.
2.
Retention of current arrangements
Retaining the status quo may mean ongoing, and possibly
increasing, financial losses from the reserved letter services if letter
volumes continue to decline. This would not meet the objective of a financially
self-sustaining letter business.
In the past, falling revenue has been countered, at least
partially, by cost efficiencies and/ or postage price rises. Australia Post has
also diversified into other related activities to build business sustainability.
Ducasse et al (2008) note the difficulties postal operators face in balancing
competing priorities as part of their efforts to find sustainable business
models.
While increasing the range of products aimed at different customer segments may
increase revenues, it also runs counter to the objective of reducing costs as
postal operators need to support the increased range of products.
Cost reductions
Costs of providing a postal universal service obligation
arise from two main sources—the need to provide a service to everyone no matter
where they live, at an affordable price, and the need to operate and maintain a
network of post outlets that are accessible to everyone.
Labour costs make up over 60 per cent of costs for Australia
Post’s reserved letter services delivery,
and it is in the process of making staffing reductions in response to declining
letter volumes. While labour costs suggest an obvious place for cost
reductions, the ability to make reductions in staffing is not necessarily
directly linked to declines in letter volumes, as Australia Post is required to
deliver to all delivery points regardless of whether there is one letter or one
hundred letters for a particular delivery point. These staffing reductions will
be offset, at least in part, by growth in other areas, particularly parcels and
warehousing and logistics.
These adjustments are being made through Australia Post’s Value Optimisation
Program (VOP), which commenced in October 2009. The VOP consists of three
elements—a new organisational design, a new operating model and establishment
of a performance-based culture.
Staff will also be affected by Australia Post’s business renewal program
(Future Ready).
Australia Post has also
implemented cost efficiencies by changes to its operating procedures. The ACCC
note that Australia Post’s Future Delivery Design Program includes three key
elements:
·
using enhanced optical character recognition (address
recognition) software to provide additional labour savings
·
extending automated small letter sequencing to enable the sorting
of machine-addressed mail to the street delivery sequence, and
·
reconfiguring the mail delivery network to obtain benefits from
automation such as through optimising delivery rounds.
Despite these measures, the ACCC considers that Australia
Post is still falling behind world’s best practice in the deployment of
automated sorting and sequencing technology.
However, further capital investments in automated processing may be difficult
to justify in the context of declining letter volumes. Without government
intervention to stem losses from the reserved service, further productivity
improvements and greater cost efficiencies will be necessary.
Summary of costs and benefits
Retention of current arrangements would provide benefits to
mail users to the extent that they would be able to raise concerns about
proposed price increases for other letter services as part of the ACCC prices
surveillance process. However, it would not necessarily stop any proposed price
increases. Additionally, it would continue to limit Australia Post’s
flexibility to respond to market opportunities, and limit certainty in its
financial planning. Retaining the status quo may mean continued losses from the
reserved letter services—compromising not only Australia Post’s ability to
deliver its universal letter service CSOs, but also a return to government
through payment of dividends.
Consultation section
The Department of Broadband, Communications and the Digital
Economy prepared a discussion paper on possible changes to prices surveillance
arrangements and placed it on its website on 8 June 2011. This was
linked to the ‘What’s new’ section of the department’s homepage. The department
wrote to the following organisations that have consistently provided
submissions to the ACCC on previous Australia Post price notifications on the
same day seeking their comments:
·
Major Mail Users Australia Limited (MMUA)
·
Post Office Agents Association Limited (POAAL)
·
Australian Direct Marketing Association (ADMA)
·
Printing Industries Association of Australia (PIAA).
Additionally, the department wrote to Australia Post and the
ACCC seeking comments.
The due date for submissions was 7 July 2011, and
the department received five submissions. Submissions are available on the
department’s website,
and can be summarised as follows.
MMUA
MMUA represents customers who collectively lodge over 80 per
cent of bulk PreSort mail and is strongly opposed to the proposal to ‘give
Australia Post a free hand in setting prices within its monopoly services’.
MMUA considers that it is a question of principle as to
whether or not an organisation given a statutory monopoly should be able to set
its own price levels. Or, indeed, whether such a monopoly should be allowed to
continue without some form of examination of the continued relevance of the
conditions that gave rise to the monopoly, and how the organisation has handled
the monopoly powers.
MMUA notes that current price discounts for bulk mail are
tied inextricably to prior work by mail generators (for example, presorting and
barcoding) in preparing the mail prior to its lodgement. MMUA notes that, in
accordance with the Australia Post–MMUA code of practice, these productivity
gains should be shared amongst all stakeholders.
MMUA considers that there is no need to change current
prices surveillance arrangements, as it would reduce the already limited
opportunities for consumers to have a say in these arrangements. MMUA notes
that the proposal would remove all opportunities for its members to challenge
bulk mail price increases before an independent umpire, including whether there
has been adequate consultation or whether discounts adequately reflect the work
done by mail generators. MMUA suggests that the current proposal appears to be
predicated on making life easier for Australia Post and the ACCC by removing
customers from the equation.
MMUA notes that for high-volume users of Australia Post
letter services there is no marketplace competition available, and that
therefore prices surveillance should be retained, as there are insufficient
competitive pressures to achieve efficient prices and protect consumers.
However, the MMUA also notes that businesses are replacing ‘postage budgets’ with
‘communications budgets’, and that its members advise that every increase in
price of postage simply means a shrinkage in usage of paper-mail and the search
for ways and means of using e-alternatives to communicate. MMUA suggests that
Australia Post has been unwilling to consider suggestions by it to improve the
efficiency of bulk mail processes.
MMUA suggest that before bulk mail is removed from ACCC
scrutiny there needs to be a reconsideration of and public inquiry into
Australia Post’s CSO. MMUA notes that Australia Post has extended its business
reach into a myriad of other products on the basis of its CSO and monopoly. It
suggests that areas that should be considered in any review could include
separating reserved services from other areas of Australia Post’s activity,
changing the parameters of the CSOs and funding them from the federal Budget,
removing business and advertising mail from Australia Post’s monopoly and
appointing an industry regulator to examine proposals to make the reserved
services more effective.
POAAL
POAAL is the membership association for the owners and
operators of licensed post offices and for mail and parcel contractors who
deliver on behalf of Australia Post. POAAL supports the focusing of ACCC prices
surveillance on ordinary letter services and considers that Australia Post
should be able to set prices for discount letter services without reference to
the ACCC.
POAAL notes that its members are witnessing a fundamental
shift in the community’s use of hard-copy mail, and considers that if Australia
Post is to remain viable it needs to respond promptly to opportunities that the
market presents. POAAL also notes that it has limited resources to review and
respond to issues that can arise in ACCC price notification processes.
POAAL notes that there may be community concern that the
proposed changes will reduce the ability to detect any cross-subsidies from
Australia Post’s ordinary letter service. However, POAAL considers that the
ACCC’s existing cross-subsidy reporting role provides adequate protection to
the community and organisations competing with various aspects of the Australia
Post business.
ADMA
ADMA represents over 500 businesses that operate in the
marketing industry, and is extremely concerned by the proposal to limit the
ACCC’s prices surveillance role to ordinary letter prices.
ADMA notes that for some businesses, which cannot readily
move to the digital economy and e-substitution, demand for letter services is
more inelastic. In this context, ADMA considers that ACCC’s independent
oversight provides protection against Australia Post using its monopoly
position to extract monopoly revenue. However, ADMA does acknowledge that
continued ACCC scrutiny of ordinary letter prices will provide some safeguards.
ADMA is also concerned about potential conflicts of interest
between Australia Post’s other business strategies (such as parcels and
e-services) and PreSort letter services. ADMA is concerned that Australia Post
will use increases in prices for PreSort letters to help it pursue its other
business objectives. However, as noted in the discussion above, the ACCC will
continue to have a role in monitoring for cross-subsidies between Australia
Post products.
PIAA
PIAA represents some 1800 companies in the print, packaging
and visual communication industries. PIAA members are directly involved in the provision
of bulk mail services and in the production of printed material that is sent by
bulk mail. PIAA believes that ACCC prices surveillance of other letter services
should be retained.
PIAA does not believe that, despite the declines in mail
volumes and Australia Post’s financial losses on reserved letter services,
there is sufficient evidence to justify any changes to existing arrangements.
PIAA considers that there is further scope for Australia Post to achieve
efficiencies. It notes that, in the context of the recent price notification,
the ACCC’s estimate of Australia Post’s under-recovery of efficient costs for
reserved services is considerably lower than that of Australia Post.
PIAA considers that it would be unfair of Australia Post to
move prices of other letter services to equivalent ordinary letter rates, as
this would not acknowledge the fact that current discounts are generally the
result of efficiencies that users have generated. PIAA is concerned that the
removal of ACCC surveillance would allow Australia Post to increase prices
without factoring in the value of these efficiencies.
PIAA considers that if timeliness of actual ACCC price
notification processes is of concern then this should be addressed in its own
right rather than removing third-party oversight of a monopoly provider.
PIAA notes that Australia Post currently consults with key
stakeholders in the development of price notifications. However, PIAA is uncertain
whether Australia Post will continue with the same level of consultation if the
obligation to refer price increases to the ACCC is removed.
PIAA suggests that it may be timely to consider whether
Australia Post’s monopoly on other letter services should continue, and
proposes that any removal of ACCC scrutiny of reserved services should be
accompanied by an opening of the market for the carriage of such services.
Australia Post
Australia Post supports the proposal. Australia Post notes
that the proposal would provide it with the flexibility to respond more rapidly
to market conditions and technology changes.
Australia Post notes that it has only sought moderate price
increases in other letter services, and that overall reserved letter revenue
does not cover efficient costs plus an appropriate rate of return on capital.
In developing letter prices, it will continue to consider the relativities
between price points and look to encourage and provide incentives to encourage
the use of efficient other letter services (such as machine efficient letter
formats) by reflecting specific cost savings associated with those services
relative to the equivalent ordinary letter services.
Australia Post states that it will continue to undertake
appropriate consultation with relevant stakeholders to facilitate mutual
understanding with its customers, and to understand whether particular market
segments would be disadvantaged by any proposed changes.
Discussion of issues raised
Australia Post freedom to set prices for monopoly services
MMUA, PIAA and ADMA raised concerns about Australia Post
being able to set prices for statutory monopoly services. However, as noted
above, there is now considerable and increasing competition to letters from
digital communications, such as email and social networking websites. While
Australia Post’s letters monopoly may be absolute, there is considerable
competition in the wider communications marketplace. Additionally, prices
surveillance would remain for ordinary letter prices. In setting discounts for
other letter services, Australia Post would need to reflect the costs to
customers of preparing and lodging mail for processing, or else customers could
simply migrate to ordinary letter services. Australia Post’s Letter Pricing
Principles
recognise that, as well as providing a cross-subsidy towards meeting the CSO of
providing a universal letter service, prices for other letter services should
broadly reflect the level of work saved through work carried out by customers.
The ACCC’s continued legislated roles in relation to bulk mail disputes and
monitoring for cross-subsidies will also mitigate abuse by Australia Post of
its monopoly position.
MMUA and PIAA have also raised concerns that Australia Post
will no longer consult about changes to prices and terms and conditions of
other letter services if ACCC scrutiny is removed. In its submission, Australia
Post has stated that it will continue to undertake appropriate consultation
with relevant stakeholders to facilitate mutual understanding with its
customers, and to understand whether particular market segments would be
disadvantaged by any proposed changes. Australia Post recognises that
stakeholder engagement is an important corporate responsibility, and has
created a stakeholder council so that it can consult with customers, suppliers
and community groups on issues relating to postal products and services.
Scope for efficiency and productivity improvements
PIAA and MMUA have both suggested that there is scope for
further efficiency and productivity improvements in Australia Post processes,
rather than removal of prices surveillance. However, a 2009 international
benchmarking study by Economic Insights commissioned by Australia Post found
that Australia Post had shown the most consistent improvement in total factor
productivity of seven postal services in advanced economies over the seven
years from 2002 to 2009. Additionally, when results were adjusted for mail and
customer density, Australia Post’s total factor productivity was ranked first. In its
submission, Australia Post has stated that it is committed to continuing to
achieve efficiency gains in service provision in order to be able to earn an
economic return on supplying the reserved services.
Cross-subsidies
A number of submissions have raised concerns about the
possibility of cross-subsidies between Australia Post’s reserved and
non-reserved services under the proposed changes to prices surveillance
arrangements. However, the ACCC would continue to have a role in monitoring for
cross-subsidies.
Efficiency of ACCC review processes
MMUA and PIAA have argued that if the time taken by the ACCC
to process price notifications is of concern, then ACCC processes should change,
rather than removing prices surveillance. However, the ACCC has finite
resources, and Australia Post price notifications are only one of a wide range
of competition and consumer issues that it must consider. ACCC processes are a
matter for the ACCC itself, but will by necessity be time-consuming, given the
complexity of issues associated with a price notification and the need for
consultation with stakeholders.
Broader review and changes to Australia Post’s community service
obligations and monopoly
MMUA and PIAA have suggested that the scope of options under
consideration should be broadened. However, the Prime Minister has agreed that
the current process be limited to the two options under consideration.
Conclusion
Given that:
·
letters are now part of an increasingly more competitive overall
communications market
·
Australia Post’s ability to fund its legislated CSO from within
its reserved services monopoly is becoming increasingly more difficult in the
context of declining letter volumes
·
the increased flexibility to respond to market opportunities would
assist Australia Post’s revenue streams
·
ordinary letter prices would remain subject to ACCC scrutiny
under the proposal, and would act as ceilings for prices for other letter
services—that is, prices for other letter services would need to reflect an
adequate discount for work undertaken by customers prior to lodgement, and
·
the ACCC would continue to have legislated roles in relation to
disputes about terms and conditions of bulk mail services and monitoring for
cross-subsidies between and within Australia Post’s reserved and non-reserved
businesses
the preferred option of the two identified above is to
remove ACCC prices surveillance of other letter services.
The benefits of this option to business in terms of a
potential increase in available letter products, and the benefits to Australia
Post and the government in terms of helping to ensure the viable delivery of
the universal letter service CSOs and a financial return on resources, outweigh
any potential costs to users of other letter services from possible price
increases.
While this option will help Australia Post to address the
problems it is facing, it should not be inferred that it has the greatest net
benefit overall, as the regulation impact assessment process was limited to two
options.
Implementation and review
Removal of ACCC prices surveillance oversight of other
letter services will be implemented by revocation and replacement of the
existing declaration under section 95X of the CCA by the Treasurer. It is
envisaged that the new declaration will be made before the end of September 2011.
The Department of Broadband,
Communications and the Digital Economy will monitor terms and conditions and
prices for other letter services (relative to ordinary letter services), with a
view to informing any decision on whether to continue or amend these
arrangements prior to the expiry of the new declaration in September 2016.
Appendix A
Description of domestic reserved letter services
|
Ordinary letter services
|
|
|
|
Description
|
Current price
|
|
|
Small letter
ordinary
|
$0.60
|
|
|
Large letter
ordinary
|
|
|
|
—up to
125g
|
$1.20
|
|
|
—over
125g up to 250g
|
$1.80
|
|
|
|
|
|
Other letter services
|
|
|
|
Description
|
Current price
|
Equivalent ordinary
letter price
|
|
Small letters
|
|
|
|
—small letter
metered/imprint
|
$0.58
|
$0.60
|
|
—small letter
seasonal greeting card
|
$0.55
|
$0.60
|
|
|
|
|
Large letters
|
|
|
|
—large letter
metered/imprint up to 125g
|
$1.16
|
$1.20
|
|
—large letter
metered/imprint over 125g up to 250g
|
$1.74
|
$1.80
|
|
—large letter
seasonal greeting card
|
$1.10
|
$1.20
|
|
|
|
|
Clean Mail
|
|
|
|
—small letter
|
$0.535
|
$0.60
|
|
—small plus
letter
|
$0.84
|
$1.20
|
|
|
|
|
Reply Paid
|
|
|
|
—small
letter barcoded
|
$0.43
|
$0.60
|
|
—small
letter unbarcoded
|
$0.65
|
$0.60
|
|
—large
letter
|
$1.30–$1.90
|
$1.20–$1.80
|
|
—reply paid
annual fee
|
$80.00
|
|
|
|
|
|
Local letter service
|
|
|
|
—small letter
|
$0.56
|
$0.60
|
|
—medium letter
|
$0.80–$1.10
|
$1.20–$1.80
|
|
—large letter
|
$1.00–$1.45
|
$1.20–$1.80
|
|
|
|
|
PreSort letter services
|
|
|
|
(prices
vary by weight and sort level)
|
|
|
Regular
and Off Peak
|
|
|
|
(Includes
Charity Mail and Acquisition Mail)
|
|
|
|
—small letter
|
$0.31–$0.535
|
$0.60
|
|
—small plus
letter
|
$0.43–$0.84
|
$1.20
|
|
—medium letter
|
$0.68–$1.29
|
$1.20–$1.80
|
|
—large letter
|
$0.81–$1.51
|
$1.20–$1.80
|
|
|
|
|
Impact Mail
|
|
|
|
—small letter
|
$0.64–$0.75
|
$0.60
|
|
—small plus
letter
|
$0.90–$1.06
|
$1.20
|
|
|
|
|
Prepaid envelopes
|
|
|
|
Small letter
size
|
|
|
|
—DL plain
|
$0.70
|
$0.60
|
|
—DL window-face
pack of 50
|
$34.70
|
$30.00
|
|
—C6 plain
|
$0.70
|
$0.60
|
|
—C6 window-face
pack of 50
|
$34.70
|
$30.00
|
|
—postcard
|
$1.60
|
$0.60
|
|
Large letter
size
|
|
|
|
—C5 plain
|
$1.40
|
$1.20–$1.80
|
|
For further details on some of the
above categories of letters, refer to http://auspost.com.au/media/documents/bulk-mail-guide.pdf
|